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ABSTRACT 
This study analyses politics in Pakistan viewed 
from the perspective of Bhutto and The Pakistan People's 
Party in the period 1967-1977. This involves a detailed 
consideration of the nature and performance of the PPP, in 
terms of its social composition, organisational development 
and its role in the political system, and of leadership 
patterns in Pakistan with special reference to Bhutto. In 
the process of this inquiry we examine the origin and rise 
of the PPP, its electoral performance in 1970 and the re- 
percussions of the 1971 crisis on the party. In analysing 
the Bhutto regime in the period 1971-1977, we look at both 
the internal dynamics of the PPP in terms of its develop- 
ment as a patrimonial-clientele type party exhibiting some 
'mass party' features, and Bhutto's relations with the 
political opposition, the civil bureaucracy and the 
military. 
This study attempts to apply the patrimonial model 
to Bhutto's political system. As a heuristic tool, this 
concept enables us to explain and relate a wide range of 
phenomena such as personalism, factionalism, patronage and 
corruption. The phenomena of a dominating figure as re- 
flected in Bhutto's patrimonialism is viewed against the 
background of the country's colonial Viceregal tradition 
and related to its culture and social structure. Bhutto's 
patrimonial system is viewed as an adaptation of the Vice- 
regal model. Patrimonial features such as the personalis- 
ation and concentration of power, the manipulation of 
clientele support from rural landed groups, and the primary 
reliance on bureaucratic, rather than participatory and 
representative instruments of rule are essentially those 
identified with the Viceregal pattern of governance. It is 
argued that Bhutto's patrimonial strategy not only resulted 
in a failure to develop the PPP into an institutionalised 
party of the type associated with 'modern' political systems, 
but served to inhibit political development and reinforce 
Pakistan's praetorian tradition. 
The materials used in this thesis include official 
publications, political party literature, Urdu and English 
language newspapers and magazines as well as information 
derived through personal interviews with prominent person- 
alities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has a two-fold purpose: (1) To contri- 
bute to the subdiscipline of what has been termed Stasi= 
ology by focusing on and analysing the performance of a 
political party - the PPP - in a particular country and 
(2) to explore a number of themes in nation-building and 
political 'modernisatidn' as illustrated from Pakistan's 
experience in the period considered - 1967-1977. In the 
case of the former, our aim is to enhance the empirical 
knowledge of Third World parties by a detailed consider- 
ation of the nature of the PPP in terms of its social com- 
position, organisational development, leadership style, 
and structure, its relationship with the society at large, 
and its role in the political system. The personalism, 
factionalism and patronage practices that are identified 
as the dominant characteristics of the PPP lead to our 
depiction of the party as a patrimonial clientele type, but 
a party which nonetheless exhibits features of the 'mass 
party' type. Out concern is to examine the PPP as a patri- 
monial style party and the problems inherent in the combin- 
ation of 'mass and 'clientele'characteristics. 
The latter purpose involves an appraisal of leader- 
ship patterns in Pakistan with special reference to Bhutto. 
We also look at problems of political institutionalisation 
as illustrated from the case of the PPP and the nature of a 
patrimonial-clientele system as reflected in Bhutto's 
strategy of political consolidation. 
dý 
The focus of the study is 'national' and repre- 
sents a 'case study' approach, but the range of questions 
asked, such as the tension between a patrimonial type 
party and 'mass' party, the obstacles in the development 
of the PPP into a discrete, autonomous organisation, are 
typically those raised with respect to parties elsewhere 
in the Third World. At the same time the thesis incor- 
porates suggestions from broad cross-national analyses. It 
utilises certain middle-range generalisations that have been 
derived from comparative studies, which act as a guide to 
this study. 
In many countries of the Third World, the political 
party-has become a prominent feature of political life. 
This has led many western scholars to direct considerable 
attention to studying and analysing this political phenom- 
enon. Much of this concern arises from the widespread 
assumption that parties are vital mechanisms by which the 
'new nations' can deal with the societal transformations 
implicit in the 'modernisation' process. Through the writ- 
ings of many scholars of the development process runs the 
persistent theme: without denying the efficacy of other 
institutions, political parties are the most important agency 
in helping to cope with the problems that result from 
'modernisation'. 
1 
"In the modernising world he controls 
the future who organises its politics", Huntington writes. 
2 
In a similar vein, David Apter notes that "in the area of 
political modernisation, no single role is of greater 
3 
importance than that of party politician., 
3 
The study of political parties in the Third World 
however, has been problematic. 
4 
The tradition of classi- 
cal European party theory handed down by scholars such as 
Sigmund Neuman, Maurice Duverger, Giovanni Sartori and 
Otto Kirchheimer, while providing a valuable source of in- 
sights, could not be applied satisfactorily to the great 
variety of parties in political systems markedly different 
from the European environment. Thus those studying parties 
in'the Third World invented new typologies and categories 
to analyse the non-western parties. This is not the place 
for a detailed review ofthe, large literature on political 
parties in the developing states. However, some of these 
typologies deserve to be mentioned both because they have 
provided some of our terms of reference and to indicate 
some of the problems inherent in such typologies. 
Many of the typologies emerged from studies of 
African political parties5 but can be applied elsewhere in 
the Third World. The starting point of most of these 
studies was an acceptance of the position taken by Thomas 
Hodgkin in his influential study of African political par- 
ties that it was neither necessary nor useful to define the 
term 'party' and that we should'bonsider as parties all 
political organisations which regard themselves as parties 
and which are generally so regarded., 
6 
Different writers 
put forward a wide variety of typological constructs. One 
such: approach was to distinguish between 'mass' and 'patron' 
parties, (an adapted version of Maurice Duverger's distinct- 
ion between 'mass' and 'cadre' parties), in which the way 
4 
elites related to non-elites and the ideology of elites 
were treated as the crucial variables.? 'Mass' parties 
reached out to all the citizens in the community to rep- 
resent, rule and lead them, and relative to 'patron' 
parties had an articulated organisation and institutional- 
ised leadership. Patron parties usually rested on limited 
elitist support and their goals were likewise limited. 
Other typological constructs emphasised the social 
bases of parties and their goals as distinguishing criteria. 
Thus 'mass' parties were contrasted with ethnic, tribal 
and regional or 'clientele' parties. 
8 The typologies con- 
structed for the African one-party states increasingly 
focused on the notion of "dynamism", and there was a dis- 
tinct trend toward categorisations of parties in terms of 
their mobilisation and integrative functions. 
9 
'Revolut- 
ionary'- centralising parties, '10 'revolutionary mass move- 
ment regimes', 
11 
'mobilising' parties12 were contrasted with 
13 
'pragmatic-pluralistic, or 'consociational types'. 
14 
With- 
in the mass parties, a distinction was also frequently made 
between 'mobilist' and 'adaptive' parties. 
15 
The former was 
typically concerned with effecting attitudinal and behaviour- 
al changes within society while the primary concern of the 
latter was its adaptation to the sentiments of the public 
in its quest for electoral support. 
The tendency in the literature and research that 
utilised such typologies was to attribute characteristics 
to the parties studied that were often based on the images 
that such parties wished the world to see rather than on 
ls 
empirical reality. It soon became apparent that the images 
5 
conveyed by such typologies were based on a description of 
those aspects of Third World parties which were most access- 
ible to outside observers. As one scholar wrote, address- 
ing the same point: 
"Too often the politics of new states 
have been described as if intentions were 
facts, as if the word had become flesh; 
the characterisations of political sys- 
tems in Africa are based on images con- 
veyed to the world by party leaders. " 17 
When. in a growing number of Afro-Asian countries supposedly 
'strong' 'mass' parties were overthrown by the military with 
relative ease and little reaction from the party membership 
or general populace, it became apparent that early studies 
had frequently mistaken the rhetoric of the political 
elites for reality and posited characteristics, such as 
mass support and organisational coherence, that simply were 
not there. 
The fluid nature of Third World polities not only 
required a set of typological constructs that were rooted 
in empirical reality but which could also explain a wide range 
of phenomena, such as personalism, factionalism, and. corrupt- 
ion, previously considered deviant or pathological and 
hence excluded from-any analyses, but which appeared to be 
pervasive in the developing nations. Many scholars claimed 
to have found categories that could be adapted for use in 
the Third World context in the initial and earlier stages 
of the western evolution of parties. According to this 
approach most parties of the Third World could be perceived 
and rendered in terms of the familiar 'clientele' or 
'political machine' models derived from the pre-mass stage 
of party development. 
18 
This has led to the depiction of 
6 
the political parties in developing countries as organ- 
isations resembling the political machines - the patron- 
age party - so widely discussed in the literature on 
American political parties. This approach may still 
appear a variety of western-centricity, but endeavours 
based on such an approach are not liable to be more 
western inspired than the Third World polity builders them- 
selves. After all, party symbols, techniques and arrange- 
ments are largely - for the new states - adaptations of 
imports. 
The approach in this study combines some of the 
terms of reference provided by the earlier typological con- 
structs with those derived from the 'machine' model. To 
these are added distinctive features of Pakistani society 
to produce a comprehensive analysis of the PPP in the 
period under review. This involves, inter alia, three 
general questions. The first of these concerns the ten- 
sion between a mass-based party and a patrimonially-led 
clientele one as illustrated from the case of the PPP. The 
second concern is with identifying the dilemma of reconcil- 
ing strong, personalised leadership with developing organ- 
isational strength and viability. And third, we are con- 
cerned with the problem of institutionalisation, i. e. in 
examining the factors which hindered the institutionalisation 
of the PPP as a political party of the kind associated with 
'modern' political systems. The discussion of such questions 
should not only reveal the specific nature of the PPP but 
also help to illuminate aspects of the general dilemma of 
party-building in a Third World country. 
7 
However, before the role of the PPP in the 
political development of Pakistan can be analysed, it is 
appropriate to outline the conceptual and methodological 
assumption underlying this study. Since there are several 
definitions of political development, an assessment of the 
party's role in political development and how the one re- 
lates to the other, depends in part on one's conceptual- 
isation of the phenomenon. It would be inappropriate here 
to review either the extensive original or secondary liter- 
ature concerning political development. It is sufficient 
to note that no consensus emerges from this literature on 
the precise definition - and measurement - of political 
development. A number of quite individualistic central 
concepts have been put forward as characterising the 
essence of political development. Some of these are: 
the restructuring of society, the acquisition of new poli- 
tical capabilities, increasing differentiation and special- 
isation of political functions, greater participation of 
citizenry in the political system, ontological change, 
improvements in organisational technology, social mobil- 
isation and a communications revolution. *However, closer 
inspection shows that these concepts are interrelated, and 
that there is considerable conceptual equivalence among 
the various formulations (of political development), part- 
ly hidden though it is by terminological variety. Thus 
these and other views about the attributes of political 
development have contributed to what is an increasingly 
accepted understanding of the general concept. 
8 
We examine now how the terms 'political develop- 
ment' and 'political modernisation' are generally used by 
political scientists. Although some scholars have used 
the two terms interchangingly, it is usually recognised 
that modernisation refers to a much broader process of 
change than political development as we shall see below. 
'Modernisation' in general refers to a complex process of 
change producing significant social, economic, political and 
psychological transformations. The cluster of interrelated 
transformations labelled 'modernisation' includes changing 
forms of economic and social activity as production for the 
market and wage labour made inroads into subsistence agri- 
culture and non-monetary exchange of goods and services, 
growing urbanisation, broadening application of technology, 
and'increasing ; specialisation and division of labour. In 
the modernisation process, old social relationships, 
customary patterns of social and economic activity, and 
former attitudes and values are being gradually eroded and 
replaced or joined by new and different social and psycho- 
logical patterns. Accompanying these changes have come 
wider exposure to mass communications media, new and broad- 
er identifications and loyalties, and an expansion of 
political awareness and participation. Modernisation is 
seen as the effect of the new on the old, not the eradication 
of the old and its substitution by the new. It is generally 
agreed that modernisation should not be confused with 
'progress', nor should it involve teleological assumptions. 
That roughly similar patterns of change are occurring 
throughout the world is not to say that any nation is 
9 
presently at the end point of modernisation or indeed 
that there is a final end point at which modernisation will 
be complete. Such transformations are not inexorably 
bound to terminate in presently definable societies, eco- 
nomies and political systems. 
These transformations in the political sphere have 
commonly been expressed as a syndrome of related charac- 
teristics of political modernisation. The syndrome as 
suggested by Lucien Pye19 and others, varies somewhat, but 
may be said to include (1) a general attitude towards 
equality which allows equality of opportunity to partici- 
pate in politics and compete for government office; (2) the 
capacity of people in a political system to formulate 
policies and to have them carried out; and (3) different- 
iation and specialisation of political functions. 
These changes are often seen to give rise to what 
are generally called "developmental problems". These prob- 
lems or crises to be met within the course of modernisation 
are listed differently by different writers. They include 
problems of legitimacy (expressed as a problem of state- 
building), identity (expressed as a problem of nation- 
building), distribution (how political and other bene- 
fits are to be shared), penetration (effective administration) 
and integration (of specialised governmental functions). 
20 
Given the existence of these developmental problems arising 
from political modernisation, political development is then 
often seen as a political system's capacity to solve these 
problems. 
21 Leaving aside the point of why some problems 
(or crises) are selected and not others, this formulation of 
10 
political development does not provide a uniform approach 
as writers are often at variance in stating what is part 
of the modernisation syndrome, and what constitutes a 
problem arising from the syndrome. Political development 
as a capability to solve problems arising from modernis- 
ation is suggested more simply but rather differently by 
Alfred Diament. He views political development as a pro- 
cess which creates an institutional framework for solving 
an ever-widening range of social problems. 
22 While this 
formulation avoids specifying the goal or purpose of poli- 
tical development, it too is fraught with difficulties. 
By suggesting that the problems to be solved may extend 
beyond the bounds of the developmental set of problems, 
the definition ends up in a potential minefield. 
If the discussion of political change is fraught 
with serious ambiguities and theoretical difficulties, 
nevertheless, the different perspectives of writers in the 
field have provided us with the material to assemble a con- 
ception of political development. For the purposes of this 
study we have sought to incorporate in our analysis some 
Of the key dimensions of political change and modernisation 
which students of the new state tend to refer to when 
speaking of political development. The key elements of 
political development involve, first, with respect to the 
population as a whole, a change from widespread subject 
status to an increasing number of contributing citizens, 
with an accompanying spread of mass participation, a great- 
er sensitivity to the principles of equality, and a wider 
acceptance of universalistic laws. Second, with respect to 
ýNrF 
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governmental and general systemic , performances, politi- 
cal development involves an increase in the capacity of 
the political system to manage public affairs, control 
controversy and cope with popular demands. Finally, with 
respect to the organisation of the polity, political develop- 
ment implies greater institutionalisation of political 
organisations and procedures and greater integration of all 
the participating institutions and organisations. 
However, since this conceptualisation contains 
elements of western ethnocentricity and tends to imply a 
vision of the end-product of modernisation or political 
development in terms of these interrelated elements, it 
needs to be qualified by a number of additional assumptions, 
central to this study. First, we assume that societies 
may develop in ways not necessarily envisaged by the 
western model of modernisation. Second, we recognise the 
importance of various aspects of a society's historical 
continuity for shaping different contours of its development. 
Thirdly, we recognise that the mere destruction of tra- 
ditional forms of life does not necessarily assure the 
development of a new and viable modern society. Finally, 
as our use of the term 'patrimonialism' in depicting 
Bhutto's political system implies, modernising societies 
do not necessarily travel along an inevitable path 
towards one type of modernity, but tend to develop their 
own pattern or 'logic' which can perhaps be better explained 
and understood in terms of different aspects of the society's 
tradition. In a sense, then, the 'patrimonial model' as 
illustrated from the Pakistani case can be viewed as a 
12 
particular method of coping with political change, suggest- 
ing its own version of modernity. 
From the standpoint of political development, 
party roles and configuration can be viewed as the out- 
growth of the development process - the culmination as it 
were, of processes of societal, economic and political 
change - indeed it is customary to view the party as a 
dependent variable in this sense, influenced by interact- 
ing societal variables. But parties can also be viewed as 
institutionalised forces affecting political change, whether 
it be "progressive" or "retrogressive". Parties can, and 
often do, habe an impact on the development of the political 
system in which they operate. The assumption underlying 
our concern with the role played by parties in political 
development, reflects our understanding that they are not 
only the products of their environment but also instruments 
of organised human action for affecting that environment. 
Therefore, a meaningful research strategy must view the 
party as both dependent and independent variable in the modern- 
isation process. Just as the importance of social, econo- 
mic, cultural and communication factors in shaping and con- 
straining the process of a party's development cannot be 
denied, neither should the important influence which may 
be exerted in these sectors by the party be forgotten. It 
is true that several scholars have treated the party as a 
dependent variable, suggesting that it is the modernisation 
process itself that produces political organisations, and 
that political organisation is a consequence of increased 
occupational differentiation which in turn results from 
13 
economic growth and technological change. The difficulty 
with viewing political change in such a sequential fashion 
is that however logical it may appear to°be, in the history 
of political change no such sequence can be found. Indeed, 
political organisation often precedes-and may be an import- 
ant factor in whether or not there is a large scale 
economic change. 
Pakistan both shares a number of common charac- 
teristics with other 'new nations' often described as 
constituting the Third World, and exhibits a number of 
features that are distinctive to it. Like most other post- 
war 'new' nation-states, Pakistan is still grappling with 
the problem of forging a positive national identity. 
Pakistani society is highly fragmented, divided, sub- 
divided and cross-divided by horizontal cleavages based, 
on cultural, linguistic and ethnic diversity, and vertical 
cleavages based on class, and by 'social gaps' between the 
westernised, urban-based modern elite and the predominantly 
rural, illiterate masses. An overwhelmingly rural society 
with dense population, cruel poverty and growing tensions 
between expanding hopes, wants and needs, and painfully slow 
economic and social advancement, are characteristics 
broadly shared by most Third World countries. Pakistan 
exhibits social patterns associated with subsistence and 
village life - rigid stratification and tight bonds of 
family and kinship groups. Relatively rapid, frequently 
disturbing and disorienting change is an additional charac- 
teristic Pakistan shares with other new nations. Processes 
of social, economic, political and psychological change have 
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commenced which have already produced important alter- 
ations in the patterns of life and work of vast numbers 
of persons in the country and bode further, far reaching 
transformations creating what is often described as a 
'transitional' society. However, such change has affected' 
the country in what one scholar has called. a'dysrhythmic' 
fashion. 23 That is to say, it has affected parts of 
society at a differential rate. We can identify regional 
variations - with Baluchistan virtually unaffected, the 
North West Frontier marginally affected, Sind more relative- 
ly affected and Punjab perhaps the most significantly 
transformed. Moreover, even where the incidence of change 
. has been the greatest, old and new persist side by side 
and few social structures have been wholly transformed. 
For example, - in the Punjab, the feudal chieftan may have 
lost some of his political authority but he retains his 
position in the ritual and social heirarchies. Clearly 
then, certain sections of Pakistan society seem relatively 
impervious to the transformations and some traditional 
customs and attitudes have proved to be astonishingly 
persistent. Yet if one looks at the country as a whole, 
such transformations have given rise to a host of problems 
common to traditional societies responding to the demands 
of the modern world. Such problems have led to the con- 
cern in this study with the processes of change and 
adaptation. 
The distinctiveness of Pakistan lies in (1) the 
religious nature of the states raison d' 
tre; (2) the 
unique geographic aspects (in the pre-Bangladesh period) of 
15 
the union of East and West Pakistan; -(3) the tenuous 
integration of the four ethnic/regional groups into what 
now constitutes Pakistan and (4) the Viceregal tradition. 
The unique aspects of two parts of the country 
1' 
separated territorially was an incongruity that needs little 
explanation, and in the post-Bangladesh period has little 
relevance. But the subcultural differences in the Pakistani 
population based on four distinct ethnic/regional groups 
means that the integration of Pakistan is a largely form- 
alistic and tentative phenomena. Each of the four major 
ethnic groups (the Punjabis, _Pathans, 
Sindhis and Baluchis) 
has its own language, culture and social customs, and is 
based in a clearly defined regional area. A fifth ethnic 
group is composed of the Urdu-speaking Muhajirs (refugees 
from India) who are dispersed throughout the Punjab and 
Sind. However, their largest concentration is found in 
Karachi and the major urban centres of Sind. 
Another distinctive feature of Pakistan is its 
Islamic identity. Over 97% of Pakistanis are Muslim, but 
despite this regional homogenity of Pakistan's population, 
Islam has not always proved to be unifying force for 
a number of reasons. To begin with, Pakistani Muslims are 
divided into two major sects - Shia and Sunni - which them- 
selves are sub-divided into numerous groups and movements. 
The Sunnis compose the preponderant- majority and contain within 
their: fold numerous groups and movements, but these are 
not distinctive sects. The Shia community (which forms an 
estimated 20% of the population) is sub-divided into a 
number of sects, such as the Ismailis and the Bohras. The 
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Ahmeddiyas represent a separate, distinctive sect although 
originating within the Sunni fold. 
The Shia-Sunni schism has been of relatively 
minor political significance in Pakistan in the past. Of 
greater importance has been the problem of defining the role 
of Islam in the state. Except for the state of Israel no 
other modern nation has appealed to a religious faith as 
the basis for its establishment. The religious basis of 
Pakistani nationalism raised the problem of what sort of 
state wgs appropriate for Muslims and what policies should 
be pursued. The Pakistani state could not be aý; theocracy, 
for the campaign for Pakistan was led by political rather 
than religious leaders, and political power subsequently 
was exercised by the former rather than the mullahs. But 
it could not be a secular state either, for Islam was the 
raison d'etre of Pakistan, and Islam, unlike Christianity, 
did not recognise a separation between the religious and 
political sphere. 11, Moreover, Pakistani leaders from Jinnah 
onwards believed that while other Muslim countries like 
Turkey, Egypt, Indonesia and Tunisia could embark on a 
territorial and secular nationalism and forge a feeling of 
common identity on a unity of race, territory, history and 
culture, in Pakistan each of these factors tended to make 
for sub-national unity rather than a sense of Pakistan 
nationhood. Thus, in Pakistan, Islam provided the only 
stable basis of unity between its various provinces and 
sub-groups. At the same time since Pakistani leaders re- 
cognised that -. it .\ was.. 
their Islamic identity that set 
them apart from their neighbours, the new state should 
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reveal its Muslim heritage. How this was to be done, 
however, became a highly contentious political issue at 
the elite level. 
Conflict between the westernised, partially secu- 
larised elite and the traditional Ulema (the religious 
leaders) over the proper role of Islam . 
in the state has charac- 
terised Pakistani politics throughout. It needs to be 
mentioned that while several elites can be identified in 
Pakistan (with a certain amount of overlapping between them)- 
the Ulema, the civil-military bureaucratic elite, the 
leading industrial families, the traditional landed-gentry 
and the emerging urban middle-class professional elite - 
when we abstract generally these elites can neverthe- 
less be aggregated:. to enable us to differentiate broadly 
between the westernised, partially secularised elite and 
the religious elite. Even amongst the non-Ulema elite 
groups, the 'problem' of Islam has been a source of con-. 
siderable tension and controversy. This explains the fact 
that even amongst the non-religious leadership, no one has 
ever openly pressed for secularisation of the polity. 
Indeed, successive Pakistani rulers have recognised the 
need to pursue the goals of modernisation and progress in 
an Islamic setting. 
The fourth distinctive feature of the country is 
its Viceregal tradition. Before outlining this, it is 
important to note that the areas that comprised Pakistan 
(with the exception of East Bengal) inherited the tradi- 
tion of what the British termed the Non-Regulation provin- 
ces (in which the district administration enjoyed enormous 
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discretionary powers) on the one hand, and that of 
political agencies and princely states on the other hand 
(which had been personal autocracies). The rest of India, 
for the most part, inherited the tradition of the Regula- 
tion Provinces, in which the local administration had 
enjoyed less discretionary authority and had functioned 
within a more rigid framework of rules and regulations. 
The colonial Viceregal system, that prevailed in 
undivided India before partition, was in essence, an 
autocracy. The hallmark of this system was a", powerful 
viceroy, who as de facto Emperor of India, possessed 
immense authority (subject to a distant crown) and ruled 
with the help of a powerful civil-military bureaucracy, 
free from parliamentary or popular limitations on his 
power. Power in India proceeded downward from the Viceroy- 
Emperor not upward from the people. Although ultimate 
power lay with the viceroy, he delegated part of his 
authority to his chosen representatives in the provinces 
and districts. A direct chain of authority descended from 
the viceroy to the provincial Governors to the District 
Officers. Each of these was an identifiable person, who 
enjoyed paternal power and was called Ha-baap (mother- 
father) by the people whose welfare he held in trust. 
Thus the conventions of government in British India were 
based on paternalistic, authoritarian rule from above. 
However, such paternalism in no sense reflected the notion 
of accountability to the Indian public; rather any bene- 
volence exercised represented an act of grace. It is true 
that as time went on, the British applied a policy of gradual 
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extension of self-government to India, -but until the 
very end of British rule, final power remained in the hands 
of the viceroy and his governors. In fact there was a 
steady increase in the powers and status of-'the viceroy's 
office as the territories he ruled grew larger and its 
responsibilities correspondingly greater. Central to the 
viceroy's strategy of rule (in the area that later com- 
prised Pakistan) was a policy of quid pro quo with the 
zamindars (feudal landlords) and tribal chieftans. 
Feudal privileges, far from being challenged, were ex- 
tended in exchange for their loyalty to the Crown. 
Many of these elements of the Viceregal system 
have endured and survived, with some modification through- 
out Pakistan's history. Indeed, of all the successor 
states to the British Indian Empire, Pakistan retained 
most completely the institutional configuration of the 
British Raj. In fact behind Pakistan's constitutional 
instability and its experimentation with different forms 
of government, lies a fundamental continuity in terms of 
its Viceregal tradition. The explanation for this need 
not detain us here, as it is dealt with in the following 
chapter. It is necessary only to note how the structure of 
the new state showed substantial continuity with the old. 
Many essential elements of the Viceregal heritage can be 
discerned in the Pakistani polity: in the concentration 
of power in a strong leader from Jinnah through Ayub to 
Bhutto, in the primacy of personality over institutional- 
ised governance, in the supremacy of the permanent execu- 
tive over representative institutions, in the primary 
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reliance placed on the civil-military bureaucracy, and 
in the ultimate dependence of the entire system on a 
glorified 'Great Leader'. The military regimes of Ayub 
and Yahya Khan were structurally revivals from a Viceregal 
past without even the feeble legislature-of the earlier 
period. 
24 The anti-political bias of the civilian-military 
bureaucracy and its suppression of political groups claim- 
ing to represent the people and demanding a parliamentary 
system, was partly aimed at building a state free from 
political division. These goals and strategy bore a 
close resemblance to the colonial system's aims and policy. 
In many important respects, Bhutto's patrimonial 
system represented an adaptation of the Viceregal model. 
Patrimonial features such as the personalisation and 
concentration of power, the manipulation of clientele 
support from landed groups, the personalised supervision 
over the bureaucracy and military, are essentially those 
that we identified with the Viceregal pattern of rule. 
As in the latter case, in Bhutto's patrimonial system, 
power radiated from a single point in the system, and was 
delegated as an act of benevolence to those personally 
chosen by the patrimonial leader. The Viceregal disdain 
for the notion of popular sovereignty was reflected in 
Bhutto's reluctance to develop representative institutions - 
even his own PPP as an instrument of popular participation. 
The similarities can be extended and multiplied, but the 
brief summary above, will suffice at this stage to indi- 
cate both the historical continuity of the Viceregal 
system of political control, and its adaptation into a 
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patrimonial-clientele system. 
When our research commenced, secondary material 
on the Bhutto period in general, and the PPP in part- 
icular was fairly limited, although subsequently more 
literature became available. The earlier studies, largely 
monographs and articles, dealt with the initial phase 
of the party. Some were essentially narrative accounts of the 
party's origin and development. 
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The analytical studies 
by K. B. Sayeed, 26 M. Gopinath, 27, S. J. Burki28 and 
Craig Baxter, 29 focused on the party's ideological con- 
tent and social composition, depicting the PPP as a 
party of change. While this was a reasonable inter- 
pretation of the party's early image and support-base 
in the Punjab, the PPP's anti-status quo nature seems 
to have been overstressed and the generalisation made 
on its basis, exaggerated. It is equally important to 
describe and analyse the party's feudal links in the Sind, 
which the earlier literature seems to have glossed over. 
Moreover, little attention was directed in the above- 
mentioned literature, to the party's organisational 
structure, to the personalities and internal schisms 
and leadership style. Therefore, this study in its dis- 
cussion of the party's early years attempts to fill in 
these gaps in our knowledge of the party, and further- 
more by directing attention to the party's various com- 
promises with tradition, seeks to qualify the depiction 
of the PPP as a party of radical change. Robert La Porte's 
22 
study30, which also covers the Bhutto period, con- 
eludes that the PPP had emerged as a vehicle for 
'middle-sector' groups, a view that we find difficult 
to accept in this study in the light of the evidence 
on the party's subsequent development. A number of 
articles by G. A. Heeger31 and Robert La Porte32 dealt 
with specific aspects of the early part of PPP rule. 
The literature that became available while this 
research-study was in progress included Salmaan Taseer's 
biography of Bhutto33 (see below), and a book of readings 
entitled Pakistan: The Long View, 
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which dealt with 
various aspects of the Bhutto period. The latter includ- 
ed Anwar. Syed's article on the PPP. These works raise a 
number of issues germane to this thesis, which are dealt 
with at the appropriate places in this study. Other 
note-worthy articles published during the course of re- 
search included G. A. Heeger's 'Politics in the Post- 
Military State!. 
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A spate of literature followed the fall of the 
PPP government, and dealt with the 
aftermath. The literature is too 
mentioned here or assessed. 
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it 
that each of these works provided 
perspectives on the 1977 crisis. 
discussed in later chapters. 
1977 election and its 
voluminous to be either 
is sufficient to note 
somewhat different 
Many of these are 
Two major works on the Bhutto period by 
S. J. Burki37 and P. E. Jones38 became available when 
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this study was nearing completion. Jones' study 
is confined to analysing the party in the Punjab, and 
covers only the period from the party's foundation 
to 1971. The study's major contribution lies in the 
analysis of the PPP (in the Punjab) within the con- 
text of the 1970 elections, for which the author had 
access to polling station level data. Burki's work 
covers the Bhutto era up until the fall of the PPP re- 
gime in 1977. His entire analysis is built around the 
"group theory of politics", by which he seeks to ex- 
plain Bhutto's rise as a leader, his actions in office 
and his eventual fall from power. But, group theory 
has its weaknesses when it comes to empirical applies 
cation. However satisfying it may be to the analyst 
of theoretical systems to reduce everything political 
to groups, it is precisely this homogenisation of di- 
verse' political realities that makes group theory a 
not very adequate analytical instrument. Moreover, if 
all factors of politics are made out to be groups, then 
the term group loses its analytical value. For these 
reasons, the Burki study has a number of limitations. 
Despite the recent growth in literature covering 
the PPP/Bhutto era, to date there is still no study that 
takes a comprehensive picture of the entire period. This 
research effort is an attempt at filling that vacuum in 
scholarship. Such originality as this study may have 
lies not only in the fact that it is an inquiry into 
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the nature and performance of the PPP in the period 
1967-77, that has not been comprehensively studied 
to date, but also in the range of issues and questions 
discussed during the course of such an inquiry. This 
thesis explores a number of themes from the perspec- 
tive of nation-building - such as the role and form of 
leadership, factors inhibiting the development of an 
institutional capability, and patrimonialism versus 
mobilisation as strategies of political consolidation. - 
A major theme of the study is the nature, and'consequen- 
ces of personalism over institutionalised politics as 
illustrated from the case of the PPP. The patrimonial 
aspects of the Bhutto regime forms a central feature 
of the study -a characteristic to which Gerald A. 
Heeger also directs attention in his article cited 
above. This study differs from Heeger's in that it 
represents a fuller elaboration of the patrimonial 'model' 
and its applicability to Bhutto's political system. 
Here, patrimonialism is viewed as a variant of politi- 
cal clientelism, which, because it cuts across both 
"traditional" and "modern" referents, has a heuristic 
value generally missing from the conceptual arsenal of 
either "modern" or traditional politics. It directs 
attention to and enables us to explain a wide range of 
behaviour such as political corruption and factionalism 
which have thus far received relatively little analyt- 
ical treatment from observers of Pakistani politics. 
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An interpretation of the Bhutto/PPP era has 
much to do with one's assessment of Bhutto's personality. 
Our assessment differs fundamentally from the 'two faces 
of Bhutto' thesis advanced by S. Taseer in his biography 
of Bhutto, and echoed by others elsewhere. 
39 Taseer inter- 
prets Bhutto's apparent paradoxes and contradictions in 
terms of an essentially schizophrenic personality. Thus 
Bhutto's actions are explained with reference to a basic 
tension in his personality between the modern progressive 
reformer and the feudal chieftan, between the democrat and 
the despot. The position taken here departs from Taseer 
in that it views Bhutto pre-eminently as a power crafts- 
man with an overwhelming preoccupation with his personal 
destiny. For Bhutto politics was less a matter of 
principles and commitments, and more a game to be played 
with a Machievellian sense of manipulation. His mani- 
pulation of different interests was not the product of a 
schizophrenic personality, but revealed a balance-of-power 
strategy of a practitioner of Realpolitik, for whom 
politics was pre-eminently the art of attaining and re- 
taining power. His hero was not a Gandhi, or a Lenin, but 
Napoleon Bonaparte from whom he claimed he had "imbibed 
the politics of power. " 
40 He claimed that the great 
failing of his predecessors was their inability to com- 
prehend the flow of historical changes. 
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Holding that 
he possessed a "sense of history", he sought to move with 
the forces of change as he understood them in order not 
to be overtaken by them. His espousal of socialism was 
therefore less a matter of ideological commitment than an 
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opportunistic response to what he characterised as the 
"central theme of Asia", that of "upheaval and change" 
brought about by the growing demands by the masses for 
social justice and equality. 
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According to Bhutto, one of 
the cardinal rules of politics was "not to go against the 
current and the tide. "43 He likened political strategy to 
military strategy: "One must know when to move forward 
and when to go back, as in military work. " 
44 Such pro- 
nouncements were the product not of a schizophrenic mind, 
but of an astute observer of events for whom politics was 
a game of power play and tactics. 
For its primary data, this study relied on official 
gazettes, government white papers, newspapers and week- 
lies (both English and Urdu), political party literature, 
records of national assembly proceedings, official docu- 
ments and reports, and the speeches, statements and bio- 
graphies of important political leaders as well as infor- 
mation acquired through personal interviews. 
The published data resources increased during the 
course of research as a consequence of a series of white 
papers published by the government of General Zia-ul Haq 
after the fall of the PPP regime, dealing with different 
aspects of the latter. 
45 The lengthy annexures to these 
white papers consisted of correspondence between Bhutto 
and his political associates and bureaucratic advisers 
drawn largely from files kept in the Prime Minister's 
Secretariat. Since it was widely recognised that the 
release of such files was politically motivated -Il ý 
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forming part of the military regime's activities aimed 
at disparaging Bhutto's reputation, 
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- the information 
derived from them has been used cautiously. The comment- 
aries of the Zia government contained in the various white 
papers were largely disregarded while information from the 
secret files was checked and corroborated by other sources. 
It is relevant to mention that few, if any, of the PPP 
leaders challenged the authenticity of the documents, but 
only the interpretation given to them. Even Bhutto accept- 
ed their authenticity - for instance with reference to the 
first white paper, he protested that "the 342 hand-picked 
documents.... present a one sided picture" if they are 
"not read with other documents" that had not been released. 
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From his prison cell, Bhutto wrote an. extensive reply 
to the charges made in the first and second white papers, 
which was subsequently published in the form of a book 
entitled "If I Am Assassinated... "48 Again, the main 
brunt of Bhutto's reply was directed towards challenging 
the interpretation given to the documents, not the authen- 
ticity of the documents themselves. 
It was partly due to the kind of problem presented 
by the nature of published information, that the interview 
process proved indispensable to the study. A total of 
97 individuals were interviewed, including representatives 
of the major political parties and leading interests in the 
country, such as military leaders, bureaucrats, business- 
men/industrialists, landlords, trade'union leaders, 
student representatives, lawyers, teachers/educationalists. 
(See Appendix A). An attempt was made to contact those 
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who had a 'reputation' for being knowledgeable about 
subjects relevant to the research topic. The particular 
individuals interviewed were therefore not selected 
randomly, but purposively. 
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However, not all of those 
thus selected cooperated, with a few declining to grant 
an interview. 
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Nevertheless, those interviewed express- 
ed candid opinions and assessments, much of which was 
provided on an "off-the-record" basis. 
51 The majority of 
PPP politicians and military leaders-interviewed stressed 
the confidentiality of the information provided by them 
and asked not be be quoted by name on specific points. 
The information solicited through the interview process 
was checked and corroborated wherever possible, through 
the published data sources and cross checked against 
other interviews. 
This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I 
begins with an introductory chapter which aims at portray- 
ing briefly, the Pakistani scene prior to the emergence 
of the PPP. It attempts to illuminate some of the fund- 
amental problems that have conditioned the Pakistani poli- 
tical tradition. It is not intended to be a comprehensive 
or even a radically new treatment of events prior to 1967, 
but represents a brief overview of factors considered 
necessary to mention in order to understand and put into 
perspective subsequent developments. The quasi-chrono- 
logical survey is aimed at enabling the reader to identify 
historical traditions and important personalities and 
power groups, their inter-relationships, and significant 
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political events which set the dynamics for the Bhutto/ 
PPP era. The introductory chapter also outlines the 
salient social and economic characteristics of the country 
in order to provide the environmental backdrop to its 
politics. 
The next three chapters are organised chronologic- 
ally and trace the origin of the PPP and its development 
in opposition. Chapter II begins by examining the cir- 
cumstances which led to the emergence of the party in 1967, 
and its role in building up opposition in the period 
1968-69. Chapter III deals with the transformation of the 
PPP from a 'movement' of protest to a party seeking elec- 
toral support, and examines the party as an electoral 
machine within the context of the 1970 general election. 
In the light of the secondary literature (see above) cover- 
ing the early phase of the PPP (i. e. the period dealt with 
by these chapters, 1967-1970), the contribution of these 
chapters is of a qualificatory type rather than a radical critique. 
The last chapter of Part I analyses the role 
played by Bhutto and the PPP in the events that ultimately 
culminated in the break-up of Pakistan in 1971. Again, this 
period has been covered by several accounts of the 
Bangladesh crisis, most notably by G. W. Choudury and 
R. Jahan52, but none of these accounts viewed the crisis 
with the PPP as the focal point of the analysis, or indeed 
involve a detailed appreciation of the PPP's role and 
position. Taseer's chapter on the 1971 crisis in his bio- 
graphy of Bhutto partially covers this, but a discussion of 
the party's internal dynamics is conspicuously absent. 
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Jones' study does address itself to this subject in its 
epilogue, but is confined to analysing the party in the 
Punjab. Therefore it is hoped that the material provided 
in chapter IV in terms of the internal developments in 
the party as well as the repercussions of the crisis on 
the internal party structure can be regarded as original. 
Part II is divided into eight chapters, which 
deal with the party in power both in terms of its internal 
dynamics and its external relations with other institutions/ 
power groups in the country. Part II does not follow the 
chronological approach of Part I. Only chapter V proceeds 
quasi-chronologically, providing a narrative account of 
PPP actions during its years in power (from 1972 to 1977), 
for the analytical chapters that follow. The next three 
chapters analyse the PPP's internal dynamics in the post- 
1972 period. Chapter VI is concerned with analysing the 
building of the party, while chapter VII deals with the 
actual working of the party machine by examining faction- 
alism and political corruption through the concept of 
political clientelism. Chapter VIII focuses on the phenomena 
of the primacy of personalism over institutionalism in the 
PPP. Chapters IX, X and XI analyse the PPP/Bhutto's 
relationship with the political opposition, the civilian 
bureaucracy and the military respectively, and assesses 
its implications and consequences. Chapter XI also attempts 
to provide insights into the military coup that toppled 
Bhutto. In chapter XII, the PPP is analysed in terms of 
its performance as a regime. In the concluding section of 
chapter XII, the social and economic policies of the PPP 
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government are examined in terms of their relationship 
with the urban protests of 1977 which preceded and paved 
the way for military intervention. 
The final chapter of the thesis sets out some 
conclusions and perspectives about Bhutto and the PPP and 
their place in the political development of Pakistan. It 
establishes the experience of Bhutto/the PPP within the 
country's historical tradition. In all major respects, 
the Bhutto era is viewed as representing a continuation of 
the country's Viceregal tradition and its ultimate depend- 
ence on the "Great Leader'. On the basis of these assess- 
ments, the prospects for Pakistan's political future are 
considered. 
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PART I 
I 
A PROFILE OF PAKISTAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 
Pakistan came into existence on 14 August 1947, 
a heterogeneous community brought together because its 
people, adherents of Islam, refused to be absorbed by a 
Hindu-dominated political system. Admittedly, its leader- 
ship was secular prior to partition and beyond. No doubt 
also, a consensus was never reached on what an 'Islamic 
Polity' should be. Nevertheless, Pakistan was created to 
satisfy the demand for statehood by a broad and deep coal- 
escing of Muslim opinion in the Muslim-majority areas of 
British India. Pakistan had evolved from a threatened 
sense of distinct identity that would have been exaggerated 
by remaining part of Hindu India. Islam dictated separation 
but not the pattern of future development. 
The tenuous unity imparted by Islam dissipated 
before long. For the first year or two after independence 
the elan and dedication of the Pakistan movement had 
imparted an impression of a greater unity than actually 
existed. Gradually, as attentions returned to more mundane 
problems of existence, considerations of social prestige, 
political or economic power, tribal or. clan loyalties, 
sectarian or linguistic allegiances prevailed over any 
theoretical recognition of broader national interests. 
Diversity rather than unity proved to be the dominant cha- 
racteristic of Pakistani politics. For Pakistan - with 
a low level of educational and population mobility, a 
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territory widely dispersed, with its two parts uniquely 
separated by a thousand miles of what was viewed as a 
hostile country, and most of its inhabitants lacking a 
tradition of living together - the abstract concepts of 
nation and state were bound to remain relatively meaning- 
less for the overwhelming majority of its citizens. Thus, 
after the euphoria of independence had dissipated, the 
transfer of citizenship from primordial to national 
levels proved extremely difficult, and the quest for forg- 
ing a national identity proved elusive. Consequently, 
the country was not able to establish a common set of 
values that underpinned either the polity or any specific 
set of institutions in the society or economy. The entire 
history of Pakistan can be interpreted as a series of 
attempts to establish a national, identity and an orderly 
political system. The results of the failure of these 
attempts have been a chronic instability, a vain search 
for a constitution and finally a civil war leading to the 
dissolution of the country within twenty-four years of its 
creation. 
The confused environment and fragility of govern- 
ment in the first few years of the country's existence was 
highlighted by an abortive military coup d'etat in 19511 
and the outbreak of communal violence in 1953.2 Another 
principal legacy of the first few years of independence 
was a fundamental disagreement about the organisation and 
purposes of the Pakistani state - the controversy over 
Islam. The controversy over the role Islam should play in 
the polity left the state polarised between orthodox and 
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secular-oriented factions. The debate, both inside and 
outside the two constituent assemblies, was indicative 
of serious rifts. 'The crisis was never resolved and the 
Islamic identity of the state varied from one constitution 
to another. As the communal disturbances in Punjab in 
1953 demonstrated, Islam, far from being an integrative 
power, could work as a divisive force. The Punjab disturb- 
ances also provided a painful reminder of the possible con- 
sequences of an open split between, for the most part, 
secular authorities and the orthodox Ulema. The controver- 
sial Munir Report stated bluntly that if religion was 
to be allowed a say in political affairs, the country 
would be reduced to a state of perennial civil war. 
deed, the report concluded on a rather cynical note: 
"If there is one thing which has been 
conclusively demonstrated in this inquiry, 
it is that provided you can persuade the 
masses to believe that something they are 
asked to do is religiously right or en- 
joined by religion, you can set them to 
any course of action, regardless of all 
considerations of discipline, loyalty, 
decency, morality or civic sense. " 3 
In- 
Doctrinaire disputes about the religious character of the 
state alternated with the sordid squabbles of highly per- 
sonalised politics, (which will be discussed below), while 
the state itself decayed. 
AUTHORITY AND THE STATE: THE PRIMACY OF THE CIVIL-MILITARY 
BUREAUCRACY 
The principal legacy of the early disorganisation 
- and confusion of Pakistan's public life was the autonomy 
and primacy of the civil and military bureaucracy. While 
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emerging political forces and weak political institutions 
characterised the ambiguous politics of constitution - 
making, the civil and military bureaucracy assumed a 
predominant position in the political system of Pakistan. 
Pakistan's national life in its first years, therefore, 
found the praetorian elites manning the battlements while 
the public men disagreed on fundamentals of national life. 
But there were other reasons for this bureaucratic domi- 
nance. Most Pakistanis saw the first need of the country 
as government, not an effective political system, and for 
the first decade efforts were directed at building an 
effective army and civil administration. The British had 
left a useful 'Praetorian Guard' in civil and military 
leadership. Moreover, the imperial legacy, strong in 
the instruments and lessons of control and administration, 
was comparatively weak in the practices and institutions 
of popular participation. Few Muslim politicians had 
had parliamentary experience - the Muslim League, Pakistan's 
independence party, was weak and perhaps, most important, 
most of the able provincial politicians in the country 
were in parties which, prior to 1947, were in provincial 
opposition to the Muslim League. Another important factor 
was that the areas that came to Pakistan were politically 
inarticulate, little experienced in mass politics and 
themselves divided into parochial groups. Indeed, the 
areas comprising Pakistan, were for historical and other 
reasons, the most backward politically and economically. 
The Punjab and Sind were incorporated in the British Raj 
only in 1849; Sind was given the status of a province -- , 
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for the first time in 1937 - the North West Frontier 
Province (NWFP) was ruled as a special area till the 
mid-thirties while Baluchistan had no representative 
government of any sort during the entire period of British 
rule. 
Another colonial legacy, which is frequently 
overlooked in studies of the development of the Pakistani 
polity, concerns the distinction made by the British 
between what were called "Regulation" and Non-Regulation" 
Provinces. 
4 
Historically, in no part of British India did 
the system of close administrative supervision and bureau- 
cratic power at the district level strike such deep roots 
as it did in the provinces of the Punjab and the NWFP, 
which became parts of West Pakistan. 
5 
These provinces 
inherited the administrative system of what was called 
the "Non-Regulation" Provinces. The British found that 
the over-legalistic administrative system of Bengal, 
Madras and Bombay (known as Regulation Provinces), with 
its careful definitions of rights and obligations of the 
citizens and officers, had not produced an equitable 
system of justice. In the Regulation Provinces, the dis- 
trict officers could not use their discretionary authority 
to help the illiterate and poor peasants against the 
exploitation of the landlords and the moneylenders. 
However; the administrative system of the Regulation Pro- 
vinces With its careful definition of rights of the 
citizenry, and the restrictions it placed on the authority 
of the district officer enabled the growth of political 
consciousness in those provinces. In the Non-Regulation 
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Provinces like the Punjab and the NWFP, all powers - 
executive, magisterial and judicial - were concentrated 
in the hands of the commissioner. In other words, the 
British in the Non-Regulation Provinces had restored the 
old Moghul administrative system in which enormous 
executive power was concentrated in the hands of the 
local representative of the government. The system in 
the Non-Regulation Provinces was clearly authoritarian and 
paternal rather than legal and democratic. (This partly 
explains why political consciousness in what was West 
Pakistan which inherited the system of Non-Regulation 
Provinces was seldom as high as that in (the former) East 
Pakistan, which inherited the system of Regulation 
Provinces). 
The above-mentioned colonial heritage coupled with 
the conscious attempt made in the post-independence years 
by successive governments to pursue policies maximising 
the state's cohesion, further contributed to the strength- 
ening of the 'administrative state'. This emphasis on the 
development of government capabilities not only meant an 
unbalanced growth of the political system (that is, the 
growth of output functions at the cost of input functions)6 
but also led to an imbalance in the distribution of powers 
among the various subnational groups. Emphasis on the 
output sector meant strengthening the civil-military 
bureaucracy - which was dominated by Punjabis (and to a 
lesser extents Muhajirs). The political elite itself 
did little to reverse this trend. Part of the reason for 
this was that the elite that came to power in Pakistan 
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after independence was a small group of people (as 
represented by leaders like Liaqat Ali) who generally 
came from regions which were not part of Pakistan, and 
lost their political constituents after partition. They 
were reluctant either to broaden their ranks by including 
the regional leaders from within Pakistan, or to risk an 
election, for fear of losing power. In their bid to 
stay in power this political elite found an ally in the 
civil-military bureaucracy. The latter came to the 
former's aid partly because they were trained to carry 
out their political superior's orders and partly because 
they also shared the elite's belief in the policy of cen- 
tralisation and 'nationalisation'. Thus, during the 
first decade, a close working alliance developed between 
the political elite and the civil-military bureaucracy - 
an alliance which in later years, especially after 1954, 
was dominated by the latter. 
The instability and uncertainty in the Pakistani 
polity is reflected in the fact that during the first 
twenty years of its existence, the country had had two 
constituent assemblies, one constitutional commission and 
three constitutions. 
7 All this experimentation, however, 
still did not produce any constitutional formula or 
consensus. In fact constitution-making epitomised many 
of the problems faced by the country since independence, 
chiefly the problem of the proper role of Islam in the 
state, and the question of federalism, 
8 
which underscored 
the tensions created by the regional/ethnic division of 
the country. The political arena presented the chaotic 
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spectacle of political in-fighting and political pro- 
fiteering. Alliances among groups of politicians were 
made and unmade with no direct reference to the elector- 
ate or guidance from public opinion. The object in each 
case was none other than occupying ministerial offices. 
Every new opportunity of capturing office brought with it 
a shifting of loyalties, fall of governments and change 
of prime ministers. The conduct of public affairs de- 
generated into a spoils system which set political life 
at the mercy of Vested interests and removed it entirely 
from the comprehension as well as from the sympathy of 
the masses of the population. 
9 
This fierce competition 
for influence, wealth, power and prestige between various 
interests and personalities contributed to the chaos, 
unpredictability and instability which characterised 
Pakistani political life. However, while on the surface 
Pakistan's political experience appears to have merely 
been one of persistent instability - one of a struggle for 
power resulting not only in a succession of governments 
but also in new constitutional arrangements none of which 
survived for long, interrupted by interludes of martial 
law, yet a closer examination reveals something beyond 
this. On closer examination, in fact, there is a 
striking continuity in certain political traditions and 
in the alignment of social forces that have made up 
Pakistan's ruling oligarchy. It is toward these elements 
of continuity that we now turn, in order to provide a 
meaningful background perspective on subsequent political. 
developments. 
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The most outstanding, and perhaps the most 
important pillar on which the entire political structure 
of Pakistan seems to have rested - with or without 
assemblies and parliaments - has been the Viceregal system 
and the supremacy of the permanent executive over repre- 
sentative institutions. It has, correctly been pointed 
out that "the strongest traditions and structures of 
politics that were inherited by Pakistan were autocratic 
and Viceregal. "10 It needs to be emphasised that the 
main components of the Viceregal system were a powerful 
viceroy, otherwise known as the Governor-General, an 
executive council, chosen by the Governor-General, a cen- 
tral assembly with limited powers, subordinate provincial 
governments, and above all, a powerful bureaucracy placed 
in strategic positions at the centre, in the provinces and 
in the districts. The army in this system provided the 
coercive cover and was called into action in extreme cases. 
All these characteristics have been in operation in 
Pakistan ever since its inception, with the crucial differ- 
ence that unlike under the British Raj, the Governor- 
General in independent Pakistan was not appointed by or 
subject to the authority of a distant Imperium. During 
the first three decades of its existence, Pakistan has had 
several constitutional systems but the basic political 
system, with some variation has been more or less the 
Viceregal systemll 
The tradition of executive supremacy can be traced 
to Pakistan's first Governor-General, Mohammed All Jinnah. 
Jinnah's preference for a Viceregal authority pattern, at 
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the outset of Pakistan'a political existence, reinforced 
the'trend to an increasing reliance on a quasi-colonial 
style of governance, and set the tone for this pattern of 
governance. Of course, this tradition was reinforced by 
personality considerations. Jinnah brought to the office 
his tremendous prestige and charisma as "Father of the 
Nation" and the Quaid-i-A'zam (The Great Leader). Thus, 
Jinnah ex'ercised powers unfettered by the constitutional 
limitations of an orthodox governor-general, 
12 
even as en- 
larged by the discretionary powers laid down in the 1935 
Act, which was taken as the new state's temporary legal 
framework. 
13 Jinnah's exercise of absolute power created 
a dangerous precedent, which was drawn upon by his 
successors. Ghulam Mohammed's frequent abuses of such 
powers were only the wider extensions of the practices of 
his predecessor. Those extraordinary powers of the governor- 
general were simply passed on without any fundameital 
change, to the hands of the chief executive of the country. 
Any reading of Pakistan's chequered history will show that 
the head of the state has remained powerful and autocratic 
in character. From the time of Ghulam Mohammed onwards, 
the Viceregal tradition, not the parliamentary experiment, 
proved dominant. Iskander Mirza, who succeeded Ghulam 
Mohammed in 1955 and Ayub Khan who followed Mirza in 1958, 
only perpetuated this tradition of strong, paternalistic 
personal rule through an elite bureaucracy. In this 
sense, the martial law regimes have, structurally, been 
revivals from the Viceregal past without even the feeble 
legislatures of the Nineteenth Century. 
46 
The coup of 1958, far from being a fundamental 
departure, in fact brought Pakistan's political realities 
abreast of its political theory, and threw off the veneer 
of 'parliamentary democracy'. When the army and the civil 
service decided on a take-over, they were, in fact, 
formalising and institutionalising a situation (the ascend- 
ancy of the civil-military coalition) which had existed 
almost since independence, but particularly since 1953. 
As Hamza Alavi has pointed out: 
"In Pakistan, the army and the bureau- 
cracy had played a dominant and decisive 
role.... the 'seizure' of power in 1958 
by General Ayub Khan in the name of the 
army was just a dramatic movement in that 
continuing domination, .... In the first decade of independence the facade of 
parliamentary government obscured the 
role of the bureaucracy and did its 
bidding. " 14 
At any rate, the civil and military bureaucratic 
coalition had been ascendant at least since 1953 when 
prime minister Nazimuddin, who symbolised political 
elitist consensus, was summarily dismissed by the governor- 
general, a former civil servant, presumably with army sup- 
port. 
15 
This was followed by an equally summary dismissal 
of an elected government in Bengal in 1954 and the dis- 
solution of the constituent assembly-cum-legislature in 
the same year. 
16 
The supremacy of the civil-military 
bureaucratic apparatus over representative institutions 
proved to be a pervasive and persistent feature of the 
Pakistani political system. Such pre-eminence was in 
large part the product of the Viceregal heritage which 
had accorded prominence to praetorian elites thereby 
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resulting in the organisational superiority of the civil- 
military bureaucracy vis a vis political institutions. 
Till October 1958, however, the higher civil service was 
the senior partner in this military-bureaucratic coalition; 
after that the armed forces became the chief focus of 
power. A variety of reasons lay behind the military's 
seizure of power. 
17 Of these the most significant were 
the breakdown of law and order (a symptom of civilian 
political failure at consensus-building), and the prospect 
of a general election in 1959, which the military felt 
would only bring more chaos and bloodshed, but more im- 
portantly, challenge the dominant position of the Viceregal 
institutions (military and civil service) in the political 
system. 
Ayub continued to rely on the bureaucracy as an 
instrument of the Viceregal, colonial-style regime he 
inherited and reinforced. The hallmark of such a system, 
was of course, its extreme centralisation. Both formally 
and in practice, the tradition of a strong Centre was firm- 
ly established. The Government of India Act Of 1935 : to'gether 
with various modifications made in the post-independence 
period18 provided for a strong central government, and 
the constitution of 195619 perpetuated the essentially 
strong position of a Centre vis a vis the provinces. The 
administrative-political policies pursued during the course 
of time were characterised by centralisation. Also, from 
the very beginning, the central government intervened 
directly and frequently in the administration of the pro- 
vinces. Chief ministers were regularly deposed, 20 and 
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provinces were frequently brought under direct central 
control. Such centralisation exacerbated provincial 
frictions and ethnic tensions - since dominance of the cen- 
tre almost invariably meant domination by one province - 
Punjab. The pre-eminence of the civil-military bureaucracy 
also translated into 'Pfinjabi domination' since Punjabis 
constituted the overwhelming majority of the senior per- 
sonnel in the civil service and the armed forces (70% in 
the case of the latter). 
21 All this inevitably caused 
increasing frustration and disenchantment on the part of 
other provinces, particularly East"Bengal. 
22 Demands for 
regional autonomy have been a perennial feature of 
Pakistani politics, and were not merely limited to East 
Bengal. 
RURAL STRUCTURE 
Another persistent feature in the political sys- 
tem of Pakistan has been the dominant position of rural 
landed interests in the political and economic life of the 
country. In fact it would not be too much of an exagger- 
ation to say that as far as the institutional bases of 
power in pre-1970 Pakistan is concerned, while the civilian- 
military bureaucracy dominated national (and provincial) 
decision-making after independence, landed wealth inter- 
connected these two institutional bases. Landowning 
families, have been the source of ministerial talent for 
all regimes in Pakistan since 1947. The Punjab, particular- 
ly has traditionally contributed heavily to the civil- 
military administration. The British called them the 
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'martial races', and a tradition of military service 
grew here. 
23 
One observer has rightly suggested that the 
"key to Pakistan politics is to be found in a little 
official publication for restricted circulation by the 
Government of India before 1914 and entitled 'The Landed 
Families of the Punjab'. "24 
West Pakistan, particularly the Punjab and Sind, 
possessed one of the most skewed landownership structures 
in Asia. We may recall that there were, in part, historical 
reasons for this. British Indian officialdom under the 
Raj regarded the Punjab (and to a lesser extent, Sind) as 
the key to the security of north India, since these areas 
were close to the frontier. This larger security interest 
of the empire led the British to seek the loyalty of the 
proprietary-agricultural tribes by preserving (even 
extending) the economic resources and social authority of 
the chiefly and gentry lineages. 
25 
In the Punjab, the 
salience of these concerns was evident from the founding 
(and operation) of the paternalistic and conservative 
school of administration (associated with such figures as 
John and Henry Lawrence). 
26 Clearly then, the British 
interfered less with feudal privileges here than they did 
elsewhere in India. The economic and social power of the 
rural landed classes persisted in the post-independence 
period, and they remained a very influential political 
27 
group. 
The extent of the concentration of ownership was 
such that in Punjab in 1958, more than one-fifth of the 
cultivable land was owned by about one-half of one percent 
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of the owners. The concentration indices for Sind were 
even higher, with a mere 3000 landlords holding 69% of 
the occupied land. 
28 In the NWFP, 0.1% owners possessed 
nearly one-eighth of the total area. 
29 For 'Vest Pakistan 
as a whole, about 0.1% of landowners, that is about 6,000 
people, owned land to the extent of five hundred acres or 
more. 
30 Consistent with this ownership structure was a 
high incidence of tenancy in which tenants-at-will 
cultivated the land, usually under the batai system (a 
rent system with rent paid in kind as a certain proportion 
of the produce). 
31 Although no precise figures are 
available, it has been surmised that at the time of 
independence over 50 per cent of the cultivated land was 
held in such forms of tenancy in West Pakistan - in the 
Punjab, 56 per cent of land was cultivated by tenants-at- 
will, in Sind 80 per cent was cultivated by such tenants 
known as Haris, and in the NWFP the figure was 50 per cent. 
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"While taking stock of the conditions in the country", the 
authors of the First Five Year Plan wale moved to write, 
"one is struck with their similarity to feudalism. "33 
Political leadership was drawn primarily from 
this feudalistic landlord class. The economic and social 
power of the landed aristocracy gave it a political ascend- 
ancy that neither the introduction of universal suffrage 
nor the rise of new political parties could snatch from 
it. The Punjab, for instance, had many features of a 
squirearchy not unsimilar to that of seventeenth or 
eighteenth Century England. That is, the key rural families 
controlled politics through elections and the holding of 
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appointive offices. Traditionally then, the landlords 
played an important role in Pakistani politics and con- 
stituted the most significant class interest in the 
Muslim League. The extent of their predominance is best 
indicated by the social composition of Pakistan's legis- 
lative assemblies. The largest single group in both the 
first and second constituent assemblies was that of the 
landlords - 27 out of 79 and 28 out of 40 respectively. 
34 
Again, in the Punjab, provincial elections in 1951, about 
80. per cent of the members elected were landlords. In the 
Sind elections in 1955,90 per cent of the members of 
the Sind assembly came from large land-owning families. 
The key posts in the Muslim League heirarchy were held by 
big landlords. Even after the so-called land reforms of 
1959, the representation of landlords in the assemblies 
remained the highest for any one group. In the 1962 nation- 
al assembly for instance, 58 out of 96 members were land- 
lords, 35 in the 1965 national assembly the figure was 34 
out of 82.36 
Given the above structure, the political process 
has been one in which rlv 1:; ýý landlords constantly feuded 
against each other. The governments of Sind and Punjab 
were perpetually riddled with intrigues and feuds between 
rival factions of landlords - politics came to reflect 
the animosity (based on biradarism, local and ancestral 
rivalries, etc) between rival landlord groups. As these 
rival groups were more or less in agreement in retaining 
their landed interests, politics in West Pakistan became 
more a cynical pursuit of sheer power. Even the One-Unit 
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(the scheme whereby all four provinces and areas in West 
Pakistan were integrated into a single province or unit 
in 1955) controversy 
37 has been interpreted as factional 
fighting amongst the landlords of various provinces. 
38 
Ayub's land reforms (1959) did not substantially 
alter the rural power structure. Although it reduced the 
influence and manipulative power of some of the wealthier 
landlords, the impact of the reform was minimal, especially 
since the senior personnel of the military and the bureau- 
cracy themselves owned substantial land. Indeed, conven- 
tional village life was reinforced, not altered by Ayub's 
"new" system of local self-government - the Basic 
Democracy system. 
39 As Gunnar Myrdal has pointed out: 
"The system of basic democracies has 
actually strengthened the position of the 
local landlords - first because it is 
easier for them to manipulate and inti- 
midate a small electorate than a larger 
one and second, because the candidate must 
reside in the locality, thus making it 
impossible to provide the peasants with 
an alternate leadership, .... The effect of the new system has been to associate the 
local landowners with the official machinery 
of government. " 40 
Thus, "the real levers of power" continued in the hands of 
the "upper class of landlords, civil servants, industrial- 
ists and professional men. ''41 Therefore, despite land 
reforms, the landlord class, the zamindars, were not dis- 
placed from their power position. As one observer has 
written: 
"Powerful landlords and a mass of captive 
peasantry continue to serve as the chief 
explanatory variables in the sociology 
of Pakistan's politics, past and present. 
Urbanisation and economic growth notwith- 
standing, the power of the big landlords 
persists both at the apex and the base. " 42 
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Despite indications of accelerated urbanisation 
(discussed below), Pakistan is still very much land- 
oriented. Seventy-four per cent of its people43 live in 
some 45,000 villages, ranging in size from several hundred 
to a thousand or so inhabitants. Agriculture is-the main- 
stay of the country's economy. In addition to employing 
54.80% of the labour force, 
44 it has constituted the found- 
ation on which the industrial sector rests (textiles and 
food processing accounting for the major share in value 
added), and through its exports, agriculture has earned 
most of the country's foreign exchange. 
The predominantly rural character of Pakistani 
society makes it necessary to describe briefly a number 
of important aspects of village life. 
45 
To begin with, 
the villages depend on agricultural economic bases. A 
substantial part of agricultural cultivation contributes 
to a subsistence rather than a commercial market. In 1972, 
67% of the landholdings were below 12.5 acres or over one- 
half of (owner occupied and tenanted) farms were believed 
to consist of 5 acres or less. 
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These mini-plots combined 
with relatively primitive methods of cultivation has meant 
that the commercial market contribution of the majority 
of agriculturalists is negligible. Elsewhere, however, 
the introduction of new technology has extended monetisa- 
tion of the rural economy and served to undermine tradi- 
tional life in the villages. 
In terms of social organisation, a village is a 
system built around the structural relations of extended 
families, which translate themselves into a system of 
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caste-like relationships. Although the importance of 
caste varies from place to place and tends to be greater 
in the Punjab than in Sind, the. NWFP and Baluchistan, 
traditional caste differentiation and social status none- 
theless underlies village structure in most of the country. 
Although ostensibly based on the egalitarian principles of 
Islam, Pakistani society functions in terms of a modification of 
the Hindu-based caste system prevalent throughout South 
Asia. Thus religious teaching has not sufficed to over- 
come the combined influence of the social system of pre- 
Islamic India and the traditions of Hinduism, from which 
the ancestors of most Pakistanis converted. 
Caste, in the Muslim context, means an endogamous 
group with either a common traditional occupation or a 
tradition of descent from a common ancestor or both, but 
completely devoid of the Hindu connotations of religious 
(as distinct from social) heirarchy and hereditary ritual 
purity or pollution. Used in-this sense the term caste 
is applicable to most of the traditional social groups 
in the Punjab. The three most important castes in the 
Punjab are the Jats, Rajputs and Arains. 
47 
In terms of 
social precedence, the Rajputs come first - and are by 
tradition warriors, rulers, landowners and cultivators. 
48 
The Jats are the largest group in the Punjab. Their 
social position, though lower than the Rajputs, is highly 
respectable, and the line between the two sometimes in- 
distinct. A Jat is usually a landowning cultivator and 
he has also contributed substantially to the fighting 
forces of the country. The Arains also enjoy a good 
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social standing. Many of them moved into the canal colony 
districts after new land was opened by irrigation. There 
are four other groups of social and political signifi- 
cance: the Biloches, Awans, Gujars and the Lohars and 
Tarkhans. There are, in addition, other functional castes 
of a distinctly lower social position. The Chuhras and 
Mussallis, traditionally sweepers and scavengers, are 
often landless agricultural labourers and menials, and they 
have the lowest status. 
In rural areas, the individual has social importance 
only as a member of a family. Groups of patrilineally 
related families in turn form units, called in the Punjab, 
biradari. The biradari as a functioning unit acts to pro- 
tect the interests of its members, exercises social control 
through threats of ostracism, and has significance in 
marriage arrangements. Biradaris usually claim common 
descent from a known ancestor. A number of biradaris form 
the local caste group, extending over several villages. 
The major Punjabi biradaris include the Syeds, Awans, 
Qureishis and Sheikhs. It is difficult to estimate the 
precise number of biradaris in rural Pakistan. We have 
felt it necessary to dwell, at some length on the struc- 
ture of the rural countryside, not only to provide a com- 
prehensive background to politics, but also because, all 
too often these aspects of the social structure are over- 
looked by political observers whose gaze does not extend 
beyond the city, towards which we now turn our attention. 
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URBAN STRUCTURE 
The urban component49 of the country's population 
has increased in recent years, as is indicated by the 
table below. 
TABLE I. 1 
LEVEL OF URBANISATION 
1961 1972 
URBAN RURAL TOTAL -URBAN RURAL TOTAL 
Actual 9.7 33.2 42.9' ' 16.6 48.4 65.0 
(in million) 
Percentage 22.5 77.5 100.00 25.5 74.5 100.00 
Source: Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1976 
(Islamabad, Statistics Division) 
Although urban areas are dominated in terms of population 
by metropolitan centres like Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi, 
Lyallpur, Hyderabad--and Multan, there are in addition, at 
least thirty cities with populations exceeding 100,000. 
The principal groups in the urban areas are indus- 
trial labour (comprising 25.7% of the urban labour force), 
those engaged in commerce and trade (comprising 25.9% of 
the urban labour force), and college and university 
students. 
50 In addition there are professional groups 
such as lawyers, teachers, doctors and engineers, often 
referred to as the 'educated middle class'. The numbers 
of these groups increased phenomenally over the years 
and particularly as a consequence of Ayub's policy of 
rapid industrialisation in the 1960's (discussed below). 
This has been accompanied by the growth of modern, asso- 
ciational interest-group type of organisations based on 
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the protection of the economic interests of' these groups. 
Taking the case of the trade unions first, Table 1.2 
below indicates the growth in both the numbers of trade 
unions and their membership in the period 1948-1977. 
TABLE 1.2 
'REGISTERED TRADE UNIONS AND MEMBERSHIP 
YEAR NO. OF T. U. 's MEMBERSHIP 
1948 110 116,300 
1950 185 128,888 
1955 240 120,081 
1960 466 175,313 
1965 592 218,665 
1971 1,997 581,219 
1975 8,196 695,667 
1977 9,110 760,300 
Source: 25 Years of Pakistan in Statistics. 1947-1972 
(Government of Pakistan, CSO) 
Pakistan Labour Gazette, Jan-March 1977 
(Islamabad: Labour and Manpower Division) 
This is not the place for a review of the history 
of the trade union movement in Pakistan. 
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It is suffi- 
cient here to note that until the mid-sixties, trade unions 
did not emerge as effective instruments of collective 
bargaining that had any appreciable impact on governmental 
policy. There were several reasons for this trade union 
weakness, some of which can be summarised below. First, 
membership in unions was (and is) low - in 1964 less than 
10% of the urban industrial labour force had been organ- 
ised into unions. Second, largely as a consequence of the 
former, unions have been financially poor. Third, since 
0 
most unions are organised on a plant (rather than industry 
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group) basis, it has been difficult for them to combine 
with other trades in order to exercise concerted pressure 
on the employers or the government. A number of feder- 
ations at the national level have emerged from time to 
time such as the All-Pakistan Confederation of Labour, 
Pakistan Trade Union Federation, Pakistan National 
Federation of Trade Unions, but none of these succeeded 
in affiliating a sufficient number of individual unions 
to create a comprehensive nation-wide organisation. 
Another source of trade union weakness has been intra and 
inter-union leadership rivalries, 
52 
much of which was 
manipulated by employers to divide the labour movement. 
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Perhaps the most important factor responsible for 
the weakness of the labour movement was the commitment of 
successive regimes to the support of the emerging indus- 
trial entrepreneurial class, which in their view necessi- 
tated severe restrictions on labour unions. 
54 Industrial 
growth (through the private sector) was given priority, 
while the requirements of 'social justice' were clearly of 
subordinate concern. By a series of measures, successive 
regimes sought to place curbs on trade union activity. For 
instance, in 1954, the Punjab-based Pakistan Trade Union 
Federation was banned as 'Communist', while in 1959, the 
government imposed a virtual ban on strikes. 
55 Such res- 
trictions, together with the reasons enumerated above, com- 
bined to seriously inhibit the growth of trade unionism. 
However, despite these grave disabilities, labour 
unions attempted to exert pressure on the government and 
employers on a number of occasions from 1962-63 onwards, 
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at times winning limited wage increases. Then, in the 
1969 urban protest against Ayub Khan, (discussed below and 
in more detail in the following chapter) labour unions not 
only displayed the capacity to confront the police appara- 
tus of the regime, but also developed an organisational 
capacity to conduct effective strikes, to combine with 
other unions in different industries, trades and profes- 
sions and to formulate certain concrete demands relating 
to wages, living conditions and certain desired changes in 
the economic and political system. 
56 -Although the imme- 
diate reason for this labour militancy and unity was the 
decline of industrial wages57 during the Ayubian period of 
high industrial growth (discussed below p. 80 ), the power 
of organised labour, as demonstrated in 1969, indicated 
that trade unions had developed an organisational depth 
and power that would have to be recognised and reckoned 
with by any subsequent regime. 
Traders, merchants and small businessmen form a 
sizeable proportion of the urban population. This group 
also includes shopkeepers and the 'arhtis (commission agents 
or middlemen) of the mandi (market) towns. Not included 
in this group are the big industrialists who form a separ- 
ate category designated as the industrial elite, which 
is discussed below. The traders, merchants and shopkeepers 
are organised into various trade and commerce associations, 
numbering several hundred. The most powerful of these 
associations representing bigger traders/merchants are 
the local chambers of commerce (in the cities and large 
towns) all of which are affiliated into the Federation of 
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Chambers of Commerce, with its head office in Karachi. 
The latter has played an important role in advising succes- 
sive governments on the formulation of economic policy 
especially with regard to import and tariff rules and on 
measures of local taxation. 
58 In the smaller towns there 
is usually a separate mohalla (alley or quarter) that 
specialises in particular trades or businesses. Thus there 
are mohallas where goldsmiths, or tanners predominate, 
others where wheat or sugar keepers are located. - Such 
segregation, a legacy of the old Guild system gives rise 
to considerable cohesiveness within each trade and has 
not prevented concerted action by the various trades, when 
the occasion has arisen, in the'form of successful Hartals 
(a protest whereby shops and trades are shut down). In 
certain cities, traders and merchants predominantly belong 
to a particular ethnic group - Muhajirs (refugees from 
India) in the case of Karachi and Hyderabad and refugees 
from East Punjab in the case of Lahore and Multan - which 
reinforces their cohesiveness as an occupational category. 
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In some cities, these traders/merchants also belong to 
particular biradaris - the Sheikh and Qureishi biradari 
in Multan for instance - which again reinforces their 
sense of solidarity. The arhtis are found in towns 
that provide market outlets for the agricultural produce 
of the adjoining countryside and function as service cen- 
tres for the villages. 
60 The arhti is concerned with the 
movement of primarily cash crops (cotton, rice, etc. ) from 
the village/farm level to the primary markets in the 
mandi towns, but often also acts as money-lender to the 
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small landowners. As such the arhti belongs to the rural 
economy and can be said to constitute the rural bourgeoi- 
sie. The arhti is often viewed as an exploitative 
middleman by the grower, but is nevertheless utilised 
for the disposal of the farmer's agricultural surplus. 
These arhtis are well organised by numerous arhti asso- 
ciations - there are an estimated 
15,000 such associations 
in the Punjab alone. 
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A relatively small, but influential and growing 
element of the urban population is the group of profess- 
ionals, such as lawyers, doctors, teachers, engineers and 
journalists. Almost every profession has some form of 
voluntary association modelled after their western counter- 
parts. 
62 Lawyers appear to be the best organised, with 
the Bar Council linked comprehensively to the network of 
local bar associations throughout the cities and smaller 
towns. These bar associations have functioned as important 
units of political organisation and the various bar 
councils figure prominently in the political campaigning 
tours of politicians. Lawyers have been well represented 
in almost all the cabinets and legislatures of Pakistan, 
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although this is largely because such lawyers were drawn 
from landed backgrounds (in Pakistan, a degree in law 
was and still is considered a virtual sine qua non for 
entry into politics). Teachers too, have emerged as a 
significant force, organised in various associations. 
64 
These associations, along with associations of journalists, 
lawyers, doctors, and middle-level civil servants have 
provided the salaried middle class with considerable 
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organised power, demonstrated most impressively on those 
rare occasions, as in the anti-Ayub. agitation in 1969, 
when they were in concert. Yet despite these broadly 
shared trade unionist concerns, 
65 
these associations have 
been afflicted by divisions arising from ethnic/linguistic, 
sectarian and biradari cleavages. 
66 This has led one 
observer to term these professional groups as 'modern 
tribes' or biradaris, "whose membership is acquired through 
appropriate degrees but whose organisational behaviour: 
bears close resemblance to the traditional social patterns. " 
67 
Another sizeable urban group consists of students 
(at the university and secondary school levels). In 
1975-76, the student population was composed of 23,000 
university students, 47,726 students in professional 
colleges, 211,600 in arts and sciences colleges, and 480,000 
secondary school students. 
68 
Not only are these students 
important, in terms of numbers, but by virtue of their 
deep involvement in politics throughout Pakistani history, 
they constitute an influential urban group. In analysing 
the linkages between education and politics, one writer has 
used the phrase "politically over-developed youth" to des- 
tribe student involvement in politics in the developing 
countries. 
69 "Political over-development" is a complex 
concept, but it directs attention to the pivotal role 
played by the student generation in national politics - 
and South Asia is no exception. In Pakistan, student in- 
volvement in politics can be traced to the independence 
movement, when students were one of the major instruments 
utilised by Jinnah and the Muslim League in the anti- 
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colonial struggle. 
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pointed out: 
Subsequently, as one writer has 
"Much of the dynamics of politics in 
Pakistan has been provided at key 
periods by the political activism of 
university students. " 71 
Student activism in politics is the result not 
simply of a distast-efor authority amongst rebellious youth, 
but of the students' self-perception of their responsibility 
to the society of which they are a part. In developing 
countries, the students form a sizeable section of the 
intelligentsia in a predominantly illiterate society. Con- 
sequently, as an official commission on student problems 
and welfare noted in 1966, the student community 
"feels by reason of its education that 
it has the right to take a leading part 
in the building up of political conscious- 
ness of the illiterate and uneducated 
masses.... they form a very influential 
political element, whose support is 
sought for by almost all politicians, 
whether in power or out of power. Lea- 
ders of the opposition and ministers alike 
woo students and seek to be popular among 
them, for in political campaigns they are 
found to be useful and loyal workers. " 72 
Many political parties have organised youth branches to 
recruit student-support in the universities and colleges. 
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Thus many student organisations in the universities and 
colleges are youth branches of political parties, and 
their manifestos contain political programmes rather than 
demands for better amenities or educational reforms. 
74 
There are, however, student organisations, such as the 
National Students Federation, which are not affiliated to 
political parties, but are no less politicised in their 
programme or actions. 
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The majority of students at college and university 
level, come from high income families, both urban and 
rural. 
75 But. the fact that they are drawn from socially- 
privileged groups, in no way diminishes their propensity 
towards political activism. Indeed, one study of univer- 
sity students found that those belonging to more educated 
and higher income families tended to be more politicised 
than those from less-well-to-do backgrounds. 76 Secondary 
school students come from a wider social, backgroundi and 
have often involved themselves in politics by participating 
in student demonstrations against successive rcgimes 
organised by their counterparts at higher levels of edu- 
cation. Indeed, whenever successive regimes have appre- 
hended or been confronted with student unrest, they have 
proceeded to order the temporary closure of schools in 
addition to universities and colleges. 
The media (newspapers, radio, television) is 
largely restricted to the urban centres, but is growing 
rapidly. In a country where literacy is only 21% (in 1976) 
it is the 'transistor revolution' which has been respon- 
sible for making news and information accessible to the 
large majority of the illiterate masses. But the press is 
the oldest and'the best developed of the mass media. Partly 
because of the traditional Islamic credence accorded to 
the written word, it is also the most influential medium, 
even though it has operated under severe restrictions 
(and at most times, censorship) under successive regimes. 
The influence of the press is much greater than newspaper 
circulation -five per thousand population in the Seventies - 
65 
would indicate because single copies of newspapers and 
newsmagazines are often passed from person to person, 
and individuals who are unable to read often have the 
newspaper read to them. In 1976 the number of dailies was 
105, while the total number of periodicals (including bi- 
weeklies, weeklies, monthlies, quarterlies) was 1,211. 
The major daily newspapers, their ownership and circulation 
figures are shown in Table 1.3 below. 
TABLE 1.3 
MAJOR DAILY NEWSPAPERS, OWNERSHIP AND CIRCULATION (1974) 
Title Language City of Publication Circulation 
(in thousands) 
ownership 
Jang Urdu Karachi 190 Private 
Mashriq Urdu Karachi, Lahore, 145 NPT* 
Peshawar , Quetta 
Nawa-I-Waqt Urdu Lahore & Rawalpindi 100 Private 
Imroze Urdu Lahore & Multan 45 NPT 
Musawaat Urdu Lahore & Karachi 30 PPP 
Hurriyat Urdu Karachi 30 Private** 
Jasaarat Urdu Karachi 16 Jamaat-e- 
Islaami 
Pakistan English Lahore & Rawalpindi 63 NPT 
Times 
Dawn English Karachi 41 Private** 
The Sun English Karachi & Lahore 23 Private 
Morning News English Karachi 17 NPT 
NPT - National Press Trust (Government owned) 
** Owned by the Haroon Family 
RELIGION AND SOCIETY 
A major feature of Pakistani society, that is 
common to both rural and urban sectors, is the prominent 
position accorded to mosques and mazaars (spiritual centres) 
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which represent two distinct traditions in Islam. Although 
there institutional hierarchy of ordained priests 
in Islam, there are two groups of men in Pakistan who 
provide:. religious leadership and often function as priests. 
One is the body of men known collectively as the ulema, who 
are learned in Islamic theology and law and have tradition- 
ally provided what might be called the orthodox leadership 
of the community. The other is the collection of men often 
called Airs, who are associated with the mystical or de- 
votional side of Islam known as Sufism. -Both traditions 
are important in Pakistan. In the first the mosque plays 
a central role. Traditionally, the mosque had a maktab 
or madrassah (primary and secondary schools which imparted 
religious teaching in Arabic and Urdu) attached to it and 
although these have declined in number and standards with 
the spread of western-style education, 
77 these are never- 
theless important, particularly in the remote villages. 
The members of the Ulema are variously called maulanas, 
maulvis, imams and mullahs. The first title is accorded 
to those who have received special training in theology and 
law and represent a body of learned men. The other titles 
refer to those with varying degrees of knowledge of 
theology and who perform certain religious functions. 78 
Members of the Ulema control some 40,000 mosques all over 
the country. Their influence also extends into many aspects 
of local community life, through solemnising marriages, 
reading funeral prayers, etc. Since the mosque represents 
the moral authority of religion, it functions as a major 
instrument of social control. The Friday Khutbas (sermons) 
67 
have often emerged as a powerful instrument of opinion 
forming, particularly in the rural areas, but are by 
no means restricted to village life. 
Potentially, the Ulema through the mosques can 
wield formidable power. In practice, however, such power 
has been demonstrated only rarely, owing to a number of 
reasons. First and foremost, the predominantly Sunni 
Ulema are divided among themselves into several groups and 
movements. Several schools of thought can be discerned, 
such as the Ahle-Quran, Ahle-Hadith, Wahabi, Barelve, 
Deobandi, and so on. Thus the Sunni Ulema have not been 
sufficiently united to assert their power, unlike the 
Shia Ulema who in Pakistan and elsewhere (Iran) form a 
relatively closer-knit community. Second, unlike the 
Shias, who through the concept of Ijtihad, (independent 
exercise of judgement) were able to re-interptet Islam in 
the light of the modern world and its complexities and 
thus present Islam as a vibrant force relevant to the 
problems of the modern world, the Sunni ulema remained 
orthodox and rigid in their doctrine. This has meant that 
while the Sunni community reveres and seeks religious 
guidance from its Ulema, they do not necessarily seek or 
accept guidance on worldly matters to the extent that the 
Shia community perhaps does. Third, the ulema themselves 
have often preferred not to operate through mosques, and 
have attempted to exert pressure on successive governments 
through organising political parties, such as the Jamaat- 
e-Islaami, Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam and the Jamiat-e-Ulema- 
e-Pakistan, which have met with varying degrees of success. 
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In general, however, as one observer has pointed out, 
"The orthodox ulema..... have lacked 
the knowledge of the techniques of 
effective political action to enable 
them to take the offensive on behalf 
of a rigorous return to classical 
standards. " 79 
Nevertheless, on the rare occasions when the religious 
leadership has acted in concert, as for instance during 
the 1953 anti-Ahmeddiya disturbances, or in opposing Ayub 
Khan's family laws, the mosques emerged as formidable 
centres of political agitation. 
80 
Pirs and Sufism represent the mystical and devot- 
ional side of Islam common throughout the Islamic world 
but especially prevalent in the Indian sub-continent. 
Sufi 'saints' preached and popularised the word of Islam, 
creating systems of devotion which were built into spirit- 
ual orders (silajat). Innumerable tombs of the saints 
function as shrines and devotional centres. 
81 
In Sind, many 
of the feudal landlords are also Pirs, such as the Pir of 
Pagaro and the Pix of Hala. Additionally, in Sind, such 
'priesthood' is dynastic. The power wielded by such 
feudal aristocrats-cum-Pirs is considerable, a fact acknow- 
ledged by political parties like the Muslim League, which 
have sought the support of Pirs in order to obtain blocks 
of votes of their fanatical followers. Although chiefly 
characteristic of Sind, this phenomenon occurs throughout 
Pakistan. Pirs are viewed with suspicion, often derision 
by the orthodox ulema, but the two traditions nevertheless 
persist side by side throughout rural and urban Pakistan. 
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PARTY DEVELOPMENT IN PAKISTAN 
One of the most striking characteristics of 
Pakistani politics and perhaps the most important from 
our point of view, has been (and continues to be) the 
weakness and unstructured nature of its political parties. 
Party tradition in Pakistan is far from being well estab- 
lished, and has been relatively divisive. Many scholars 
have attributed the 'failure' of parliamentary democracy 
and the country's drift into military rule to the ineffect- 
iveness of its political parties. As one scholar has 
written: the 
"Main hindrances to the development of 
a parliamentary system in Pakistan were 
the absence of broad-based political 
parties and a lack of political leader- 
ship. " 82 
Mushtaq Ahmed writes in the same vein: 
"What went wrong with Pakistani democracy 
was not the character of the 1956 consti- 
tution or the parliamentary system - it 
was the failure of the unwritten consti- 
tution, namely the political parties, 
without which written constitutions tend 
to wither away. " 83 
An official inquiry conducted in 1960 into the question 
of the failure of parliamentary democracy put the major 
portion of the blame on the lack of leadership of well- 
organised and disciplined parties. 
84 
To some extent, the failure to establish a strong 
party tradition in Pakistan was due to the inability of 
its independence party, the Muslim League to set this 
tradition. 85 And here a comparison with the Indian ex- 
perience may be instructive. To begin with, Pakistan had 
no political institution comparable in organisational terms 
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to the Indian Congress Party. The difficulties which 
the League faced with the creation of Pakistan were 
colossal as compared to those faced by India. But the 
inadequacies of the League to meet the. tasks can be traced 
to'the circumstances under which it developed in pre- 
independence India. The Muslim League entered the politi- 
cal arena somewhat later than the Congress, but like the 
Congress it entered as an interest group with limited 
demands rather than as a comprehensive nationalist move- 
ment. And until the mid-Thirties, the League remained a 
small interest group, largely supported by landlords, high 
officials, and Muslim princes. It was in the years between 
1937 and 1940 that the League grew from a limited interest 
group to a mass movement. However, it was not until 1940 
that the League officially adopted the demand for 
Pakistan, but even then its programme remained vague. The 
League, - consequently, did not struggle for very long to 
win freedom. Its mass movement phase lasted only a few 
years and this was to exact a heavy price later. The long 
struggle of the Congress, (its mass movement phase spanned 
two decades), on the other hand, enabled it to develop 
as a cohesive, well-organised 'mass' party which preserved 
its own inner discipline reasonably well. Unlike the 
Congress, the League failed to develop organisational loyal- 
ties. It also did not have much experience in running pro- 
vincial governments as did the Congress. Although the 
League became "comprehensive" enough to have a mass 
following, it never built an effective organisation. It 
did virtually no work among trade unions or peasant 
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associations, nor did it encourage constructive work organ- 
isations as did Congress. And provinces, where it was 
strongest in. quality and organisation - Bombay, Bihar, 
the United Provinces - did not become part of Pakistan. 
In the early years, the League having almost no 
open political enemies to fight was involved with dividing 
the spoils of office among its adherents. Jinnah's death 
in 1948, just over a year after independence, deprived the 
League of the only leader who could have held it together. 
Factional struggles imperilled the unity of the League, - 
and soon the League organisation in the provinces virtually 
resolved itself into a chaotic tangle of small factions, 
each attached more to a person, or an interest, rather 
than representing a policy. The League made no attempt 
to appeal to a national public - it was, for example, un- 
representative of the great mass of rural poor and its 
organisation remained confined to the urban centres. More- 
over, from the inception of the state, the League, especial- 
ly in the East, wore an aristocratic label and thus lost 
much of its popular appeal. In the West too, it progress- 
ively became the monopoly of a class who aimed to use it 
for the realisation of its own political ambitions and 
the advancement of its economic interests. The organisation, 
particularly in the West, passed under the control of the 
landlords and the legislatures remained filled with their 
representatives. One illustration of the Muslim League 
government's concern with protecting landlord interests 
can be adduced from the fact that in Punjab, an Act was 
passed in 1950 under which 'a tenant can be ejected if 
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he is guilty of reading out. at a-public or private meeting 
the Punjab Muslim League Manifesto of 1944, in which land 
reforms have been vehemently advocated. '86 The Muslim 
League was repudiating its own programme. 
Opposition organisations emerged in reaction to 
a Muslim League party which could not and would not address 
itself to a national constituency. The Muslim League, 
fonts part, claiming to represent the Muslim nation and 
identifying itself with the state, viewed its opponents 
as "traitors" and all forms of dissent as "anti-state" and 
"foreign-inspired". It was such an attitude that estab-' 
lished the tradition of intolerance of opposition and a 
tendency to view all dissent as the result of foreign 
conspiracies attempting to undo the state. Such an atti- 
tude is best exemplified in a speech made by Liaqat Ali 
Khan: 
"As long as I am alive no political 
party will be allowed here. " 87 
Some of the Muslim Leaguers even went so far as to say 
that any Muslim who opposed the Muslim League had betrayed 
the cause of Islam itself. 
88 
This intolerance of opposit- 
ion, in fact, led to the banning of Abdul Ghaffar Khan's 
Red Shirt Organisation in NWFP in July, 1948, and may: 
have been a factor in outlawing the Communist Party of 
Pakistan in 1954.89 However, the strenuous techniques 
employed to frustrate the opposition only seemed to gene- 
rate greater antagonism. Sensing a threat to its pre- 
eminence, the Muslim League, as usual, insisted that it 
ruled by divine fiat and hence could not be displaced with- 
out at the same time, throwing the South Asian homeland 
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into shambles. However, such protestations were less and 
less successful after the deaths of Jinnah and Liaqat. 
With no one of like stature to succeed them, regional 
leaders soon fell to bickering among themselves and ex- 
posed the organisation's vulnerability to opposition att- 
acks from without and bureaucratic manipulation from 
within. By the end of 1954, the party had already reached 
its end but few of its remaining leaders had grasped the 
consequences. 
The Muslim League decline was sharp and precipi- 
tous. Just as constitution-making foundered on the 
question of East Bengal's claim to representation in 
consonance with its larger share of population, so too did 
the eastern wing play the important role in judging the 
Muslim League as inept and soon to be defunct. The League 
was routed in the 1954 provincial elections in East Bengal, 
by the United Front, a coalition of opposition parties. 
This accelerated the undermining of the Muslim League in 
the West. The Republican Party came into being there, and 
when this party sought to link up with the regional parties 
in the East, the League was hard pressed to maintain any 
kind of following. 
To summarise the experience of the League: once 
Pakistan was established, its raison d'etre disappeared and 
before it could discover another, Jinnah's death deprived 
it of his great moral authority. In the absence of agreed 
purpose or inspired leadership, the League disintegrated 
and was succeeded by a constellation of parties represent- 
ing small societies, appealing to more limited segments of 
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the national community. Although there was general 
agreement among party leaders that a parliamentary form 
of government was desirable, their diverse political com- 
mitments precluded the consensus essential to its 
smooth functioning. 
Apart from the Muslim League, Pakistan has had a 
plethora of parties such as the Republican Party, Awami 
League, National Awami Party, and the 'Ulema' parties. 
90 How- 
ever, most of these were coteries of groups; the multi- 
plicity of parties did not for the large part reflect 
difference in social and economic philosophy and policy 
(with the exception of the religious parties). Such or- 
ganisations as the parties claimed to possess, existed 
largely on paper. Parties depended largely on the popu- 
larity and influence of individual leaders rather than on 
any effective base. They were not solid organisations - 
but shifting combinations of members of parliamentary ass- 
emblies, rather like the parties in Eighteenth Century 
England: 
"Lists of members never agree and 
nobody knows from week to week who be- 
longs to what. A government attracts 
support if it looks like forming a 
government. " 91 
To a large extent parties (we are referring here 
I 
primarily to West Pakistan) were the personal following of 
large landowners, who marshalled their tenants to vote as 
they directed. This was probably one reason why a modern 
party system did not develop: there were too many pocket 
boroughs. The traditional, predominantly rural nature of 
Pakistani society as described above, meant that social 
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relations were organised by kinship; power and status 
were heirarchical; and political cleavages reflected 
customary and lineage ties to powerful landlords, pirs 
or tribal leaders. In this environment, political par- 
ties were little more thanlextensions of the influence 
and network of the locally dominant zamindars. Muslim 
' League politics - and Republican in due course - were 
built on alliances and rivalries of Legharis, Daultanas, 
Qizilbashes, Tiwanas and other leading feudal families in 
the Punjab; 
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of Talpurs and Khosos, Pirs and Mukhdooms 
in Sind, of Mazaris, Bugtis and Marris in Baluchistan, and 
the delicate balancing tribal interrelationships in the 
Frontier. Such parties resembled pre-party phenomena-- 
rather than "political parties" of the type associated with 
'modern' political systems. Thus social structural charac- 
teristics served to inhibit the development of 'modern' 
political parties. 
As a result of this, organisational loyalty re- 
mained poorly developed. Since political power was highly 
localised and fragmented, parties instead of building up 
their organisations or mass support, generally co-opted 
locally influentially leaders with their own group of 
supporters. Since local leaders were co-opted into the 
party, and did not join because they believed in the 
party's programme and ideology, they felt free to alter 
affiliation whenever they stood to gain by doing so. And 
since parties were composed of local leaders with their 
own followers, factionalism was rife; party differences were 
often based on factional/personality factors rather than on 
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matters of policy. Since rural factions were the parties' 
major sources of support, and the factional bases were 
local, it was difficult to build national political 
parties. Indeed, no party succeeded in developing as a 
national institution. Throughout'Pakistan's political 
history one theme is constant. Pakistan's political par- 
ties were regional and parochial in form and personal in 
performance. Changing party loyalties became a perennial 
feature of Pakistan's party system. One scholar has des- 
cribed parties in this way: 
"The political groups of Pakistan were, 
strictly speaking, not parties. They 
may have been on their way to becoming 
political parties but they were at best, 
centres of opinion, and at worst feudal 
clans, or phantom groups, or religious 
associations. " 93 
Keith Callard in a frequently quoted passage, made the 
following observation about the nature of parties: 
"The system of political parties in 
Pakistan bears little resemblance to that 
of most other democratic countries.... In 
Pakistan politics is made up of a large 
number of leading persons who, with their 
political dependants, form loose agreements 
to achieve power and to maintain it. Con- 
sequently rigid adherence to a policy or a 
measure is likely to make politicians less 
available for office. " 94 
Regular national general elections might have 
brought about a national outlook among at least some politi- 
cal parties, leading them to the. development of more cohe- 
sive structures and programmes, and thus may have helped 
to lay the foundation of a modern, mass-party based 
tradition. But this did not happen. Pakistan has had 
precious few elections. In the absence of a national 
77 
legislature elected directly by popular vote (until 1970), 
parties did not feel the necessity of turning their 
attention to the primary voter. In West Pakistan each 
province (except Baluchistan) had an adult suffrage elec- 
tion to elect their respective provincial legislatures but 
as the Electoral Reforms Commission reported: 
"It was widely and persistently com- 
plained that these elections (1951- 
53). were a farce, a mockery and a fraud 
upon the electorate. " 95 1 
. The Basic Democracy 
'elections' of 1959 and 1964 could 
hardly have been a more meaningful experience for the 
voters and parties than the provincial elections of dubious 
propriety during the 1950's. Indeed, the 1959 election took 
place in the absence of parties, since they were banned at 
the time. 
In evaluating party performance, it is important 
to remember that often, parties in Pakistan have operated 
under severe restrictions. Policies of repression adopted 
by successive regimes played their part in preventing 
parties from developing into broad-based national organ- 
isations. Imprisonment and harassment of party workers, 
periodic banning of some parties, such as the Jamaat-e- 
Islaami, the National Awami Party, disqualification of 
politicians through such instruments as PRODA96 and EBDO97 
censorship of the press and other media of communication, 
were hardly conducive to the development of parties. The 
restrictions on parties began in a systematic manner in 
1954. With the dissolution of the first constituent 
assembly, the civilian bureaucracy, backed by the military 
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establishment, became openly involved in the political 
life of the country. Thereafter, the activities of. 
political parties were largely circumscribed, and an 
attempt was made to impose a consensus on them by holding 
out the threat of martial law or a military-backed dic- 
tatorship. With the military coup in 1958, political 
parties were banned altogether, along with all other 
forms of political activity, and it was not until 1962, 
that the ban was lifted, and that too, partially. 
THE AYUB KHAN ERA 
The Ayub Khan era (1958-1969) saw the rise of 
both Zulfikar All Bhutto and his Pakistan Peoples Party. 
The main features of the era therefore, relevent to out 
purpose, need to be noted briefly. 
98 
Ayub Khan came to 
power in 1958 by ousting politicians who had lost the 
ability to work out stable coalitions, with the ostensible 
aim of replacing the immobilism and corruption of politi- 
cians with the speed and efficiency of the army. 
99 Few 
voiced dissatisfaction over the liquidation of parliament- 
ary government. The politicians were either held in contempt 
or were too distant from the general population to be 
missed. Ayub and the civil-military coalition that support- 
ed him saw the imperative need of the second decade of 
independence as more discipline, stability and security 
rather than mass mobilisation and participatory democracy. 
And since the relatively weak political forces of the 
country were incapable of resisting the army's power, its 
leadership could undertake the operation without worrying 
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about its possible high cost of uncertainty. For almost 
a decade, Ayub's leadership gave Pakistan relative 
political stability and a coherent public policy. But for 
all these 'successes', Pakistan at the end of Ayub's decade 
remained what it was at the beginning: a politically 
divided, economically poor, and militarily vulnerable 
state. What is more important is that Ayub's policies 
generated widespread social, economic and political dis- 
content, unprecedented in its magnitude, and from which 
both Bhutto and his PPP were to benefit. 
In the political field, Ayub considered the pre- 
valent forms of democracy too complex to be operated success- 
fully by the simple illiterate peoples of Pakistan. What 
was needed was a system more suited to the 'genius' of the 
Pakistani nation. This was presented as the system of 
'Basic' Democracy, (B. D. ) which was, Ayub's version of 
a '. guided' or 'controlled' democracy. 
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Through this 
system, Ayub sought the support of what he called "the hard 
core of the nation", the rural majority, and attempted to 
exclude from political power, the urban middle class - 
which was the source of opposition to him and his system. 
The chief motive behind the B. D. system was to build 
support at lower levels primarily through patronage and 
distribution of favours among the rural elite and the 
establishment of channels of communication with them. 
The large and middle landlords in West Pakistan and the 
surplus farmers, in the East, were the major beneficiaries 
of the B. D. scheme. It was from these categories that the 
majority of the B. D. 's were drawn. The underlying 
80 
assumption of such a strategy was that by mobilising 
support from traditionally privileged sections of rural 
society, the regime could entrench itself for a long time 
to come. The "suitable" government for Pakistanis, 
maintained Ayub, was one which consulted with only those 
localised, Ayub-designated rural elites through the 
Basic Democracies scheme. 
Free from popular or political limitations on its 
powers, the civil-military elite under Ayub, set its 
sights on the building of a "modern" nation. Economic 
growth was accorded top priority - and the official , 
Pakistani doctrine was one of functional inequality i. e. 
income inequality was considered a necessary evil in the 
drive towards rapid economic development, and growth was 
put before equality. During the period from October 1958 
to March 1969, Pakistan experienced an economic growth 
that was spectacular for Asia in gross, quantitative 
terms, but which occurred within a context of increasing 
economic inequality between a minute upper class on the 
one hand and a small middle class and the masses on the 
other hand. The strategy of development followed aimed 
at creating an industrial entrepreneur class capable of 
bringing about rapid industrialisation. Ayub's approach 
to economic development was marked by the fostering of 
a private sector through state subsidies, concessions, tax- 
holidays and other incentives, emphasising gross economic 
increase without regard to income redistribution or other 
considerations of social justice. 
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By 1968, twenty families, who constituted the 
industrial elite, were said to control 66 percent of all 
industrial capital, 97 percent of insurance funds and 
80 percent of banking. 
101 These "industrial robber barons" 
were the-logical outcome. of Ayub's policies of industrial 
development (in the west) which was based on the philosophy 
of what Gustav Papanek called "the social utility of 
greed". 
102 The costs of change - were squarely placed 
upon those who could least afford to carry it. The social 
impact of this kind of capitalist expansion which created 
(or accentuated) income inequalities between classes, 
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cannot be overemphasised. 
It was clear that the main beneficiaries of 
Ayub's 'Decade of Development' were the new industrialist- 
and business class in the urban, and the traditional elite 
in the rural areas. Ayub's economic policies resulted 
not only in depriving the rural landless (and land-poor) 
of the fruits of rapid economic growth, but also adversely 
affected industrial workers (see below). Such neglect 
was to have a profound political impact as this increasing- 
ly impoverished rural and urban working class was to 
demand greater, more equitable distribution. Ayub's 
policies also led to the expansion of urban and small-town 
professional classes, thus increasing the strength of the 
groups bitterly opposed to his rural-biased political sys- 
tem, and consolidating the politicising new social forces, 
ready perhaps for mobilisation by a new political party. 
Another effect of Ayub's economic policies was to 
widen regional disparities. During the third plan period 
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(1965-70) economic disparity between East and West 
Pakistan in per capita terms rose from 46% to 60%104 
Frustration with Ayub's political system and economic 
policies sharpened regional loyalties not only in East 
Pakistan, but also in Sind, Baluchistan and the NWFP, 
where opposition to the 'one-unit' scheme intensified. The 
growing economic disparity between the two wings plus the 
continued dominance of West Pakistan power elites in the 
policy-making structure of Pakistan served to strengthen 
latent Bengali nationalism. Bengalis remained seriously 
underrepresented in the civil bureaucracy and the military. 
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The political opposition in Bengal compläined bitterly that 
Ayub had virtually turned East Pakistan into a "colony" of 
West Pakistan. 
Discontent with Ayub's system first became apparent 
during the 1965 presidential 'election', in which the 
Combined Opposition Party candidate, Miss Jinnah, was able 
to win a respectable 36% of the emotes cast, despite the 
biased nature of Ayub's electoral system 
? 06This discontent, 
however, gained momentum in the aftermath of Pakistan-'s 
disastrous war with India in September 1965. While 
severe recurrent droughts in the mid-sixties brought to a 
virtual halt the rapid advance in the agricultural sector, 
the 1965 war had an equally adverse impact on the urban 
economy. Against this background) the Tashkent agreement 
in which Ayub agreed to re-establish relations with India 
(which was interpreted by the political opposition in the 
West as a sell-out of the Kashmiris and a humiliating 
capitulation before the Indians) began a period of political 
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ferment which was to culminate in the challenge to the 
Ayubian system in 1968-69 (discussed in the following 
P 
chapter). 
The Ayub Khan era gave rise to widespread 
discontent amongst various strata of the population. The 
cause of disaffection varied from group to group, but the 
alienated groups as a whole formed a wide spectrum. They 
included urban dissidents (intellectuals, lawyers, teachers, 
journalists, lower government servants, students and the 
newly mobilised urban-proletariat) who resented Ayub's 
paternalism and interpreted his rural bias - as reflected 
in the B. D. system - as a scheme not only to deny them 
access to political power but also as a means of entrench- 
ing himself; industrial workers who saw their real wages 
declining'07 and who viewed the denial of their rights 
to strike and better pay as a result not only of a lack 
of distributive capabilities of the system, but also, 
of the regime working hand in glove with vested interests; 
the Ulema, who distrusted the regime for its modernising 
activities (e. g. family planning, family laws); and the 
'Leftists' who opposed Pakistan's continued membership in 
western military pacts, (SEATO, CENTO) and the regime's, 
unabashed, unmitigated, capitalist-oriented planning. This 
discontent was to find expression in the anti-Ayub move- 
ment - which culminated in the collapse of the Ayub regime. 
It is apparent that Ayub made economic development, 
without social justice, the major national goal, and the 
civilian bureaucracy the main instrument of governance. 
Emphasis on rapid growth rather than distribution created 
social tensions, by fostering income inequality between 
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classes and exacerbated the problem of East-West integra- 
tion, by widening regional inequalities. 
The link between landed interests and the civil- 
military bureaucracy was reinforced in the Ayub era by the 
grant of land to civilian and military officers, 
108 
who there- 
by became substantial landowners in their own right when 
they were not already. 
109 Additionally, leading landowning 
groups established and maintained close family links with 
high ranking army officers and bureaucrats through inter- 
marriages. 
110 The civil-military bureaucracy was however, 
not only recruited from a narrow social base, but from a 
specific regional area - the Punjab. This helps to explain 
why the most powerful challenge to the dominant bureaucrat- 
ic-military oligarchy has come primarily from regionally- 
based opposition movements, in East Bengal, Sind, Baluchis- 
tan and the NWFP. 
The industrial elite fostered by Ayub's policies 
popularly known as 'twenty-two families', but which in actual 
fact consists of about forty families, were for the most 
part, Gujarati-speaking refugees from India. belonging to 
Shia trading communities. 
111 The industrial elite has been 
linked to the civilian and military bureaucracy (and indirect- 
ly to the landed elite) in the form of joint partnerships, 
which were promoted during the Ayub and Yahya regimes. 
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These partnerships were formed principally between retired 
generals or central civil service personnel and industrialists; 
the former provided the contacts and licenses required for 
business purposes, and the latter the capital and managerial 
talent required to make the business successful. The industrial 
elite is also linked to senior military officers, bureaucrats and 
85 
landlords through inter-marriages, a link which has nqt 
been documented by writers on Pakistan. 
113 
CONCLUSION 
Few governments created since World War II have 
had greater problems in establishing and maintaining their 
authority than Pakistan. By 1971, Pakistan had experienced 
and experimented with various types of rule - it had under- 
gone eleven years of civilian government (1947-58) and 
thirteen years of military-led regimes (1959-71). But 
Pakistan was not able to develop a form of government, and 
the necessary institutions and processes required to 
support it, which endured beyond the political 'life' of 
a dominant leader. The 'Great Leader' phenomenon appeared 
to have become a continuing feature of political life. The 
personal approach to governing, begun with Jinnah became 
a political tradition. It has been pointed out that 
Pakistan is "a country whose political culture almost 
guarantees the rise of a single leader. , 
114 The Pakistani 
political system has always been dominated by a single 
personality, who with the help of the civil and military 
bureaucratic machinery, has attempted to grapple with the 
basic problems of national survival. Jinnah, Liaqat, 
Ghulam Mohammed, Iskander Mirza, Ayub Khan, were such 
leaders, and although they came from different backgrounds 
and subscribed to different political and ideological 
positions, they neither sought nor did anything to change 
the country's dependence on strong one-man government. 
The coup of 1958 inaugurated an extended period of martial 
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law followed by an exceptional manifestation of bureau- 
cratic government under Ayub Khan. Ayub's failure was 
written large in the policies of Yahya Khan and the re- 
sultant political weaknesses that led to the debacle of 
Bangladesh in 1971. The country passed through several 
sequences where its existence as an independent national 
entity was seriously questioned - and then eroded in 1971. 
Its primary dilemma lay within itself and essentially in 
its inability to develop sound representative political 
institutions. Bureaucratic government meant giving pre- 
eminence to the administered state, over the political 
nation. Political institutions were allowed to atrophy to 
the point where national political leaders - let alone 
national political parties, had little chance of develop- 
ing. Accompanying this was political discontent and social 
frustration - unfulfilled promises and unsatisfied demands. 
This - political impotence and administrative dominance and 
military rule - is the babkground against which the emergence 
of the PPP must be seen. It is also all the commentary 
needed on Pakistan's political tradition. 
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II 
I BHUTTO AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE PAKISTAN PEOPLES PARTY 
1967-1969 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the rise 
of the PPP, the milieu in which it emerged, the part played 
by its founder, Bhutto, and the social and economic trans- 
formations related to the party's subsequent growth and 
development. We are concerned, then with the circumstances 
that led to the birth of the party in 1967 and the role 
played by the party and its leader in building up oppo- 
sition to the Ayub regime in 1968-1969. 
The impetus for the creation of the PPP came from 
Bhutto, who was an established public figure much before 
he came to found the party. In so far as the party was 
build around the personal popularity of a single indivi- 
dual, it did not represent a complete break with Pakistani 
political tradition, as its leaders claimed or as suggested 
by writers such as H. A. Rizvi. 
1 As indicated in the 
preceding chapter, politics in Pakistan has been much the 
politics of personalities, with political parties often 
representing little more than the personal following of 
certain leaders. But while the PPP originated primarily 
as Bhutto's vehicle, to be utilised in his campaign to 
dislodge Ayub Khan from power, the emergence of the party 
and its subsequent growth were closely bound up with the 
general process of modernisation and came to reflect the 
socio-economic changes set in by Ayub Khan's policies of 
industrialisation and economic development. As we shall 
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see below, without the economic and social deprivations 
that arose during Ayubian rule, the Bhutto phenomenon 
and the PPP would not have become such a significant 
force in 1968-69 and later in 1970. Bhutto's remark at 
the time that "nothing that I might say or do can possibly 
stir the masses in any way unless the objective situation 
was there"2, was more than political rhetoric. As such 
the PPP was also a product of the changing character of 
West Pakistan society of the late 1960's. 
Since the emergence of the PPP cannot be under- 
stood without directing attention to its founder, it is 
necessary to begin with a brief account of Bhutto's public 
career, political views and tactics in order to gain a 
comprehensive picture of how it was that he came to found 
a new party in an environment in which there were already 
a plethora of parties. (See Appendix B for political 
parties of the period 1968-1969). 
BHUTTO: BACKGROUND AND EARLY CAREER 
It is not intended to write a detailed profile 
of Bhutto, 
3 but to mention the salient features of his 
career relevant to this thesis, and to suggest, if not to 
emphasise the prominence he acquired in Ayub Khan's adminis- 
tration. 
Bhutto came from an aristocratic wadera (Sindhi 
feudal) family of Sind. His father, Sir Shahnawaz Bhutto 
was an eminent political figure of his time, a leading 
member of a clan of wealthy zamindars, and a community 
leader who had acquired the reputation of being a spokesman 
I 
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of Sind in British India. 
4 He was appointed to various 
official positions by the British. He was a member of 
the old Imperial Council and minister of the Government 
of Bombay, besides having worked -as adviser to the 
Governor of Sind, being chairman of the Bombay Provincial 
Committee and a member of the Public Service Commission 
for Bombay and Sind. He was a delegate to the Round 
Table Conference in 1931 and 1932 and member of the Bombay 
Provincial Simon Committee. 
5 Many Imperial distinctions 
were conferred upon Bhutto's father6 and in 1930, he was 
knighted for being "the most influential zamindar in Sind.. 
.. (who had) constantly and effectively exercised 
influence 
in support of the Government. 
7 It was Shahnawaz's 
campaign for the separation of Sind from the old Bombay 
Presidency -a demand which the British conceded in 
1935 - that gave the Bhutto family added prominence in 
Sindhi politics. Indeed, as Bhutto once claimed, his 
father's campaign for the separation of Sind on the basis 
of its Muslim identity in many essential aspects, "contained 
the germs of the two-nation theory propounded by Jinnah 
for the partition of India. "8 However, despite this 
achievement, Shahnawaz lost the election to the Sind 
Legislative Assembly in 1937 -a defeat which his son 
later attributed to betrayals and jealousy on the part of 
his father's feudal chieftan friends. 
9 In 1947, Shahnawaz 
moved to Junagadh, a small princely state, and became 
the Divan (Prime Minister). Under Jinnah's direction, he 
advised the Muslim ruler to opt for Pakistan when the 
transfer of power took place. However, agitations by the 
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predominantly Hindu, pro-Congress population forced the 
ruler to abdicate in 1947, and Shahnawaz left for his 
ancestral home'in Larkana (Sind) with his family. 
10 
The young Bhutto was brought up in this colonial - 
though highly politicised milieu. Referring to this 
background, Bhutto once described himself thus: 
"Although by birth I am an agricul- 
turalist and by education a lawyer.... 
It is politics above all that inspires 
me and kindles in me the flame of a 
lasting romance .... my association with 
politics is rooted in my environment. 
I come from a politically saturated 
district in which my family played a 
prominent part. Politics was the milk 
given to me at birth...... " 11 
According to Bhutto, he was raised in an atmosphere per- 
vaded by "wadera politics", and it was "naturally assumed 
that I would be in politics. "12 The Bhutto home at 
Larkana was frequented by leading Sindhi feudal politicians 
from influential families such as the Soomros, Talpurs, 
Jatois of Nawabshah and Mehar, Syeds of Nawabshah, and 
Bijaranis. 13 As a boy, Bhutto was exposed to the 
feudal politics of alliance-making, faction-building and 
manoeuvre with his father schooling him in the art of 
developing links with members of the Sindhi squirearchy, 
and introducing him to the waderas and political barons 
of Larkana and Sind. 
14 
Such connections were to prove 
extremely useful, when Bhutto later sought to launch his 
own political party. 
Bhutto received his education at the highest 
seats of learning in the United States and England, in 
Los Angeles at the University of Southern California and 
in Berkeley at the University of California from where he 
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graduated in 1950 with Honours in Political Science, 
and at Christ Church, Oxford, where in 1952, he re- 
ceived a post-graduate degree in Jurisprudence. He was 
called to the Bar in London at Lincolns Inn in 1953 and 
was then appointed Lecturer in International Law at 
Southampton University. 
On his return to Pakistan, he taught Constitutional 
Law at the Sind Muslim Law College at Karachi, and at 
about the same time, 1954-1958, practised as a barrister 
at the Sind High Court in Karachi. It was at this junc- 
ture that Bhutto became involved in Sindhi politics by 
joining the opposition to the 'one-unit' scheme. 
15 But 
Bhutto did not wish to launch his political career as a 
regional leader, and in this he was guided by his father 
who "had a broad vision, and the role he envisaged (for 
me) was (as a national leader).... otherwise I would have 
gone into the direction of regionalism, localism, pro- 
vincialism, zatism (castism), and biradarism........ since 
every Pakistani in order to be a politician goes in that 
direction. "16 Thus Bhutto quickly extricated himself 
from the politics of regionalism surrounding the 'one- 
unit' controversy. 
Elite politics rather than popular politics was 
to be Bhutto's first route to public position. In Septem- 
ber 1957, thanks to his father's friendship with 
President Iskander Mirza, Bhutto, then twenty-nine, was 
selected as a member of the Pakistani delegation to the 
United Nations, where he delivered his first speech before 
17 an international assembly on "Defining Aggression". 
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Soon after, in March 1958, he represented Pakistan at 
the Law of the Sea Conference at Geneva. 
18 Bhutto, who 
by now had shown considerable talent, energy and ambition 
was appointed Minister of Commerce at the age of thirty 
(making him one of the youngest cabinet ministers in 
the history of the sub-continent) in Iskander Mirza's 
cabinet in October 1958. Later, in the same month, when 
Iskander Mirza was deposed by Ayub, Bhutto was retained 
in the same post by the new regime. In January 1960, 
he was given the Ministry of Minority'Affairs as well as 
National Construction and Information, and three months 
later took charge of the additional portfolio of Fuel, 
Power and Natural Resources. 
19 It was at this time that 
he visited Moscow and negotiated an oil agreement with the 
Soviet Union, an event that is said to have inaugurated - 
largely at Bhutto's instance - the era of friendly ties 
with the Russians. 
20 This and other such agreements pro- 
vided Bhutto with good initial preparation for the port- 
folio that he coveted: foreign affairs. In January 1963, 
upon the death of Mohammed All Bogra, he became Foreign 
Minister. This reinforced Bhutto's belief that he was 
destined to play a decisive role in his country's history - 
a belief that he did little to disguise, then as before. 
21 
Two broad aspects of Bhutto's association with 
the Ayub regime need to be noted: his relatively more 
publicised role as foreign minister and his somewhat less- 
publicised, but varied experience in domestic politics, 
in terms of organising a political party, learning about 
feudal politics and serving as Ayub's personal confidant 
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in domestic policy matters. It is important to note 
at. the outset that while Bhutto's views on an appropriate 
foreign policy 'for Pakistan were clearly articulated and 
coherently set forth in his writings of the period - as 
for instance in The Quest for Peace and Myth of Independence, 
22 
his views on aspects of domestic politics, in marked con- 
trast, appear ambivalent. Of course, in this period, 
Bhutto's major preoccupation was foreign policy, but des- 
pite this, and especially since, as we shall see below, he 
did serve the regime in various capacities related to 
domestic policy, his failure to enunciate his political 
views on the domestic political system (other than in the 
most general terms by defending the Ayubian system) as 
clearly and lucidly as his foreign policy doctrine, suggests 
among other things, his lack of commitment to any particu- 
lar dogma or ideology, and more importantly his strategy, 
as his sights were set on his future political career, of 
keeping open the widest possible options. Certainly, 
there is no record of his enunciating any socialist prin- 
ciples, either publicly or in private, 
23 
despite his 
later claims that he disagreed with Ayub on domestic 
issues such as "the concentration of wealth, the theory 
of creating barons of capital" and "ignoring the working 
class. "24 Bhutto's later socialist views are discussed 
below; here it is sufficient to note that his claim that 
his commitment to socialism was an old one which found its 
origin in the grotesque poverty of Sind, as reported by 
a number of writers25 appears to possess little credibility 
in the absence of any trace of socialist thinking either 
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in his early writings and speeches or performance as a 
member of Ayub's administration. 
Bhutto's foreign policy doctrine as reflected 
in his writings, was, in the main, concerned with pointing 
out that in an era of super-power domination and neo- 
colonialism, smaller developing nations should be wary of 
trying to placate or of always supporting one of the 
klobal powers, but should constantly function within en- 
lightened self-interest. Insofar as Bhutto spoke of the 
dangers of neo-colonialism and of the need to withdraw 
from western military pacts, his views can be said to have 
had a leftist orientation, but can more appropriately be 
termed nationalistic. Bhutto frequently declared at 
various public forums that he would never allow Pakistan 
to become subservient to any Great Power. He argued for 
and attempted to bring about a shift in regional relation- 
ships towards rapprochement with the Soviet Union and China 
with an attendant withering away of American influence and 
economic assistance. He gradually became identified as 
the architect of friendly relations with China and with 
the move away from close dependence on the United States 
26 
This brought him a considerable measure of personal 
popularity, particularly amongst youth and students, who 
not only viewed China as a powerful friend who came down 
fairly and squarely on Pakistan's side (unlike the Americans) 
over the Kashmir question but saw it in a much broader 
context - as an example that Pakistan would do well to 
emulate; the example of a poor nation, courageously work- 
ing out its own salvation without help from others and 
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systematically putting its own house in order by disci- 
pline, unity and hard work. 
27 
Bhutto also became well known for his anti-Indian 
stance. Indeed he created a conscious image of himself as 
a champion of confrontation with India. His public state-, 
ments and particularly his emotionally charged speeches 
before the Security Council and elsewhere identified him 
with a militant posture towards India and in favour of the 
liberation of Kashmir's Muslims from Indian hegemony. This 
again appealed particularly to the youth, who, in contrast 
to their elders (who by and large, having witnessed the 
trauma of partition, wished to avoid further acrimony 
and bloodshed), appeared to be more emotionally involved 
with the issue of Kashmir's liberation. What further 
helped Bhutto acquire personal popularity was the wide public- 
ity. givep to his nationalist views in the official media 
and the fact that he was presented by the regime as a 
youthful, brilliant, dynamic foreign minister relentlessly 
campaigning against India and fighting a "Thousand year 
war" for justice. His impassioned speech before the Security 
Council in 1965, in which he had referred- to the Indians 
as "dogs", for instance, was always recalled with great 
pride by chauvinistic Pakistanis and his youthful 
admirers. 
28 
What added to his popularity amongst students 
and the intelligentsia was that he himself was a repre- 
sentative of the educated and determined young generation. 
It would not be in error to suggest that he was a figure 
that the educated youth and the intelligentsia could 
identify with in a regime otherwise known for its anti- 
intellectualism. 29 
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Although Bhutto achieved public prominence and 
popularity as foreign minister, his experience in the 
domestic domain provided him with the necessary grounding 
for the political role that he was to assume later. Such 
experiences were wide and varied, ranging from his member- 
ship of the cabinet sub-committee which studied the Report 
of the Constitutional Commission (1961), 
30 
and in which 
Bhutto gave his unqualified support to the principles of 
the 1962 constitution - despite his later condemnation of 
the whole exercise - to his role in advising Ayub to take 
over the chain of newspapers owned by Progressive Papers 
Limited in an effort to suppress criticism of the govern- 
ment. 
31 On such occasions, the views expressed by Bhutto 
scarcely established him as a democrat championing the 
cause of political liberty or freedom of speech. Indeed, 
as a member of the cabinet committee, Bhutto's views 
corresponded closely with Ayub's32 and he supported the 
strongly authoritarian presidential form of government based 
on a restricted franchise (the Basic Democrat system, 
discussed later) which was later operationalised in the 
1962 constitution. 
33 Further, Bhutto was reported to have 
been closely associated with Ayub's decision to introduce 
press censorship. 
34 
Additionally, he was also reported to 
have advised Ayub in 1961, in his capacity as member of the 
cabinet sub-committee which examined the Constitution 
Commission Report, to set up a one party state by merging 
the party and the civil administration in order to create 
a new political structure based on a mixture of coercion 
and persuasion. 35 Later-when Bhutto condemned the Ayubian 
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political system as a "disguised form of fascism", he 
justified his earlier support of such an authoritarian 
arrangement by arguing that at the time he felt anything 
was worth trying that would end political chaos and 
instability that was humiliating Pakistan in the eyes of 
the world - particularly in contrast to the stability of 
neighbouring India. 
36 
For the present purpose it is necessary to emphasise 
two aspects of Bhutto's experience with domestic politics 
which had an important bearing on his subsequent political 
career. These are his involvement in organising Ayub's 
Convention Muslim League and his personal rivalry with the 
Nawab of Kalabagh. When Ayub decided to organise his own 
political party in 1962 - or, to be more precise revive the dor- 
mant Muslim League, he appointed Bhutto as secretary 
general. 
37 This post, which Bhutto later said he did not 
want, 
38 
enabled him to establish important political links 
and to gain a useful insight into the dynamics of Pakistani 
politics. Exposed to the feudal machinations and the poli- 
tical horse trading that were characteristic of the League, 
he learnt important lessons in power-broking, feudal 
alliance-making and patronage politics. The Convention 
Muslim League was a patrimonially-led, patronage party par 
excellence, with Ayub dominating the party, nominating the 
members of the key central bodies, and utilising patron- 
age to cement the party organisation. 
39 When Bhutto 
organised his own party later, it was to bear a striking 
resemblance in terms of these features to Ayub's party. 
40 
And Bhutto was also able to draw lessons from the failings 
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of the Convention Muslim League, particularly its weak- 
ness vis a vis its lack of a mass base. 
41 But besides 
gaining experience in party organisation, Bhutto'estab- 
lished personal links with several notables and attempted 
to create his own group of supporters. This can be 
adduced by the fact that on one occasion he was chided 
by Ayub Khan for ! 'putting in his own cronies" in the 
Muslim League organisation. 
42 Many of Bhutto's ex-Muslim 
League friends, such as Pir Ghulam Rasool Shah, Mustafa Khar, 
Jatoi, and Fazal Elahi, were to later join him when he 
organised his own party. 
The mutual antagonism and rivalry between Bhutto 
and Ayub's governor of the Punjab, the Nawab of Kalabagh, 
also afforded Bhutto the opportunity of forging links with 
political notables. Kalabagh, during the course of his 
Governorship (1960-1966) had acquired the reputation of 
being a dictatorial person who disliked opposition and 
had no hesitation in crushing those who attempted to 
oppose him or who had offended him. 
43 
Although Bhutto's 
official position in the Ayub administration was in no 
sense comparable to Kalabagh's as to have given rise to 
rivalry between them, both competed for Ayub's favour and 
confidence and personally disliked one another -a dislike 
that was based more on a personality clash than a Sindhi- 
Punjabi collision. 
44 
As a consequence of this rivalry, 
those who had suffered at Kalabagh's hands, in one way 
or another, rallied around Bhutto for protection and 
favours. 45 There were three reasons for this: first, 
it was generally accepted that Bhutto enjoyed Ayub's trust 
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and confidence - indeed, there were wide speculations 
that Ayub was grooming Bhutto to be his successor. 
46 Second, 
since the Bhutto-Kalabagh antagonism was a well-known 
fact, anti-Kalabagh elements knew they would find a 
sympathetic response from Bhutto. And third, Bhutto 
consciously made himself easily accessible to such indi- 
viduals, and went out of his way to accommodate and help 
them. 
47 
Bhutto had evidently learnt that governmental of- 
fice was a great client-creating resource, and he cleverly 
manipulated the anti-Kalabagh groups to his own political 
advantage. It is reported that a year before he left 
Ayub's cabinet he began 'sounding' people in the Muslim 
League and the government opposed to Kalabagh in an effort 
to rally personal support. 
48 
It was on a foreign policy issue - Tashkent - that 
Bhutto broke with the regime that he had served for eight 
years. 
49 
The outcome of the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 
marked the beginning of a parting of ways between Bhutto 
and Ayub. 
50 In retrospect, whether Bhutto's disillusion- 
ment with Ayub rose out of the poor conduct of the war and 
the subsequent 'surrender' at Tashkent, 
51 
or whether Bhutto 
with consumate political skill wanted to disassociate 
himself from a regime that had become increasingly un- 
popular, 
52 is a question that may never be answered. What 
is undoubtedly true is that the ceasefire in September 
1965 and the Tashkent agreement brought him his severest 
disappointment as well as the highest pinnacle of popular- 
ity that he had yet achieved. The Tashkent declaration 
restoring the status quo in Kashmir, had been the occasion 
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for widespread students' riots in the towns throughout 
West Pakistan in January-February 1966.53 This had been 
put down by a firm show of force for fear of its spread- 
ing to infect the armed forces who were thought to be 
restive over the cease-fire agreement. The demonstrations 
that followed the Tashkent declaration were the immediate 
outburst of a dazed people, who had been led by years of 
official propaganda to believe in the military superiority 
of Pakistan vis a vis India. Although every political 
party in the opposition tried to cash in on the general 
unrest the agitation remained leaderless - perhaps giving 
Bhutto the cue, and the nation a foretaste of the greater 
storm that was to be let loose two years later. 
Bhutto, who was present at Tashkent, was believed 
to have strongly opposed the settlement and his departure 
from the government shortly afterwards gave currency to 
this view, along with the idea that his departure was 
the price demanded by the United States for the resumption 
of aid. 
54 Bhutto deplored the Tashkent Agreement, because, 
as he was later to declare, he believed that what was won 
on the battlefield was lost at the conference table. 
Whether Bhutto drew a timely lesson from the manifestation 
of public discontent in the streets with Ayub's performance 
at Tashkent or not, it was obvious that Bhutto was con- 
vinced that Tashkent had sealed the fate of the Ayub 
government. This surely was the most opportune moment to 
leave the government and reap a political harvest. Bhutto, 
after all, professed to believe in the dictum that "when 
events change, men must change with the events, " and that 
"consistency was the virtue of small minds. ""55 
4 
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Ayub's popularity declined sharply after the 1965 
war and Tashkent. When Bhutto proceeded on 'long leave' 
never to return to his post in the Ayub cabinet, a 
delicate situation had already built up. This sprang 
from the widely held belief that it was Bhutto who, in 
September-1965 and thereafter, had displayed the greater 
resolution. His image as the young and forceful foreign 
minister who, at the Security Council, had defied India, 
occupied a large place in the public mind. By contrast, 
Ayub was felt to have given away too much at Tashkent. 
After Tashkent, Bhutto remained in office for another six 
months and then finally left in June 1966, having resigned 
his Muslim League post earlier, in March. 
56 After Bhutto's 
official exit from the Ayub cabinet, in June 1966, he 
proceeded by train from Rawalpindi to his ancestral home 
in Larkana. At intermediate stopping places throughout 
his journey he was given tremendous ovations and a 
hero's reception. The sympathy expressed for him, mostly 
by students and young people was intense, since his un- 
ceremonious departure together with (later) official 
harassment and persecution was symptomatic of the treat- 
ment that students themselves were receiving at the 
hands of the Ayub regime. Additionally, Bhutto capital- 
ised on the image he enjoyed of an inflexible champion 
of Pakistani rights, who had been 'sacrificed' by a 
corrupt and weak regime in deference to American wishes. 
The Ayub regime itself fell into Bhutto's trap, and 
did much to perpetuate this image. A leading minister 
of Ayub's cabinet, to give but one instance, accused Bhutto 
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of creating "unpleasant relations with American and 
western countries. "57 In addition, the government sought 
to discredit him in several ways58 -a factor which only 
served to increase his popularity by presenting him as a 
martyr, and did much to erase the embarrassing memory of 
his eight-year association with the Ayub regime. 
BACKGROUND TO THE FORMATION OF THE PPP 
The period between the departure of Bhutto from 
the cabinet and the formation of his own party (i. e. June 
1966 - November 1967) was for him one of calculated 
manoeuvre, to gauge the intentions of an increasingly hos- 
tile government, to understand the directions of public 
opinion and to test the strengths and weaknesses of the 
various opposition parties and leaders. It needs to be 
emphasised that Bhutto moved towards adopting a leftist 
political position and founding a 'socialist' party only 
after a careful reading of the country's economic and 
political situation, and after consultations with various 
political parties and groups - in the period June 1966 - 
June 1967. A number of factors appear to have influenced 
Bhutto in arriving at the decision to launch a new party 
and to adopt socialism as his political creed. These need 
to be examined in some detail. 
Initially, Bhutto explored the possibility of 
working within existing political parties. For instance, 
he spoke of creating a 'Forward Bloc' within Ayub's 
Convention Muslim League, a move that was unequivocally re- 
buff ed by the party stalwarts. 
59 He was also involved in 
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negotiations with the National Awami Party (NAP) and 
Daultana's Council Muslim League. 
60 Clearly, these par- 
ties were not willing to accept Bhutto as their leader, 
which aas the position he envisaged for himself. 
61 , Add- 
itionally, Bhutto, himself, regarded these parties with 
a measure of contempt. According to him, none of them 
measured up to his criteria in leadership, organisation or 
programme. 
62 Almost all the opposition leaders were men 
of parochial appeal and provincial stature, and their party 
organisations were riven by factionalism. 
While, on the one hand Bhutto was rebuffed by and 
disillusioned with existing parties, on the other hand he 
recognised the political potential of a disparate group 
of leftists, who were attracted by his vehemently, anti- 
imperialist and nationalist stance, and were now urging 
him to form a new party. 
63 This is not the place for a 
detailed review of the history of the Left in Pakistan, 
64 
but a few background features of these groups need to be 
noted here. First, leftist organisations in West Pakistan 
had had little continuity in terms of their existence. 
The Pakistan Communist Party (PCP) was banned in 1954 after 
a series of events involving the party. 
65 
Efforts to 
organise a Pakistan Socialist Party proved shortlived, 
with the party hampered by its secularism, by the earlier 
connections of its leaders to the Congress and Indian 
Socialist parties, and by the Hindu complexion of the party 
in East Pakistan. 66 Thereafter many members of the banned 
PCP and the moribund PSP joined and worked within 
"progressive parties" (such as the Azad Pakistan Party which 
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merged with similar leftist groups in 1954 to form the 
National Party; the National Awami Party formed by the mer- 
ger of the National Party with Bhashani's peasant movement 
in East Pakistan) the majority of which were regional in 
form, while others chose to work within trade unions. 
67 
Thus the Left persisted in a fragmented form, focused 
around particular groups of leaders, small groups of in- 
tellectuals, peasant organisers and trade unionists, rep- 
resenting remnants of earlier organisational spurts. Many 
members of these diverse groups such as J. A. Rahim, 
Mubashar Hasan, Mukhtar Rana, Mairaj Mohammed Khan, K. H. Meer, 
Taj Mohammed Langah and Sheikh Rashid, admired Bhutto for 
his unrelenting anti-imperialist campaign and attempted to 
persuade him to launch his own party. 
The urgings of such admirers coincided with Bhutto's 
own assessment that the changed economic and social real- 
ities of Pakistan of the mid-sixties required a new party 
with a message that would have a mass appeal. Such an 
assessment was based on a perceptive analysis of the social 
and political repercussions of Ayub's policy of vigorous 
economic development. In a society characterised by grow- 
ing disenchantment with the wide gulf between the abject 
poverty of the have-nots and the ostentatious living of 
the haves, Bhutto discerned that the most powerful rallying 
slogan would be one which addressed itself to the issue of 
economic deprivation. Bhutto not only recognised the 
importance of directing attention to the "exploited urban 
and rural working class", but sensed the growing resent- 
ment amongst urban professional intelligentsia and the 
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student community against the Ayubian political system. 
Indeed, in the Punjab, (and to a lesser extent ; in Sind) 
Bhutto was sought out by a number of 'progressive' groups 
amongst lawyers (through various bar associations) and 
students (through'student federations such as the Muslim 
Students' Federation and the National Students' Federation), 
who on account of Bhutto's unceremonious ouster from the 
Ayub cabinet following his opposition to the Tashkent 
declaration, viewed him as a progressive, -nationalist figure, 
symbolising their own resentment against the Ayubian system. 
Thus, Bhutto could discern that an amorphous constituency 
was beginning to congeal around him. These developments 
and the underlying economic and social tensions provided 
Bhutto the cue for his future strategy. The support of 
feudals and the politically influential was important, 
but as a consequence of the social and economic developments 
of the 1960's, any aspirant for political power must also 
appeal as a populist politician. 
68 Only a new party, 
according to Bhutto, could succeed in accommodating the 
emerging social groups and the new generation that had 
come of age in the country. 
69 
The socialist cry of equality was part of Bhutto's 
strategy aimed at gaining popular support, an ideological 
move assisted by such leftist intellectuals as J. A. Rahim 
and Mubashar Hasan. Thus Bhutto's emerging socialist 
beliefs were the result, less of ideological commitment, than 
of . 
his calculation that political success in the Pakistan 
of the late sixties required mass support. Or as one 
writer has pointed out, to Bhutto, socialism represented 
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an "ideology of protest" to be utilised in his attacks 
on the Ayub government, for he "was never really an. 
ideologically oriented political actor. "70 His espousal 
of socialism thus represented an opportunistic response to 
what he saw as the "central theme of Asia", that of "up- 
heaval and change. "71 Privately, and particularly to his 
conservative, feudal followers, he is reported to have 
explained that his espousal of socialism was necessary to 
prevent more radical leaders from capitalising on the 
social and economic tensions, which would only bring vio- 
lence and bloodshed. 
72 
Just as Bhutto's move towards socialism had occur- 
red gradually, so too did his elaboration of the kind of 
socialism he professed to believe in. Although he adopt- 
ed a socialist orientation in his attacks on the govern- 
ment, his vision of socialism at this stage remained vague. 
However, he made it clear at the outset that: 
"We do not advocate the communist kind 
of socialism...... we stand for a social- 
ism which is compatible with our own 
conditions. " 
In emphasising that his brand of socialism was not of a 
militant, atheistic variety, Bhutto was taking full cog- 
nizance of Pakistan's Islamic identity. He was cautious 
not to preach anything that might appear to contravene 
Quranic teachings. Bhutto's personal views on Islam were 
ambivalent - he was in no sense religious-minded, but 
acknowledged Pakistan's Islamic heritage and identity, and 
believed passionately in the two-nation theory. 73 It would 
not be wrong to suggest that Bhutto, like other Pakistani 
leaders such as Jinnah, Liaqat and Ayub, had an essentially 
117 
secular outlook, but one qualified by the need to find 
a place for Islam in the Pakistani state and society, 
which arose from the recognition of Pakistan's Muslim 
identity. Bhutto was aware that socialism would have to 
be tailored to the country's prevailing and dominant 
Islamic ethos, and he was also aware of how earlier attempts 
(by the traditional left) at using socialist ideology had 
been hampered by its open secularism. Therefore, he in- 
eluded Islam as an integral part of his emerging ideology. 
In his speeches, he stressed the compatibility between 
Islam and Socialism, by, interpreting socialism in terms 
of Islamic musawaat (egalitarianism). 
74 However, it was 
, not until 
he had formed his party, that he fully elaborated 
his concept of the congruency between Islam and socialism. 
In September 1967, Bhutto announced his decision 
to form a new party dedicated to "democracy, independent 
foreign policy and a socialist pattern of economy': , Bhutto was 
75 careful to stress that his party's socialism would be reformist. 
In the intervening period between this announcement and 
the party's inaugural convention in November 1967, Bhutto 
moved on several fronts simultaneously. He entrusted 
several intellectual leftists, notably J. A. Rahim, 
Mubashar Hasan and K. H. Meer, with the task of drawing up 
the party''s_programmat. ic and ideological documents - under 
of course, his personal supervision. 
76 Others, notably 
his personal followers and friends such as Khar and Talpur, 
were given the task of 'sounding' politically notable 
people (zamindars for the most part), an effort which met 
with little success, for those who were sympathetic to 
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Bhutto, nevertheless feared reprisals from the government, 
while others wished to wait until the party had been 
launched to make up their minds about joining it. 
77 At 
the same time, contacts were made with student and labour 
representatives known to be sympathetic, inviting them to 
the convention. 
78 The aim was to collect the widest 
possible assortment of individuals and interests. But, 
as many of the organisers of-the inaugural convention in- 
dicated in interviews with the author, the haste with which 
Bhutto called the conference, together with the legal res- 
trictions imposed by the government on political activity, 
did not enable them to achieve this aim, and they did not 
expect the convention to be a success. 
FOUNDATION OF THE PARTY 
The first convention of the PPP, at which the 
party was founded by the unanimous decision of the delegates 
present, was held in Lahore on November 30 and December 1, 
1967. Although, at the time, there were no occurrences 
that could give reasonable cause to apprehend on outbreak 
of disorder, the government had prohibited assembly in 
public places in Lahore. The convention was therefore 
held at the residence of Mubashar Hasan. About 300 dele- 
gates (including a handful of women) from various parts 
of West Pakistan participated. It is significant that no 
one from the eastern wing of the country was present. 
There were few political notables who could be identified 
amongst the founding members at the convention. Those who 
could be identified as politically notable, included the 
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Talpur brothers (who belonged to the pre-British ruling 
family of Sind), Mohammed Hayat Khan (former secretary 
general of the Council Muslim League), Nisar Mohammed 
(former MPA), Begum Abad Ahmed Khan (formerly of the 
Awami League), Gandapur and Sherpao (from the NWFP), and 
Bhutto's ex-Convention Muslim League colleagues, Khar and 
Mumtaz Bhutto. Significantly, no member of the Punjabi 
feudal aristocracy can be identified amongst the dele- 
gates.? 
9 A fair number of student, ' representatives were 
present at the inaugural meeting, as were lawyers and a 
couple of labour union organisers. Two Ulema were present 
in order to ensure the Islamic credentials of the party. 
so 
The heterogeneous composition of the party was 
thus evident'from the beginning, as the organising confer- 
ence was attended by not only leftist organisers and in- 
tellectual socialists, but also aristocratic, conservative 
followers of Bhutto. Taseer's contention that there was 
"a marked absence of feudalists"81 applied only to the 
representation from Punjab, for a number of zamindars can 
be identified from Sind and the NWFP. However, it was 
the leftists who dominated the convention, both in terms 
of numbers and in terms of affecting the proceedings. 
82 
According to several founder-members, many of those 
, attending were government agents, informers or C. I. D. 
men. 
83 Indeed, it was this fear of government agents that 
provided Bhutto with the justification for 
personally nominating, (rather than electing) the members of 
the various committees constituted at the convention. 
84 
Thus began the tradition of nomination, which was to 
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characterise the party throughout its existence. 
The convener of the convention, which held four 
sessions, was Malik Aslam Hayat (a lawyer and president 
of the Lahore district bar association), while Bhutto pre- 
sided over all four sessions. 
85 In his presidential 
address, Bhutto launched a frontal attack on the existing 
socio-economic system, and called for a popular struggle 
to overthrow it. 
86 
"Political and economic realities de- 
manded a new party", as "the country was bending towards 
self-destruction. The old forms of political arrangements 
are not sufficient.. , 
87 Bhutto explained that the economic 
programme of the party aimed at social justice, and the 
aim of the party was to bring socialism to the country. 
However, Bhutto declared that the party would be sufficient- 
ly adaptable to absorb and synthesise diverging viewpoints. 
He called for nationalisation of all key industries. His 
party would also struggle for the rights of the Kashmiris, 
since "Pakistan without Kashmir is as incomplete as is a 
body without a head. "88 The convention passed twenty-five 
resolutions, which dealt with a wide range of issues such 
as expressing solidarity with the Third World and the 
people of Jammu and Kashmir and condemning the Ayub 
regime. 
89 
The only election held at the convention was for 
the chairman, and Bhutto was declared elected by a unan- 
imous show of hands. 
90 
Four committees - all nominated 
and chaired by Bhutto - were declared constituted at the 
convention. These were the Steering Committee and the 
Resolution Committee, comprising ten members each, the 
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Constitution Commission, comprising twelve members, and 
the Draft Declaration Committee, composed of eleven mem- 
bers. 91 The last three committees were to be concerned 
with ideological work for the party and the task of framing 
a party constitution. Provisionally an interim consti- 
tution, prepared jointly by Bhutto and K. H. Meer (lawyer, 
formerly of the Azad Pakistan Party and NAP - ßhashani 
group) was passed. 
92 The Steering Committee was to be 
concerned with organisational work and selecting the 
organising committee. In constituting these committees 
Bhutto attempted to balance intellectual leftists with 
feudals and moderate middle-class professional represent- 
but in general zamindars did not form a preponderant 57 
17 
majority - in marked contrast to later committees of the _ 
party which were dominated by them. For instance, out of 
the thirty individuals represented in the Convention 
Committees, eleven were zamindars (of both large and medium 
status), six were lawyers, two were journalists, two were 
teachers, four were students (two with labour connections), 
v 
one was a woman, and three each were former government ser- 
vants and small businessmen. The'membership of these 
committees clearly illustrated the heterogeneous nature of 
the PPP from the beginning. Here was a diverse collection 
of individuals with widely varying social backgrounds, 
ge a characteristics and importantly with potential- 
ly conflicting notions about the aims and purposes of 
their new party, 
The supreme body of the party was to be its Central 
Committee, to be constituted by the Chairman, "in consultation 
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with the organisers and leaders of the party in the 
country". 
93 The Central Committee, in turn, was to elect 
the secretary general, the vice-chairman, the treasurer 
and other office bearers of the party. The dominant part 
to be played by the party's chairman was quite apparent. 
In effect, he was given the authority to pick members of 
his choice for the party's highest authority, the Central 
Committee. The awareness of Bhutto's primacy existed among 
all the members of the party right from the beginning. 
94 
Bhutto chose not to constitute a central committee at this 
stage - indeed it was not until after the 1970 election 
that one was formally nominated. The reason he most 
frequently gave for the delay was that since several mem- 
bers of the party were suspected of being government agents, 
and he had yet to test the loyalty and integrity of many 
around him, it would not be opportune to appoint the 
party's supreme body. 
95 For the same reason, there was no 
question of holding party elections. But many of his 
party leaders, in interviews with the author, suggested 
that a more plausible explanatipn for the delay was that 
Bhutto needed the time and the opportunity to bring in 
more feudals into the party before naming a central com- 
mittee, to ensure their dominance over the radical and 
progressive elemnts, 
THE FOUNDATION DOCUMENTS 
At the inaugural meeting of the PPP, ten Foundation 
Meeting Documents were published under the collective 
title, Foundation and Policy, embodying the party's 
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programme and policies. 
97 The Documents, purporting to 
be Bhutto's covenant with the people, spelt out the 
party's views of Pakistan's development since independence, 
the rationale behind the party's formation, its version of 
socialism, and the party's principal aims and objectives. 
These were widely interpreted as an attempt to unite the 
country's nationalist forces irrespective of their class 
character. 
98 The three main slogans of the party - Islam 
is our faith, Democracy is our polity, and Socialism our 
economy - were a safe combination of the three different 
trends in opposition politics. The party programme rep- 
resented a curious mixture of socialism, welfare economy 
and an enlightened private enterprise. Socialism and the 
establishment of a classless society were stated as the 
avowed objectives of the party, but incitement of class 
hatred was expressly forbidden, and provision for free 
enterprise was securely made. It is interesting to note 
that the term 'Islamic Socialism' nowhere appears in the 
original Documents, although in some public pronouncements 
Bhutto is reported to have used the term without, however, 
elaborating conceptually upon it. 
99 In his inaugural 
address to the first session of the party, Bhutto had 
asserted that Islam and Socialism were harmoniously compat- 
ible but the slogan of '-Islamic Socialism' was not used. 
The rationale for a new party was set out in 
Foundation Meeting Document Number Three, entitled 'WWhy 
a New Party'. The reasons behind the formation were later 
echoed in two other party pamphlets - both written by 
Bhutto, The Political Situation in Pakistan, and 
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Why the People's Party. 100 Justifying the need for a new 
party, its sponsors felt that as. Pakistan entered the third 
decade of its existence, fundamental issues involving its 
citizens remained in a state of "anxious uncertainty. " 
Successi°vei regimes had not only failed to solve national 
problems but their policies had ledtb further degeneration in 
the quality of Pakistani life. Crime and violence had 
increased, corruption and nepotism had reached new heights, 
labour was in a state of tumult, while the poor and the 
middle class found the burden of rising prices unbearable. 
The values of the intellectuals, the young and the 
students had degenerated as they had grown progressively, 
apathetic and alienated. According to the Document, "the 
political parties were split into factions and were in 
disarray. " In such an environment "a new party is necess- 
ary to cement the unity of all the existing political 
parties ..... It will form a bridge between the existing 
conflicting interests and give a lead in reconciling the 
historical dichotomies of the opposition. " Above all, 
"in the existing state of affairs a new progressive party 
is also imperative for the task of uniting all the pro- 
gressive elements. " There was another important consider- 
ation according, to the Document. This was that 
"a growing and powerful body of people, 
spearheaded by the younger generation, 
firmly believes that the old ways and the 
traditional methods are not sufficient to 
surmount the colossal problems of Pakistan.. 
.... the people.... are not willing to toler- 
ate the present conditions much longer. 
They want a new system based on justice and 
attached to the essential interests of the 
toiling millions. Only a new party can dis- 
charge this responsibility. " 101 
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The Foundation Documents lamented that in the 
Pakistan of 1967, the means of livelihood were not open 
to 
all, that the rich kept growing richer while 
the poor 
became poorer. Document Four, entitled, 'Why Socialism 
is Necessary for Pakistan', declared that socialism was the 
only answer for Pakistan's dilemma, and that 
the aim of the 
party was the transformation of the country into a social- 
ist society. The PPP had come forward to represent the 
underprivileged against a'regime that promoted-monopoly 
capital (i. e. industrialist elite) and was working against 
the interests of the poor, students and intellectuals. 
102 
The PPP believed that all basic industries of the national 
economy should be nationalised - but there was room for 
private enterprise, so long as it did not create 
"monopolistic preserves. " In Document Five, the party 
announced that its guiding principles would be the 
establishment of a classless society and the application of 
socialistic ideas to realise economic and social justice. 
It set forth a number of programmatic principles, which 
included the 'abolition of feudalism'. It is noteworthy 
that before the convention met, Sheikh Rashid (socialist, 
former associate of the communist Muslim Leaguer, Danyal 
Latifi), successfully insisted that the Foundation Papers 
include the 'abolition of feudalism', whereas Bhutto had 
preferred 'the elimination of feudal practices'. 
Certain sections of the Documents are vaguely 
worded and poorly defined - perhaps deliberately. Where 
the PPP was unequivocal was in its declaration of confront- 
ation with India over Kashmir, and its opposition to the 
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Awami League's Six Points programme for regional autonomy. 
Not wishing to provoke widespread hostility when it was 
just getting off the ground, and to keep its appeal as 
wide as possible, the PPP wished to create an image of a 
pragmatic party, and not a rigidly doctrinaire, ideologi- 
cal one. Consequently, there is little revolutionary 
about the Documents. At the same time, there was enough 
radical nationalist rhetoric to appeal to the student 
community and progressive sections of the community. In 
some parts, the Foundation Documents resorted to Marxism 
terminology, which, perhaps, reflected the views of a 
number of socialist intellectuals associated with its 
preparation, most notably, Rahim, Mubashar, Sheikh Rashid. 
But, other than that, the socialism that the PPP claimed 
to profess was of a mild, reformative kind, rather than 
Marxist or Communist. Indeed, Bhutto was at pains to 
point out 'that his brand of socialism was not to be 
equated with Communism or Marxism. 
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The authors of the Documents appeared to be 
sensitive to the attacks that might be hurled at the 
party from various quarters - in particular the traditional 
religious ulema - alleging that advocacy of socialism was 
un-Islamic. This concern was reflected in the importance 
given to Islam in the Documents. The compatibility of 
Islam with socialism was stressed by suggesting that the 
major socialist values - egalitarianism and condemnation 
of exploitation - were pre-eminently Islamic values. 
Indeed, among the documents was a curious litany based 
on the theme of Jehad (Muslim holy war). Its tone can be 
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guaged from some of the sub-titles - MAN HAS GONE ASTRAY, 
MAN IS ON THE BRINK OF DISEASE, SOCIETY HAS LOST ITS 
ANCHOR, and, WE PROMISE TO CONTINUE THE JEHAD UNTIL 
GOD'S EARTH-IS LIT UP WITH DIVINE LIGHT. 104 Thus the 
documents invoked Islam in calling for a Jehad against the 
oppressive and exploitative political and economic system 
of Ayub, and bringing about socialism. In the Documents 
and elsewhere, Bhutto emphasised that the socialism he 
envisaged would be in strict conformity with Islam. On 
one occasion, for instance he declared: 
"The socialism applicable to Pakistan 
would be in conformity with its ideology.. 
.... if there can be a Scandinavian form 
of socialism, why cannot there be a 
Pakistani form of socialism suitable to 
our genius..... Islam and the principles 
of socialism are not mutually repugnant... 
... Islam preaches equality and socialism is the modern technique of attaining it. " 105 
Despite the fact that the party's advocacy of socialism 
was predicated on its professed harmony with Islam, the term 
'Islamic Socialism' was fastidiously avoided by party 
leaders. The reason for this was that Ayub had used the 
term, 
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giving it a strongly anti-socialist connotation, 
and it was felt that this would cause considerable con- 
fusion in the public mind. 
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However, the press frequent- 
ly defined the party's position as Islamic socialism, 
and the term gradually began to be used by PPP workers; 
thus the phrase became associated with the party. But 
the party leadership did not dfficially adopt the slogan 
or elaborate upon the concept until the 1970 election 
campaign. 
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From our discussion of the party's Foundation 
Documents, it is clear that Bhutto's strategy was to 
appeal to the widest possible section of groups. According 
to the documents, the PPP would be essentially nationalist, 
the "basic guide to all problems" being"the teachings of 
the Quaid-e-Azam. " It would appeal directly to the 
masses and represent a new generation. It would serve 
first as a polarising centre for progressive forces and 
then as a catalyst around which multiple interests and 
classes could unite to restore democracy. The extent to 
which the PPP actually achieved these objectives or develop- 
ed along these lines will be discussed during the course of 
this and subsequent chapters. 
ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARTY AND GROWTH OF ITS 
SUPPORT BASE 
Having launched his party, Bhutto began to tour 
the countryside, holding meetings and making speeches, 
to build support for the PPP. Soon after its formation, 
the Ayubian regime showed its disdain and contempt for the 
party by declaring that the PPP would remain a students' 
party -a reference to the students attending the convention 
meeting and to the absence of a substantial number of 
politically notable people there. The party became the 
object of ridicule and attack by all government ministers, 
and the officially-controlled press gave prominent coverage 
to such attacks. 
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Amongst the opposition parties, there 
was growing suspicion within conservative religious circles 
regarding the PPP's socialism, while other parties expressed 
their disquiet over Bhutto's lack of commitment on the issue 
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of the form of democracy that he aimed for. 
109 When 
Bhutto began his extensive tour of West Pakistan in the 
spring and summer of 1968, his meetings were often inter- 
rupted by rowdies and by threats of personal violence. 
On several occasions, he was the target of physical 
attack. 
110 At the same time a constant barrage of propa- 
ganda emanated from the government controlled media 
attempting to project Bhutto as a charlatan and opportunist, 
reminding the public of his past association with Ayub's 
regime and his unqualified support to Ayub's political 
system and economic policies, which he now condemned as 
a 'socialist'. 
111 In its formative phase, therefore, the 
party operated under severe restrictions, hostile propa- 
ganda, official harassment, intimidation and threats. Such 
official action, however, not only proved to be futile, 
but helped the party tb gain rapid popularity. 
Since the initial goal of the party was the dis- 
lodging of the Ayub regime, it set about enlisting numer- 
ous dissident groups from among Pakistani society. Amongst 
its early recruits were leftist leaders and groups, who 
were attracted to the party by Bhutto's aggressively pro- 
China foreign policy as well as the loudly proclaimed 
Marxism of some of his followers. The party itself had 
foreseen, in the Foundation Documents,, that it had a good 
chance of weaning away support from NAP's pro-Peking 
faction. 
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This hope was borne out by subsequent 
developments, as several members of this faction (many with 
trade union links) in West Pakistan joined the PPP. 
113 To 
these were added other small leftist groups. In the large 
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urban centres of Punjab, some of these groups - such as 
Mukhtar Rana's in Lyalipur (Punjab's second largest in- 
dustrial city) - had assumed control over some of the 
large industrial and public utility labour unions. Thus 
these groups provided the PPP with an avenue for recruit- 
ing the support of the urban labour. At the same time, 
the PPP attracted radical labour union organisers such 
as Ziauddin Butt,, former aide of Mirza Ibrahim in the 
(Lahore-based) Railway Workers Union, and Mahmud Babar who 
had links with trade unions in Multan. Of these leftists, 
many who did not believe in the socialist bona fides of 
Bhutto contended that it was at least possible to bring 
about a confrontation with the Ayub regime and the 'monopoly 
capitalists' in co-operation with him. Indeed, interviews 
conducted with some of these leftist leaders indicate that 
although many doubted Bhutto's socialist credentials, they 
wished to use the platform; ' provided by the PPP for the 
time being, at any rate. 
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The PPP also attracted leftist student leaders - 
such as Mairaj Mohammed Khan from Karachi (a recent presi- 
dent of the National Students Federation), Raja Anwar from. 
Rawalpindi and Amanullah Khan, a student activist from 
Lahore - who provided important manpower for early party 
activities in urban centres in terms of distributing party 
literature, propagating the party programme and acting as 
unpaid volunteers for party work. In general, students 
in West Pakistan demonstrated considerable sympathy for 
the PPP, as we shall see below, on account of the party's 
militant nationalism and its support of student demands. 
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It is imrortant to note that the PPP refused to support 
any specific student organisation, or indeed organise its 
own student wing, maintaining that the student community 
in its entirety had Bhutto's support. Thus Bhutto pre- 
ferred to keep the emerging student movement unstructured 
and generally united on an anti-Ayub pro-Bhutto platform, 
rather than risk splitting the student community by 
selecting a single group for direct support. This policy 
enabled the PPP to avoid being drawnintothe highly factional- 
ised and unstable arena of student union politics. In 
East Pakistan however, the situation was different. There, 
students as well as leftist and progressive intellectuals 
were already in the fold of the Awami League and Bhashani's 
NAP. Bhutto had undertaken a tour of East Pakistan in 
October 1967, prior to the PPP's formation, but it was 
reported that he failed to muster any support there, other 
than establishing an informal agreement'with Bhashani 
over opposition to Ayub, and making arrangements for the 
establishment of a zonal office of the PPP at Dacca 
(which was however wound up within a year). 
In the Punjab, the party made considerable headway 
in recruiting support from urban professional groups, such 
as lawyers, writers, journalists and teachers. Many mem- 
bers of the urban middle and small-town'professional groups - 
who were becoming increasingly resentful over injustices 
in income distribution fostered by Ayub's economic policies 
and their lack of representation in his rural-based 
political system, were attracted to the PPP by its pro- 
mise of. social and political change. But it was not only 
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from these 'modern' sections of the population that the 
PPP began to draw its support. Bhutto utilised his feudal 
links with the landed aristocracy of Sind and the adjoin- 
ing areas of Punjab, to bring in several landlords into 
the party. Many feudal landlords, former Cönvention 
I 
Muslim Leaguers, joined the party - much to the chagrin of 
Bhutto's leftist supporters, who viewed the entry of such 
jagirdars with great alarm. However, it needs to be 
pointed out that at this stage, only members of Bhutto's 
landlord faction in Sind joined the party, while their 
traditional opponents remained with Ayub's Convention 
Muslim League. It was only after Ayub's fall, that Bhutto 
was able to wean away members of other factions. In the 
Punjab, it was only the smaller, lesser-known feudals who 
joined the party at this stage - indeed it was only after 
the PPP's election victory in 1970 that Punjab's feudal 
aristocracy joined the party in large numbers. In terms 
of support then, the PPP, within two years of its existence 
had become an amalgam of older vested interests and new 
social forces -a coalition of leftist groups, newly mobil- 
ised urban social groups (labour, students, professionals), 
and experienced politicians. Its support base 
contained both traditional, conservative elements and 
modern, progressive elements. 
Ehutto's prosperous feudal friends provided much 
of the necessary finances for the party, and he himself 
used a not inconsiderable sum from his own personal 
funds. 115 Indeed, as one writer has suggested many of the 
leftist intellectuals and student leaders were attracted 
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to the party inter alia by Bhutto's financial resources. 
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However, at this stage, party funds were not sufficient 
in the view of party leaders, since it only succeeded 
in drawing substantial contributions from wealthy donors 
after the fall of Ayub, when it became evident that the 
party stood a good chance of assuming power. 
117 It is 
reported that many party men had become "bankrupt" 
spending personal funds for party work. 
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Organisationally, the party expanded in an extreme- 
ly chaotic fashion. Although a central organising commit- 
tee was constituted by Bhutto soon after the November 
Convention, chaired by him and dominated by leftists - 
notably Mubashar Hasan and Sheikh Rashid - this body did 
not play a central part in organisational activities in 
the sense of co-ordinating the various party units or 
maintaining a record of party branches and registered mem- 
bers. 119 Indeed, as our interviews with leading PPP members 
indicate, many PPP leaders were not even aware of the 
existence of such a body. 
120 There were two major reasons 
for such disorganisation. The first concerns the rapid 
popularity of the party, while the second relates to 
Bhutto's personality. As the party gained popularity, 
local party offices were set up whenever and wherever a 
coterie of supporters existed, with or without authorisat- 
ion from the central organising committee. 
121 
Three 
zonal organising committees were set up for Sind, Punjab/ 
Bahawalpur and NWFP, but these too proved to be ineffective. 
Local party offices were often set up first and then 
chairmen of these zonal committees invited to officially 
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inaugurate these offices. 
122 This frequently resulted 
in two or more offices emerging in the same locality, 
each claiming to represent the same or at least over- 
lapping areas. The extent of such organisational chaos 
was such that district party organs often had no idea 
of how many offices existed in their respective areas. 
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Nor were records maintained systematically of registered . 
membership of the party, which in common with other parties 
in the Third World, and generally, always-tended to be 
much less than the actual supporters of the party. 
The second reason for the party's weak organisational 
development lay in Bhutto's relative inattention to matters 
of party structure and organisational detail. 'One writer 
has described this in the following way: 
' 
"Attempts at organisation were half- 
hearted ..... Bhutto's role .... was ... 
.... never organisational .... His time was 
spent in recruiting individuals and power 
groups into the party. " 124 
Although three conventions of the party were held in 1968 - 
a Punjab and Baluchistan convention was held in Lahore 
in August 1968, a Sind convention at Hyderabad in September 
1969, and a Frontier convention at Peshawar in November 
1968 - no attention was. directed either then or on". other 
occasions to the need to effectively organise the provin- 
cial and local units of the party. The low priority 
given to party organisation can in large part be explained 
by the fact that given his goal of dislodging the Ayub 
regime, Bhutto's concept of the PPP was less that of a 
party with a well-structured organisation, than a broad 
political movement, where groups and leaders were held 
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together segmentally with vertical lines of authority 
leading to the chairman (i. e. Bhutto). This early organi- 
isational aspect of the party is crucial to understanding 
the PPP's later development into a patrimonial-style 
party (in the post 1972 period). 
In the large urban centres, much of the party 
work was undertaken by experienced party organisers, 
originally either from the Muslim League or even from the 
Communist Party. 
125 These active party organisers were 
concerned with explaining the party programme to the 
urban masses and establishing links with labour groups. 
In Lahore, for instance, under the direction of leaders 
such as Sheikh Rashid and Ziauddin Butt, these workers 
succeeded in recruiting valuable support from amongst the 
railway workers and workers from the government mint and 
V, 
W"WAPDA (Water and Power Development Authority). 
126 At the 
same time, leaders like Mubashar Hasan from Lahore, (an 
engineer by profession) enabled the party to forge links 
with the middle-class urban professional community (groups 
such as university and college teachers, engineers, and 
other members of the urban intelligentsia) and gain access 
to, their interest group organisations. The social back- 
ground of these party workers ranged from middle class 
(such as lawyers, doctors, teachers) to lower middle 
and working class (such as tea-stall owners, fruitsellers, 
industrial workers). 
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The heterogeneous nature of the party membership 
indicated difficulties of sustaining such a coalition in 
the future. Already, there were signs of strains in the 
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PPP coalition. 
128 Such strains were exacerbated by the 
fact that many party leaders, such as Sheikh Rashid, and 
other personally linked to Bhutto, (e. g. Khar) had their 
own factional supporters and competed for control over 
the local groups. 
129 In some districts there were open 
clashes between rival factions. Much of the factional 
rivalry reflected ideological divisions. When old 
Convention Muslim Leaguers and landlords joined the party, 
there was increasing fear amongst leftist party workers 
that these conservative forces would, distort the progress- 
ive image of the party and rob it of its leftist 
elan. 
But, these notables wielded considerable power in their 
areas due to their wealth and political ascendancy. By 
virtue of their influential, positions, they were often given 
important posts in the party organisation which was highly 
resented by the leftist workers. 
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For the-time being, 
however, these tensions did not assume a serious nature, 
as the party sought to present a united front in mobil- 
ising political support for the movement against Ayub. 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the disputes that 
marked the early phase of the party's existence would become 
issues in the internal factional politics of the PPP in the 
post-1971 period (see below, chapter VI and VII). 
THE ROLE OF THE PPP IN THE ANTI-AYUB MOVEMENT 
The anti-Ayub movement has received considerable 
academic attention. 
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There is, however, disagreement 
over the importance that should be accorded to Bhutto in 
the anti-Ayub movement. 
132 There is consensus that Bhutto 
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and the PPP did play 'a part in building up opposition to 
the regime, but disagreement over the question, 'how big 
a part? '. The contention of this chapter is that while 
Bhutto and the PPP were not solely responsible for creat- 
ing the crisis that culminated in the fall of Ayub, they, 
nevertheless played a significant role in the anti-Ayub 
agitation and emerged as the principal beneficiary of the 
upsurge. While the anti-Ayub movement was a complex social, 
economic and political phenomenon, it is conceivable that 
without Bhutto's leadership and his party, the agitation 
that built up would not have been able to overturn the 
Ayubian system. The movement was by no means 'led' by the 
PPP - indeed the party was more a creature of the protests 
than its creator. But the PPP was an important factor . 
that contributed to the spread of the movement of politi- 
cal, social and economic discontent, with Bhutto's per- 
sonality becoming an important rallying point for oppo- 
sition to the administration. The spreading sense of pub- 
lie disquiet was accentuated by Bhutto's fierce public 
attacks on Ayub, and by the seeming effort to victimise 
him through the criminal courts. 
133 
Our purpose here is to examine the part played 
by the party in the upheavals of 1968 and 1969 by posing 
the question as to how and why the PPP, a new, hastily 
organised party, was successful in mobilising support in 
opposition to Ayub, where the older, more established and 
better organised parties failed. Rather than recite the 
continuous sequence of riots, disturbances and strikes, 
we are primarily interested in outlining the PPP's role in 
the anti-Ayub movement - and its consequences. 
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Discontent with the Ayubian system had been 
simmering for some years prior to the crisis, and had 
begun to gather momentum immediately after the 1965 war 
and the Tashkent Agreement ( see above, chapter I). 
A yub's-- image and_.: _ popularity 
declined rapidly, both 
among the people, and importantly within the armed forces. 
The dissatisfaction over the Tashkent Agreement, growing 
East-West Pakistan tensions, and economic discontent after 
the 1965 war, 
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were all working against Ayub. These 
rumblings, however, still had little focus and no leader 
or organisation. 
In the summer and autumn of 1968, Bhutto swung over 
from relatively low-keyed to boisterous opposition and 
began a major assault on the Ayub government. In September, 
he launched a frontal attack on Ayub at Hyderabad. 
135 In 
a provocative speech, Bhutto attacked Ayub over the short- 
comings of the regime and spoke of the "bloodshed" and 
"rebellion" that was inevitable as a consequence of the 
cruelties perpetuated by the administration upon the 
students. Bhutto embarked upon a major speaking tour of 
West Pakistan, his articulate attacks on the regime 
attracting large, enthusiastic audiences wherever he went. 
In an already tense atmosphere, there was little doubt 
that Bhutto's statements and actions were complicating the 
situation and provoking further disaffection and encourage- 
ment for protest as doubtless Bhutto fully intended, and 
for which he was castigated by the Ayub government. 
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The fall of 1969 marked the tenth year of Ayub's rule, an 
era that was officially termed 'Decade of Development'. 
139 
Bhutto's attack on the Ayub government coincided with 
the official celebrations. of Ayub's ten years in power. 
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When large sums of public revenue were allocated to 
publicise the regime's accomplishments, this provided 
Bhutto with an effective propaganda weapon, and it hardly 
came as a surprise when these official celebrations 
coincided with an outbreak of widespread disturbances and 
violence. This constituted the immediate background to 
the crisis. 
The precipitant factor in the anti-Ayub movement 
was student unrest. 
138 Such unrest originated in student 
issues, such as demands for the repeal of the University 
Ordinance (that inter alia, restricted student political 
activity and provided for the forfeiture of their degrees 
if accused of subversive activities), but rapidly spread 
to more generalised demands concerning broader social and 
political issues. 
139 Student agitation began with sporadic 
strikes at Karachi University in October 1968 and became. 
increasingly violent as it merged with Bhutto's campaign 
against the regime. The students' cry was taken up and 
generalised by Bhutto. He mounted the hustings to demand 
that Ayub quit and that the Basic Democracy system be re- 
placed by full adult franchise. Responding to and in turn 
stimulating student agitation, Bhutto rapidly became the 
students' hero. 
What marked the inception of the country-wide 
movement against Ayub was a trifling incident in Rawalpindi 
involving a scuffle between the students and the police 
over some allegedly smuggled goods. This culminated in a 
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bloody student-police clash (in which one student was 
killed) on 7 November when Bhutto was visiting Rawalpindi 
(and was due to address students). 
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Thus Bhutto became 
the focus for the initial outbreak of violent agitation 
against the government. ' Two days of rioting followed, 
accompanied by arson and looting; troops were called out 
and two more students were killed. 
141 Seizing the advan- 
tage offered by the occasion, Bhutto attended the funeral 
of the students. The firing triggered off student demons- 
tration in other parts of Pakistan - in cities and towns, 
such as Lahore, Karachi, Sialkot, Multan, Quetta, Lyallpur, 
Peshawar, Jehlum and even in smaller towns such as 
Campbellpur, Okara, Charsadda, Lalamusa, Mianwali. 'In 
further clashes between the students and police, the anti- 
Ayub movement found its martyrs and the resulting flames 
spread across the country. This marked the inception of 
a movement which was brought to a close only when Ayub re- 
linquished office. From 9 November 1968 to 25 March 1969, 
not a day passed in Pakistan without some kind of civil 
disturbance, riot, strike, bloodshed or demonstration. 
On 10 November, a student attempted to assas- 
sinate Ayub at a public meeting in Peshawar. 
142 Meanwhile, 
Bhutto continued his attacks with redoubled vigour, and 
went on to address the Lahore District Bar Association on 
11 November. 143 Here he refused to appeal to the student 
community for moderation, saying that the students were 
fighting for a just cause and that he was with them: 
although he did not want bloodshed he was not afraid of 
it. Bhutto was arrested under the Defence of Pakistan 
a 
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Rules on 13 November on charges of inciting the students 
to violence. 
144Bhutto's 
provocative tone had left the 
government with little choice but to arrest him, which is 
precisely what Bhutto intended. The tactics of his deli- 
berate challenge to the government were clear: a jail term 
(just before the 'presidential' elections due in-winter 
1969) would make Bhutto a martyr and at least partially 
lead to his atonement for previous service to Ayub. Other 
politicians arrested at the same time included Khan Abdul 
Wali Khan (president of the National Awami Party), 
Mumtaz Bhutto (a cousin of Bhutto and a member of the 
national assembly) and the president of the Lahore District 
Bar Association. Those arrested were'said to include seven 
members of the PPP and five members of the National Awami 
Party. 
These arrests only intensified the crisis, and so 
began nineteen weeks of the most widespread urban unrest 
Pakistan had ever experienced. It was not that the number 
of deaths was strikingly high, a matter of scores rather 
than hundreds, but that in every medium and large city - 
and later even villages - in East and West Pakistan, the 
government's writ ceased to run. The range of the protest 
began to gather momentum. What was initially a students' 
protest now widened into a broader movement incorporating 
other middle and lower middle class groups and eventually 
industrial labour and spread to smaller towns and rural 
areas. Lawyers, teachers, journalists and other urban 
professional groups began to march in the streets adding 
demands for better wages and service conditions to the 
universal demand for constitutional reform. As Ayub Khan 
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put it, "every problem of the country was being de- 
cided in the streets : 'x45 The volume of public protest 
grew as the Ulema and Islamic religious groups joined 
forces with other groups to denounce police brutality 
and to demand the introduction of Islamic law. 
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An analysis of the newspaper reports for the 
period October 1968 - March 1969, reveals that a wide 
variety of social groups were involved in the anti-Ayub 
movement. These can be identified as follows: student 
groups, journalists, lawyers, teachers, other members of 
the urban intelligentsia, such as poets and writers, re- 
ligious groups and Ulema, medical workers and doctors, 
engineering workers, lower government functionaries, bazaar 
shopkeepers, industrial workers (organised through such 
established groups as the West Pakistan Federation of Trade 
Unions as well as new labour fronts and workers committees) 
and some kisan (peasant) groups in West Pakistan and pea- 
sants in East Bengal organised by Bhashani's NAP. It is 
important to note that many of such protesting groups 
tended to rely either on pre-existing organisations - such 
as student unions, Bar Associations - or on recently- 
created ad hoc committees (such as the labour fronts that 
emerged in various cities), as planning and mobilisation 
bodies. This signified the participation of urban social 
elements in the movement as discrete social groups through 
various voluntary interest group associations. However, 
there was at the same time a tendency for some social 
groups to enter the movement haphazardly and to partici- 
pate in the more anomie forms of protest, although in some 
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cases they moved towards creating distinct organisations 
(such as the Engineers Action Committee). Newspaper 
reports of the period also reveal that in most cases the 
protesting groups were not (at least initially) organised 
or led by any particular political party. In other cases, 
the opposition parties, such as NAP, the Jamaat-e-Islami 
(and later, the Democratic Action Committee) and the PPP 
organised these groups via their interest group associa- 
tions in processions and demonstrations. It would be rele- 
vant to mention here that the PPP organised several joint 
processions and meetings with other political parties, 
chiefly NAP (Mazdoor Kisan Group), 
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the Jamiat-e- 
Ulema-Islam, and NAP (Wali Khan Group). Earlier in April 
1968, the PPP had entered into an alliance with Bhashani's 
pro-Peking NAP, 
148 to work together for democracy and 
socialism. 
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It is noteworthy that while the protesting groups 
were not always led by the PPP, the latter had by far 
the best connections with key social groups in the move- 
ment because it was itself a coalition of figures who 
identified with these same social groups - students: 
Mairaj, Raja Anwar; lawyers: Aslam Hayat and K. H. Meer; 
urban intelligentsia: Ramay; teachers and engineers: 
Mubashar Hasan; and labour: Ziauddin and Mukhtar Rana. 
It was at the same time under PPP banners that many of the 
new labour fronts participated in the movement. 
With Bhutto in jail, the movement was deprived of 
his direct leadership, but other members of his party such 
as J. A. Rahim (as acting chairman) and Sheikh Rashid, and 
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other opposition leaders carried on the struggle and 
attempted to provide leadership to the amorphous movement. 
More significant was the role played by Begum Bhutto, who 
toured the entire countryside campaigning for her husband's 
release, addressing party workers, leading processions, 
issuing statements of policy and urging people to join the 
PPP. 150 A new element was introduced into the situation 
when ex-Air Marshal Asghar Khan announced his entry into 
politics on 17 November in opposition to the Ayub regime. 
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Asghar Khan's campaigning stimulated what Bhutto had, in 
a sense, begun. Indeed, Asghar Khan was "thanked" by 
PPP leaders for "sustaining the peoples movement after 
Bhutto's arrest'; 
152 The fact that after Bhutto's arrest 
the focus shifted to Asghar Khan, (and Begum Bhutto), 
rather than to Bhutto's political party indicated both 
the heavy dependence of the party on Bhutto's charisma, 
and its consequent institutional weakness, and to a well- 
known feature of Pakistani society - the greater appeal 
of leaders rather than parties or principles. This is not 
to underrate the activities of the PPP in mobilising and 
organising opposition to Ayub in its leader's absence, 
but to emphasise an important and recurring feature of 
Pakistani political life. 
Meanwhile, the agitation, hitherto confined to 
West Pakistan, spread to East Pakistan on 7 December 1968, 
with general strikes called by the opposition parties and 
clashes between police and demonstrators. 
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Students 
were again in the forefront, but in the East wing, the 
agitation began in an early stage to draw in working class 
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elements, and Bhashani electrified the whole province 
by involving the rural masses and urban workers. As the 
movement widened, it became evident that the mass movements 
in the two provinces differed in emphasis. In the West, 
the movement was against Ayub and his system; in the East 
it was against Ayub and his system as a vehicle of Pakistan's 
domination. 154 Although the demand for regional autonomy 
was also voiced in the smaller provinces in West Pakistan, 
it was more clearly and vocally articulated in the eastern 
wing. 
The older opposition parties now attempted*to 
capitalise on a movement that had very largely been beyond, 
their control. Leaders of eight opposition parties joined 
to form the Democratic Action Committee (DAC)'in January 
1969 155The DAC's eight-point programme156 attempted to 
embrace the diverse concern of its component parties, and 
the alliance called for a boycott of the 1969 elections. 
The DAC's programme however, omitted reference to the 
contentious question of regional autonomy and 'one-unit', 
and avoided matters of social and economic policy. The 
PPP and Bhashani's NAP decided to keep away from the DAC. 
Earlier J. A. Rahim, at Bhutto's direction, had announced 
the latter's candidacy for the presidential elections with- 
out consultation with other opposition parties, or for 
that'matter his own party. 
157 This was not only criticised 
by the opposition parties, 
158 but was reported to have 
caused a split within the PPP and allegedly led to the 
creation of a 'Forward Bloc' within the party. 
159 In fact 
Rahim had to issue an official denial of the existence of 
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such a bloc, and to announce that the decision had been - 
taken after consulting the members of the party's 
Principle Committee and Organising Committee. 
160 However, 
this was characteristic of Bhutto's approach of arriving 
at decisions without prior consultation with his party 
men. This also demonstrated Bhutto's ability to abruptly 
throw his political foes off balance by sudden, dramatic 
announcements. 
With violence intensifying in the new year, the 
government began offering - too haltingly perhaps - con- 
cessi6ns_ to its opponents' demands. In February 1969, 
Ayub offered to talk to "responsible" opposition leaders. 
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In February, the: country witnessed yet another event, which 
was of some political significance in the anti-Ayub move- 
ment. This was the filing of Bhutto's affidavit in the 
West Pakistan High Court in Lahore, in support of his 
writ petition challenging his detention. 
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Bhutto's 
voluminous affidavit was a massive indictment of a dictator, 
and was read as an important and influential tract of the 
time. It recounted much detail of Bhutto's association with 
Ayub, of events immediately prior to his dismissal and of 
his subsequent harassment by the regime. Bhutto's polemical 
piece was addressed to the public rather than to the court. 
Except for two paragraphs concerning the Tashkent 
Declaration, the affidavit was published in full in most 
newspapers. Since the document is a good example of the 
rhetoric employed by Bhutto during the anti-Ayub movement, 
and of his political style, it would be worthwhile furnish- 
ing a couple of excerpts from it. Bhutto states, 
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"the popular agitation in the country 
is an expression of protest against a 
derelict system,..... The voices raised in 
the streets are a spontaneous verdict of 
the people against the excesses of the 
regime, its corruption, its selfish pur- 
poses, its contempt for the rights of man, 
its corroding of institutions, its depend- 
ence on an oppressive bureaucracy, its 
failure to serve the common weal, its 
pedantic approach to culture, its insu- 
lation from the people and its insatiable 
appetite for family fortunes....... 
Starvation has dried the milk in the 
mother's breast and suffering has dried 
many af atherls tear. It is not the law of 
God that our people must live eternally in 
despair and that their children-should die 
of disease and want....... Deny them their 
rights and they will find a redeemer and if 
none is available they will redeem them- 
selves. " 
Outlining his role in the disturbances, Bhutto asserts, 
"The phenomenon of change is the law of 
nature. It lies in the conditions of : 
society.... There must be something brittle 
about this system if the government feels 
its edifice shaky after a weeks' tour of 
mine. The people acclaimed me..... because 
I represented their feelings when I declared 
that corruption had permeated all levels, 
that the students were in chains, that the 
people were in agony. '. ' 
In the affidavit, Bhutto explains that, 
"the, true reasons why I have been pursued 
by the government with grotesque harassment 
and finally arrested and thrown into prison 
....... (are)... (i) the fear that I might take the Tashkent affair to the people of 
Pakistan for their verdict and (ii) the 
fact that President Ayub Khan believes 
that I am his most powerful rival for the 
presidentship because I enjoy the confidence 
of the people whereas he does not. " 
Simultaneously with the affidavit, Bhutto announced 
that he would go on hunger strike to force the government 
to lift the emergency. Bhutto aimed now at humiliating 
Ayub by forcing an unconditional release as opposed to a 
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release ordered by the court on mere legal grounds, 
should that be the view taken by the judges. Bhutto 
announced that if the emergency was not lifted by 
14 February, he would begin a fast unto death. The impli- 
cation here was that if, at any time in the near future, 
Ayub did withdraw the emergency it would be said that he 
did so under the threat of Bhutto's intended fast. Soon 
after, Ayub announced the release of Bhutto along with 
other political leaders detained including Mujib, 
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and 
called for a round table conference (RTC) between the 
government and the opposition, while promising to end the 
state of emergency. The DAC accepted Ayub's invitation to 
talks at Rawalpindi. Meanwhile, Bhutto emerged to a hero's 
triumphal welcome in Karachi, 
164 
although amidst some 
violence. 
165 At Karachi Bhutto declared that he would con- 
tinue to fight for 'Islam, Socialism and Democracy, and 
a thousand years'war to liberate Kashmir. '166 Bhutto also 
refused to attend the forthcoming RTC -a tactic that paid 
off handsomely, and demonstrated how accurately he had 
judged the mood of the country. Despite these negotiations 
and the DAC leaders' satisfaction with the concessions 
extracted from Ayub167 (including the latter's decision to 
drop the Agartala case), the rising tide of revolt con- 
tinued unabated. This gave credence to PPP claims that 
the DAC politicians were merely serving their own inter- 
ests and had no real public support, at least in West 
Pakistan. 
The disintegration of both political and public 
authority was not halted by the result of the RTC. Indeed 
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the movement entered, what can be called its, 'second', 
more violent phase of rioting and mass strikes in March. 
The leaders who were most closely associated with this 
phase of the movement were Bhutto and Bhashani. Both had 
put their faith in the streets. Although their weak 
organisations made them spokesmen rather than leaders of 
the popular mood, their radical socialist rhetoric cer- 
tainly contributed to the mood of militancy amongst urban 
labour and peasants (in Bhashani's case). 
168 March was 
a month of massive labour unrest throughout Pakistan, as 
factory workers resorted to 
ýhg erao (seizure) and jalao 
(burning), of factories belonging to the twenty-two 
families. 169 These conditions together with strikes by 
lower echelon government servants brought the government 
bureaucracy and much of the urban economy to a virtual 
standstill. This phase saw the emergence of new labour 
fronts and organisations, such as the Joint Labour Council 
(representing the major established unions and federations), 
Muttihida Mazdur Mahaz (United Workers Front of Lahore), 
Mazdur Majlis-i-Amal (Workers Action Committee of Multan) 
and Peoples Labour Front (of Rawalpindi). Some of the new 
labour fronts organised processions and industrial action 
under the guidance of labour leaders belonging to the 
PPP, for instance Mahmud Babar in Multan and Ziauddin Butt. 
in Lahore. At the same time, many NAP (Bhashani) labour 
labour union organisers in West Pakistan - such as Khalid 
Mahmud of the Thal Mahnatkash Mahaz (Thal Workers Front) - 
shifted their support to the PPP. Through such links with 
labour unions, the PPP became associated with several in- 
dustrial stoppages and strikes. 
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Several radical PPP leaders with labour union 
links were in favour of organising a trade union federation 
formally allied to the PPP. But Bhutto adopted a simi- 
lar policy to that adopted with regard to students. He 
did not want to lost broader labour support by identifying 
too closely with the radical left segments of the labour 
union organisations. Being reluctant to be drawn into 
the highly volatile field of labour union politics, Bhutto 
preferred to declare his support for the labour community 
in its entirety. This policy was to pay the party rich 
dividends later in-the 1970 elections. 
By the middle of March, the uprising against Ayub 
had turned into a violent, ugly situation, particularly in 
East Pakistan, where signs of peasant revolt began to 
appear. The villages there were in a state of near 
anarchy as the whole system of local government collapsed 
and as peasant mobs began to attack and kill Basic 
Democrats (often the local landlords and moneylenders), 
members of the Muslim League, unpopular officials, rent 
collectors, and "foreign intruders" from West Pakistan. 170 
Another aspect of the second phase of the anti- 
Ayub movement was the increasing ideological polarisation 
in the country. With Bhashani and Bhutto occupying the 
centres of the political stage, the air was thick with 
socialist slogans. The traditionalist Ulema began to 
"denounce socialism from the pulpit" up and down the 
country, while industrial and business interests report- 
edly moved to support conservative religious parties like 
the Jamaat-e-Islami. 171 We find then, that the PPP (as 
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the NAP-) was involved in fighting on two fronts simul- 
taneously - against the Ayub regime and against attacks 
from the Islamic parties and groups. The assault mounted 
by the Islam-Pasand parties was not a new phenomenon. 
The author of the history of the Jamaat-e-Islaami points 
out that "after 1966, the main direction of the Jamaat's 
attack was turned against Socialism. " 
172 The Islamic 
groups redoubled these attacks during the anti-Ayub move- 
ment. "The Jamaat's attack was mainly directed against 
Bhutto's PPP and Bhashani's NAP.... both.... used the term 
'Islamic Socialism'. "173 The PPP for its part, accused 
the Jamaat of being a tool in the hands of the "worst 
enemies of Muslims and other oppressed peoples - the 
imperialists.. " On the national level, the Jamaat was 
"serving the interests of the big landlords and the bureaucracy 
and exploiting the sacred name of Islam for the survival 
of capitalism and feudalism., 
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Bhutto had entered into 
a "gentleman's agreement" with Maulana Maudoodi, Amir of 
the Jamaat, in 1968, pledging to avoid mutual acrimony, as 
according to him extremists on both sides had created 
"bad blood" between the two parties. 
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But it is apparent 
that this "agreement" had fast worn thin. In the 
existing highly charged emotional atmosphere, both PPP and 
NAP supporters were involved in street fights with followers 
of Maudoodi's vehemently anti-socialist Jamaat. 
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On 
one occasion Maudoodi called on the "faithful", "to silence 
the tongue that utters the wor)i Socialism. "177 The PPP 
was highly sensitive to such attacks by the Islamic parties, 
and particularly to the accusation often levelled by them 
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that the party was financed by the Chinese. 
178 
Bhutto, 
therefore, had constantly to deny such unfounded charges, 
179 
and on occasion his pro-Peking (foreign policy) stance. 
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At the same time, party propaganda had to take cognisance 
of these political realities and adjust accordingly - 
emphasising the 'Islamic' element in the PPP's slogan of 
'Islam and Socialism', lest they be outflanked by the 
Jamaat. It was also under these pressures that Bhutto 
began to moderate his leftist leanings and the party's 
radical rhetoric. 
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It would be instructive here to examine Bhutto's 
style of rhetoric, and the language he employed in his 
political speeches to mass audiences, in order not only to 
understand his success at establishing a rapport with the 
masses, but also the manner in which he countered the 
fatwas (religious decrees) issued by the Ulema against him. 
Sindhi-speaking, himself, Bhutto's command over Urdu was 
limited - but it was in Urdu that he had to address 
audiences in the Punjab. Bhutto did not speak Punjabi, 
but his use of Urdu was also aimed at conveying his iden- 
tification with the idea of 'Greater Pakistan', (since 
Urdu is the country's national language) transcending his 
Sindhi origins. His limited Urdu far from being a handicap, 
proved to be an asset,. for his Urdu with its plain, often 
crude idiom, was of a kind ordinary people could understand 
and which appealed to them. On one occasion, when his 
Urdu was criticised by his opponents, he aptly retorted: 
"There are only two languages in Pakistan - the language of the exploited and the 
language of the exploiters. Today I am going 
to speak to you in the language of the 
exploited. " 182 
153 
Moreover, Bhutto often tried to compensate for his weak 
Urdu through dramatic gestures, acting, and mimicry or 
ridicule of political opponents. This kind of showman- 
ship appealed to the crowds, and became an essential part 
of his political style. His style of rhetoric can best 
be examplified by reference to a public meeting where, 
he was being heckled that he drank alcohol, strictly 
forbidden by Islam. He retorted that yes, he did drink, 
but unlike his opponents, he did not drink the poor 
peoples blood. Similarly, on other occasions, when he 
had to counter fatwas that his socialism was un-Islamic, 
he for instance, declared: 
"I respect the Ulema, but those who 
give fatwas after receiving money have 
served the Kafirs (non-believers).. .. 
... Islam is not in danger. Those who 
are in danger are the capitalists and the 
landlords and their puppets.... Islamic 
musawaat is called socialism in English... 
.... just as peoples' rule is called democracy. " 183 
The idea that socialism was merely the English equivalent 
of the Arabic/Urdu word musawaat which means equality, was 
reiterated in many of Bhutto's speeches. It was through 
such techniques and display of rhetoric that Bhutto was 
able to appeal to the ordinary masses. 
For his audiences amongst the intelligentsia, 
Bhutto produced more sophisticated arguments in his imma- 
culate English. To give but one example, again dealing 
with the question of the compatibility of Islam and 
Socialism: 
"The roots of socialism lie deep in a pro- 
foundly ethical view of life.... the high 
ideals of Islam in relation to society can 
154 
be attained only through a socialist 
system abolishing the exploitation of 
man by man. We believe that the nature 
of justice in the world demanded by our 
religion is inherent in the conception 
of a classless society. In this Islam 
differs fundamentally from other religions. 
Islam recognises no castes. Capitalist 
society has a class structure which is 
opposed to the equality and brotherhood 
enjoined upon Muslims by Islam. When we 
call our economic programme Islamic so- 
cialism.... we are..;. within the moral 
traditions of Islam. " 184 
The movement of 1968-69 finally culminated in the abdi- 
cation of President Ayub and his surrender of power to 
the army. Ayub announced his resignation in a public 
broadcast on 25 March, 1969. Ayub's period in power ended 
as it had begun, at a time of internal crisis and with the 
proclamation of martial law. General Yahya Khan, the 
commander-in-chief of the army, assumed the Presidency 
on 31 March, 1969. A mass movement had succeeded in over- 
throwing an authoritarian regime and ending the Ayubian 
era. One of the objectives of the PPP had been realised - 
the overthrow of the Ayub regime. 
CONCLUSION 
During the formative phase, the PPP became a 
I 
'movement' to overthrow the Ayubian political order on the 
basis of a socialist posture and utilising Bhutto's per- 
sonal popularity. The success of Bhutto in the brief span 
of a few months was by any standard, exceptional. Indeed 
his party did not gain as much popularity in one year 
(i. e. 1967 to 1968) as it did in the few months begin- 
ning November 1968. Here, an important qualification is 
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in order-- Bhutto did not create the vast popular up- 
surge in West Pakistan which erupted spectacularly during 
the month of November. Rather he rode on the crest of 
a wave, which later, he was able to manipulate. He, and 
the party, became the beneficiary of a popular upsurge that 
came into existence quite independently of them. We should 
not, however, lose sight of the fact that Bhutto's early 
open confrontation and his party's machinations probably 
contributed significantly to the mood of defiance and re- 
sentment that was to manifest itself later. As a member 
of the Ayub cabinet remarked, 
"Mr. Bhutto was the first to offer 
open confrontation. He sensed in good 
time that 1968-69 was to be the period 
when the last trial of strength would 
take place. This may be because he had a 
keener perception of the situation or 
because he was better informed of the weak- 
ness of the government. " 185 
The PPP's programme of propaganda and sloganeering did 
play an important part in contributing to the sense of 
deprivation and awareness of exploitation felt by various 
social groups who came to protest against the Ayub govern- 
ment. At the same time, as mentioned earlier, the PPP had 
by far the best connections with key social groups in the 
movement. In a sense, the PPP provided a new vocabulary 
to politics in Pakistan. Bhutto's populist style gave a 
new idiom to politics and brought about a new awareness of 
the importance of the politics of the people. 
For these reasons the PPP emerged as the principal 
beneficiary of the upsurge, and not other opposition 
groups. And that is also why Bhutto's personality managed 
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to eclipse and overshadow other opposition leaders. 
While other opposition leaders talked about vague consti- 
tutional issues, the PPP offered a new message of socio- 
economic justice designed to appeal to the new social 
forces and other disgruntled groups, and in particular, 
youth. Bhutto had appealed to the post-independence gene- 
ration and the PPP had sought to cultivate this important 
constituency. The anti-Ayub movement, can in part, be 
viewed, as a 'crisis of participation' brought on by new 
social groups that had, as a result of Pakistan's first 
surge of industrial and agricultural development (under 
Ayub) acquired political identities, associational forms 
of organisation and high social and economic aspirations. 
Bhutto, by articulating their frustrations emerged as the 
victor of the movement. As far as the other opposition 
parties were concerned, *it is significant that not one of 
the DAC's eight points dealt with economic problems. 
Further, in the midst of the agitation, while the DAC chose 
to talk to a discredited Ayub on the future political 
order, Bhutto refused to participate in the RTC, choosing 
the mass movement as the proper vehicle for the transfer 
of power, and putting his faith in the streets. It was 
Bhutto's policy that paid off in the end. The PPP could 
claim with some justification, that it gave the first 
lessons in mass agitational politics in Pakistan. 
As for the internal characteristics of the party, 
three major features can be identified: (i) the hetero- 
geneous nature of its membership; (2) its weak organisational 
nature and (3) its heavy reliance on Bhutto's personality. 
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Originating essentially as a union of an established 
public figure with his own group of personal (feudal) 
followers, and a disparate group of leftist leaders and 
factions, the party expanded by recruiting from various 
dissident groups - traditional feudal landlords, students, 
urban professionals, industrial labour - linked primarily 
by a common animosity towards the Ayub regime. In build- 
ing his party, Bhutto relied both on traditional ties and 
personal linkages with Sindhi landlords, and 'modern' 
appeals based on a socialist ideology to urban social 
groups. These disparate constituencies made the PPP a 
coalition of diverse interests. This, together with the 
fact that Bhutto chose not to develop the PPP into a clear- 
ly structured organisation meant that the PPP was, in con- 
sequence less party, than movement. 
What party organisation existed was weak, at best. 
As mentioned earlier, the party developed rapid popular- 
ity and in a tumultuous period. Few efforts were directed 
at effectively organising the party or rationalising its 
structure. Bhutto's broad coalition strategy for challeng- 
ing the Ayub regime led him to maintain the PPP as an 
amorphous structure that was neither rigidly defined nor 
clearly delineated. Moreover, Bhutto placed greater 
emphasis on his personalised leadership than on party 
organisation. 
Related to this, was the heavy emphasis of the party 
on Bhutto's personality. One aspect of this was the weak 
development of secondary leadership in the party. This is 
apparent from the fact that while Bhutto was in jail, no 
158 
effective second-ranking leader emerged. Another as- 
pect of this was Bhutto's supremacy over the party. Thus 
the dominant features that later characterised the party - 
Bhutto's patrimonial control over the party, its weak 
organisational nature, the tension between the disparate 
elements, and the attempt to combine 'mass party' features 
with traditional features - were all evident in its 
formative phase. Indeed, they laid the basis for the 
party's subsequent development. 
An additional characteristic of the party was its 
regional support base; its strength was confined to West 
Pakistan, and within West Pakistan, primarily to Sind and 
Punjab. It made no headway in East Bengal. 
186 In fact, 
the East Pakistan branch of the party was dissolved in 
March 1969, in view of Bhutto's failure to support the 
Bengali demand for full regional autonomy. 
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The upheaval of 1968-69 illustrated the radical- 
isation and polarisation as well as the structural changes 
that Pakistani politics underwent in Ayub's decade. It 
saw not only widespread support for radical demands for 
social justice (articulated so effectively by the PPP) and 
autonomy (a demand put forward by the Awami League in the 
Eastern wing), but also an ideological division between the 
Left and the Right. Finally, the uprising showed that 
after ten years of Ayub's centralised, personal rule, the 
country was left with no national institution that could 
usher in a smooth transition for a successor regime or 
hold the two wings together. 
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III 
THE PPP AS AN ELECTORAL MACHINE, 1970 
This chapter is concerned with analysing the role 
played by Bhutto and his PPP in the 1970 election, focus- 
ing on the transformation of the PPP from a protest movement 
into a party seeking electoral support. Much has been 
written about the 1970 election itself) The focus of 
much of this literature, however, ds:. on analysing the 
party in the Punjab, with the major emphasis directed to- 
wards a discussion of the party's 'modern' characteristics 
which led to the depiction of the PPP as a party of 
change. 
2 This chapter attempts to provide a more com- 
prehensive picture of the party by analysing the party 
both in the Punjab and Sind and by emphasising its 
'traditional' features along with its 'modern' character- 
istics to arrive at a more satisfactory assessment of the 
party as an electoral machine. As we shall see below, this 
involves a qualification of the view that the PPP was a 
party of radical change. 
In his attempt to forge a broad electoral coalition, 
Bhutto relied on a mixture of appeals to traditional as well 
as 'modernised' social groups. In rtiral Sind and the 
äjöining parts of Punjab, his rty ö ted to co-opting 
established feudal and clan leaders, while in the Punjab 
fIhe-most paw--thy-party-at" m ste to pa 
peal directly, 
---------------------------------------------------- over the heads of local notables, to-the-mas In the 
urbanised parts of the country, attempts were directed at 
recruiting the support of the urban poor, and middle-class 
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professional groups. Such an electoral strategy meant 
at the PPP had many different faces and spoke in 
different lan ua ent. __provincial and socio- 
economic groups. Thus Bhutto's electoral strategy combined 
the traditional 'patron' mode of political campaigning 
i. e. by manipulating feudal elites (in Sind), with popu- 
list politics aimed at mobilising mass support (in the 
Punjab). 
In several respects the pattern and nature of the 
coming election campaign had already been determined by 
the 1968-69 mass urban protests. 
3 Four months of inter- 
mittent rioting by urban social groups, such as industrial 
labour and white-collar professionals, had demonstrated 
both the growing political importance of these newer social 
groups and the salience of economic grievances, which 
formed the basis of such social unrest. The lessons-of 
the 1968-69 upheaval were quickly absor -and-ass-imilated 
in the PPPýr gramme ndý1e ^rai strategy. Bhutto's 
aim was to manipulate the 'revolution of rising frustrat- 
ions' amongst such groups to his party's electoral advan- 
tage by appealing directly to these urban masses in the 
Punjab (for it was in urban Punjab that the anti-Ayub move- 
ment developed and gained momentum) through socio-economic 
slogans promising social justice and better standards of 
living. Thus Bhutto's eler_alstrategy envisaged the 
-recruitment of thýsecentl-y-created-and mobilised urban 
interest groups in addition to drawing upon traditional 
patron-client pyramids in te Sin hi rural countryside. 
The extent to which this strategy was successful is 
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discussed later. Here, it may-be relevant to mention 
two additional aspects of the November mass movement that 
had an impact on the election campaign subsequently. 
These are the growing polarisation between the 'left' and 
the 'right' and between the two halves of the country, 
East and West Pakistan. 
4 
The election campaign period fur- 
ther strengthened these divisions that had been accentuated 
during the mass upsurge. The slogans of the November mass 
movement were repeated with ferocity during the campaign - 
the demand for regional autonomy (as symbolised earlier 
by the demand for the dissolution of "one-unit" in the 
West, and by the Six Points of the Awami League in the 
East) and the issue of Islam versus Socialism. 
Before we go on to look at the 1970 election, it 
is necessary first to outline the nature of the Yahya 
regime 
5 
and the PPP's attitude towards it, and second, the 
manner in which the PPP arrived at the decision to partici- 
pate in the election. 
The political atmosphere during the Yahya period 
was one of heightened tensions and rising often violent, 
economic and political discontent. The transfer of power 
6 from Ayub to Yahya on 25 March . 'signified a return to 
military rule, undisguised by the trappings of civilian 
institutions. The reimposition of martial law did not 
put an end to the riots and strikes, which continued, ' 
albeit sporadically, in both wings of the country. 
7yahya 
inher- 
ited the dilemmas of his predecessors, but his method 
of dealing with these differed markedly. Yahya demons- 
trated far more willingness to respond to widespread 
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demands for popular participation and redistribution 
than earlier regimes. This was reflected in a number 
of reforms announced by his regime in the spheres of 
education and labour legislati6n. 
8 In deference to 
popular demands, a purge of the civilian bureaucracy 
followed. 
9 The Yahya regime also announced that from now 
on social welfare and economic growth must harmonise in 
the country's planning policies, and this required a com- 
plete re-orientation of commercial, industrial, fiscal 
and foreign trade policies. 
10 
Responding to the evident 
social and political strains caused by the rapid economic 
growth of the preceding years, the martial law regime also 
introduced measures to increase the emphasis on the 
equitable distribution of wealth. All this went some way 
to placate various discontented social groups such as 
urban labour and the intelligentsia.. However, the 
ll 
atmosphere remained charged with tension and uncertainty. 
The main source of uncertainty lay in the fact that the 
various social and political conflicts of the country had 
only been frozen by martial law. Violence and rioting 
continued in East Pakistan, while in the West, in 
September 1969, there began a period of strained and tur- 
bulent labour relations which provided fertile ground for 
political intervention. Professional groups such as 
teachers, lawyers and journalists also continued to re- 
organise and agitate in this period. The continuing unrest 
among these groups demonstrated that the reform proposals 
of the Yahya regime only partially satisfied their central 
demand for redistributive justice and more specific demands 
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pertaining to, for instance, reform of the educational 
system or labour laws. 
Bhutto was quick in seizing the opportunity 
afforded by these circumstances. In his public speeches, 
he articulated the grievances of these social groups and 
pressed for the recognition of their demands in an attempt 
to rally their support for the coming election. 
12 Thus, 
while other political leaders waited for Yahya's official 
'proclamation' permitting political campaigning, Bhutto 
was already on the public platform. For instance, capital- 
ising on discontent among urban industrial workers which 
continued despite the regime's measures at restoring the 
right to strike and subsequently increasing the industrial 
minimum wage, 
13 Bhutto made several public statements in 
support of higher wages, and restrictions on the profits 
of the industrial elite. Bhutto's unqualified support 
for the demands of industrial workers was aimed at winning 
their electoral support. The same applied to his 
championing the demands of professional groups, such as 
teachers and journalists. In the case of teachers, Bhutto 
voiced the demand for better pay and later, nationalisation 
of educational institutions. 
14 The grievances of these 
urban social groups were carefully noted by Bhutto and 
incorporated in his party's slogans and manifesto. 
In mid-1969, Yahya began outlining his time-table 
for the return to civilian government, reserving at the 
same time the right of the military regime to define 
the parameters of political activity. In November 1969, 
Yahya announced full freedom of action for political 
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parties subject to certain 'guidelines' from 1 January 
and general elections on 5 October 1970. The 1970,5 
16 1 
procedures to be followed were spelled out in greater 
detail in the Legal Framework Order (LFO) promulgated on 
30 March 1970,17 and based on those principles on which a 
broad consensus had emerged at the 1969 Round Table Confer- 
ence. The LFO envisaged the dissolution of "one-unit" in 
West Pakistan and its sub-division into four provinces - 
Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and the North West Frontier, i. e. 
the restoration of the situation prior to 1955. The LFO 
also resolved another ticklish issue - that of represent- 
ation on a population basis. Parity between East and 
West Pakistan in the national assembly, a basic principle 
in the 1956 Wand 1962 constitution, was discarded, and the 
East wing was conceded 56% of the seats (169 out of 313 
seats). The election would be direct and on universal 
suffrage - "one-man, one vote". Prior to assuming govern- 
ment and legislative function, the assembly would be 
given a period of 120 days to draft a constitution - with 
Yahya reserving the right to authenticate the constitution. 
The LFO also spelled out a number of fundamental princi- 
ples which the constitution would have to incorporate in 
order to meet Yahya's approval. These included a guaran- 
tee of the inviolability of Pakistan's territorial integrity 
preservation of Islamic ideology, independence of the 
judiciary, fundamental rights, free elections, a federal 
system ensuring not' only autonomy to the provinces, but 
also adequate legislative, administrative and financial 
powers to the federal government, and the removal of 
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disparities, especially economic disparity, among the 
various region's. 
Out of 'the three main points of political con- 
troversy about the future constitutional set-up, Yahya 
took it upon himself to settle, albeit provisionally, two - 
namely, the issue of "one-unit", and the question of parity 
versus population as a principle of representation. The 
third issue, which related to the distribution of powers 
between the Centre and the provinces, was left to the 
N. A. to resolve. 
is Yahya's decision to abolish "one-unit" 
proved a blessing for Bhutto and the PPP. Bhutto could 
not openly advocate the break-up of "one. -unit" for fear 
of alienating the major source of his party's support - 
the Punjab, which had traditionally supported the idea 
of "one-unit; " at the same time he could not oppose it-for 
fear of annoying his native Sind, a province that had for 
long voiced its resentment against "one-unit". By removing 
this issue from the arena of political controversy, Yahya 
indirectly defused an issue which could have been a 
highly divisive one in the PPP. 
By and large, Bhutto publicly welcomed and support- 
ed Yahya's political policy pronouncements, 
19 
although as 
we noted above, he severely criticised the regime's social 
and economic policies. But, while Bhutto proclaimed that 
he did not doubt the sincerity and "bonafides" of the 
Yahya government, 
20 he often complained of victimisation 
by the regime. 
21 It is important to note that whatever 
the fluctuations in the public relationship between Yahya 
and Bhutto, in private, the two scarcely concealed their 
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mutual animosity. But despite this, Bhutto evidently 
decided to adopt a policy of, pragmatism vis a vis the 
Yahya government partly in order to establish a more 
'respectable' image for the party in the election period. 
That is one of the reasons why, for instance, when radical 
PPP leaders like Mukhtar Rana and Mahmud Babar were arrest- 
ed by the Yahya regime, the PPP did no more than make a 
22 
feeble protest. But as the election campaign intensi- 
fied, Bhutto stepped up his attacks on the regime, re- 
counting various incidents to demonstrate that the regime, 
far from being neutral, was biased against the PPP. He 
accused the administration of attempting to unite the 
three Muslim Leagues to check the growing popularity of 
the PPP. 
23 Bhutto's attacks were largely directed at 
individual ministers of the Yahya government whom he 
accused of directly supporting various political parties24 
and of encouraging the 'anti-socialist' movement that had 
begun in the national press. 
25 
Bhutto's allegations about 
the partiality of the Yahya regime were interpreted by 
his opponents, at the time, as part of a strategy to, 
gain the sympathies of the people, 
26 by putting forward 
the image of the mazloom. (oppressed ) 
The government on its part claimed that it was 
maintaining a policy of non-interference. The regime was 
certainly interested in the results that would be produced 
by the elections. At the same time it seemed to have 
convinced itself that the best way of bringing about the desir- 
ed_result.; was. to display more or less total impartiality 
toward all political parties. 
27 
The political scene'in 
Pakistan appeared sufficiently confused to convince the 
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government of Yahya that no single party would triumph. 
28 
With the seats split among a number of parties, the regime 
could play the'role of a political broker. 
PPP: THE DECISION TO PARTICIPATE AND THE HALA CONFERENCE 
Bhutto's attitude towards elections (as with his 
views on 'democracy' in general) had always been somewhat 
ambivalent. In the past, this ambivalence had manifested 
itself in shifting positions on the issue, with Bhutto re- 
jecting on some occasions the very idea of elections and 
maintaining that his party was a 'revolutionary' one, 
29 
while at other times he had even expressed his willingness 
to contest elections on a restricted franchise. 
30 
With 
the scene set for the first ever general election in 
Pakistan, there seemed little doubt in Bhutto's mind that 
as the 'victor' of the anti-Ayub movement, he would reap 
a rich harvest electorally if he contested the election. 
But what of the party's revolutionary image, and of the 
die-hard leftists within the party who rejected the very 
idea of elections as 'bourgeois' and meaningless? 
31 
Although Bhutto's mind was largely made up on the 
question of participation, he decided to call a conference 
of the party to debate this issue. 
32 
But he announced 
that till such time as the party took a final decision on 
the issue, it should be assumed that the party would part- 
icipate in the elections. 
33 
A two-day, all Pakistan 
conference of the party was called at Hala (in Sind) under 
Bhutto's presidentship. This was the second major con- 
vention of the party since the party's founding. Although 
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conventions of the party had been held on a provincial 
basis in 1968, no all-Pakistan convention had been organ- 
ised since 1967. The Hala conference, therefore, deserves 
some attention, as it proved to be a historic one in the 
annals of party history. 
The Hala conference was convened on 2 July 1970 
at the residence of Makhdoom Zaman, the Pir of Hala. It 
was ironical that a self-acclaimed 'revolutionary' party 
had convened its first major convention at the home of one 
of Sind's biggest landlords and spiritual leaders. Indeed, 
the Makhdoom's connection with the PPP was an explicit mani- 
festation of the PPP's links with the waderas and spirit- 
ual leaders of Sind (as discussed later). 700 delegates 
attended the conference, representing various parts of the 
country. The delegates came from a broad social spectrum, 
ranging from lower middle and middle class urban professionals 
(lawyers, teachers) to scions of Sindhi aristocratic 
families, and included student leaders and labour organisers. 
This reflected the heterogeneous nature of the party's 
membership and the divergent interests represented by it. 
The conference, in which there was relatively free 
and open debate, discussed and reviewed various aspects of the 
political situation in the country, focusing on whether 
or not the party should contest the elections. From 
information obtained from interviews, 
34 
a shares division 
arose at the con. f. eýence-on-t s iGsue between the 'right- 
ists' (Peerzada) and 'centrist' (Mubashar, Ramat') eleme 
who advocated participation and the 'leftist' (Mairaj, Tariq 
Aziz, Shamim Zainuddin, Ziauddin Butt) and 'progressive' 
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(Rahim) elements who opposed participation (or supported 
participation on certain conditions). _ 
As stated by Mairaj, 
he left position maintained that a radical party like 
the PPP could not view the elections as-s&lvingthe prob- 
ems p Revolutions were never produced by 
elections - indeed elections only returned thöse to power 
who protected the status quo or their own narrow interests. 
Electioneering would mean that the party would have to 
rely, to some extent, on t support of monied interests 
and this would bring-in L-r of "opportunist"'; 
conservative interests and "feudals" into the party. Thus 
even you s emocracy cou], d not be established if the 
PPP was to consist of feudal sts. The right groups 
disagreed with the left groi4ps' interpretation of a 
'revolutionary party'. The party was indeed revolutionary 
but it believed in peaceful methods of acquiring power, and 
this necessarily entailed contesting elections. As for 
the entry of 'feudals' in the party, this could not be 
opposed per se - all were welcome to join the party as 
35 long as they decided to abide by the party programme 
Among the 'leftist' groups the Mairaj Mohammed faction 
argued that while ideologically it was opposed to the idea 
of 'bourgeois elections', boycotting the election might 
prove to be wrong strategy. The PPP should utilise the 
electoral platform to establish itself nationally and to 
spread 'socialist consciousness', while at the same time 
barring the entry of "feudal opportunists" and adopting a 
clear stand that elections per se were no solution to 
the problems of the mass populace. 
36 
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With the party so sharply divided on the issue, 
two days of heated discussion failed to produce any con- 
sensus. At this stage. of the proceedings, the conference 
gave a 'mandate' to the chairman (Bhutto) to resolve the 
deadlock. Although it is not known who arranged the 
'mandate', this method of not taking a vote, and delegating 
all responsibility to Bhutto to arrive at the final decis- 
ion, in fact set up a tradition in the party whereby 
decision-making, as we shall see later, became highly 
personalised, with Bhutto making all major policy decisions, 
often against the wishes of other members of the party 
heirarchy. Instead of voting upon an issue and setting 
up a democratic tradition in the party, "mandates" were 
"issued" to Bhutto to resolve issues in a highly personalised 
manner. This was an early indication of Bhutto's Viceregal 
approach - in terms of the centralisation and personalis- 
ation of decision-making, and obviously inhibited the 
evolution of any institutionalised decision-making mechan- 
ism within the party. 
On the last day of the conference, Bhutto announced 
his decision to participate in the election, but stated 
at the same time that elections by themselves would. not 
solve the problems of the masses: The latter portion of 
the announcement was clearly aimed at appeasing the 'leftist' 
groups. 
37 At the close of the conference, several reso- 
lutions were passed that for instance, condemned the 
Yahya regime's policy of "victimising" students, industrial 
workers and members of leftist parties, criticised the 
fourth Five Year Plan, and demanded a ban on the use of 
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mosques for political propaganda. 
38 
Although the election issue had dominated the 
convention's proceedings, related issues, notably the kind 
of 'revolution' the PPP envisaged for the country, occupied 
a central role in the debates. This, like the election 
issue, revealed deep ideological differences within the 
party. As stated by Mairaj, the radical leftists main- 
tained that in its fight against imperialism the PPP 
should not only take a stand against the capitalists, but 
also the feudal system. 
39 Thus the leists, led by 
*ýaýra' wanted t^ ^ýýýe_primary emphasis on the liquidation 
of feudalism, whereas Bhutto (supported by Mubashar, 'Ramay 
and Peerzada) argued that since the links perialism 
in Pakistan w ith-t-h pitalists (and the higher 
buret aucracy) this class, not that of the landed notables, 
was the primary internal enemy. The immediate, implication 
of Mairaj's argument was that feudalism could not be 
destroyed if the PPP gave tickets to this class (a refer- 
ence to the Sindhi landed elite in the party) and reflect- 
ed the leftists' growing doubts about their chairman's 
commitment to revolutionary change. Thus, the Hala 
Conference, despite the demonstration of unity at the 
end, revealed deep ideological divisions in the PPP. 
Immediately after the convention, the PPP launched 
its own daily newspaper Musawaat from Lahore on 7 July, 
40 
under the editorship of Hanif Ramay (a member of the central 
organising committee of the PPP). 
41 
It is noteworthy, 
that although, in theory, the government-owned National 
Press Trust (NPT) which controlled the largest section of 
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the press, both English and Urdu - was free to report 
the campaign and to adopt a non-partisan role, in prac- 
tice, this was not the case. The NPT was headed by 
Information Minister Sher All, whose antipathy for Bhutto 
and the PPP's socialism 1. was well 
known, as were his 
sympathies with right-wing Islamic parties, particularly 
the Jamaat-e-Islaami. In his public speeches, Bhutto 
repeatedly accused Sher All of being responsible for biased 
reporting in the NPT press. 
42 
Such allegations, were in 
large part, justified. This factor together with the 
nature of the non-official press media stressed the need 
for the party to launch its own daily newspaper. The 
conservative Islamic parties either. owned or had the 
sympathy of a large number of widely circulated Urdu news- 
papers and newsweeklies. 
43 
Much of the remaining press 
media was owned by the Haroons, one'of the twenty-two 
families, from which the PPP could scarcely expect favour- 
able reporting. Therefore, the launching of the party's 
own organ was, in Bhutto's view, a necessary step towards 
propagating the party's electoral programme and countering 
the-attacks of the right-wing press. 
Soon after, the PPP published its Election Manifesto, 
drafted by Bhutto, Mubashar Hasan and J. Rahim, setting 
forth the party's ideological and programmatic position, 
44 
There was some delay in the final release of the Manifesto 
to the public. 
45 
It was reported at the time that this 
delay reflected differences of opinion among the various 
ideological groups within the party (outlined to some 
extent in the preceding section above, and below); this 
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also helps to explain some of the seeming contradictions 
in the document 'is va n-impor-tant--issues, 
such as ceilings on land holdings and regional autonomy. 
The programmatic pro 69- n in lengthy 
Manifesto were substantially the same as in the Foundation 
Documents (discussed in the preceding chapter): the 
commitment to socialist objectives and the promise of 
nationalisation of ke industries For the 
agricultural sector, while the Manifesto proclaimed that 
it stood for the elimination of feudalism, there appeared 
to be some dilution of even the moderate reformist programme 
proposed in the Foundation Documents. For instance, on 
the issue of land reforms no precise cei'1ing was set. 
46 
The 
vagueness on this crucial issue was a reflection of Bhutto's 
anxiousness not to frighten the Sindhi aristocracy, which 
was an important constituency of the PPP. It may be rele- 
vant to mention here that a few months earlier, in March, 
the issue of land ceiling had been a highly contentious 
one at a meeting of the Punjab provincial committee. A 
group of leftists comprising Sheikh Rashid, Amanullah Khan 
and K. H. Meer demanded that the land ceiling be fixed at 
25 acres in the party's manifesto. 
47 
This was vehemently 
opposed by landed members led by Khar. No consensus was 
reached, and a proposed party meeting was postponed. 
48 
At 
the same time one student member of the leftist group, 
Amanullah was expelled from the party. 
49 
The Manifesto avoided comment on the question of 
regional autonomy. Although it referred to West Pakistan's 
domination of the East as an "internal colonial structure", 
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it did not spell out any solution to this problem other 
than the general preý-r____ition that socialism would 
-- 50 "abolish" such esýuities _. and__ exploit 
ion. On con--at 
stitutional issues, in general, the Manifesto said little. 
It envisaged a federal, parliamentary system of government 
and "full democracy", but these concepts were not elaborate . 
51 
In the field of foreign policy great emphasis was laid on 
the 'confrontation with India' theme, and solidarity was 
expressed with the people of Kashmir. In terms of spe- 
cific commitments, the party promised withdrawal from 
SEATO and CENTO, "for avoiding neo-colonialist dictation 
of policy. " 
52 
There was greater emphasis on Islam in the 
Manifesto than in the Foundation Documents. Indeed the 
Manifesto named Islam as the derivative source for all its 
policy proposals: "The substance and spirit of the party's 
programme, demands, and activities obey the teachings of 
Islam. " However, the Manifesto did not use the term 
'Islamic Socialism', which we shall see presently, became 
an important part of Bhutto's campaign speeches. Although 
the Manifesto used socialist vocabulary, and talked of 
class conflict, it was devoid of the militant, hard-hitting 
content that we otherwise find in Bhutto's speeches and 
public pronouncements of the time. The Manifes`too w-as 
certainly radical in the range of socio-economic change 
that it envisaged for the future, but it was by no means 
a 
olutionary document. 
THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1970 
Pakistan's first ever general election was scheduled 
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for 7 December 1970. For the first time since independence, 
all Pakistanis above the age of twenty-one were being 
called upon to"elect members of a national assembly by 
direct vote. Ten days later, on 17 December, they were 
to exercise their vote again, to elect members of provin- 
cial assemblies for each of the five provinces. Even the 
direct election of provincial legislatures was a new exper- 
ience for many voters - thou who had come of age since the 
early and mid-fifties. These were the first elections in 
Baluchistan, the first direct elections in East Pakistan 
since 1954, first since 1951 in Punjab and the NWFP, and 
since 1953, in Sind. Thus previous electoral experience 
included only four provincial elections (on adult franchise 
basis) in the early fifties, and two (indirect) national 
'elections' (including a presidential one) under Ayub's 
Basic Democracy system in the sixties. 
53 
Under Yahya's LFO, the national assembly was to 
consist of 313 members of whom 300 would be elected to 
fill general seats while 13 seats were reserved for women. 
54 
The number of seats in the N. A. and the P. A. 's were 
distributed amongst the provinces and the centrally adminis- 
tered tribal areas (CATA's) according to the census of 
1961. See Table III. 1 below for the allocation of seats. 
Yahya had decreed that the elections be held on 
the basis of single. member territorial constituencies of 
approximately equal size and the first-past-the-post system. 
Delimitation and other arrangements were in the hands of 
the Election Commission headed by a retired Supreme Court 
Justice. The last census (that in 1961), was used as the 
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TABLE III. 1 
ALLOCATION OF SEATS FOR THE 1970 ELECTION 
National Assembl 
General Women 
East Pakistan 162 7 
Punjab 82 3 
Sind 27 1 
Baluchistan 41 
North-West-Frontier Province 18 - 
Centrally Administered 71 
Tribal Areas 
Total seats 300 13 
Provincial Assemblies 
General Women 
East Pakistan 300 10 
Punjab 180 6 
Sind 60 2 
Baluchistan 20 1 
North-West-Frontier Province 40 2 
basis for delimitation subject to the proviso that rational 
administrative boundaries be used as constituency boundar- 
ies as well. 
55 At the same time, the Commission considered 
tribal and biradari to be important factors in delineating 
constituencies. Two examples of these are Dera Ghazi Khan 
district (in the Punjab) where the territories of influence 
of the Leghari and the Mazari clans were placed in separate 
constituencies, and Campbellpur (Punjab), where the Khattar, 
Awan and Makhad areas were provided with potential "pocket 
boroughs. " 
The electoral register was based on the 1961 census, 
but brought up to date by including those who had come of 
voting age by 1970. Registered voters totalled 56.94 million 
189 
(30.5 males and 26.44 females), representing just under 
half the population (47%) of Pakistan - estimated at 120 
million in 1970, (94 million in the 1961 census). 
56 It can 
be surmised that the electoral roll was a fairly accurate 
representation of the population (above 21) eligible to 
vote, since the Pakistani population is predominantly 
young - 46.4% being below the age of fifteen years. 
57 
Before we go on to look at the election campaign 
and the results produced by the election, it is necessary 
here to give a brief survey of the main parties that con- 
tested the election. 
CONTESTANTS: THE PPP AND ITS COMPETITORS 
The Pakistani electorate in 1970 was confronted 
by a plethora of parties, with twenty-five parties contest- 
ing the election, eleven in East Pakistan and fourteen in 
West Pakistan. Nominations for the national assembly by 
(major) party and region are shown below, in Table 111.2. 
We can classify the major parties contesting the 
election into four broad groups: 
1. The various factions of the Muslim League. 
2. Conservative and fundamentalist "Islam - Pasand" 
(Islam. - loving) parties, like the JUI, JUP and JI. 
3. Older, more established parties (or splinter groups 
of older parties), regionalist in form and ideology, 
such as NAP and the Awami League. 
58 
4. Newly-established parties (not splinter groups of 
older ones) such as the PPP. 
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TABLE 111.2 
NOMINATIONS FOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BY PARTY AND REGION 
Balu- 
chistan 
Total Seats (4) 
NWFP 
(25) 
Punjab 
(82) 
Sind 
(27) 
W. Pak 
(138) 
E. Pak 
(162) 
Pakistan 
(300) 
Awami League (AL) 1 2 3 2 8 162 176 
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) .... 2 15 44 19 80 71 151 
Pakistan Muslim ......... 4 17 35 12 68 65 133 
League (Qayyum Group) 
(QML) 
Pakistan Muslim ......... - 1 24 6 31 93 124 
League Convention 
(PML (C) ) 
Pakistan Peoples Party... 1 16 78 25 120 - 120 
(PPP) 
Council Muslim .......... 2 5 50 12 69 50 119 
League (CML) 
Pakistan Democratic ..... 1 2 21 3 27 78 105 Party (PDP) 
Jamiatul Ulema-i- ....... 4 18 46 21 89 15 104 Pakistan (Hazarvi 
Group (JUP (H) ) 
National Awami Party.,.., 3 16 - 6 25 39 64 
(Wali Group) 
(NAP (W) ) 
Markazi Jamiatul-Ulema-  - 2 3 - 5 49 54 i-Islam & 
Nizäm -i-Islam (MJUI) 
Jamiatul Ulema-e-......,, - 1 41 8 50 - 50 Pakistan (JUP) 
National Awami Party..... 1 - 2 2 5 14 19 
(Bhashani Group) 
(NAP (BH) ) 
Pakistan National ....... - - 2 - 2 14 16 
League (PNL) 
Other Parties ........... 1 1 6 8 16 18 36 
Independents ............ 6 46 105 46 213 113 326 
Total .................. 26 142 460 170 BOB 781 1589 
Source: Report on General Election Pakistan 1970-1971, 
Vol. II, (Karachi: Manager of Publications), 
pp. 122-123. 
We shall now take a brief look at the major parties 
within these broad groupings, beginning with the Muslim 
League factions. 
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THE MUSLIM LEAGUE FACTIONS 
The Muslim League, Pakistan's independence party, 
was split and in disarray. 
59 In 1962, Ayub tried to seize 
control of the League as a vehicle for his regime and his 
supporters. He called a convention of. the Muslim League; 
hence his party became known as the "Convention" Muslim 
League (PML(C)). Other Leaguers who did not find Ayub Khan's 
leadership acceptable, under the inspiration of Mian Mumtaz 
Mohammed Khan Daultana (a member of the Punjabi feudal 
aristocracy and a former chief minister) reconvened the 
Council of Muslim League under the presidency of former Prime 
Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin. This is how the "Council" 
Muslim League (CML) came into existence in 1962. In 
February 1969, a third faction emerged under the leadership 
of Qayyum Khan, the Pakistan Muslim League (Qayyum group or 
QML) and consisting of dissident members of both the 
PML (C) and CML. 
All three factions of the League relied on the 
support of the West Pakistani feudal aristocracy. In a 
sense, the three Leagues were the vehicles of different 
landlord factions and were essentially 'patron' parties. The 
Convention Muslim League for instance, enjoyed the support 
of some members of the Qizilbash and Tiwana clans in the 
Punjab. The CML's principal source of support appeared to 
be the Punjab feudal aristocracy, to which both Daultana 
(the leader of the party) and Shaukat Hayat (the provincial 
president) belonged. The CML was built around a series 
of alliances between the leading Punjab feudal families - 
the Noonr, Gilanis, Qureishis, Hayats, Makhads, Mazaris, 
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Legharis, Syeds and Mians. In Sind, Daultana's faction 
was aligned with the Sindhi waders faction of Ayub Khuhro, 
a former chief minister and traditional rival of the 
Bhutto clan. The QML was based on similar alliances bet- 
ween landlord factions, and enjoyed the support of the 
Pir of Pagaro faction of Sind, members of Qayyum's own 
landlord faction in the NWFP, and Punjabi landowning 
families like the Noons of Sargodha, Gilanis of Multan and 
Hasan Mahmud of Bahawalpur. 
There were few programmatic differences between 
the three Leagues. 
60 All subscribed to a conservative 
political philosophy, invoking Islam to assert their leader- 
ship claims. All three stood for a strong Centre, although 
the CML appeared to be more tolerant than the other two, 
towards demands for regional autonomy. All three advocat- 
ed social justice although in the vaguest of terms. 
However, of the three, the QML was vociferous in its 
rejection of the PPP's socialism as being inconsistent with 
Pakistan's Islamic ideology. 
THE ISLAMIC PARTIES 
Generally speaking, all these parties stood for 
a political, economic and social system rooted in Islam. 
There were sharp differences of opinion on interpretation 
of the meaning of an "Islamic System", especially in the 
economic field, and between the various Sunni Islamic sects. 
Therefore, the various Islamic parties represented different 
schools of thought in Islam. Of the Islamic parties, the 
Jamaat-e-Islaami, led at the time by its founder, Maulana 
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Maudoodi, was generally regarded to be one of the best 
organised parties in the country, with an elaborate under- 
structure in both wings down to the Mohalla (precinct) 
level. 61 It had a clearly articulated orthodox Sunni 
philosophy based on Maudoodi's interpretation of Islam, 
and had consistently advocated the establishment of an 
Islamic state and society adhering to the tenets of the 
Qur'an and Sunna. During the campaign the Jamaat enlisted 
the support of some prominent politicians such as former 
Punjab Governor Nawab Gurmani and some retired military 
officers including General Umrao Khan. 
The Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) was another 
variant of the ulema parties, belonging to the Barelvi 
school of thought. The Jamiat-e-Ulema-Islam (JUI) derived 
its inspiration from the Deoband school. In 1969 the JUI 
split into two factions - the more orthodox faction JUI(T) 
led by Maulana Thanvi and a more liberal Sunni faction, 
JUI(H), led by Maulana Hazarvi. The JUI(T) claimed some 
support in the Sind and Punjab, while the JUI(H) drew its 
strength from the Frontier and Baluchistan. 
THE REGIONAL PARTIES 
Of the regional parties, the most vociferous advocate 
of greater regional autonomy was the Awami League led by 
Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman, which was almost exclusively East 
Pakistani based. 62 Its concept of regional autonomy was 
presented in the form of a Six-Point Programme. 63 
In the West, the National Awami Party (Wali Khan 
Group) which derived its support largely from tribal chiefs 
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of NWFP and Baluchistan advocated greater regional 
autonomy for these provinces. 
64 The NAP(W) claimed its 
descent from the National Party of Pakistan, generally 
regarded as representing the 'Old Guard' Left in Pakistan. 
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The party supported a socialist programme, calling'for 
nationalisation of banks and key industries and fixing a 
ceiling on land holdings. NAP(W) was perhaps the only 
party in the country that was openly secular. The Sind 
United Front led by G. M. Syed (a Sindhi landlord), 
similarly, called for greater regional autonomy, and enjoy- 
ed the support of some Sindhi landlords and members of the 
Sindhi intelligentsia. 
THE PPP: ORGANISATION AND CANDIDATE SELECTION 
The state of party organisation was far from 
satisfactory as the election date approached. A party 
central committee had yet to be formally constituted - up 
to now decisions were generally taken by Bhutto and a caucus 
of advisers which included J. Rahim, M. Hasan and Khar. 
Four provincial committees - ranging in membership from 
20 to 30 - had been appointed earlier by Bhutto, but of 
these only the Punjab committee had met regularly. 
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For 
the purposes of candidate selection, four provincial 
parliamentary boards were set up, along with an 11-member 
central Parliamentary and Review Board. 
67 
The setting up 
of centrally selected provincial parliamentary boards 
meant that the provincial committees already in existence 
were shunted aside. This was to some extent motivated 
by the desire to avoid factional in-fighting over tickets 
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in the provincial committees that had already manifested 
itself in Punjab, for instance, in the ideological-cum- 
factional conflict between Sheikh Rabhid(provincial presi- 
dent) and G. M. Khar (provincial secretary-general), and 
in Karachi between the president Hafeez Peerzada and 
secretary Mairaj Mohammed. 
68 However, the whole business 
of candidate selection proved to be quite chaotic, both 
because of the party's disorganisation and because of 
factional disputes in the party. 
The PPP had no coherent structure. Bhutto had yet 
to organise the party in a systematic manner. As we saw 
in the previous chapter, party units had in the past been 
set up haphazardly and with little regard for coordination. 
This'pattern intensified as the election approached: 
provincial and national structures remained poorly 
delineated; local branches were set up whenever and wher- 
ever a coterie of supporters existed. Consequently, when 
the time came for the allocation of party tickets, local 
party groups in many areas made competing claims for the 
candidature of the same or overlapping constituencies. 
The problem of organisational incoherence was 
compounded by a surge of factionalism at all levels bet- 
ween old party workers (founder members and those who 
joined the party prior to the Hala conference) and new 
ones (who had joined after the Hala conference). When the 
list of candidates was finalised, it became apparent that 
in many places, many old workers had been passed over in 
favour of those who had jumped on to the PPP bandwagon 
recently. As the party's secretary-general later pointed 
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out: 
"Tension was inevitable in view of 
of the way last-minute-arrivals .... 
... were'given party 
tickets. 69 
It was the type of constitutency that these new entrants 
represented which became the source of tension-. Although 
this is discussed in more detail below, it is necessary here 
to note that in its list of nominees from Sind and parts 
of the Punjab, a large number could be identified as 
feudals, pirs and former followers of Ayub. Amongst the 
feudals nominated from Sind, at least four remained with 
Ayub till the last days of his regime. 
70 
The same could 
be said of two of the three nominees from Gujrat, Choudrey 
Fazal Elahi and Choudrey Ghulam Rasool. Similarly, a Multan 
tehsil seat was given to Nawab Sadiq Hussein Qureishi, 
a wealthy member of the Qureishi landed-gentry family, with 
strong local influence and a significant political network, 
who had joined the party in August 1970. On the other hand, 
a dedicated worker like Amanullah Khan, was not only 
refused a party ticket, but expelled from the party. As 
mentioned earlier, Amanullah Khan had been a vociferous 
advocate of radical land reform. The PPP leadership obvious- 
ly felt that he had become a liability for the party, when 
it was trying to draw in men of influence. The expulsion 
of Amanullah, however, brought on a chain reaction of 
open protests, student resignations and resolutions from 
various left groups in the Punjab denouncing the "undemo- 
cratic attitude of the central leadership. "7 
1 This led to 
his reinstatement in August 1970 but not after producing 
a great deal of intra-party bickering. 
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All this led to considerable resentment within 
the party among the more dedicated socialist membership 
and the rank and file. In Sialkot, for example, the 
party chairman resigned in protest against what he termed 
Bhutto's wrong policy in awarding party tickets. 
72 Similar 
discontent was voiced by the rank and file membership in 
Multan. Here, the chairman of the Multan PPP, Babu Feroze 
Din Ansari, a working class leader in the artisan tradi- 
tion, (head of the West Pakistan Weavers Conference with 
a biradari following of 200,000 Ansaris) announced his 
departure from the party in protest against not being 
given a party ticket, whilst a gentry notable (Sadiq H. 
Qureishi), even though a recent convert, was awarded a 
ticket in a tehsil of Multan73 (see above). Leftist lea- 
ders of the Multan PPP organisation, such as Taj Mohammed 
Langah, too expressed their resentment against Bhutto's 
decision to grant Qureishi a party ticket -a decision 
evidently taken without consulting anyone in the Multan 
PPP. These reactions perhaps received the greatest 
publicity but they were by no means isolated incidents, 
and they illustrated how the ticketing process became the 
source of serious 'factional infighting in the Punjab PPP, 
at time bringing the provincial organisation close to a 
breakdown. Indeed in virtually every district of the 
Punjab, local PPP units experienced ticketing disputes 
that were based on personal, biradari and ideological 
issues. 
Of course part of the problem relating to ideo- 
logical disputes over tickets arose from the fact that the 
198 
party did not adopt any selective method for admitting 
people into the party. The PPP had opted for a mass 
'open' membership. Bhutto had set a simple test: 
"Every person who is in agreement 
with the manifesto of the PPP is 
welcome to join it. " 74 
The question of party finances was another reason why 
the party now preferred to admit and nominate men of money 
and influence. Electioneering required funds, and Bhutto 
made several appeals for party funds. 
75 Indeed, the cen- 
tral leadership directed the provincial parliamentary 
boards to give preference to candidates who were financially 
well off. 
76 This advice, however, was not always followed, as 
in many parts of the Punjab (excluding Multan and Sargodha 
districts), self-appointed PPP officials defying 
the central provincial leadership selected less prosper- 
ous candidates generally lacking in local notable status. 
77 
No effort was made to hold-elections in the PPP 
which may have helped in providing the starting point for 
building up a solid and effective organisation. Party 
elections, it was felt at this stage, would merely lead 
to further factional in-fighting and 'petty jealousies' - 
a situation the PPP could ill afford, faced with an 
election. 
78 Such an argument had prima facie validity, 
for internal elections in the case of parties in the Indian 
sub-continent have frequently produced severe factionalism 
and splintering. Technically, the party was governed by 
its interim constitution during what the party called the 
"organisational period" i. e. the period till the organisation- 
al work of the party was completed. 
79 
This interim 
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constitution was to remain in force until "another consti- 
tution is adopted by the National Council to be constituted 
after the party had been built up on the widest base and 
elections held democratically upwards from below. " Until 
such time office bearers were to be nominated - the chairman 
appointing provincial chairmen and office-bearers at the 
provincial level, and the provincial chairman appointing 
district office-bearers and so on. Under the interim consti- 
tution, the chairman was to nominate office-bearers like 
the secretary and vice-chairman in consultation with the 
central committee of the party. But since the latter had 
not even been constituted, in practice, Bhutto made these 
appointments by himself. Second, since elections were 
continuously postponed, this established the tradition of 
nominations in the party. All this could only inhibit the 
development of a solid party organisation. 
On the eve of the election, the party structure was 
as follows: FIGURE 1 
- PPP ORGANISATION - 1969/70 
CHAIRMAN: BHUTTO 
CENTRAL SECRETARY GENERAL: RAHIM ANNUAL 
PARLIAMENTARY 2 VICE CHAIRMEN CONVENTION 
BOARD 
PROVINCIAL 
PROVINCIAL ORGANISING PRINCIPLES PARLIAMENTARY 
COMMITTEES(4) COMMITTEE COMMITTEE BOARDS (4) 
I (PARTY PROGRAMME) 
PROVINCIAL ORGANISING COMMITTEES (4) 
1 
ZONAL COMMITTEES 
DISTRICT COMMITTEES CITY COMMITTEE 
(FOR LARGE, URBAN AREAS)* 
PRIMARY COMMITTEES 
(ON THE BASIS OF ONE FOR EVERY 20 MEMBERS) 
*Large Cities could have more than one city organisation. 
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THE PPP AND THE CAMPAIGN 
The Muslim League factions and the other parties 
adopted the traditional mode of campaigning in the rural 
areas, i. e. relying on what may be termed 'intermediaries' - 
biradari3-emullahs, etc. Campaigning thus involved 
using the rural elites and winning over local influentials. 
The slogan 'Islam in danger' was often used. The lessons 
of the 1968/69 upheaval seem to have been lost on these 
parties. Bhutto, on the other hand, had carefully noted 
and absorbed the wider implications of the mass urban 
protests, and these were reflected in his party's electoral 
strategy. 
The PPP's campaign strategy was based on an appeal 
to traditional feudal forces in rural Sind and the adjoin- 
ing areas of the Punjab but complemented by - and this is 
what differentiated the PPP strategy from that of other 
parties - an appeal to the 'modern', newer social groups in 
urban Punjab and Sind. Such a strategy reflected Bhutto's 
assessment firstly that each province had its peculiar 
characteristics, and secondly that in general it was necess- 
ary to differentiate between the rural and urban areas. The 
,p 
eed to rall the support of the urban social. groups 
followed from Bhutto's interpretation of the events of 
1968/69. Bhutto had had the double advantage of witness- 
ing from both inside and outside the government how the 
development programme initiated by Ayub had generated 
certain forces of discontent. As an astute politician, 
Bhutto no doubt discerned that electoral success in urban 
" areas could be ensured by articulating the frustrations of 
the newer social groups - such as industrial labour, and 
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middle class professional groups. Bhutto was convinced 
that politics in urban Pakistan, at any rate, must now be 
mass-oriented and mass-based in order to succeed. Thus, 
in the campaign, Bhutto and the PPP leaders addressed 
themselves directly to the grievances and aspirations 
of the urban masses. Bhutto declared: 
"Our politics is the politics of the 
masses....... now the politics of the 
people will decide- the future of the 
country. " 80 
To gain the support of industrial labour and the 
under-privileged urban masses, Bhutto put forward the image 
of the PPP as a revolutionary socialist party that was 
bent upon "tumbling the thrones and tossing the crowns. 
81 " 
They were told that every trace of feudalism and capital- 
ism would. be eliminated, that the lands would belong to 
the tillers and the factories to the workers, and that 
every exploiter would have to be answerable to the people's 
court; 
82, Roti, Kapara, Makan' (Food, Clothing, Shelter), 
promising a better life for the underprivileged, became 
the key slogan of the party to win the support of these 
groups. The success of this strategy became evident when 
several trade unions announced their support for the PPP 
in the election. In October 1970, Bashir Bakhtiar 
announced that his Pakistan Labour Party (effectively the 
West Pakistan Federation of Trade Unions) would support 
the PPP in all but a few constituencies where it was 
committed to JUI candidates. Other unions backing the PPP 
included the Pakistan Press Workers Union, The Pakistan 
Mint Workers Union and the Tonga and Taxi Drivers 
Union. 
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At the same time, the party sought to win the 
support of urban and small town professional groups by its 
promise, of social change in general and better pay and 
working conditions in particular. To give one illustra- 
tion the PPP incorporated the demands and grievances of 
teachers in its campaign strategy, and succeeded in winning 
the support of various college and school teachers' 
associations. 
84 At the lower levels, such numerical 
support was impressive. The Punjab Private School Teachers 
Federation, for example, embraced eleven member associa- 
tions and had an aggregate individual membership of about 
16,500 teachers. 
85 Similar associations in Sind added an 
equal number. Dispersed in every urban neighbourhood, 
the teachers constituted measurably to PPP urban elector- 
al victories, especially in Punjab. The same could be 
said of lawyers. Bhutto and other PPP leaders, many of 
whom were lawyers, (Hafiz Peerzada, K. H. Meer) addressed 
the various bar associations throughout the country, pro- 
mising benefits to the legal community. 
86 During the 
early part of the campaign, Bhutto persuaded an eminent 
Punjabi lawyer,! Mahmud All Kasuri, known for his passionate 
advocacy of civil liberties, to leave NAP(W) and join 
the PPP. 87 A former secretary-general of NAP(W), Kasuri 
was immediately appointed as one of the PPP's vice-chairmen 
by Bhutto. 88 After Kasuri's exit from NAP(W), several 
former NAP(W) office-holders in the Punjab, many of them 
lawyers, joined the PPP. 89 The PPP also succeeded in 
mobilising support from the journalist community through win- 
ning the backing of the Pakistan Federated Union of 
Journalists. 
203 
It was, however, not only from these 'modern' 
elements that the PPP sought support. In its drive to 
build up an effective electoral coalitio it also focused 
- -i-on-on- 
'tional groups. In Sind, other than its , - 
tt-en 
the urban centres of Karachi and Hyderabad, Bhutto 
utilised the--traditional---mode_-. O _campaigning 
by enlisting 
the support of feudal waderas and pirs. Bhutto's major 
campaign victory came when the PiI of Hala (feudal aristo- 
crat and spiritual leader of over a million followers) 
joined the party. After his entry many politically influen- 
tial --. aristocratic landlord families joined the party such 
as Pir Rasool Shah of Tharparkar, Darya Khoso of Jacobabad, 
Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi and Hakim Zardari from Nawabshah. 
Immediately before the election, Bhutto managed to wean 
away a leading member of the Pir of Pagaro faction, 
Jam Sadiq All from Sanghar. Bhutto had skillfully utilised 
his former links with the Convention Muslim League to win 
these allies since almost all of those mentioned above were 
former Convention Muslim Leaguers. Thus by mid-1970, the 
Sind PPP had become the preserve of Sindhi landed notables - 
Bhuttos, Talpurs, Jatois, Peerzadas and the Hala Makhdums, 
junior partnership accorded to Ji'ay Sind ('Long 
Live Sind) provincial elements. (See below). 
Ostensibly a leftist party, the PPP had to explain 
its apparent willingness to admit landed notables and so- 
caU ed ! react-iöriär es' to its ranks. Bhutto's defence was 
that there was not a single party, including the NAP, which 
was without capitalists and feudalists in its ranks. He 
---- ------ - explained: -""" 
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"It was a fact that some capitalists 
and feudal lords have joined my party, 
but it does not at, all mean that the 
PPP has been converted into a party of 
jagirdars to suck the blood of poor 
people. The capitalists and feudal lords 
who have joined the-party have already 
taken an oath before me to abide by all 
the conditions laid down-in the Wanifesto. " 90 
Privately, however, Bhutto is reported to have assured these 
landlords that their interests would be protected once 
he was in power. 
91 At the same time, leaders like Mubashar 
Hasan, argued that these feudals were indispensable if 
the party_ was to win seats. However, the discomfort 
amongst the radical leftist leaders in the PPP (such as 
Mukhtar Rana, Mairaj) was scarcely assuaged by such 
arguments; these leaders were not so naive as to believe 
that the landed notables of Sind (and Multan) had entered 
the party to preside over their destruction as a class. 
In rural Punjab for the large part, the situation 
was different. Here, as we saw earlier, the leading 
feudal families were aligned to one or other of three 
Muslim League factions. Consequently, despite Bhutto's 
courting of the Punjabi zamindariat, the PPP was only able 
to attract a limited number of feudal landlords. These 
included members of the Qureishi, Khakwani and Gilani 
families of Multan and a branch of the Noon family in 
Sargodha. These feudal elements sensing the growing 
popularity of the PPP by mid-1970 joined the party during 
the last phase of the campaign. Much as their forefathers 
they quickly learned to accommodate themselves to a new 
political phenomenon by embracing it. But other than these 
bandwagoners, the PPP had little support from the Punjab 
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feudal aristocracy. Therefore, -Bhutto's campaign 
strategy here differed from that in rural Sind. Here 
Bhutto sought to appeal to the less-privileged rural 
forces, through promises of "zamin kashtkaron ko" (land to 
the tiller), tenancy reform an ee feudal- 
-Whether this strategy was the result of Bhutto's 
failure to mobilise the support of the Punjabi feudal 
aristocracy or whether it emerged from a shrewd assess- 
ment of the impact of socio-economic changes that had to 
some extent begun to erode traditional patterns of power 
and authority in the Punjabi countryside, 
93 
or both, is 
a question that may never be answered satisfactorily. But 
whatever the reason, Bhutto's campaign strategy involved 
mobilising the support of smaller zamindars, non-gentry 
landlords and the rural under-privileged (tenants and 
landless peasants) through its promise of 'change' and a 
better deal for the agricultural sector. 
An important element of Bhutto's campaign was the 
heavy emphasis on the slogan of 'Islamic Sociälism'. 
94 
Sensitive to attacks made upon his party by the Islamic 
parties and other right-wing parties, Bhutto sought to 
blunt their attack by making Islam an important plank in 
his campaign. 
95 As noted earlier, the term 'Islamic 
Socialism' was not used either in the party's Foundation 
Documents or the Manifesto for a number of reasons dis- 
cussed previously but now it appeared both in Bhutto's 
speeches and in the public pronouncements of other party 
leaders. 96 This move appeared to have been assisted by a 
97 new entrant in the party, Maulana Kauser Niazi. Formerly 
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an important leader in the Jamaat-e-Islaami, Niazi 
formally 
joined the PPP in August 1970.98 That Bhutto immediately 
appointed Niazi, information/publicity secretary of the 
party against the protests of secular-minded party 
leaders, such as Rahim, indicated the importance he 
attached to giving his party an 'Islamic' face. This 
need was an especially pressing one in view of the fact 
that 113 maulvis in both parts of Pakistan had issued 
fatwas (religious decrees) holding socialism to be un- 
Islamic and Bhutto a kafir (non-believer) for espousing 
it. 99 With Niazi's help Bhutto sought to counter these 
attacks by holding that Islamic Socialism meant only 
Musawaat (egalitarianism). 
While the Islamic parties attempted to conduct 
a debate in terms of Islam versus Socialism, asking people 
to choose between secularism and religion, Bhutto rejected 
this, and asked the people to choose between two inter- 
pretations of Islam, i. e. between his egalitarian variety 
and the 'capitalist version' of his opponents. When the 
religious parties raised the cry 'Islam in danger', he 
countered by saying that it was not Islam that was in 
danger - that was a contradiction in terms in a predominant- 
ly Muslim country - but "it is the rich people who are 
in danger". 100 In order to placate the fears of those 
who were suspicious of the term socialism, Bhutto pointed 
out that his party did not believe in the socialism of the 
Soviet Union or Peoples' China. It had firm faith in the 
tenets of Islam to resolve all problems. 
101 
It should be 
noted that the term 'Islamic Socialism' has been current 
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in Muslim political discourse in parts of the Arab world 
(Egypt, Syria) for decades, particularly after Nasser's 
promulgation of 'Arab Socialism'. 
102 
Judging by their 
writings and public speeches, the "Islamic Socialists" of 
Pakistan (Bhutto included) were apparently quite unaware 
of this rich literature and did not exploit it. Or per- 
haps Bhutto preferred to put forward a Pakistani version, 
drawing on the quotations of Jinnah or Liaqat to demons- 
trate that these two nationally revered leaders had also 
advocated 'Islamic Socialism'. 
103 
Surprisingly, the Islamic parties (all Sunni) did 
not attack Bhutto on the basis that he was a Shia and 
thus-belonged to a minority sect in a predominantly Sunni 
country. Part of the reason for this may have been that 
Yahya too was Shia. Bhutto, however, utilised his Shia 
background to gain the support of the three major Shia 
bodies in the country, Pakistan Shia 
Tahafaz-e-Haqooq-e-Shia and the Shia 
At the same time, the PPP's image as 
of the various parties attracted the 
Ahmeddiya community, 
105 
Another aspect of the PPP ca; 
Tanzeem, Idara-e- 
Demands Committee. 104 
the least orthodox 
support of the 
mpaign that deserves 
attention was the heavy reliance on Bhutto's personal 
campaigning. Bhutto travelled extensively throughout the 
country, explaining his party's programme in the context 
of local conditions, exposing the inconsistencies of his 
opponents' arguments, and expounding his views on the 
situation as it developed from day to day. Bhutto's per- 
sonal appearances always drew large audiences, although for 
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many, no doubt, his 'aý lsas (public meetings) had an enter- 
106 tainment value owing to his often theatrical performances. 
At times, he addressed up to a dozen meetings in a day. 
A brilliant speaker, Bhutto would use simple language and 
invoke popular symbols establish a rapport with his 
audiences- nn he--public-p-lathelwas performer, 
utilising rhetoric, mimicry, ridicule, insinuations and 
irony, which all went to create a characteristically 
'Bhutto style' of political artistry and drama. He excelled 
in holding up his opponents to ridicule, often nicknaming 
them with derogatory terms. As one of his political 
opponents remarked, "not a day passes when Bhutto does 
not make a personal attack on his political opponent or 
indulge in imitating them 107 g just to please the crowds.... 
Bhutto often tailored the party's slogans to suit 
the requiremen soere appened to be campaign- 
ing in, thus appealing to the peculiar prejudices of a 
given region or province. For instance in the Punjab, which 
is known to be the most chauvinist of all the provinces, 
and which is also the major recruiting area of the army, 
much emphasis was laid on the theme of confrontation with 
India. 108 In Sind, on the other hand, Bhutto would talk 
about the rights of Sindhis, and of giving the Sindhi 
language its 'rightful' place in the country, in an obvious 
attempt to woo the Sindhi regionalists away from the Sind 
United Front. 
In his campaign speeches, then, Bhutto attempted 
to aggregate diverse interests, promising something or 
another to every one. As one observer has written: 
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A 
"He promised an economic nirvana to 
peasants, workers and the underprivi- 
leged through socialism, while adopting 
landlords (and) monied people..... as 
candidates for the most part. He exploited 
the lack of leadership among leftists in 
the West after the NAP's fragmentation to 
win their support by calling for a social- 
ist revolution; but at the same time he 
dispelled the Islam-pasands' misgivings 
by interpreting his Islamic Socialism in 
terms of Islamic musawaat,..... and by 
attaching an Islamic connotation to the 
PPP election symbol, the sword, which 
was presented as the Zulfiqar-i-Ali, the 
famous sword of Ali (the fourth Caliph of 
Islam'. 109 
But apart from the central role played by Bhutto's 
personal campaigning, the PPP campaign rested also on the 
activities of party workers, both paid and voluntary. 
Paid party activists (some of whom were experienced 
party organisers formerly from the Muslim League), together 
with student supporters who acted as unpaid workers for 
the party, were involved in door-to-door canvassing in 
the large urban cities and small towns, and often made 
sweeping promises to urban groups such as industrial labour 
and the katchi-abadi ( mud huts and slums) dwellers. 
In some parts of rural Punjab adjoining the cities, it 
was also reported that PPP workers had distributed pro- 
missory notes promising twelve and a half acres for each 
landless tenant. 110 In the urban areas of Punjab, these 
party workers were fairly successful in establishing 
contacts with the urban masses and were instrumental 
in mobilising them to-cast their votes. 
During the campaign the PPP concentrated all its 
energy in Punjab and Sind. It did not attempt to rally 
support or even put up a single candidate in East Pakistan 
210 
where the campaign had turned into a referendum on 
regional autonomy, as symbolised in Mujib's Six Points. 
Bhutto did not expend much energy campaigning in Baluchis- 
tan, where politics remained the close preserve of 
tribal leaders and sardars. An attempt was made, instead, 
to win over tribal leaders, with the party eventallly 
enjoying the support of the nawabs of Kheran and Mekran. 
In the NWFP, 'progressive' sections had already been 
mobilised by a well-established party, Wali Khan's NAP 
while tribal leaders were split between NAP and Qayyum's 
Muslim League. In Sind and Punjab, as we have seen, the 
PPP distinguished between urban and rural areas for the 
purposes of its campaign, and in rural Punjab it followed, 
with a few exceptions, a different strategy than that 
in the rural Sind. Thus we find the PPP enlisting the 
support of different socio-economic strata in different 
provinces. 
To conclude then, the party's 
wb sed on a mixture of app. eal_s_to 
an 'modern' elements. Its strategy 
appeals to urban masses as well as t 
electoral strategy 
'. tradi-tional' forces 
combined 'direct' 
o Punjabi rural 
masses with the manipulation of rural elites in Sind. At 
the same time Bhutto was careful not to alienate any impor- 
tant power cen re in the country, with the exception of 
the industrial elite. This applied particularly to the 
military, whom he referred to as the third major force in 
the country - the other two being the PPP and the Awami 
League. Indeed, Bhutto's strong nationalistic stand won 
lll him support among the jawans as well as among officers. 
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RESULTS OF THE ELECTION 
58% of registered voters cast their vote in the 
national poll. ' Voting turnout by province for both the 
national and provincial poll is indicated in Table 111.3 
below:. 
TABLE 111.3 
PERCENTAGE VOTING TURNOUT BY PROVINCE FOR NATIONAL AND 
PROVINCIAL ELECTION, 1970 
PROVINCE N. A. 
PERCENTAGE TURNOUT 
P. A. 
PERCENTAGE TURNOUT 
Sind 58.44 59.66 
Baluchistan 39.04 43.53 
Punjab 66.48 61.56 
N. W. F. P. 4 83 47.34 
West Pakistan .0 
, 2. ` 
East Pakistan 5 5; D9ý 
0: 
8.28 
Source: Ibid, pp. 24-33. 
The Awami League won a landslide victory in East 
Pakistan and an absolute majority in the N. A. This was 
both a protest vote against West Pakistan domination and 
a demand for greater provincial autonomy for Bengal. The 
AL captured all but two seats in the East and about 75% 
of the vote, while the PPP with 81 seats (out of 138) 
became the majority party in the West. (See table III. 4). 
Although the PPP emerged as the majority party in 
West Pakistan, its victory was by no means as decisive as 
the Awami League's in East Pakistan. In terms of votes 
polled, the PPP's competitors had together received more 
votes than the PPP in West Pakistan. The PPP polled 38% 
of the total votes cast in the West. 
112 Although much less 
than half, its voting percentage was still the highest among 
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all parties, the second highest being 10% for the CML113 
The votes cast for the PPP, province-wise, are shown in 
Table 111.5. 
TABLE 111.5 
VOTES CAST FOR THE PPP BY PROVINCE 
(National Assembly Election) 
WEST PAKISTAN VALID VOTES 
CAST 
(TOTAL) 
VOTES POLLED 
BY THE PPP PERCENTAGE 
Punjab 1,08,79,416 0 45,32,759 41.66% 
Sind 31,18,338 14,01,660 44.95% 
N. W. F. P. 14,39,720 2,05,599 14.28% 
Baluchistan 3,73,240' 8,869 2.38% 
Source: Ibid, p. 68 
Table 111.6 gives some indication of PPP's lead 
over the parties in terms of percentage of votes received 
in Sind and Punjab. It also demonstrates that if the PPP's 
opponents had combined against it, their combined vote 
would have been higher (49.69% - excluding independents) 
than the PPP's in the Punjab (41.60)', and only slightly 
lower (43.34% - against the PPP's 44.95%) in Sind. 
The Provincial Assembly election followed the 
N. A. poll by ten days, well after the results of the first 
elections were known. During the intervening period, a 
number of candidates retired from the contest. In many 
cases, this was the result of inter-party bargaining as 
efforts were made to confront the PPP with a single 
opponent. The 'merger' of opposition candidates was more 
successful in the urban than in the rural areas. Wherever 
such a merger occurred in the rural areas, it tended to 
214 
TABLE 111.6 
VOTING PERCENTAGE (N. A. ) 
PARTY 
PPP 
CML 
PML (CONVENTION) 
PML (QAYYUM) 
JAMAAT-E-ISLAAMI 
JUP 
JUI (H) 
NAP (W) 
PDP 
OTHER PARTIES 
INDEPENDENTS 
PUNJAB SIND NWFP BALUCHISTAN 
41.66 44.95 14.25 2.38 
12.66 6.84 4.06 10.99 
5.11 23.19 1.79 19.33 0.57 27.27 - 21.93 
5.42 10.70 22.64 10.94 
4.74 10.31 7.22 1.16 
9.96 19.89 6.94 22.1 0.02 32.69 - 21.16 
5.19 4.85 25.45 20.0 
- 0.37 18.40 45.23 
2.26 0.08 0.32 . 0637 
1.35 2.16 0.93 2.12 
11.65 11.71 6.01 6.81 
further consolidate biradari hold over the votes. The 
opposition to the PPP particularly sought to field the 
'right' biradari candidate. We should also bear in mind 
the fact that for the provincial elections, the size of 
the constituencies was considerably smaller. In the rural 
areas, consideration of biradari membership had a greater 
impact on votes in more compact constituencies. 
It was for these reasons togother with the much 
higher candidate/seat ratio that in the provincial poll, 
the share of the vote received by the PPP dropped. In the 
Punjab, for instance, it obtained 39.07% of the vote, as 
against 41.66% polled in the N. A. election, in Sind it 
received 39.11% of the vote compared to 44.95% in the 
national poll, in Baluchistan 1.88% as against 2.38% in 
the national poll. In NWFP, however, there was no 
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change, with the party 
the provincial poll ag; 
assembly election. 
114 
gain a majority in the 
28 out of 60 seats and 
There were two 
receiving 14.29% of the vote in 
einst 14.28% in the national 
Despite this the party was able to 
Sind and Punjab legislatures, with 
113 out of 180 seats respectively. 
striking features of the N. A. 
election in Punjab and Sind. Firstly, the poor perfor- 
mance of the three Leagues in terms of seats received. 
The other important outcome was the serious setback. to 
parties fighting on a purely religious programme. The 
debacle of the rightists and centrists may be attributed 
to the proliferation of parties among them and to their 
consequent in-fighting. The PPP benefftted immensely from 
the fact that the votes cast against it were split between 
various parties. The votes received by the PPP's opponents, 
which (as indicated above), when combined constituted a 
sizeable proportion of the total votes cast, were not 
translated into seats under the first-past-the post electoral 
system in use. At least four organisations claimed 
votes in the name of Islam, and four centrist parties 
(the three Leagues and the PDP) stood on almost identical 
platforms. For example, in Punjab's 82 constituencies, 
some 260 rightists and centrists plus 114 (conservative) 
independents divided their common following. As a result, 
many top-ranking leaders of the three Leagues lost the 
election, including such personalities as Ayub Khuhro 
and Kazi Fazlullah from Sind, Hasan Mahmad from 
Bahawalpur, Kirmani, Abid Hussain, Yasin Wattoo from the 
Punjab, and Sardar Bahadur Khan and Yusuf Khattak from 
the NWFP. 
115 Perhaps the only survivors among the League 
216 
stalwarts were Daultana, Shaukat Hayat and Qayyum Khan. 
Since the election result showed distinct regional 
patterns, and different elements were responsible for the 
PPP victory in Sind and Punjab, it would be more useful to 
analyse it on a provincial basis. 
NWFP AND BALUCHISTAN 
Both these provinces, regarded as the most back- 
ward socio-economically, in Pakistan, where tribal and 
sardari influences predominate, seemed to have followed 
stronger traditional voting patterns. This produced a 
fragmented result, with no party emerging with a clear 
majority at either the national or provincial level. 
The PPP did poorly in both provinces winning only 
one seat to the N. A. in the NSVFP (out of 18) and none in 
Baluchistan. It was in Mardan (a relatively industrial- 
ised part of the Frontier) that the party met its single 
success. In the D. I. Khan district, Bhutto suffered his 
only defeat amongst the six seats that he contested 
personally, 
116 
Tribal factors influenced the electoral outcome 
in the NWFP. 117 The majority of the inhabitants of the 
NWFP belong either to the Yusufzais or the Kirlani tribes. 
118 
The Yusufzais have traditionally supported NAP, while the 
Kirlanis have, by and large, supported the main opponents 
of NAP (the Muslim League and the JUI). The contest in 
the NWFP was dominated by a triangular struggle between 
NAP, the Qayyum Muslim League and the JUI. Wali Khan 
appealed to the Pathans of the Peshawar plain, the 
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majority of whom are Yusufzais- and who supported his 
father Ghaffar Khan and uncle, Dr. Khan Sahib in the 
elections of 1937 and 1946, and to those Pathan nation- 
alists who looked for greater provincial autonomy for the 
Frontier. NAP, however, won only three seats, in pre- 
dominantly Yusufzai areas. Qayyum's Muslim League, 
accusing NAP of being anti-national and playing on the 
Congressite background of the party, tried to rally those 
who believed in a strong central government. 
119 Qayyum's 
support came largely from -Häzara district and the 
formerly princely states to the north, in regions which 
had an ethnically mixed population, i. e. Pakhtun and non- 
Pakhtun. 120 JUI secured the largest number of votes in 
the NWFP, and the second largest number of seats from the 
province for the N. A. Its support came from traditionally 
anti-NAP areas (Bannu, D. I. Khan), where the population 
is non-Yusufzai, and predominantly Sunni. 
Independents won all seven seats reserved for 
the Tribal Areas of the NWFP. Among the 76 candidates for 
the 7 seats, only one was sponsored by a party, the JUI(H). 
Political parties have yet to make any inroads into these 
tribal areas, where tribal loyalties are at a premium. 
In Baluchistan, PPP's efforts to woo leading 
tribal leaders and Sardars`did not meet with much success. 
NAP won 3 out of the 4 N. A. seats and 8 out of 20 provincial 
seats. Its success here can be attributed to its close 
links with influential tribal sardars. It had the support 
of the major Baluchi tribes such as the Marris, Bizenjos 
and Mengals. 
121 
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SIND 
The PPP won two-thirds of the seats from Sind. 
Only the city of Karachi stood aloof from the PPP tide, but 
in the provincial election the party fared better in the 
city. The pattern of voting differed from that of Punjab. 
Sindhi politics remained feudal, while long-standing 
family rivalries seemed to determine power-alignments in 
the province. As mentioned earlier, the traditional rival- 
ry of the two major Pirs - the Pir of Pagaro and the Pir 
of Hala surfaced into new electoral alliances, with the 
latter supporting Bhutto and the former, the Qayyum 
Muslim League. Bhutto was able to weaken the unity of 
the Pir of Pagaro's faction, by enlisting the support of 
the Raisani pirs and Jam Sadiq Ali, who traditionally 
supported Pagaro. Thus we find that in Sind, the PPP 
operated largely within the traditional framework of 
feudal politics by enlisting many of the waderas and pir 
type of traditional leaders. In some cases, it was the 
younger members of influential families who supported the 
party, but they were nonetheless able to draw on the 
traditional voting influences of the past. That is, the 
greater proportion of the PPP vote came as a result of 
feudal influence, and its victory in a number of consti- 
tuencies, as in Khairpur district, was due simply to 
support of influential families whose close preserve the 
constituency was. These rural notables used their voting 
banks to run up majorities in constituencies which are 
little more than bailiwicks controlled by the squirearchy. 
Additionally, as in the case of the Pir of Hala, the 
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landed-gentry had religious roles as Pirs, and could 
therefore reinforce their feudal position with their 
spiritual status. Although it has been suggested that the 
more conservative of the Sindhi rural elite was aligned to 
one or the other Muslim League factions, 
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and by 
implication that those aligned with the PPP represented 
less conservative landlords, such a distinction is not 
justified for the large part. Nine of the PPP's eighteen 
candidates elected to the N. A. from Sind were former 
Convention Muslim Leaguers who cannot be considered any 
less conservative than the Muslim Leaguers. Adopting the 
PPP ticket is not a sufficient indicator of their less 
conservative position. 
There is no; - disputing the fact that the PPP owed 
its success in Sind to primarily feudal power, even though 
the virtual eclipse of the Sind United Front suggested that 
the party had-picked up the Sindhi regionalist vote from 
the small Sindhi intelligentsia. It is important to note 
that as the first Sindhi leader to achieve a national 
status, Bhutto attracted the support of Sindhi regionalists, 
who probably felt that he would have greater leverage, 
than say, a provincial leader like G. M. Syed, at the 
central government level to press for Sindhi rights. 
If we look at the 'independents' who won seats - 
a total of three were returned - we find, again, that 
voting followed traditional patterns. In one of the 
Sukker constituencies, voting was purely on a clan basis, 
returning the head of the Soomro biradari. In Sukkur II, 
Mangi (through the support of the Soomro clan and Bhutto's 
Zzu 
Wit support) was able to defeat his rivals, A. K. Brohi 
and the Jamiat candidate. 
In Karachi, however, the situation was different. 
Although ;' part of Sind, it is a cosmopolitan, non-Sindhi 
city, where the majority of the population are the Urdu- 
speaking refugees or muhajirs. 
123 This makes Karachi 
different not only from Sind, but by virtue of the social 
and economic characteristics of the"Muhajir community, 
different from the rest of urban Pakistan. The muhajirs 
constitute a closely knit community, have a higher rate 
of literacy than any other ethnic group in-the country, 
tend to be engaged in 'modern' professions, but are in 
general deeply religious, and have traditionally supported 
Islamic parties like the JUP and Jamaat. 
124 Voting in 
Karachi thus reflected the continuing appeal of Islamic 
parties to the muhajir community. All of the five seats 
in the heart of the city were won by refugee candidates 
of religious parties. The PPP won two seats - victories 
that were ensured by the support of industrial labour 
(both Sindhi and refugee). 
125 In Hyderabad, again a pre- 
dominantly Muhajir city, a JUI refugee candidate won the 
national seat while the two provincial seats were also 
won by Islamic parties. The pattern of refugee or non- 
Sindhi victories was continued in the provincial election, 
although the PPP won eight out of fifteen seats in 
Karachi. Only four of the PPP winners were Sindhi, all 
the six from the other parties were muhajirs. It is clear 
from this that voting patterns in rural up-country Sind 
differed considerably from those in the Karachi and 
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Hyderabad city complex, with feudal factors pre- 
dominating in the case of the former, and refugee support 
for Islam-Pasand Muhajir candidates influencing voting 
behaviour in the latter. 
PUNJAB 
The Punjab emerged as a major bastion of PPP power. 
The PPP won three-quarters of the seats to the N. A. by 
polling 41.66% of the vote, and almost two-thirds of 
the seats to the P. A. by polling 39.07% of the vote. The 
Punjabi feudal aristocracy suffered a serious setback. As 
Craig Baxter put it, 
"no member of the rural elite can find 
much pleasure in the results of the 
1970 elections. Perhaps individuals - 
Daultana, Shaukat, those who jumped on 
to the PPP, might find their own picture 
not clouded, but as a group, the rural 
elite was badly beaten and this by a 
group largely comprising unknowns. " 126 
At least twenty-three candidates from the rural aristocracy 
could be identified in the N. A. contests. The CML account- 
ed for eight of these and four won seats. Each of the 
three accepting the PPP label were winners (Anwar Ali 
Noon, Sadiq Hussain Qureishi and Hussein Gardezi from 
Multan). The other two winners were independents. 
The traditional means of campaigning in the 
Punjab was to rely on established leadership drawn generally 
from landed families. The Muslim Leagues operating as 
essentially 'patron' parties depended on their linkages 
with rural notables to deliver the votes. The election 
results indicated that such a method of campaigning was 
not as successful as it had been in the past. As we saw 
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earlier, the PPP did not utilise this method of campaign- 
ing in the Punjab, with a few exceptions. Instead, the 
PPP directed its appeal to the newly-emerged urban social 
groups and to non-privileged rural groups such as smaller 
landlords and tenants through its promise of social and 
economic change. The election results indicated that this 
strategy had been a successful one in the relatively 
'modernised' areas of the province. The pattern of the 
PPP showed distinct regional patterns. They did much 
better in the relatively prosperous and 'modernised' areas 
of Lahore, Sheikhupura, Lyallpur, Eastern Multan district 
and all along the Grand Trunk Road as far as Rawalpindi - 
areas where industrial development has taken place, and 
which are relatively more urbanised. Table III.? below 
shows the seats won by the PPP and the percentage votes 
received by it districtwise. 
TABLE III. 7 
PERCENTAGE OF SEATS AND VOTES WON BY THE PPP IN PUNJAB 
DISTRICTS (N. A. ) 
DISTRICT TOTAL SEATS 
PPP: NO. 
OF SEATS 
PERCENT OF 
SEATS WON 
VOTE 
PERCENTAGE 
Rawalpindi 4 4 100 49.76 
Campbellpur 2 0 0 23.78 
Jhelum 3 3 100 39.89 
Gujrat 4 3 75 30.14 
Sargodha 5 3 60 35.52 
Mianwali 2 0 0 5.70 
Jhang 3 0 0 16.93 
Lahore 8 8 100 53.38 
Sheikhupura 4 -4 100 53.01 
Gujranwala 4 4 100 49.67 
Sialkot 5 5 100 52.67 
Multan 9 7 87 46.15 
:. G. Khan 2 0 0 20.51 
Muzaffergarh 3 2 66 27.26 
Sahiwal 7 7 100 54.86 
Bahawalpur 2 0 0 8.73 
Bahawalnagar 3 2 66 37.12 
Rahimyar Khan 3 1 33 41.66 
Lyallpur 9 9 100 56.72 
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Districts where the PPP won 100% seats - such as 
Lahore, Lyallpur, Sheikhupura, constitute what can be 
called 'modern' Punjab, where groups like industrial labour 
form a sizeable proportion of the population. The PPP's 
success in the rural constituencies of what is generally 
referred to as the 'Punjab heartland' (i. e. the rural' 
areas of Lahore, Gujranwala, Wagha, Gujrat, Kasur and 
Sialkot) indicated that the party was able to break through 
parochial biradari structures and traditional loyalties 
and galvanise the non-privileged rural groups. As 
Jones' study has also shown, the PPP's success in such 
constituencies could be attributed to support from small 
landholders and non-landholding groups (such as tenants, 
field labourers, menials). 
127 Similarly, in the rural 
canal colony areas (Lyallpur, Sahiwal), many of the PPP's 
victories rested on the support of small and middle land- 
holders, tenants and field labourers. In some instances, 
the PPP won because biradari rivalries between gentry 
landlords split the non-PPP vote, allowing the PPP candi- 
dates to win pluralities. However, it is-clear that in 
the relatively modernised parts of the Punjab, the crucial 
factor in the PPP's success was largely the support from 
'mass' sectors of the populace (both urban and rural). 
Along the Indus Valley, in less prosperous districts 
such as Jhang and Mianwali, traditional biradari factors 
continued to predominate as representatives of the Islam- 
Pasand groups of parties and the Muslim'Leaguers won many 
national and provincial seats. 
There have been three studies on the 1970 elections 
in the Punjab. In the first, Craig Baxter analysed the 
224 
effects of the election on the Punjabi feudalists by 
relating socio-economic factors to the election result 
at the district level. 
128 In the second, Burki and 
Baxter correlated voting returns at the tehsil level with 
various indices of modernisation. 
129 
They found that the 
PPP "polled strongest in those urban and rural tehsils 
which have been undergoing recent change as measured 
by (the following) socio-economic indices": the level 
and rate of increase of urbanisation, literacy, industrial 
labour force, electrified villages, and agricultural land 
under tubewells. In the third, most recent study, Philip 
E. Jones used polling station level data for a very 
detailed analysis of social group response in the elec- 
tion in Punjab. 
130 Although the three studies utilised 
different methodologies (the first two using quantitative 
methods), all three arrived at broadly similar conclusions 
regarding the PPP's electoral performance. All three found 
that the PPP vote was highest in the more developed areas of 
the Punjab indicating that the PPP was able to overcome 
biradari and customary authority influences; in the 
relatively backward regions, traditional support patterns 
(such as biradari, pirship). were evident as candidates 
belonging to parties that represented traditional elite 
or religious interests (CML, JI, PML(C) ) were returned. 
We are in broad agreement with these assessments, although 
the Baxter study (see below) perhaps exaggerated the nega- 
tive impact of the election on the landed notables. 
To supplement Burki's findings, we selected a 
limited number of socio-economic variables and attempted 
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to correlate these to the level of the PPP vote at the 
district level in the Punjab. Our findings are given 
below: 
TABLE 111.8 
SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES AND THE PPP VOTE - 
COEFFICIENT OF RANK CORRELATION 
1. Percentage of industrial Value Added 
(1969-70) 
2. All weather Road Mileage per 1,000 
square miles 
3. Industrial workers as a percentage of 
district population 
4. Literacy (per cent) 
5. Electrification (KWH per person) 
0.626 
0.533 
0.465 
0.453 
0.398 
The data used in the sample covered all nineteen 
districts of the Punjab and each variable was correlated 
with the percentage of PPP votes cast in the district. 
These variables were chosen as they denote the level of 
modernisation in a district. The first four variables 
showed a significant correlation with the percentage of 
votes cast for the PPP in the district. On the basis of 
this evidence it can be hypothesized that the PPP owed its 
victory in Punjab to its successful mobilisation of 
newly-emergent groups, both urban and rural. The PPP's 
appeal in the Punjab was directed towards those who were 
already caught up in the process of change - by promising 
to extend and accelerate socio-economic change within the 
framework of an egalitarian society, the PPP was able to 
win mass support in the relatively modernised areas of 
the Punjab. 
What implications can be derived from the 
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'modernisation' thesis as put forward by others and 
developed above, for both the PPP and Punjabi politics 
in general? As far as assessing the PPP in the Punjab is 
concerned, a number of reservations are called for to 
qualify the statements made above. Bhutto's candidates 
in the Punjab, were by no means all drawn from a non-feudal 
background. In several constituencies, the PPP drew on 
landlords, both members of the landed aristocracy (Sadiq 
H. Qureishi) and others of medium status (such as Khar). 
Bhutto's charismatic appeal and the PPP programme were 
often not always sufficient to overcome traditional 
leadership. For example, it took a Noon on the PPP ticket 
to defeat the "official" Noon-Tiwana clan candidate in 
the Sargodha seat, while a scion of the Qureishi clan 
was given a PPP ticket in a Multan constituency. This 
policy of adopting feudal candidates had not pleased left- 
wing factions in the party and led to much disillusionment 
amongst both party activists and student supporters. 
131 
The adoption of landlord candidates and the appointment 
of Maulana Kauser Niazi to an important party post, also 
led to an open rift between Bhutto and the party secretary- 
general, J. A. Rahim on the eve of the election. 
132 
Rahim accused Bhutto of changing the character of the PPP 
to suit landlords, and of totally ignoring socialistic 
principles. It also needs to be pointed out that Bhutto 
won his own seat (out of the six he contested) in one of 
the Multan constituencies with the help of the dominant 
Qureishi and Gilani families. 
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Similarly, caution is also required in assessing 
what the election result signified for Punjabi politics 
in general. On the basis of the election result, news- 
papers both in Pakistan and abroad at the time commonted 
that the results had produced a 'Revolution Through the 
Polls., 
133 In similar vein, many writers concluded that 
"the day of the rural elite control of government in the 
Punjab has ended", 
134 
or that "the influence of the landed 
gentry.... and the biradari of caste and clan connections 
had broken down. " 
135 Such conclusions tend to exaggerate 
the extent of change that had occurred. As we saw earlier, 
in Punjab the PPP's victory was not a decisive one in terms 
of the percentage of votes received by the party. In 
thirteen out of nineteen districts in the Punjab (see- 
Table 111.7) the PPP polled less votes than the combined 
votes of its opponents. The PPP won by fifty per cent of 
the vote in only thirty-four N. A. seats in the Punjab. 
Additionally many of its feudal opponents had won seats. 
For instance, the seven candidates elected on the CML 
ticket were all either landed notables or men of wealth 
and influence. The feudal influence seemed to have worked 
equally effectively in the case of the independents elect- 
ed to the N. A. In aiMianwali constituency, one of the 
five independents returned was the son of the late Nawab 
of Kalabagh, while the other four independents (in Multan, 
D. G. Khan and Bahawalpur) were also landlords. This 
scarcely suggests the 'end of feudalism'. Therefore it is 
untenable to hold that the political structure of Punjab 
had been totally transformed. It would perhaps be more 
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accurate to suggest that while feudal influence worked 
effectively in some areas, in others, the PPP by mobil- 
ising the newer social groups (in the urbanised and indus- 
trialised parts of the province) and 'mass' sectors in 
the rural countryside had made a major dent in the 
traditional feudal political structure of the province. 
CONCLUSION: NATURE OF THE PPP IN THE ELECTORAL PHASE 
Four major features relating to the nature of the 
party in the electoral phase need to be noted. These are: 
(1) its heterogeneous support base which had both a 'mass' 
and 'patron' component; (2) Bhutto's dominance; (3) its 
organisational weakness and (4) its regional nature. 
(1) The heterogeneous nature of the PPP was evi- 
dent from the nning but in e electoral p ase its 
memb lp an support ase became even more heterogeneous. 
There has been a tendency in the literature on the PPP to 
emphasise the party's mass 'modern' features. 
136 
This 
has resulted in part from the fact that most studies 
have focused on the party's image and performance in the 
Punjab, where, as we saw above, such features are indeed 
evident. 
137 Nevertheless, it is obvious that any satis- 
factory assessment of the PPP must rest on an equal 
emphasis on its nature in Sind (and the adjoining areas 
of Punjab), where its '. traditional' features are most 
evident. There is clearly a danger in generalising about 
the PPP's nature on the basis of its 'Punjabi face' alone, 
which is for instance what a study by Gopinath appears 
to have done. Our analysis of the election results 
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suggests that the PPP in terms of its support base, had 
become an amalgam of newer social groups (the 'mass' 
component) and traditional (albeit largely Sindhi) rural 
elite groups (the 'patron' component). Thus as an elec- 
toral machine, the PPP was able to draw upon modern mass 
sectors (urban labour and professionals and the rural 
underprivileged in Punjab) as well as traditional patron- 
client pyramids. The party sought and won support from 
both 'modern' and 'traditional' elements. Clearly, then, 
the PPP exhibited characteristics of both a 'mass' type 
party and a 'patron' party. As we shall see in later 
chapters, the tension between these two types was to 
characterise the PPP's development in later years. 
(2) The second feature of the PPP was Bhutto's 
dominance over the party. The PPP relied heavily on 
Bhutto's personality to keep the disparate interests in the 
party together. This loyalty to the leader may well have 
indicated a transitional stage in which it would eventually 
be transferred to the party, but past political tradition, 
as for example in the case of the Muslim League. did not 
suggest that such a course was inevitable. In the case of 
the latter, the party relied heavily on Jinnah's leader- 
ship, so that with his death the party disintegrated 
rapidly. Indeed, Bhutto's domination of the party perhaps 
exceeded even that of Jinnah over the Muslim League. 
Bhutto's position in the party was virtually unchallenge- 
able, and those who found Bhutto's predominance unacceptable 
could do little else but to either leave the party or 
make a mild protest and then accept the situation. For 
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instance, when the secretary-general of the Rawalpindi 
branch condemned the dictatorial attitude of Bhutto to- 
wards party workers, he was promptly expelled from the 
party. 
138 
J. A. Rahim accused Bhutto of "yearning for a 
personal following" to the detriment of party democracy, 
and said that the office of party secretary-generalship 
held by him was just "Naam ke Wastey" (in name only), since 
even he was not consulted on important issues. 
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This raises the question as to why Bhutto's 
supremacy went unchallenged, when there were undoubtedly 
party members who objected to such a scheme. Two explana- 
tions seem to emerge from the answers given to the author 
by party leaders who were interviewed. First, there was 
a strong sense of dependence amongst the party leaders 
on Bhutto, based on the assessment that without him the 
party could never have achieved the kind of success that 
it enjoyed, and also that-he was the only person who 
could hold the party together. Organisational loyalties 
had not had the time to develop, and before they could, the 
party could only be united by Bhutto's personality. Second, 
there was a strong sense of personal loyalty towards Bhutto 
which does not lend itself to easy explanation. This 
personal loyalty was based on a combination of factors 
which included admiration, personal self interest, and 
above all, his charismatic appeal. 
(3) The third feature of the party concerns its 
organisational weakness. The PPP achieved its electoral 
victory without proper organisation. It enjoyed mass 
support in the Punjab but this was not adequately organised 
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in any systematic manner. Party organisation remained 
chaotic, and was characterised by ad-hocism. The important 
work of grass-roots organisation still needed to be done. 
This problem was only compounded by the huge rush after 
the PPP Is electoral victory to join th-e party. Indeed 
Bhutto had to make a public announcement asking those who 
wished to join the party to contact party offices in their 
respective areas, and not merely to make declarations of 
both support and membership in the press and on the public 
platform. 
140 In making such an appeal Bhutto probably 
lost sight of the fact that often there were no recognis- 
able party offices locally for these people to contact. 
(4) Finally, the regional nature of the party's 
support base needs to be noted. Its appeal was confined 
by and large, to the Sind and Punjab. This failure to 
make any headway in the other provinces, particularly in 
East Pakistan, was to have disastrous consequences for 
Pakistan as we shall see in the next chapter. Bhutto cannot, 
however, be blamed entirely for this failure. While there 
was a lack of interest in eastern Bengal, this was nonethe- 
less based on a realistic assessment of the political 
situation there. Mujib's hold over the Bengalis was al- 
most impregnable. With limited resources, men and money, 
the PPP could ill afford to expend its energies in a region 
that had already demonstrated its unflinching loyalty to 
Bengali leaders like Mujib and Bhashani. Bhutto adopted 
a similar stance towards building support in Baluchistan 
and NWFP. 
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IV 
BHUTTO, THE PPP AND THE CRISIS OF BANGLADESH, 1971 
Politics in Pakistan went from a peak of optimism 
in 1970 to the depths of despair in 1971. The general 
election had held out the prospect of a return to civilian 
democracy after more than a decade of military rule, but 
within three months the country was plunged into the worst 
crisis in its history with its very survival as one state 
in jeopardy. This chapter examines the role played by 
Bhutto and the PPP during this year of national crisis. 
It is not intended here to provide a comprehensive review 
of the events of 1971 that led to the break-up of Pakistan 
and of the development of the movement for Bangladesh, which 
are well documented. 
1 We are interested primarily in 
Bhutto and his PPP, their strategy and responses in this 
period, and in analysing the impact of the crisis on the 
man and the party. Most studies of the PPP have generally 
neglected this phase in the PPP's history and development. 
2 
Our contention is that the 1971 crisis had a number of 
repercussions on the PPP that need to be highlighted in 
order to understand subsequent political developments in 
post-Bangladesh Pakistan with respect both to Bhutto's 
approach to various national issues as well as the PPP's 
internal dynamics. 
By the end of 1970, Pakistan had completed success- 
fully the critical first step in the restoration of elec- 
torally based civilian government. But the process of 
transfer of power from the military to civilian leadership 
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had to await the emergence of a consensus on the future 
constitutional order between the military regime of 
Yahya and the two major victors of the election, Mujib 
representing the Eastern wing of the country and Bhutto, 
the leader of the majority party in the West (even though 
the PPP was not in as commanding a position in the West as 
the Awami League (AL) in the East, since the former had 
not won as decisive a victory as the latter). What made 
such a consensus difficult was that the three principal 
figures, Yahya, Mujib and Bhutto perceived themselves as 
representing constituencies whose interests were mutually 
exclusive. In addition, mutual mistrust and mispercep- 
tions between the military and civilian leaders on the 
one hand, and between the civilian leaders on the other 
hand, made the reconciliation of such interests difficult. 
When Mujib demanded regional autonomy on the basis of the 
Six Points (discussed below), this was opposed by both 
Yahya, who viewed it as threatening both the unity of the 
state as well as the interests of the Punjabi-dominated 
military, and Bhutto for whom Mujib's scheme signified 
a challenge to the interests of his power-base in West 
Pakistan as well as to his claim for a dominant position 
at the Centre. This led to a deadlock in the negotiations, 
while all three protagonists hardened in their postures. 
As the three set on a collision course, each protagonist 
set about playing off one against the other. As these 
manoeuverings continued, the AL's demands became more 
strident and it launched a non-cooperation movement which 
gave Mujib de facto control of East Bengal. Unwilling to 
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concede to Mujib's unusual scheme for a federation, 'and 
under enormous pressure from Bhutto and his own consti- 
tuency in the military, Yahya decided to use military 
force to resolve the crisis. This military action cul- 
minated in the secession of East Pakistan, although final 
disintegration of the state did not come about until nine 
months later after a successful national liberation move- 
ment and Indian military intervention. 
From the standpoint of Bhutto and the PPP, the 
year of national crisis had a number of effects. While' 
these are dealt with in detail later, they can be summar- 
ised below. First, the events of 1971 exhibited and high- 
lighted Bhutto's ability to manoeuvre at various levels of 
politics, amongst difficult groups simultaneously - amongst 
the mass populace, his party, the upper echelons of the 
military and the dominant feudal and industrialist families. 
Second, the Bangladesh episode influenced Bhutto's per- 
ceptions and approach towards opposition parties in general 
and those advocating regional autonomy in particular. His 
experience with the Awami League crystallised his views 
on regional autonomy and undoubtedly conditioned his res- 
ponses and actions with regard to similar demands later in 
West Pakistan. 
As for the effect of the crisis on the internal 
party structure, a number of points can be made. First, 
with, PPP leaders' attention directed to resolving the 
problem of regional autonomy in negotiations with Yahya 
and Mujib, little time or effort could be devoted to 
matters of party organisation. As indicated in the preceding 
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chapter, there was an urgent need to strengthen the PPP's 
weak organisational base. But the PPP leadership's 
preoccupation with the national crisis meant that the 
organisational problem was ignored and the institutional 
chaos continued. This had an important bearing on Bhutto's 
strategy of rule when he assumed power. 
3 Another impor- 
tant effect of the crisis was the assertion of Bhutto's 
personal dominance over the party. The 1971 crisis created 
both the need and the justification for Bhutto to strength- 
en his control over the party. The manner of decision- 
making in the party through the course of the year demon- 
strated Bhutto's primacy over the PPP. At the same time, 
the nature of Bhutto's consultations with his party re- 
vealed his preference for a Viceregal style, in terms of 
consulting with the party's central committee when he saw 
fit, and then too as a legitimising device rather than as 
an exercise in democratic consensus-building. Finally, the 
1971 crisis urged Bhutto to attempt to portray himself as 
the representative of all West Pakistan interests in order 
to bolster his negotiating position vis a vis the military 
and Mujib. This involved an endeavour to tone down the 
party's socialist rhetoric and to bring the party's left 
wing radicals under greater control. Thus another effect 
of the crisis was a deradicalisation of the PPP's ideology 
and stance. 
We now turn to a more detailed consideration of 
the 1971 crisis, beginning with an assessment'of the three 
major figures engaged in the constitutional controversy, 
their respective constituencies4 and the nature of the 
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problem they faced. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's emergence as 
an unchallengeable leader of East Pakistan has to be 
viewed against a background of Bengali dissatisfaction 
with the Punjabi-controlled West's economic and political 
domination over the country. The long history of such 
dominance is well-documented and need not detain us here. 
5 
It is sufficient to note that the most formidable problem 
of nation-building in Pakistan since independence was the 
integration of the Bengali subnation. The urgency of 
this problem was underscored by the fact that the Bengalis 
were not merely the largest ethno-cultural subgroup in the 
country and actually constituted a majority (54 per cent) 
of the total population, but resided in an area that was 
geographically discontiguous from the rest of Pakistan. 
However, successive-regimes pursued policies that continued 
and strengthened the dominance of the West through favoured 
treatment for West Pakistani industry and the Punjabi- 
dominated military, and failed to accommodate the 
Bengali demand for effective participation in the political 
system. This fuelled growing resentment in East Pakistan, 
and from 1965 onwards the earlier Bengali demand for part- 
icipation was transformed into a more radical demand for 
regional autonomy that called for a fundamental restructur- 
ing of the political system. 
6 
It was Mujib who was res- 
ponsible for this transformation. Mujib had begun his 
political career as a student leader and spent his early 
years with the AL organisation (becoming its first assis- 
tant general secretary when it was formed in 1949, and 
its general secretary three years later) which emerged as 
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the vehicle for the rising Bengali vernacular elite. In 
1966 Mujib assumed the presidency of the AL and formulated Bengali 
discontent in the famous Six Point programme for autonomy. 
7 
Originally put forward in 1966, the Six Points 
were amended in 1970 and incorporated in the Election 
Manifesto of the AL. As one observer put it, 
"The Six Points formula in fact repre-. 
sented an attempt on the part of its 
protagonists to aggregate all the region- 
al demands which were articulated by indi- 
vidual political leaders from East Pakistan 
from time to time during 1947-66. " 8 
But the Six Points represented more than this. Unlike 
previous Bengali demands, they did not call upon the cen- 
tral government to do more for East Pakistan, but asked 
the central. government to let East Pakistan do more for 
itself. As announced in the AL manifesto, the Six Points 
were: 
1. The character of the government shall be federal and 
parliamentary. 
2. The federal government shall be responsible for only 
defence and foreign affairs. 
3. There shall be two separate currencies mutually or 
freely convertible in each wing. 
4. Fiscal policy shall be the responsibility of the feder- 
ating units. 
5. Separate accounts shall be maintained of the foreign 
exchange earnings of each of the federating units. 
6. Federating units shall be empowered to maintain a 
militia or parliamentary force. 
For all political purposes, the Six Points envisaged a 
confederate rather than a federal structure. When Mujib 
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r 
launched the Six Points movement in 1966, his demands 
were branded by the Ayub regime as 'secessionist' and 'a 
demand for greater Bengal'. 
9 However, even though at this 
stage Mujib hinted that the demands were negotiable, the 
Ayub regime instead of attempting to arrive at a settle- 
ment with him, tried to suppress the movement, and arrest- 
ed Mujib charging him with sedition in the Agartala con- 
spiracy case. 
1° His arrest and imprisonment gave him the 
halo of martyrdom and instead of destroying his support 
helped to increase it by magnifying his role as the 
champion of Bengali rights. By the time he was freed 
from prison in 1969, he enjoyed unprecedented popularity 
in Bengal. 
Under Mujib the AL became an exclusively East 
Pakistani party11 seeking to mobilise support on the basis 
of a programme that promised to end the economic and 
political exploitation of the eastern province. Such a 
promise appealed to groups such as middle-class profession- 
als and (to a lesser extent) the rising Bengali business 
class, (fostered ironically by Ayubian policies) because 
(for the latter) it meant the elimination of big-business 
competition from West Pakistan. Labour and rural peasant 
support was gained by the promise that an end to the 
exploitation of East Pakistan would lead to a better stan- 
dard of living for the common man. It- was, however, the 
middle class professionals and students who formed the AL's 
major constituencies. 
12 
These constituencies were opposed 
to the ruling military junta for perpetuating the domination 
of the west and viewed their counterparts in the Punjab 
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(largely recruited by the PPP) not as national allies 
with whom they shared common social and educational charac- 
teristics, but as adversaries making their own claims 
on national resources. If we bear in mind his consti- 
tuency support and the fact that Mujib's rise to public 
prominence was so closely interwoven with his Six Points, 
it will enable us to understand his difficulties in with- 
drawing or amending them when called upon to do so by 
Bhutto and Yahya. 
If Mujib's constituency support imposed certain 
constraints on his ability to manoeuvre, the same could 
be said of Bhutto, although the latter's constituency 
was in no way as homogeneous as Mujib's. While the PPP's 
heterogeneous support-base made Bhutto's general position 
difficult in terms of the need to reconcile different in- 
terests, he nevertheless had a degree of freedom, not 
perhaps available to either Mujib or Yahya, on the 
specific issue of regional autonomy because he had not 
taken a firm stand on the issue, nor had he fought the 
election campaign, unlike Mujib, on the issue. This 
together with the fact that he enjoyed unchallengeable 
primacy over his party gave Bhutto a relatively better bargain- 
ing position. However, they were limits to his flexibility. 
In claiming to represent West Pakistani (although in reality 
he could legitimately claim to speak only for Sind and 
Punjab) interests, any scheme that envisaged a transfer 
of power from the West to the East was perceived by Bhutto as 
compromising the interests of his power base in the Punjab. 
Additionally since much of Bhutto's appeal, particularly in 
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the Punjab, rested on his image as a nationalist - as 
demonstrated by his anti-Tashkent and anti-Indian stance - 
any substantive concession to Mujib's Six Points demand 
was perceived by him as likely to erode this appeal. 
Yahya's constituency was obviously the military, 
but also the other element of the old ruling elite (i. e. 
the bureaucracy). The second Martial Law of March 1969 
was very much a defensive manoeuvre on the part of the 
civil-military oligarchy to maintain its position which 
had been challenged by the November 1968-69 mass movement. 
The task of the Yahya regime was to seek a new political 
order which could placate the demands of the more vocal 
groups in the mass movement while maintaining the status 
quo. Thus the regime adopted a number of policies (see 
chapter III above) specifically designed to placate the 
protesting groups (such as urban labour, teachers) and 
the politicians. But Yahya, as representative of the 
civil-military oligarchy, was concerned with preventing 
any fundamental restructuring of power, and even when 
permitting political activity, defining the rules of the 
game and maintaining the initiative in his hands. Central 
to Yahya's scheme was to play the role of mediator and 
power broker. Such a role was envisaged on the basis of 
Yahya's expectation prior to 1970, that the election would 
result in a multiplicity of parties(in both East and West 
Pakistan) and that in the ensuing coalition-making, the 
military would be able to assume the role of arbiter. 
13 
When the election result turned out to be different 
from the one the regime expected, Yahya was faced with a 
250 
dilemma. The interests of the regime ran counter to 
those of Bhutto and Mujib. The military was especially 
apprehensive of Mujib and his Six Points. The military 
perceiving their role as safeguarding the unity of Pakistan 
(translated as a strong Centre) found the Six Point pro- 
gramme unacceptable since in its view it spelt the end of 
a strong and united state. Additionally, the military's 
institutional interests were potentially threatened, for 
if applied, the Six Points would have effectively meant 
a loss of financial support for the army. Mujib had been 
explicit on this score in the past, complaining repeated- 
ly that two-thirds of Bengal's revenues were being spent 
on the armed forces in which the Bengalis had little or 
no representation. 
14 
The closing comments made by Ayub in 
his farewell speech seemed to reflect the general feeling 
within the military: 
"It is being proposed that ..... the Centre be made a weak and helpless 
organ, the defence forces be-paralysed 
completely..... I cannot preside over the 
destruction-of my country. " 15 
Thus the three leaders had different constituencies 
with potentially conflicting interests. Against this 
background, we can now look at the specific position 
adopted by Bhutto and the PPP and then go on to deal with 
the crisis at length. 
BHUTTO AND THE SIX POINTS 
Although, both in (as Ayub's minister) and out of 
office, Bhutto had acquired the reputation of being an 
advocate of a strong central government his stand on the 
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Six Points had, at least in public, been somewhat ambi- 
valent. Privately, however, he had consistently expressed 
serious reservations about the programme. 
16 As a member 
of Ayub's cabinet, he had described the Six Points as 
secessionist in 1966 and advised Ayub to allow him to 
challenge Mujib to a public debate on the issue. 
17 Ayub, 
however, had rejected this proposal and had, according- 
to Bhutto, turned from the "weapon of language" to the 
"language of weapons. "18 Ayub, as mentioned above, threw 
Mujib in jail, charging him and several other Bengalis with 
sedition. By this time, Bhutto had left Ayub's cabinet, 
and he now called for Mujib's release. 
At the foundation convention of the PPP, an 
attempt was made to come to grips with the problem posed 
by Mujib's Six Points. 
19 Foundation Document Number Ten, 
entitled 'The Six Points Answered', while maintaining 
that Mujib had "a just grievance with regard to the 
condition to which East Pakistan has been degraded", strong- 
ly criticised the Six Points. 
20 It accepted only the 
first and sixth point, while expressing serious reservat- 
ions with regard to the rest. But while rejecting the 
Six Points, the PPP did not outline its own proposal for 
resolving the problem of regional autonomy, other than the 
vague declaration that the remedy of national problems lay 
in socialism. In subsequent policy pronouncements too, 
the party did not spell out its stand on the issue of 
regional autonomy and dealt with this and related consti- 
tional issues perhaps purposively in the vaguest of 
terms. In one of a series of pamphlets issued by the party 
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in 1968-69, the party secretary-general, J. A. Rahim 
outlined his party's views on the future constitutional 
order for Pakistan. Rahim declared that "East Pakistan 
has indeed all the characteristic of a colony (of West 
Pakistan)", 
21 but his solution for the-key issue of 
provincial autonomy was vague to the point of completely 
avoiding the main issue. It is relevant to note that when 
the East Pakistan branch of the PPP was wound up in March 
1969, it was reported that it was the Dacca branch itself 
that had severed its connections with the party because 
of Bhutto's failure to support the Bengali demand for 
regional autonomy. 
22 Certainly Bhutto's uncertain public 
stand on the Six Points was one factor in the party's 
failure to muster support in the eastern wing. By the 
time the PPP released its election Manifesto, it seemed 
that the party was still not ready to spell out a clear 
policy regarding this issue. The Manifesto was all but 
silent on matters. pertaining to regional autonomy, although 
one could perceive a clear preference for a strong Centre. 
Bhutto evidently wished to keep the question of provincial 
autonomy open for discussion. 
During the election campaign the PPP avoided 
comment upon the Six Points - as indeed any constitutional 
issue. Since the PPP's major political base was the 
Punjab, Bhutto was unwilling to take a stand on the Six 
Points thereby possibly prejudicing his position there. 
Even during Mujib's campaign tour of West Pakistan in 
July 1970, when he was proclaiming that the Six Points 
were not negotiable, 
23 
the PPP chose, by and large to 
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remain silent. On one occasion however, Bhutto did point 
out that the Six Points contradicted the fourth fundament- 
al principle of Yahya's Legal Framework Order (LFO) - the 
one pertaining to the preservation of Pakistan's terri- 
torial integrity. 24 Bhutto appeared to take the position 
that the demand for provincial autonomy was a negotiable 
subject and suggested that since the interpretation given 
to provincial autonomy differed from one political party 
to another, the precise quantum would have to be deter- 
mined through negotiations later. In his campaign speeches 
we find Bhutto arguing for a strong Centre with adequate 
powers, but he rarely spelt out what this would imply in 
terms of the autonomy to be granted to the provinces. 
25 
Bhutto's reluctance to articulate a clear stand 
can be attributed, in part, to four factors of pragmatic 
importance. First, Bhutto did not wish to open debate on 
a potentially divisive issue within the party, and second, 
by not adopting a clearly-defined stand, he would have a 
relatively freer hand vis a vis any further negotiations 
with Mujib. Third, he perceived that even a hint of com- 
promise with the Six Points at this stage might erode his 
support base in the Punjab. 
26 
And fourth, acceptance or 
accommodation with the Six Point programme naturally had 
implications for the West Pakistani provinces. as well, and 
he had no wish to begin a controversy over the extent of 
regional autonomy to be given to the West Pakistani units. 
In contrast, the other West Pakistani parties with the 
notable exception of NAP (Wali Group) and small regional 
groups fiercely attacked the Awami League leadership and 
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its programme, the most vociferous being the Qayyuip 
faction of the Muslim League. The military regime of 
Yahya for its part maintained a tolerant silence. Even 
when, as it claimed later, Mujib was "inciting" the people 
of East Pakistan against West Pakistanis, the government 
did not deem it fit to intervene lest this was interpreted 
as official interference in the campaign. 
27 Moreover, as 
both Bhutto and Yahya argued later, they did not feel the 
need to confront Mujib publicly as the latter had to a 
large extent "skillfully manoeuvred" them into "believing 
that he would become..... more susceptible to compromise 
on Six Points after an election victory. 1128 
TOWARDS CONFRONTATION 
The results of the election posed the demand for 
provincial autonomy more starkly than ever, since the two 
majority parties enjoyed no support in each other's pro- 
vinces. Bhutto now began to define his party's stand on 
the regional issue. Initially his tone alternated between 
being conciliatory and threatening. While offering to 
enter into detailed discussions with Mujib on the future 
constitutional order, he warned that any attempt to bypass 
the PPP would lead to dire consequences. "Hamlet", Bhutto 
declared dramatically, "could not be played without the 
Prince of Denmark. "29 Bhutto took the position that 
"majority alone doesn't count in national 
30 
politics", 
that since the PPP had won in Punjab and Sind- - where 
the real power of the Centre lay - no government at the 
Centre could be run without his cooperation. 
31 He also 
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declared bluntly that his party was not prepared to 
occupy the opposition benches in the National Assembly(N. A. ). 
Bhutto's statements were greeted with derision 
by the AL Leaders. 32 Mujib pointed out that under normal 
parliamentary conventions the PPP would lead the oppo- 
sition in the N. A. and that Bhutto would have to be con- 
tent with that and the PPP's control of the provincial 
governments of Sind and Punjab. In his first major post- 
election policy speech, on 3 January 1971, Mujib announced 
at a huge public rally that his was the majority party in 
all of Pakistan. 
33 His party would try to frame a con- 
stitution in cooperation with the elected representatives 
of West Pakistan, but there would be no compromise on 
the question of principle. The future constitution would 
be based on the Six Point; programme and the Eleven Points 
of the Bengali student community. As the Bhutto-Mujib 
polemics crystallised into East-West confrontation, the 
exchanges were reminiscent of earlier debates' between 
Bengali leaders and West Pakistani-politicians. -The two, 
without meeting each other - their last meeting was in 
1969 - demonstrated their mutual suspicion of one another's 
intentions, and the gulf between them continued to widen. 
Each and every action of the other appeared suspect, and 
likely to be misperceived. While, previously Bengali 
leaders had always gone to West Pakistan for negotiations, 
Mujib deliberately chose to stay in Dacca. His refusal 
to visit West Pakistan despite urgings from Bhutto and 
Yahya, was deliberate and meant to symbolise the transfer 
of power from the Centre (West) to the East. This was 
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viewed by Bhutto and Yahya as a sign of Mujib's secess- 
ionist tendencies and was perhaps just one of the many 
misperceptions that led to the slow building up of the 
crisis. 
By now (if not before), Bhutto appeared to be 
convinced thatMujib's designs were those of a secessionist 
and that the Six Points were "a concealed formula for 
secession" - an opinion (that constituted the basis of 
PPP's subsequent policy towards the Awami League) formed 
without consulting his party colleagues. 
34 It has been 
argued by various observers and by Bhutto himself in-his 
personal account of the crisis that Mujib's position on 
Six Points hardened considerably after his election vic- 
tory. 
35 This may have been true and we find some support 
for such a contention in Mujib's own statements of the 
time. However, what is probably more relevant is that 
this was interpreted by Bhutto not as a negotiating stance 
but as a veiled threat of secession. 
36_, As Bhutto later 
recounted: "a few months before the general elections". 
he had a discussion with Lieutenant General Peerzada, 
Principal Staff Officer of Yahya, who asked him outright 
what he thought of Mujib's true intentions. Without 
hesitation, Bhutto replied, "Separation: '; 37t Nevertheless 
Bhutto claimed he decided to made "every effort to arrive 
at a political settlement.. ... knowing as I did that the 
alternative would be bloodshed and slaughter. " 
38 
Against this background, Bhutto turned his atten- 
tion to his party and called a meeting of the party's 
Central Executive Committee to discuss future strategy. 
It is significant that Bhutto sought to 'consult' his 
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party officially after so much had already transpired - 
albeit in the form of public exchanges in speeches. - 
between Mujib and him. This demonstrated the Viceregal 
nature of Bhutto's approach towards decision-making. Just 
as the viceroy consulted his Executive Council to gain 
endorsement of policy, Bhutto looked toward his party's 
Central Executive Committee for legitimisation rather 
than policy formulation. A number of other interesting 
features regarding the PPP also need to be noted. 
First, -, an eighteen-member central executive committee was 
nominated by Bhutto just a few days before the meeting; 
the party's highest organ was thus constituted more than 
three years after the party came into existence. 
39 This 
body was a nominated rather than an elected one, thus 
continuing the tradition of nominations in the party, and 
giving Bhutto effective supremacy over it. Once again a 
'crisis situation' was used as the official justification 
for not holding elections to this body: The central com- 
mittee met for the first time on 23 January to discuss, 
the East Pakistan situation and to formally endorse party 
appointments made over the last three years by Bhutto, 
which again demonstrated its role as a rubber-stamping 
authority. The meeting revealed a number of other inter- 
esting features about the party. Since there is no formal 
record of the proceedings, information about the historic 
first meeting is based on press reports and personal 
interviews. 40 
Several influential individuals who were not even 
members of the party had been invited to participate in the 
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deliberations of what was theoretically, the highest 
organ of the party. These included big Punjabi landlords 
like Nawab Muzaffer (of Kalabagh) and leading industrial- 
ists like Habibullah. This caused considerable alarm 
amongst the left-wing factions within the party; Taj 
Mohammed Langah and Begum Nasim Jahan declined to partici- 
pate in the meeting, while the Sheikh Rashid group staged 
an official walk-out. Such internal stresses were the 
natural result of Bhutto's strategy of making his con- 
stituency a more broad-based one in West Pakistan to 
strengthen his bargaining position vis a vis both Mujib 
and Yahya. This was particularly necessary since Bhutto 
feared that other West Pakistani parties especially the 
regional ones might line up with Mujib, thus preventing 
him from having a dominant position at the Centre. Bhutto 
explained that the nature of the crisis in East Pakistan 
necessitated involving individuals - even those-represent- 
ing "vested interests" that he had earlier attacked - who, 
although not members of the party, had an influential voice 
in Pakistan politics and could not be ignored. Thus one 
consequence of the crisis for, Bhutto was the need to take 
steps to convince both the military and Mujib that he 
was a leader representing all-West Pakistan interests 
(although no such formal unit existed any longer). 
As for the discontent amongst the left factions 
within his party, this could always be contained as it 
had been in the past through private reassurance, and 
failing that, threats, as we shall see below. The central 
committee proceedings were taken up largely by Bhutto's 
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address as chairman giving his views on Mujib's position, 
with little time alloted to eliciting the opinions of 
others on this issue, since the rest of the time was given 
to matters of party organisation. What little discussion 
followed revealed a divided view over the Six Points. 
Some of his party men took the 'extreme' position that 
the party should oppose the Six Points in its entirety, 
while a very small number took the position that the AL 
programme should be accepted. The majority, however, are 
reported to have supported Bhutto's view that negotiations 
should be conducted with Mujib to bring about a compromise. 
* 41 
What is clear is that Bhutto was not interested in develop- 
ing the central committee as a body for collective deci- 
sion-making but regarded it as a legitimising-instrument 
for decisions made on his own. 
An incident involving the PPP is worthy of mention 
at this stage since Bhutto utilised this to deliver a 
clear warning to those of his party men who did not fall 
in line with party policy as defined by him. In the first 
week of January, several workers of the state-controlled 
Progressive Papers Limited (PPL) went on strike over the 
dismissal of some pro-PPP journalists and press workers. 
42 
Four MNAs-elect of the PPP, namely Mukhtar Rana, Ahmed 
'Raza Kasuri, A. H. Kardar and Mian Hamid Yasin joined the 
hunger-striking workers, promising that in accordance with 
the party manifesto they would assist the workers in 
'taking over' PPL. At this stage Bhutto intervened, 
directing Mukhtar Rana to call off the strike, with which 
the latter grudgingly complied. 
43 
Bhutto publicly rebuked 
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these PPP leaders who according to him had started 
agitation on their own without a call from the party. 
Bhutto followed this by issuing a severe warning to any- 
one of his party men who were attempting to "whistle the 
leadership into action", 
44 
and warned against "left adven- 
turism" and "rank opportunism". 
45 
Clearly, Bhutto 
concerned as he was with portraying himself as the leader 
of all West Pakistan interests evidently felt it necessary 
to tone down his party's radical image. His action in 
forcing an end to the hunger strike was a manifestation 
both of his efforts to deradicalise the party's image and 
to bring the party under greater control. 
At a public rally soon after, Bhutto, in his 
typically dramatic manner, threatened to resign from the 
party. 
46 Amidst shouts of "no", "no" from the crowd, Bhutto 
said that he would bow down before the wishes of the people, 
but would set a condition for his continuance in office: 
that he should face no internal rifts in the party ranks. 
He could tolerate opposition from outside, but not from 
within the party. It was widely felt at. the time, that 
Bhutto's warning was meant not only for those involved in 
the PPL dispute but also those members of the PPP heirarchy 
who had expressed misgivings about Bhutto's attitude 
towards Mujib and his Six Points. 
47 
Thus Bhutto utilised 
the PPL episode to call for strict discipline in the party. 
This incident helps to illustrate the manner in which 
Bhutto maintained discipline in the PPP and demonstrates 
Bhutto's unwillingness to tolerate any voices of dissent 
against party policy, as formulated and dictated by him. 
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Bhutto's methods of dealing with the PPL dispute also 
enabled him to make good the promises given privately 
to leading industrialists and important members of the 
ruling military junta that if they strengthened his hands 
vis 
a 
vis negotiations with Mujib he would tone down his 
socialist stance and control his party radicals. 
48 The 
entire PPL episode is a good illustration of what can be 
called a characteristically 'Bhutto art' of being able to 
manoeuvre at different levels of politics simultaneously - 
amongst the party, the mass populace and the ruling elite. 
This revealed a political style that seemed to combine 
elite manipulation with populist politics. 
While Bhutto was engaged in attempts to establish 
himself as the sole representative of West Pakistan inter- 
ests as a counterweight to Mujib's undisputed claim as 
the sole representative of East Pakistani interests, 
Yahya proceeded to Dacca in mid-January to hold consultations 
with Mujib. While Yahya officially expressed satisfaction 
over the talks, even referring to Mujib as "the next prime 
minister" of the country, 
49 
he returned disappointed with what 
he regarded as Mujib's unwillingness to accommodate the 
"West Pakistani point of view" (in terms of preserving a 
strong union). 
50 On their return, Yahya and his aides 
visited Bhutto at his home town, Larkanaw It was here, 
according to G. W. Choudhury and others, that "a new and 
sinister alliance...... between the military junta and 
Bhutto" was formed. 
51 
While it is difficult to substan- 
tiate the nature and extent of such an alliance, there is 
sufficient evidence (see below) to indicate that Bhutto 
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and the military 'hawks'52 (a group that did- not include 
Yahya) developed close links during subsequent weeks over 
the "threat" posed by Mujib's Six Points to Pakistan's 
integrity. Significantly, it was in this period that the 
main emphasis in Bhutto's public statements shifted from 
socialist to nationalist themes and it was only a day 
before he met Yahya that he forced an end to the PPL 
strike. These were signs that Bhutto was acting to make 
himself 'acceptable' to the junta by de-emphasising his 
socialist rhetoric and demonstrating that he could control 
the radicals in his party. 
On 27 January Bhutto led a fifteen member PPP 
delegation to Dacca for talks with Mujib - his first 
meeting with Mujib in over two years. In the three rounds 
of talks the two sides failed to forge even the beginning 
of an informal consensus on the Six Points. While Mujib 
maintained that he had received a mandate from the people 
on the Six Points and was not in a position to deviate from 
them, Bhutto was equally adamant in declaring that since 
West Pakistani public opinion was against such a programme 
he could not accept them in an unamended form. 
53 Thus 
both justified their inability to compromise by, reference 
to the constraints imposed on them by their respective 
constituencies. Perceptions of conflicting constituency 
interests played an important part in the failure to 
arrive at a settlement. Additionally, the personal anti- 
pathy between the two probably also played a part. Bhutto's 
later remari, s about Mujib are instructive in this regard. 
His personal contempt for Mujib is evident in his 
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description of him as "incapable, conceited, lacking in 
culture, common sense..... there was no depth in him.... 
the only idea he's ever had in his head is the idea of 
secession. "54 This kind of contempt had been demonstrated 
by Bhutto in the past towards his political opponents in 
the West as well, 
55 
and indeed was to characterise his 
dealings with opposition leaders after his assumption 
of power. 
On Bhutto's return to West Pakistan, a series of 
party meetings were organised. 
56 These meetings were 
called, according to Bhutto to ascertain members' viewt 
57 
"on how far we could go for a consensus" (with Mujib). 
But this was not the only purpose served by these so-called 
intensive party consultations. -Bhutto utilised these to 
demonstrate to both Yahya and Mujib the legitimacy of his 
leadership claims, and also to give credibility to his 
request of being allowed more time before the N. A. met in 
order to sound public opinion in West Pakistan. At one 
stroke, Bhutto appeared to derive several benefits from 
these series of party meetings - he gained valuable time; 
he satisfied those within the party who complained that they 
had not been consulted on the key issues; he used these 
meetings to demonstrate his political base to Yahya and 
Mujib; and finally to explain and gain his party's en- 
dorsement of his own decision arrived at after his talks 
with both Yahya and Mujib that no useful purpose would 
be served by attending the N. A. session in the absence 
of a prior arrangement worked out outside the Assembly. 
Another outcome of these meetings was to reinforce Bhutto's 
264 
unchallenged leadership within 
time Bhutto also met with other 
as Qayyum Khan and Wali Khan. 
58 
several occasions. In meetings 
selled him to delay calling the 
the party. At the same 
political leaders such 
And he met Yahya on 
with Yahya, Bhutto coun- 
N. A. so as to give him 
more time to bargain with Mujib59 as well as to sound 
public opinion in West Pakistan on the Six Points which 
he hoped would pressure Mujib into amending his programme. 
60 
Two factors, however, worked against this strategy. First, 
Yahya went ahead and announced that the Assembly would 
meet at Dacca (a symbolic gesture to Bengali demands) on 
3 March. 
61 
And second, Mujib succeeded in winning the 
support of the minority parties in the West, with a few 
exceptions. 
Outmanoeuvred, Bhutto immediately, and without 
consulting his party, announced that the PPP would boycott 
the N. A. session. 
62 
At a press conference on 15 February 
Bhutto declared that his party could not attend the 
assembly session "simply to endorse a dictated constitu- 
tion. " 
63 Prone to using strong language under stress, 
Bhutto described his party's presence in Dacca as being 
"in a position of double hostage" and alluding to some 
fatal fist fights on the floor of the Dacca legislatures 
before 1958, he called the N. A. a "slaughter house". He 
explained that his party had already accepted the first 
and last point of Mujib's Six Points. On the other points, 
"something could be worked out. " Only on the point of 
taxation was he completely unable to compromise. Since it 
was this clause on which the military was expected to be 
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most apprehensive (since it threatened financial support 
for the army), this part of Bhutto's speech was clearly 
aimed at gaining the support of the military, particularly 
the "hawks" who felt that Yahya had gone too far in his 
appeasement policy vis a vis Bengal. 
64 Bhutto's boycott 
decision was supported only by the Qayyum Muslim League 
and JUP at this stage, while the other minority parties 
of West Pakistan indicated their willingness to attend 
the assembly. 
Bhutto now moved quickly and simultaneously on 
various fronts - in holding private, secret meetings with 
important members of the military junta, in calling a 
parliamentary convention of his party on 20 February and 
addressing a mass rally at Lahore to consult the people 
'directly'. This again demonstrated his remarkable ability 
to manoeuvre at different levels simultaneously with 
maximum effect. The precise nature of his meetings with 
army "hawks" such as Peerzada, Omar, Hameed and Gul Hasan 
are still clouded in secrecy, but it is generally believed 
that Bhutto's links with these army "hawks" proved crucial 
and that he played upon their fears of the 'Bengali threat' 
and their alarm at Mujib's threatening posture against the 
army, to make his views prevail upon these influential 
members of the junta. 
65 In meetings with military hard- 
liners, and Yahya, Bhutto argued that the Six Points 
demand was more than a plan that would emasculate the 
central government and cut the economic ground from under 
the military but was in reality a "concealed formula for 
secession. "66 As these private parleys continued it became 
I 
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increasingly obvious that, so far from clearing a way for 
the successful outcome of the assembly's session, these 
conversations between Yahya and Bhutto or the rumours 
of secret meetings between Bhutto and other generals 
were prompting confusion and sowing the seeds of further 
mistrust between Bhutto and Mujib. Indeed, at one point 
Bhutto had to publicly deny rumours of complicity with 
the Yahya regime. At any rate, in East Pakistan at least, 
the military - Bhutto parleys looked like a West Pakistani 
'conspiracy' to thwart the legitimate demands of the 
Bengali majority. 
67 
Some disquiet was expressed in PPP 
circles as well over the nature of these meetings and the 
rumours they were generating. 
68 
Bhutto called a convention of the PPP at Karachi 
on 20 and 21 February in order to obtain his party's 
formal endorsement of his boycott decision. It is sig- 
nificant that the meeting was called after he had publicly 
announced his decision not to participate in the assembly 
session, so that the convention was left-with the task of rubber- 
stamping the chairman's decision. 
69 
The two-day con- 
vention was attended by over six hundred delegates inclu- 
ding members of the party's central committee, MNAs and 
MPAs-elect. ?0 Despite the fact that the convention was 
presented with a fait accompli, some voices of dissent 
could be discerned during the proceedings. The Mairaj 
faction opposed Bhutto's decision and argued that no 
purpose would be served by a boycott - the party should 
instead go to Dacca and strive to pressurise Mujib both 
inside and outside the assembly. Mukhtar Rana, Abdul 
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Khaliq and Abdul Hameed Jatoi also implored Bhutto to 
reverse his decision, but their pleas were unheeded, and 
they found themselves not only outnumbered by those sup- 
porting Bhutto, but completely outmanoeuvred by Bhutto's 
tactics. Bhutto not only got the convention's endorse- 
ment of his decision but also obtained what amounted to 
a blank cheque from the party to follow any course of action 
that he deemed fit. 
71 He asked the convention to 'mandate' 
him with the power to decide all issues relating to East 
Pakistan. The convention ended with almost all the 
members taking an oath on the Quran to resign en bloc if 
the N. A. met without them. In addition, at Kauser Niazi's 
initiative party members took another oath pledging 
their loyalty to Bhutto and giving him full authority to 
outline the future course of action for the party. 
72 
Thus one important effect of the crisis was to reinforce 
Bhutto's personal dominance over the party. 
Bhutto now turned his attention to the mass public. 
Some demonstration of public support was necessary in 
Bhutto's scheme of things to further buttress his bargain- 
ing strength vis 
ä 
vis the military and Mujib. According- 
ly, Bhutto declared that he would adopt the "direct method' 
of consulting the people through a public rally to be 
addressed at Iqbal Park in Lahore on 28 February. At the 
rally in his characteristically dramatic style, Bhutto 
employed all the demagoguery and oratory at his command 
to have the crowds chant that they endorsed their Qunid-e- 
Awam's decision not to attend the assembly session. It was 
here that Bhutto demanded that the N. A. be postponed to a 
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later date or alternatively that the 120 day limit 
(imposed by Yahya under the LFO) for the completion of 
the new constitution be extended so as to give the two 
parties more time for negotiations. 
73 Bhutto threatened 
to launch a mass agitation from Peshawar to Karachi if 
the assembly went ahead as scheduled. 
74 He threatened non- 
PPP parliamentarians with "dire consequences" if they 
chose to go to Dacca. For his own party members he held 
out an even stronger threat: Those who decided to go 
would be "liquidated" by party workers and their "legs, 
would be broken. "75 It may be mentioned here that out of 
the West Pakistani parties, the QML, the JUP and CML (except 
Nur Khan who disassociated himself fra-n hispart)'sdecision) de- 
cided to keep away from the N. A. session, while the rest 
of the parties had already despatched their members to 
Dacca. Within the PPP, Ahmed Reza Kasuri was the sole 
member who revolted against the party decision and pro- 
ceeded to Dacca. Later in May 1971, when Kasuri was sus- 
pended from party membership for flouting party discipline 
(see below) he organised his own "Reza Progressive Group" 
within the party and proceeded to expel Bhutto instead, 
76 
On 1 March, Yahya announced his decision to post- 
pone the assembly session sine die, citing Bhutto's boy- 
cott as a primary cause for his action. 
77 This announce- 
ment was made without consulting Mujib and according to 
Bhutto, without even consulting him. 
78 A minister in 
Yahya's cabinet, G. W. Choudhury, however, later alleged 
that Yahya not only did this at Bhutto's behest since he 
was "by now the junta's most influential adviser" but that 
S/VV 
he along with General Peerzada probably even drafted 
Yahya's statement. 
79 Choudhury's thesis that Yahya was 
merely a helpless pawn in Bhutto's hands is not borne 
out by the evidence. 
80 As indicated earlier, Yahya had his 
own constituency interests to protect against both Mujib 
and Bhutto. Consequently in this game of three-way politi- 
cal chess, Yahya obviously had his own pieces to manoeuvre. 
Recognition of the fact that Yahya's "hawkish" colleagues 
such as Generals Hameed, Omar and Peerzada, who shared 
Bhutto's views, were pressurising Yahya to take a stronger 
stand against Mujib81 does not necessarily mean that 
Yahya was acting on Bhutto's behalf. A number of other 
actions taken by Yahya at the same time do not easily 
fit into the latter argument. Even before his postponement 
announcement, for instance, he had begun to tighten the 
military's grip over the country by dissolving his civil- 
ian council of ministers on 22 February, and even earlier 
Choudhury reports the preparation of an army contingency 
plan in case Mujib persisted in his uncompromising 
attitude. 
82 Little notice seems to have been taken in those 
accounts of the crisis of 1971 that view Yahya as a pawn 
in Bhutto's hands, of two additional factors. 
83 First, 
Yahya decided to exercise one rather than the other option 
presented by Bhutto. After all, the 120 day limit could 
also have been waived - unless of course Yahya was already 
convinced of Mujib's secessionist aims and felt that to 
allow more time would take the initiative out of the 
hands of the army. Second, while postponing the assembly 
session, Yahya did not announce a fresh date simultaneously. 
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For Mujib and his supporters, of whom the more radical 
members were already growing restive, this was a further 
indication of the army's untrustworthiness. It was not until 
five days had passed that Yahya fixed 25 March as the new 
date for the N. A. session - by which time it was probably 
too late to control Bengali passions. Had a fresh date 
been announced simultaneously, perhaps the reaction in 
East Pakistan would not have been as violent as it was. 
84 
But whatever Yahya's exact motives at this juncture, his 
actions do not suggest that he was merely acting on Bhutto's 
behalf, although it certainly appeared that way in terms. 
of the sequence of events. And from Mujib's vantage posi- 
tion in Dacca it looked like a West Pakistani conspiracy 
led by Yahya in which Bhutto willingly participated. 
as a collaborator. This was yet another illustration of 
misperceptions accentuating the East-West confrontation. 
The reaction to the postponement in East Pakistan 
has to be viewed against the background of the suspicion 
in the Bengali public mind, nurtured over the years, that 
the West Pakistani elite would never voluntarily give up 
its paramount position in the country. The Awami League 
was now certain that the PPP and the junta had combined to 
deny the majority party its right to rule. The postpone- 
ment sparked off violent demonstrations, and in the next 
few weeks, Mujib came under tremendous pressure from other 
political parties like NAP (Bhashani group), which indeed 
called for independence, and from the radicals within his 
own party to declare independence. 85 Military pressure 
also became visible as troops were flown in from the West 
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in increasingly large numbers. Mujib called for a general 
strike, accusing Yahya of postponing the assembly session 
solely in response to the machinations of a single party 
(PPP), against the wishes of the AL and several West 
Pakistani parties. 
86 
With the situation in East Pakistan deteriorating, 
Yahya on 3 March invited all the leaders of the parties 
and groups represented in the N. A. - twelve in all - to meet 
him at a Round Table Conference at Dacca on-. 10 March. 
While Bhutto accepted the President's invitation, Mujib 
rejected the offer alleging that the army was shooting down 
unarmed Bengalis in the streets of Dacca. Mujib also 
argued that constitutional issues were best resolved with- 
in the forum of the N. A. rather than by secret negotiations 
and Round Table Conferences. 
87 On 6 March, Yahya announced 
a new date for the inaugural session of the N. A. as 
25 March. 88 
In West Pakistan Bhutto's political opponents with 
the exception of the QML, seeing a fine opportunity to dis- 
credit him as being the main contributor to the crisis, 
heaped criticism on him. 
89 
This served to reinforce Bhutto's 
fear that the minority parties in West Pakistan by lending 
their support to Mujib would further strengthen the latter's 
position. Meanwhile, Mujib, addressing half a million 
demonstrators in Dacca on 7 March, put forward four con- 
ditions for the AL's participation in the assembly session: 
(1) withdrawal of martial law, (2) return of troops to 
the barracks, (3) an inquiry into the alleged killings of 
civilians by the army and (4) transfer of power to the 
272 
elected representatives of the people. 
90 It was widely 
expected that Mujib would declare independence at this 
meeting but he decided instead to launch a non-cooperation 
movement, which was to place him in complete control of 
East Pakistan. The civil disobedience movement that 
followed made him the de facto political authority in East 
Pakistan in the name of Bangladesh whose flags flew on all 
the governmental buildings by 23 March. 
All the West Pakistani leaders, with the exception 
of Qayyum, castigated Bhutto, holding his intransigence 
responsible for the crisis, and the majority of them coun- 
selled Yahya to accept Mujib's four-point demand. 
91 This 
development undoubtedly influenced Bhutto's perception of 
his political opponents and conditioned his attitude toward 
them once he was in power. Although his later intolerance 
of opposition cannot be attributed to this factor alone, 
the antagonism that developed during the 1971 crisis did 
play a part in his distrust of opposition later. 
92 After 
he assumed power Bhutto frequently referred to the support 
given by these parties to Mujib's demands to equate such 
opposition with treason and to justify its suppression. 
Thus this aspect of the 1971 crisis had important reper- 
cussions on Bhutto's subsequent attitude and tactics towards 
other political parties. Clearly apprehensive of the 
possibility of an alliance developing between Mujib and 
the West Pakistani minority parties, Bhutto told Yahya in 
a meeting on 14 March that he agreed in principle to Mujib's 
demands, but any settlement had to be made with the PPP's 
consent. 
93 And further, if power was to be transferred 
273 
before the N. A. met it should be done in both wings to 
the two majority parties. 
94 Bhutto's proposal was widely 
interpreted as implying the creation of "Two Pakistans", 
and was criticised as such by minority parties in West 
Pakistan. 
95 
It was against this alarming and rapidly deter- 
iorating background that Yahya rushed to Dacca on 15 March. 
The minority party leaders of West Pakistan also went to 
Dacca, and advised Yahya to devise an interim arrangement 
under which power could be transferred to the AL. 
96 The 
Yahya-Mujib parleys were held in utmost secrecy but from 
the various published versions of the talks it appears that 
by 20 March Yahya had agreed in principle to Mujib's four 
pre-conditions. 
97 Martial Law was to be lifted and power 
transferred in the five provinces without effecting a 
similar transfer in the central government. It was also 
proposed by the AL that the N. A. be divided ab initio into 
two committees, one comprising the West Pakistan MNAs, the 
other all those from East Pakistan, which would prepare 
separate reports within a stipulated period and submit 
their proposals to the N. A. 
98 
It would then be left to 
the N. A. to discuss and debate the proposals of both the 
committees and find out ways and means of living together. 
Under an interim arrangement which was to be an amended 
form of the 1962 constitution, East Pakistan would be 
given autonomy on the basis of the Six Points and the 
provinces of the Western wing would have powers as pro- 
vided in the 1962 constitution, but would be free to work 
out their quantum of autonomy according to a mutually 
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agreeable procedure, subject to the President's approval. 
AL leaders later claimed that the provisions for two N. A. 
committees and different levels of autonomy were incorpor- 
ated to accommodate Bhutto in response to his stand that 
99 
there were two majority parties in "two Pakistans. " 
These proposals were placed in a draft proclamation for the 
president's signature, prepared by the AL team. An 
examination of this document shows that Yahya had made 
a number of important concessions on the Six Points. 
100 
But he made his agreement contingent on that of other 
politicians, principally Bhutto. 
Bhutto arrived in Dacca on 21 March amidst a 
hostile reception, since he was associated in the Bengali 
public mind with being responsible for obstructing the 
transfer of power. From 21 to 25 March discussions were 
held at Dacca in which Yahya, the AL. the PPP, and other 
west wing political parties participated. Bhutto refused 
to accept the Yahya-Mujib agreement101 (as did the military 
"hawks" and the QML politicians). Bhutto's principal ob- 
jections centred around the provisions for the two commit- 
tees and the differential quantum of autonomy for East and 
West Pakistan, which he argued would inevitably result in 
the separation of the two wings. 
102 
Ironically Bhutto 
thus rejected that part of the scheme that was specifically 
included to accommodate him. Bhutto's alternative pro- 
posals were to call the N. A. first or to,. allow him more 
time to negotiate directly with Mujib. 
103 
The latter plea 
met with no response from the AL. By that time the pre- 
ssure on Mujib to either get a quick settlement or to 
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declare independence had nearly reached breaking point. 
The AL's detailed draft proclamation presented in 
an aides'meeting on 23 March differed from that agreed 
upon earlier by Yahya in many significant respects. 
104 
For instance the committees were now called conventions, 
and the term 'confederation' was, used. It thus appeared 
to the Yahya regime that the Awami, League had-gone some- 
what beyond the demand for regional autonomy to one which 
approximated the constitutional break up of Pakistan. 
105 
Yahya raised several objections to the AL draft proclamat- 
ion, which centred on these provisions that were viewed as 
threatening both the Centre's powers and the institutional 
interests of the military. By that time the pressure on 
Yahya from those within the military establishment such as 
Generals Peerzada, Tikka, Hameed and Omar who felt that 
already Yahya had gone far enough to accommodate Mujib, 
had a perceptible impact. 
106 
But there were other factors 
operating simultaneously which were also contributing to 
disquiet among military circles. On 23 March, 'Pakistan 
Day' (the day the Pakistan Resolution was passed in 1940), 
the AL declared 'Resistance Day', and ordered the Bangla- 
desh flag to be hoisted on all public buildings. 
107 
Clashes between the army and demonstrators cost ten lives, 
while Mujib called for a general strike for 27 March. 
The situation in West Pakistan was also far from 
satisfactory not only from the military's point of view, 
but also from Bhutto's. Leftist radicals of the PPP demand- 
ed the immediate transfer of power to a Mazdur-Kisan Raj 
(Worker-Peasant Rule), and in the Punjab there were 
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increasing incidents of factory takeovers and gheraos 
in several cities. Under the leadership of Mukhtar Rana, 
pro-PPP labour unions began to take over industrial units 
in Lyallpur, Multan and Sargodha. These efforts culmin- 
ated in bloody riots in Lyallpur on 25 March. 
108 Bhutto 
severely reprimanded Rana for such "adventurism" in an 
effort to bring the PPP left-wing under greater control. 
From the point of view of the military authorities, the 
situation in both the wings was clearly getting out of 
hand. 
On the night of 25 March, while Awami Leaguers 
were reportedly awaiting the presidential proclamation, 
Yahya without formally breaking the talks, launched a 
policy of military action against the Bengalis. 
109 The AL 
was banned and Mujib was arrested and flown to West 
Pakistan. 
110 
The exact circumstances leading up to the 
military action are still clouded in secrecy, and there 
are different interpretations of both the motives and the 
source behind the decision to resort to a military solution 
of the crisis. 
ill According to Yahya's version the military 
action was taken to pre-empt an armed insurrection planned 
by the Awami League for the night of 25/26 March. 
112 
Bhutto supported Yahya's justification of a pre-emptive 
strike in his account of the crisis. 
113 
Both Bhutto's 
and Yahya's versions put the onus of the failure of the 
talks upon Mujib, who is accused of having been determined 
to achieve secession since as far back as the 1960's with 
Indian complicity. These allegations, however, have not 
been amply substantiated. An alternative view, advanced 
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largely by Indian and Bengali writers of the crisis is 
that Yahya (and Bhutto) were negotiating in bad faith simply 
to buy time until the troop buildup was completed. 
114 
While this thesis cannot be ruled out, it seems simplis- 
tic and obscures the complex interplay of forces which led 
to the final outcome. 
115 The 'single-minded conspiracy 
theory' does not adequately explain why Yahya had to 
carry the game so far as to have even agreed to the prin- 
ciples of the transfer of power. A more plausible 
explanation may be that Yahya had prepared his coercive 
potential in case it was necessary, while he continued 
talking in the hope of finding a peaceful and mutually 
acceptable solution. 
According to Yahya his hand was forced by Bhutto 
who goaded him into taking military action against the 
AL. 116 Bhutto's precise role at this juncture remains 
shrouded in mystery, although he strongly supported the 
initial military action. This is indicated by the speeches 
he made on his return to West Pakistan. His first reac- 
tion to the news of the military offensive in the East 
was: "Thank God, Pakistan has been saved. "117 In a 
speech on 27 March, Bhutto expressed his support for Yahya's 
order to crush the independence movement for Bangladesh. 
118 
In another speech Bhutto described the Six Points as a 
"sugar-coated pill for secession" and alleged that the 
AL objective was to secede from Pakistan step by step. 
119 
At the same time he alleged that Mujib was supported in 
his aims by the regional leaders in Pakistan, who together 
prepared a "London Plan" to undo Pakistan in October 1969, 
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when all these leaders had met in London. 
120 In Yahya's 
speech of. 26 March, he announced as mentioned earlier, 
a ban on the AL, and a total ban on all political acti- 
vities and complete press censorship. Bhutto not only 
supported the ban, but publicly urged. Yahya to ban all 
other political parties that had opposed the Pakistan move- 
ment - an obvious reference to NAP (Wali Group) and those 
parties that-had cooperated with Mujib in the preceding 
months. 
121 
THE PPP AND THE YAHYA REGIME: MARCH - DECEMBER 1971 
The military action initiated by the ruling junta 
on 25 March marked the end of the negotiating phase of 
Pakistani politics and also spelt, as we shall see below, 
the beginning of the end of a united Pakistan. The months 
March to December 1971 saw the army engaged in a full 
scale military offensive in East Pakistan, and proscrib- 
ing political activity in the West. Bhutto and the PPP's 
' attitude towards the military regime alternated between 
conciliation and confrontation in these intervening months. 
As military action intensified in the East and civilian 
casualties mounted, rumours circulated widely of military 
atrocities upon the Bengali population. Bhutto could not 
openly criticise the army as some of his party members such 
as Mairaj were urging him to do, but he could criticise 
the way the junta was handling the situation. At the 
same time he continued his efforts to cultivate friend- 
ship with members of the junta in order to bring pressure 
to bear upon Yahya, who by now seemed in no hurry to 
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transfer power to a civilian government. This was indi- 
cated by Yahya's speech of 28 June 1971, when, departing 
from the LFO, he put forward a new plan for the restoration 
of democracy. By-elections were to take place in East 
Pakistan to fill the seats rendered vacant by the ban on 
the AL while a new constitution was to be prepared by a 
committee of presidential advisers. 
122 
After this the 
N. A. was to meet, followed by the formation of a new 
government in the Centre and some time later, in the pro- 
vinces. Within the PPP this announcement was interpreted 
not only as a calculated measure designed to delay the 
transfer of power, but as the first step of part of a 
larger plan to nullify the entire result of the 1970 elec- 
tion. 123 Consequently, Bhutto, unlike other West Pakistani 
leaders who appeared to have acquiesced in Yahya's plan, 
announced his rejection of it and demanded an immediate 
transfer of power to his party. 
Bhutto now also faced problems from within his own 
party. While the confrontation with Mujib - the "crisis 
situation" - had enabled Bhutto to impose discipline in the 
party earlier, now with the crisis temporarily frozen, the 
party exhibited growing signs of factionalism and 
intra-party conflict. In April, for instance, the Punjabi 
PPP was riven by the factional struggle between Sheikh 
Rashid (President of Punjab PPP) and Mustapha Khar (secre- 
tary general of Punjab PPP, who appeared to have Bhutto's 
support) over the issue of who would be chief minister 
of the province in the event of a transfer of power. 
124 
In Sind a similar conflict between Mumtaz Bhutto and Jatoi 
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was evident over the chief ministership. Elsewhere too 
various leadership groups were involved in a flurry of 
manoeuvres aimed at securing ministerial appointments. 
These were other sources of internal stress in the party. 
There was, for instance, tension between the party's left- 
wing groups and the central leadership over the entry 
into the party of several traditional landed notables, 
125 
which included Nawab Muzaffer of Kalabagh, the Gilani clan 
of Multan and the Pir of Zakori Sharif. Bhutto however, 
against the protests of the party left, continued to wel- 
come into the PPP any prominent leader who gave him ver- 
bal declarations of adherence to the party manifesto. 
The issue of party elections emerged as 
another source of intra-party tension. Several leaders 
(Kasuri, Mairaj, Rana, Kardar) who had earlier accepted 
Bhutto's justification that the intensity of the national 
crisis necessitated continuing the tradition of nominat- 
ions now strongly advocated elections to give the party 
a democratic character. 
126 
The demand for elections came 
primarily from the leftist factions within the party who 
felt that this was the only way to purge the party of the 
feudals, capitalists, and self-seekers. Mukhtar Rana appealed 
to Bhutto to come out of the cordon thrown around him by 
jagirdars, calling the PPP central committee a "feudal- 
capitalist committee of a socialist party. "127 Bhutto did 
not publicly criticise-Rana, but Musawaat launched a cam- 
paign against him, labelling him the "Lyallpur PPP's 
Liu Shao-ch' i. " 128 Thereafter, Rana announced-his resig- 
nation from the chairmanship of the Lyallpur PPP. 
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Rana's was not an isolated case of dissent with- 
in the party. Ahmed Reza Kasuri declared publicly that 
the "era of nominations" must end in the party and elec- 
tions be held, but Kasuri was first removed from his post 
as president of the Kasur tehsil PPP and then expelled 
from the party by Bhutto. 
129 Kasuri branded Bhutto 'a 
fascist' and declared that as far as he was concerned Bhutto 
was no longer chairman of the party because he had "violated 
the basic principles of the party. " In a similar vein, 
Anwar Aleemi, secretary general of the Sheikhupura branch 
called upon Bhutto to announce elections within the party, 
failing which the PPP workers would form their own forward 
bloc to free the party from the clutches of capitalists and 
jagirdars. 130 He accused Bhutto of being a dictator with- 
in the party and alleged that the party leadership, now in 
the hands of the waderas of Sind and the capitalists of 
the Punjab, had completely gone back on the manifesto. This 
agitation for party democracy was denounced by Bhutto, 
who called those demanding elections "anarchists". 
131 
Elections, Bhutto argued, could not be held until the 
national crisis was resolved. 
132 
Bhutto's response to the growing disunity in the 
PPP ranks was to divert the party's attention towards con- 
tinuing the struggle.: against the military regime and arguing 
more forcefully for an immediate transfer of power. 
133 
In September, he demanded that "the rule of the generals 
must end and the people must take their destiny in their 
own hands. " 
134 Although this pressure led Yahya to 
announce a number of concessions (as for example lifting 
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the ban on political activity), there were other signs 
that suggested that the junta was attempting to entrench 
itself more firmly in power. The Yahya regime produced 
a draft constitution, (known as the Cornelius Committee's 
constitutional draft), which, on the Turkish pattern, pro- 
vided the military with a permanent role in the country's 
political system, and also gave East Pakistan autonomy, 
but "within limits". 
135 The draft was reported tobe 
even more restrictive than the 1962 constitution. 
136 As 
we shall see below, subsequent events in East Pakistan 
never gave Yahya the opportunity to enforce this consti- 
tution. 
The Yahya-Bhutto manoeuverings in West Pakistan 
had no impact in the East where the situation except for 
a brief lull continued to deteriorate . Guerilla warfare 
organised by armed Bengali freedom fighters, the Mukti 
Bahini, gathered momentum by October. A provisional 
government of 'Bangladesh' had already been set up in April 
by AL exiles in Calcutta. The exodus of East Pakistani 
refugees into western Bengal gave an international dimension 
to the internal conflict. 
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As the refugees poured into 
India, the latter began to openly and actively support 
guerilla activities. 
138 But what alarmed the Yahya govern- 
ment even more was the signing on 9 August of a Treaty of 
Mutual Friendship between India and the Soviet Union, com- 
mitting the latter under Article nine to India's defence. 
139 
Yahya's natural response was to look towards China to 
provide Pakistan with similar support. Accordingly, in 
November Yahya despatched an eight-member official delegation 
f 
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to China led by the man who, more than any other leader 
in the past was identified as the architect of closer re- 
lations with China - Bhutto. The delegation also included 
two key figures of the military bureaucracy with whom 
Bhutto reportedly had developed close links - General Gul 
Hasan and the Air Chief, Rahim Khan. Although the mission 
brought no tangible help, 
140 for Bhutto the visit was of 
tremendous personal importance for two reasons. First, it 
brought him prominently into the public eye and earned 
for him a great deal of renewed public approbation. Second, 
and more importantly, it enabled Bhutto to renew his friend- 
ship with Gul Hasan and Rahim, who were later instrument- 
al in bringing him to power. This is borne out by the 
disclosure made later by Yahya that it was during this 
trip that Bhutto prevailed upon these key figures to 
effect what was a de facto coup that finally removed 
Yahya from power. 
141 
Soon after the China mission, a series of inci- 
dents (beginning on 17 November) along the Indian-East 
Pakistan border culminated in December in full scale host- 
ilities between India and Pakistan. 
142 The logistics of 
the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 and its conduct lie beyond 
the scope of this study. Here, it would suffice to note 
that Pakistani forces were on every front and by land, 
sea and air, seriously out-weaponed, out-numbered and out- 
manoeuvered. In the midst of a losing war, Yahya, under 
pressure from key figures in the junta - in particular 
Generals Peerzada and Gul Hasan - announced the formation 
of a coalition government at the Centre, with Nural Amin, 
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a veteran East Pakistani political leader, as premier 
and Bhutto as vice-premier. 
143 Bhutto agreed temporarily 
to accept second position in a civilian government on the 
understanding that wars do not last forever. 
144 Bhutto 
was immediately despatched to New York to argue Pakistan's 
case at the United Nations. At the Security Council, 
Bhutto delivered an impassioned speech accusing India and 
the Soviet Union of attempting to dismember Pakistan. 
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Bhutto castigated the Security Council for "legalising 
aggression" and in the face of repeated Soviet vetos on 
resolutions for cease-fire, stormed tearfully out of the 
chamber. Ironically, Bhutto's statement to the Security 
Council that "I will not be party to your ignominious surren- 
der" was being made at a time when Dacca had fallen, and 
the 90,000 strong West Pakistani forces in Bengal had 
surrendered to the invading Indian troops, and when the 
terms for surrender were being discussed by a defeated 
General Niazi at Dacca. Whether Bhutto was aware of the 
surrender at this stage or not, it is clear that his 
dramatic performance won him much acclaim at home. 
146 The 
traumatic outcome of this disastrous: war was the partition 
of Pakistan and the formation of a new nation, Bangladesh. 
The most immediate effect of these events was the 
occurrence of violent demonstrations in the West against 
the military government. Effigies of the ruling junta 
were burnt throughout the country. 
147 The unconditional 
surrender of the Pakistan army in East Pakistan was viewed 
as a national humiliation brought about by an inept and 
morally depraved military junta (since Yahya's fondness 
0 
for women and drink was no secret). The shock caused 
by the military debacle and the unconditional surrender 
was all the greater because official statements on the 
progress of the war had completely concealed the-true 
situation there. Angry mobs took to the streets, while 
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demonstrations demanding an end to military rule continued 
in the main towns until 20 December, when these threatened 
14 
to degenerate into riots. 
- 
The. outcry was joined by 
junior officers in the army who were reported to be on the 
verge of revolt. 
149 A delegation of angry young officers 
led by Colonel Aleem Afridi called upon Gul Hasan demanding 
Yahya's removal. These feelings of anger were also expressed 
at a meeting called at General Head Quarters of all army 
officers above the rank of colonel. When the army chief, 
General Hameed rose to address the officers, he .. wa"s 
abusively shouted down. 
150 
The lesson of a defeated 
army turning on its leaders was not lost on the senior 
officers in the army. Bhutto's links with important gene- 
rals appeared to have had an important impact on the 
situation. Yahya later claimed that the eleven generals 
who were most.. vocal and persistent in their demands for 
Yahya's resignation all had close links with Bhutto. 
151 
Against this background,. the top military command- 
ers met on the night of 17 December, holding what has been 
described as a "military election, ""152 The decisive voices 
seem to have been those of Gul Hasan and Air Marshal 
Rahim, who asked Yahya to resign and hand over power to 
the only legitimate source of authority - Bhutto. Bhutto's 
efforts to create a constituency in the upper echelons of 
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the military evidently paid off. Yahya considered annul- 
ling the result of the 1970 election in a bid to stay in 
power, but this proposal was shot down. 
153 Yahya's 
alternative proposal that the military remain in power 
but with General Hameed replacing him was also clearly 
not acceptable to Gul Hasan and Rahim, who pointed out 
Hameed's unpopularity within GHQ itself. The two leaders 
decided that not only should Yahya go. but that the armed 
forces itself had no'choice but to return to its profession- 
al duties, handing over power to the elected civilian 
leader. The decision to remove Yahya was in essence a de 
facto coup led by General Gui Hasan, who by all accounts, 
was the only person exercising real authority within the 
army. 
154 When . Bhutto returned from New York on 20 
December he was met by Gul Hasan and Rahim -and with- them he 
drove straight to the President's House where he was 
sworn in as President and Chief Martial Law Administrator. 
The manner in which Bhutto was brought to power 
may leave the impression that he was merely a military 
nominee, but this would do him less than justice. Bhutto's 
claim to leadership-rested after all on a sound and 
legitimate foundation - electoral success, even-if he 
needed the army's sanction to finally achieve power. And 
for the army it was a case of Hobson's Choice. Faced 
with a popular uprising in the streets and the prospect 
of a mutiny in the army ranks, and given the additional 
factor that there was nobody in the army who could have taken 
over, they could no longer delay putting into effect the 
peoples verdict as expressed in the 1970 polls. 
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BHUTTO AND THE PPP: AN ASSESSMENT 
6 Our analysis of the traumatic events of 1971 
indicates that the crisis had a number of important re- 
percussions with respect to both Bhutto and the PPP. 
First, as far as Bhutto is concerned, the crisis influenced 
his later approach to various issues such as regional auto- 
nomy within West Pakistan, and his dealings with the 
political opposition, particularly the regional parties. 
The secession of Bangladesh accentuated his fears of the 
Balkanisation of West Pakistan and conditioned his percep- 
tions of regional opponents. His experience with the AL 
reinforced his suspicions of regional autonomists and the 
secession of the eastern province with the help of Indian 
intervention indicated to him the possibility that regional 
opponents in the West under the guise of political opposi- 
tion were also actively plotting secession with 'foreign 
help. ' For Bhutto the AL's bid for independence was less 
a demonstration of what happens when demands for regional 
autonomy are denied than proof of the actual intentions of 
regional autonomists. In this sense, Bhutto too succumbed 
to the tendency_that'has character. ised_the approach of all 
central governments to date, of being suspicious about 
the loyalty of regional opponents to the very integrity 
of the State of Pakistan. No less important in this phase 
were the relations between Bhutto and other political 
opponents in West Pakistan. Since all the West Pakistani 
parties - with the exception of the QML - had sided with 
Mujib against Bhutto at some stage or the other and had 
held Bhutto primarily responsible for the crisis, this 
ý. 
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undoubtedly affected Bhutto's subsequent attitude towards 
them. This not only deepened his antagonism towards them 
but contributed to his later tendency to view all 
political rivals as "enemies of the State". 
As for the effect of the crisis on the party's 
internal dynamics, this period saw the further growth of 
Bhutto's dominance over the party. As we saw earlier, the 
crisis gave Bhutto the justification for increasing his 
personal hold over the party. This was demonstrated 
firstly, by the continuation of the practice of nominat- 
ions within the party. And secondly, by the nature of 
debates and the manner of Bhutto's consultations with the 
party. Bhutto's preference for a Viceregal style was 
evident in his relationship with his party in this period. 
The manner in which Bhutto consulted his party's central 
committee closely resembled the viceroy's consultation 
with the Executive Council; the party's highest organ was 
treated as a rubber-stamping authority rather than one 
effectively participating in decision-making. Important 
policy decisions with respect to the East Pakistan situat- 
ion were made. first. by Bhutto and. then taken to the party 
forum for endorsement. Within the party, Bhutto - much 
like Jinnah before him - demanded lieutenants who wished 
to serve him rather than partners who would argue with 
him. In this sense, he expected to be treated not as 
a colleague by the other members of the party hierarchy, 
not even as primus inter pares, but as the supreme 'Great 
Leader'. He could-and did ride roughshod over the views 
of other party members, as we saw earlier in the case of 
d, 
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Ahmed Reza Kasuri, Mukhtar Rana and Mairaj. Indeed he 
threatened the party with resignation if there was any 
attempt to challenge his personal authority. If there was 
any hint of insubordination or if any attempt was made to 
diminish his self-image, the particular office-holder had 
to face severe consequences, as was evidenced in the case 
of A. R. Kasuri. 
155 Bhutto's demand that his will be law 
within the party also set up the unhealthy tradition of 
leaving everything in the party to him. In fact Bhutto 
once rather ironically complained that the entire burden 
of the party fell on him. Given Bhutto's expectation 
of complete obedience from his lieutenants, this could not 
have been otherwise. Bhutto's centralised and personalised 
control over the party naturally inhibited the. emergence 
of secondary leadership within the party. However despite 
these efforts there were increasing signs of tension 
within the PPP coalition once it became evident that the 
party would soon assume governmental power. Factionalism 
within the party was a reminder of the fact that the PPP 
was composed of divergent interests and that it was not 
always easy to reconcile such interests, and maintain party 
discipline. These intra-party tensions were to assume 
greater intensity after the PPP assumed power. 
Another effect of the crisis on the PPP was a 
deradicalisation of the party's image. Given Bhutto's aim 
of portraying himself as the sole representative of West 
Pakistani interests and of making himself more palatable 
to elements in the junta he took several steps, as 
discussed above,. to tone down his socialist rhetoric and 
i- --. - 
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bring his party radicals under greater control. This 
marked an early phase in the PPP's progressive deradical- 
isation -a process that as we shall see later (chapter 
VI)intensified in the post-1971 period and eventually in- 
volved a decisive shift in the party's social base and 
the balance of its internal factions. 
Another feature of the PPP in this period was that 
its organisation continued to languish. Organisational 
problems were pushed into the. background as the party 
concentrated its attention upon the autonomy issue. Thus 
one effect of the 1971 crisis was to inhibit the organis- 
ational development of the party. Factionalism within the 
party only exacerbated problems of organisational weakness. 
Such institutional chaos, as we shall see later, had an 
important bearing on Bhutto's choice of patrimonialism as 
a strategy of rule. 
An early indication of such a strategy was evi- 
dent in the manner in which Bhutto finally achieved power. 
Bhutto's lobbying of influential members of the military 
heirarchy demonstrated a ', 'personalist" approach to politi- 
cal power. For Bhutto his party structure alone was not 
a sufficient resource with which to acquire power. Other 
resources were essential, and of these, the military was 
in his view the single most important means by which he 
could. assume governmental power. Bhutto had been in 
Pakistani politics long enough to realise that important 
members of the country's praetorian guard had to be won 
over or placated before the military could be persuaded 
to transfer power. It is in the light of this assessment 
i -- ' 
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that Bhutto attempted to establish links within the 
military. His reliance on non-representative actors 
to 
consolidate his political position was born of what 
he 
considered a realistic appraisal of the Pakistani politi- 
cal situation, but nonetheless reflected his belief 
that the road to power lay not merely in political party 
organisation but the manipulation of other interests as 
well. Such an assessment and reliance on non-representative 
actors was, as we shall see later, to exert an important 
influence both on the subsequent development of the PPP and 
the manner of Bhutto's rule. 
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PART II 
v 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, 1971-1977: AN OVERVIEW 
This chapter is concerned with the narration of 
the major events and policies during the PPP's five and a 
half years in office. The intention here is to provide 
the essential introductory background for the analytical 
work that follows. Such a narrative backdrop is consider- 
ed necessary in the absence of any readily available pub- 
lished record of the entire PPP era to which we can refer. 
' 
Burki's book does cover the period considered here, but 
the narrative material he provides is related primarily 
to his thesis of the applicability of the group theory of 
politics to Pakistan under Bhutto. 
2 Taseer's work also 
deals with this period, but since his is a biographical 
approach, he provides insufficient information about the 
Bhutto government's policies and actions for our purposes. 
3 
An account of internal developments in the PPP, however, 
is, for the most part, reserved for the following three 
chapters. 
THE PERIOD 1971-77 IN OUTLINE 
When the Bhutto government assumed power in 
December 1971, it was confronted with a formidable array 
of problems. Some of these problems were a consequence 
of the 1971 war and the secession of Bangladesh, while 
others were related to heightened expectations that 
accompanied the establishment of the first popularly elect- 
ed civilian government in Pakistani history. The Bhutto 
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government made vigorous efforts to reconstruct the coun- 
try both politically and economically. It announced a 
series of reforms in the economic and social sphere. At 
the same time, the regime took a number of steps to con- 
solidate its power by neutralising power centres such as the 
military, the civil service and the industrial elite. 
However, the problems of the new regime were compounded in 
the early years by increasing incidents of public disorder. 
This took several forms - labour strikes, tenant unrest, 
student agitation and linguistic riots. (in Sind) - and the 
government had to direct considerable attention towards 
dealing with these in order to preserve public order. 
6 
The task of political reconstruction depended in 
large part on the evolution of a consensus on the new 
political structure between the PPP regime and the oppo- 
sition parties. Constitution-making in 1972 and 1973 high- 
lighted the difficulties of evolving such a consensus over 
issues such as regional autonomy, the role of Islam in the 
state, and executive power. Through a series of manoeuvres 
and timely concessions, Bhutto was able to elicit support 
from the opposition for the interim Constitution of 1972, and 
then the Permanent Constitution of 1973. However, this 
achievement proved to be short-lived, and government- 
opposition relations became increasingly strained over 
the provincial autonomy question, the issue of Islamisation 
of Pakistani Society and what the opposition regarded as 
Bhutto's assumption of dictatorial powers. This eventually 
led Bhutto to ban the major opposition party NAP (National 
Army Party) in February 1975, establishing a virtual one- 
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party system. under a parliamentary facade. Bhutto 
resorted to ruling with the help of emergency powers and 
other authoritarian laws, and used military action to 
crush a regional autonomy movement in Baluchistan. By 1976, 
this insurgency in Baluchistan appeared to have been suffi- 
ciently restrained, while the opposition parties stood divid- 
ed and in disarray. This convinced Bhutto that the oppo- 
sition could no longer mount any significant challenge to 
his authority. When this coincided with a temporary up- 
turn in the economy after years of stagnation and rising 
prices, Bhutto viewed this as the most opportune moment to 
renew his party's electoral mandate. Therefore, he decided 
to call a general election in March 1977. 
Prior to the March election, the PPP regime took a 
number of steps aimed at improving its populist credentials. 
However, despite this, the nine opposition parties - now 
combined in the Pakistan National Alliance - succeeded in 
mobilising a massive wave of anti-government sentiment 
unleashed by the relaxation of curbs on political activity. 
But the election resulted in a huge victory for the PPP. 
The opposition denounced this as fraudulent and launched 
an agitation movement to dislodge Bhutto from power. With- 
in a month, the Bhutto government found it difficult to 
maintain its authority in the face of the urban protest 
and was compelled to seek military assistance to quell 
the agitation. This ultimately culminated in the military's 
seizure of power. We turn now to a more detailed account 
of these developments. 
I 
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EARLY PRIORITIES AND DILEMMAS 
Bhutto came to office in circumstances tragic for 
Pakistan, in the wake of a shattering military defeat 
which led to the break-up of the country and to over 
90,000 Pakistani troops and civilians taken prisoners of 
war by India. Coming to power after what has been referred 
to as the 'second partition' of Pakistan, the PPP government 
had a formidable array of problems'with which to deal. Some 
of these problems were the result of the 1971 war with 
India and the loss of Bangladesh, while others were a con- 
sequence of the 'crisis of expectations' caused by the PPP's 
radical rhetoric, the nature of its constituency support - 
amongst the new social groups that demanded participation 
in the political system - and the restoration of a civilian 
government after years of military rule. 
Some historians have compared the 1971 situation 
to that obtaining at the time of independence, in 1947.4 
The analogy is attractive for the legacy and the problems 
appear almost identical. Like the first post-independence 
nationalist government, the PPP regime had to deal with the 
legacy of war and economic dislocation, as well as problems 
of nation and state-building in an atmosphere of heightened 
expectations. In essence, Bhutto and his government were 
given the task of building a 'New Pakistan' -a Pakistan 
different both geographically and psychologically. 
Bhutto addressed himself quickly to dealing with 
these problems establishing as his first priority what 
W. H. Wriggins has called "the ruler's imperative, " i. e. 
the need to stay in power. 
5 Accordingly, his initial moves 
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were directed towards curtailing the influence of the 
major power groups on the one hand, and dealing with 
sources of public disorder on the other hand. Contem- 
poraneously retaining martial law under which he became 
Chief Martial Law Administrator and President, Bhutto 
appointed a twelve-member cabinet consisting mainly of mem- 
bers of his own party, while keeping the portfolios of 
Defence, Foreign Affairs, Interior and Inter-Provincial 
Co-ordination for himself. 
6 At the same time he appointed 
PPP men as governors to the four provinces.? He announced 
the release of Mujibur Rahman after 'consulting' with the 
'people' at a mass rally, 
8 
permitting him to return to 
Dacca, and lifted the ban on NAP imposed by the Yahya regime. 
Simultaneously with these actions, Bhutto through 
a series of executive decrees attempted to consolidate his 
power by neutralising potentially hostile power centres, 
such as the military, the civil service, the big industrial- 
ists and the media. Dealing with the military first, Bhutto 
"retired" twenty of the top military leaders, including 
Yahya Khan, who was placed under house arrest, and appoint- 
ed a commission of inquiry into the military debacle of 
1971. Bhutto's attempt to establish civilian control over 
the military went a step further in March 1972 with the 
removal of Lt. General Gul Hasan and Air Marshal Rahim 
along with six other military leaders. 
9 
These purges were 
followed by structural changes - for instance the post of 
Commander-in-Chief', which Bhutto described as an 'anachron- 
istic and colonialist' title, was abolished and replaced 
by Chief-of-Staff. The head of state now became the effect- 
ive 'commander-in-chief'. 10 
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The civil service was dealt with in a similar 
way as the military - with purges followed by structural 
reforms. On 12 March 1972,1,300 civil servants were 
dismissed under a Martial Law Order passed to "tone up" 
the administration and to "correct serious lapses and 
failings" in the civil service. 
11 
The purge of the 
bureaucracy was followed by the withdrawal of constitution- 
al safeguards, traditionally enjoyed by the civil service, 
in the new constitution of 1973.12 Then, on 20 August 1973, 
sweeping structural changes were announced in the civil 
service. 
13 The existing civil service structure (that con- 
sisted of classes 1 to 10) - including the elitist CSP 
(Civil Service of Pakistan)-was abolished and replaced by 
a simple unified grading structure. Condemning the CSP- 
dominated colonial structure in the most derogatory terms, 
Bhutto declared: 
"No institution in the country has so 
lowered the quality of our national life 
as what is called 'naukershahi'...... It 
has created a class of brahmins or man- 
darins, unrivalled in its snobbery and 
arrogance, insulated from the life of the 
people, and incapable of identifying itself 
with them. " 14 
At the same time, Bhutto announced that the new system would 
"remove barriers in the way of the move- 
ment of individuals both upwards to the 
posts of higher responsibility and side- 
ways between different kinds of related 
jobs. " 
A system of "lateral entry" was announced to recruit quali- 
fied specialists from professions outside the service. 
Other than the military'and civilian bureaucracy, 
Bhutto also moved against another power group, the industrial 
elite, in order to establish his political ascendancy. On 
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the very day he assumed power, he impounded the pass- 
ports of the 22 families. 
15 
Action was threatened against 
19 industrialists and three of the richest, Dawood, Valika 
and Habibullah were arrested. 
16 In January 1972, several 
private firms were nationalised to reduce the political 
and economic power that had been accumulated by a small 
number of industrial and financial houses. (The national- 
isation programme is described below under Economic Recon- 
struction)"' The capitalists were asked to surrender capital 
taken abroad, and Habibullah was even paraded on television 
in handcuffs as a warning. 
17 
Simultaneously important 
changes were made in high civilian posts - the editor of 
the Pakistan Times, the chairman of the Press Trust of 
Pakistan, the governor of the State Bank, the managing 
director of the National Shipping Corporation, and the manag- 
ing director of the Progressive Papers Limited, were dis- 
missed. 
18 
Most of these posts were either held by members 
of the 22 families or their friends. 
But after this initial show of strength, Bhutto and 
his finance minister, Dr. Mubashar Hasan, addressed about 
200 leading Karachi businessmen on 23 January 1972, adopt- 
ing a more conciliatory tone and asking for their cooper- 
ation. 
19 
At the same time, Bhutto announced the lifting of 
travel restrictions and the release of Dawood and Valika. 
20 
In early May 1972, this policy went a step further when 
Bhutto appointed Rafique Saigol (one of the "22") as manag-. 
ing director of Pakistan International Airlines (PIA). 21 
This appointment was intended as a symbolic gesture to Big 
Business. 22 However, the big business community remained 
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hostile and unreconciled by the new PPP regime, despite 
repeated assurances by the latter. The nationalisation 
measures together with Bhutto's initial actions against the 
industrialists created an atmosphere of suspicion and un- 
certainty. While Bhutto gave assurances, in several meetings 
with businessmen and industrialists that "private enter- 
prise had a distinct part to play" in the kind of "mixed 
economy" envisaged by the PPP. government, 
23 the business 
community was unwilling to accept the government's right 
to lay down conditions and rules for the role to be played 
by the private sector and remained suspicious about the 
government's intentions. This uneasy and often hostile 
relationship was to continue throughout the PPP's five and 
a half years in office, and was to have economic repercus- 
sions as we shall see below. 
Another power bloc that the Bhutto government dealt 
with upon assuming power, was the media. The influence of 
this power bloc although in no sense comparable to the 
power of the military, civil service or the industrial elite, 
was nevertheless viewed as significant enough to justify 
government attention and action. 
24 
In the first few days 
of the PPP government, controls over the press and the 
media were temporarily suspended. However, when media 
professionals began to exercise the freedom granted them, 
the PPP regime reinstituted controls upon the media. In 
February 1972, Altaf Gauhar, the editor . -of.: - 
Dawn who 
wrote critical articles about the new regime was arrested 
and jailed under Martial Law for "acting in a seditious 
manner. "25 The regime's subsequent justification that Gauhar 
309 
had been arrested not in his capacity as a journalist, 
but for his "previous role as a senior civil servant" did 
not appear very convincing. 
26 While journalists through- 
out the country campaigned for his release, the PPP govern- 
ment appointed "new management" for the newspaper, that 
was now careful not to offend the ruling party. 
27 The 
Punjab Punch of Lahore was banned in February, while the 
Sun had its operations suspended until the government was 
satisfied that the news would conform to government 
"standards". 
28 Two periodicals of Lahore, Zindagi and 
Urdu Digest were banned and their editors jailed under 
Martial Law - an action that led to strong protest from the 
Punjab Union of Journalists. 
29 Contrary to what the PPP 
had promised during the 1970 election, the National Press 
Trust (a government body used to censor newspapers) was not 
abolished, but merely reconstituted. Further, a Press Con- 
sultative Committee was set up in March 1972 under the 
Minister of Information, Kauser Niazi, which was merely a 
euphemism for a censorship body composed of 'loyal' journal- 
ists. Thus safe for. a brief period, the PPP government im- 
posed severe restrictions on the freedom of expression. 
30 
Several methods were used to establish controls and 
check dissent. 
31 
Legal methods included the use of the 
Defence of Pakistan Rules and the West Pakistan Press and 
Publications Ordinance (a remnant of the Ayub Khan era). 
A special cell was created in the Ministry of Law to make 
speedy use of the legal provisions. 
32 
Non-legal methods 
included the use of newsprint (over which the government 
had a monopoly) and advertisements both to 'control' the 
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dissenting papers and to patronise People's Party organs 
and other pro-PPP papers. 
33 The PPP newspaper Musawaat 
was given official sanction to write some critical stories 
in order to give some semblance of 'press freedom' and 
Bhutto was asked in November 1972 by his press officials 
to name the 'holy cows' whom the papers could not attack 
or criticise. 
34 Bhutto's answer was simple: "I am the 
only holy cow. " 
35 
Other than the neutralisation of important power 
blocs in'the country, Bhutto's initial priorities were 
also concerned with what we earlier called the civil order 
problem that was partially a consequence of the events of 
1971 and in part resulted from the heightened expectations 
amongst the new social groups that formed part of the PPP 
constituency. There were various sources of public dis- 
order that posed a challenge to the PPP government's autho- 
rity in the early years. These can be identified as indus- 
trial action by urban labour, tenant unrest, linguistic 
riots and student agitation. Vie will deal with labour unrest 
first. 
Labour unrest was a legacy of the Ayubian model of 
economic development which stressed industrialization but 
put growth before equity and was partially responsible for 
creating an increasingly impoverished industrial working 
class, and of the economic dislocation under Yahya, 
occasioned by the Bangladesh crisis and the war with India, 
which resulted in a fall in industrial output and the con- 
sequent deterioration in living standards. Such unrest 
was also the result of PPP's own radical rhetoric, and its 
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election promise of creating a more equitable-social 
order. Believing that the PPP government would now imple- 
ment their slogans of 'worker's government' and Awami Raj' 
(People's Rule), industrial workers in many parts of the 
country occupied factories. 
36 Awami Adalats (People's 
Court) in the Punjab and Sind 'tried' individuals for being 
prb-capitalist or anti-labour and passed sentences. 
37 
Gheraos (seizure) and Jaloas (burning) of factories 
became frequent. 
38 The PPP government was faced at this 
juncture not only by industrial action, but also by agrarian 
unrest, as pitched battles raged between landlords and tenants 
in many parts of Sind, Punjab and MVFP. Tenant unrest was 
to some extent defused by the announcement of tenancy re- 
form (see below under 'Economic Reconstruction' for details) 
but labour hartals (stoppages or strikes) assumed far more 
dangerous proportions. 
Initiälly, the PPP government adopted a cautious 
policy. Some action was taken to stop retrenchments and 
to reinstate workers dismissed for striking by employers, 
largely under the guidance of Mairaj Mohammed Khan, the 
left-wing member of the PPP Central Committee, and now a 
minister of state for Public Affairs. But when labour un- 
rest continued despite severe warnings from Bhutto, the PPP 
government decided to reorient its strategy. Bhutto now 
warned that if Gheraos and Jaloas did not stop "the strength 
of the street will be met by the strength of the state. 
39 
At the same time a, 'New Labour Policy' was announced on 
10 February 1972, followed by the passage of a large vol- 
ume of labour legislation over the next severalmonths. 
40 
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The labour reforms mandated large increases in 
both monetary and non-monetary benefits for workers. 
These benefits included compulsory payment of bonus, an in- 
crease in profit-sharing from 2% to 4%, contributions by the 
employers to pension, medical and welfare funds, as well as 
20% worker's participation in management to be worked out 
in gradual stages. 
41 Another set of provisions in the new 
labour laws set up a compulsory system of shop stewards, with 
a grievance procedure to go along with it, with appeal to a 
Labour Court. Thus the workers while retaining their right 
to strike were now provided with the option of immediate 
adjudication by the court. At the same time, reasons for 
dismissal now had to be given in writing by the employer. 
The 'New Labour Policy' (its economic aspects are discussed 
below), however fell far short of labour's expectations, 
and the strikes continued unabated. '- Faced with such a 
situation, Bhutto used the police, and later the army, to 
break up strikes in Karachi and Hyderabad in February 1972. 
The worst outbreak of violence occurred on 8 June when 
eleven workers were killed according to official figures 
in a worker-police clash in SITE, Karachi. 
43 
To add to the lawlessness, the police went on 
strike in February in several cities to press for their 
demands for better pay. 
44 Troops were called out to deal 
with striking policemen in Hyderabad, while in Lahore, 
following the then Commander-in-Chief of the army's refusal 
to supply troops, 
45 
Governor Khar used armed "supporters" 
of the PPP - mostly hired goondas (goons) to break up the 
strike on 24 February. 
46 
1972 however, continued to be a 
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year of industrial unrest with'the ruling party rather 
unconvincingly presenting this as a 'capitalist conspiracy' 
to embarass a 'socialist government' and to topple "peoples" 
rule. In October-November 1972, eighteen days of labour 
riots and hartals led by the eleven biggestýtrade, unions of 
Karachi resulted in pitched battles between police and 
workers and ended in the calling out of troops to control 
the situation. Hundreds of labour leaders were arrested 
and several workers were killed. 
47 
The adoption of tougher measures48 and ultimately 
force to bring about industrial discipline created serious 
strains within the ruling party between the Leftist factions 
and the party leadership. The first to part company with 
the PPP over this issue was Mukhtar Rana, MNA, who enjoyed 
substantial labour union support in the Lyallpur district 
of the Punjab. Accusing the party of having gone back on 
its manifesto, of closing the party's door on the 
kash (the toiling people)_and of seeking to perpetuate a 
"feudal Martial Law" regime, 
49 
Rana called for an open 
awami adalat (people's court) to "try" Bhutto. Rana 50 
was arrested on 23 March 1972, under a Martial Law Regulation 
for making an 'objectionable speech'. 
51 He was subsequently 
sentenced under Martial Law, to five years rigorous impri- 
sonment, and disqualified from membership of the National 
Assembly. 52 In the official press, Rana was portrayed as 
an "eccentric", "anarchist" and "adventurist". Rana 53 
contended that his jailing was intended as-a severe warning 
to labour union organisers to*desist from opposing the 
ruling party and marked the victory of the right-wing forces 
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ýýll 
in the party (such as Khar, Peerzada and Kauser Niazi) who 
had repeatedly pointed out to Bhutto the dangers of allow- 
ing the Left to take over the party. 
54 Mukhtar Rana was 
formally expelled from the party on 19 May 1972. 
Another PPP leader who expressed his disenchantment 
with the PPP government's labour policies - as well as 
its 
attitude towards the 'toiling people' in general - was 
Mairaj Mohammed Khan. A cabinet minister since May 1972, 
he found it increasingly difficult to justify the PPP's 
strong-arm methods against labour, 'as well as what he felt 
were the PPP's half-hearted attempts at industrial and land 
reform. Mairaj's patience was clearly exhausted when 
Kauser Niazi had made a thinly veiled threat against 
'Communists' in the party who instigated workers during the 
labour trouble in Karachi in October/November 1972.55 In 
protest against the government's repressive policies he 
resigned from the government on 17 October 1972.56 Ile 
finally left the party on 13 November 1973 accusing the PPP, 
among other things, of trying "to preserve the old, dying 
feudal and capitalist 
_system. 
"57 Mairaj continued to cri- 
ticise 
- ---------__.. __... -. _ _ -r 
the PPP government for its 'anti-labour' and react- 
ionary policies until he was arrested on 28 May 1974 for 
interceding on behalf of striking women teachers in Karachi 
during a scuffle with the police. 
58 Ile was later tried and 
sentenced to four years imprisonment by a special tribunal 
under emergency laws for making an "objectionable speech". 
59 
Similar treatment was meted out to militant union leaders; 
in some cases criminal suits were instituted against re- 
calcitrant union leaders, or they were detained under 
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emergency laws such as Defence of Pakistan Rules (DPR). 
But Bhutto's problems were not only limited to the 
'crisis of expectations' among labour described above. 
Another source of public disorder during the early years 
was language riots in Sind in July 1972. Since this coin- 
cided with the labour unrest in Karachi, this led Bhutto 
to speak of the '3 L' conspiracy in Sind - i. e. labour, 
language and lawlessness. 
61 The linguistic trouble origin- 
ated as a consequence of a bill passed by the PPP-dominated 
Sind provincial assembly on 7 July 1972, making Sindhi the 
prövincial language of Sind. 
62. 
In Sind, where an estimated 
45% of the inhabitants are Urdu-speaking Muhajirs, such a 
bill was bound to generate controversy. 
63 Predictably, the 
Muhajirs reacted violently and bloody riots broke out bet- 
ween the 'old' and 'new' Sindhis. 
64 Faced with this ex- 
plosive situation when he had just taken the first step 
towards normalising relations with India by signing the 
Simla Agreement of 2 July 1972, which had generated its own 
problems (some of which are discussed below), Bhutto was 
constrained to move quickly to defuse the issue. Inter- 
vening personally, Bhutto negotiated a settlement - The 
Language Accord - mutually agreeable to representatives of 
the 'old' and 'new' Sindhis. This provided the Muhajirs 
with several concessions such as making the learning of Urdu 
compulsory for Sindhis, and exempting non-Sindhi government 
employees from having to learn Sindhi for twelve years. 
65 
The original bill was revised to declare both Urdu 
and Sindhi as official languages of the province. 
66 
Even 
with the question settled, relations between old and new 
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Sindhis remained precarious and outbreaks of violence 
continued well into August. On 9 August, sixty active pro- 
ponents of Sindhi regionalism, including G. M. Syed of the 
Sind United Front and Sindhi PPP leaders like Qazi Mohammed 
Bux were arrested under DPR. The-crisis was past; but the 
violence and magnitude of these disturbances illustrated 
the continuing intensity of the longstanding language 
issue as a divisive factor -both -,. 'in , the country and with- 
in the ruling party. 
' 67 
Another source of public disorder that the PPP 
government had to deal with during its initial years of 
ti rule was student 
turbulence. Although Sindhi students had 
been involved in the language riots in Sind, described 
above, it was only in December 1972 that widespread student 
agitation developed throughout the country. There were 
earlier signs of student unrest which, like the labour 
troubles, resulted in part from the heightened expectations 
associated with the PPP's rhetoric and its assumption 
8P 
power. However, widespread student unrest manifested 
68 
itself over the issue of recognition of Bangladesh. 
It would be inappropriate at this stage to detail 
the Bhutto government's endeavours in international dip- 
lomacy, which is beyond the scope of this study. Here it 
is sufficient to note that at Simla in July 
1972, Bhutto had taken the first step toward an accommodation 
with India which resulted in the partial normalisation of 
relations (short of resumption of diplomatic relations) and 
the eventual withdrawal of troops behind the international 
boundaries along the border and to mutually agreed cease-fire 
ZS1"1 
positions in Kashmir. 
69 
The question of recognition of 
Bangladesh was, however, postponed, partly because public 
opinion in Pakistan and the Punjab in particular was 
strongly against it, but partly also because it gave Bhutto 
a negotiating lever vis 
ä 
vis the question of the repat- 
riation of the Prisoners of War and the issue of 'war 
crime' trials threatened by the Bangladesh government. 
Although Bhutto was known to be personally in favour of re- 
cognition he seemed equally conscious of the dangers, both 
domestic and international, of according a hasty recognition. 
70 
In November 1972, Bhutto, who had often declared that he 
would take the issue of recognition to the public, addressed 
rallies in Peshawar and Rawalpindi arguing in favour of 
recognition. 
71 The opposition parties in the Punjab, the 
Jamaat-e-Islaami, Tehriq-e-Istaqlal and the Muslim League, 
were quick to seize upon this issue and began organising de- 
monstrations against recognition in the Punjab in December 
1972. 
Against this background, a Punjab students convention, 
dominated by the Jamlat-e-Tuleba (the student wing of the 
Jamaat), met at Lahore on 10 December and passed a resolution. 
against recognition. 
72 The next day the students organised 
a demonstration which was-put down under Khar's orders with 
the most ruthless show of force. 
73 What basically began as 
a right-wing inspired students demonstration now spread, as 
the entire student community came out in protest against 
police brutality. The liberal and left-leaning students or- 
ganisations, generally thought to be sympathetic to the PPP, 
also joined the protest rallies - the National Students 
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Federation, National Students. Organisation and the 
Pakistan Students Federation. 74 The Khar. administration 
used the occasion. to arrest students belonging to the 
right and left in a bid to crush extremists from both wings 
for once and for all. 
75 When lawyers of Lahore and other 
cities of the Punjab also came out into the streets in pro- 
test, Khar once again used armed PPP men to break up the 
rally resulting in violence and bloodshed. 
76 The students 
-'Bangladesh Na Manzoor' movement (Bangladesh not acceptable) 
was crushed with force but at great cost to the ruling 
party, as we shall see later (see chapter XII). 
ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION 
The economic history of the period 1971-77 consists 
of the Bhutto regime's endeavours to firstly, rehabilitate 
the economy after the loss of East Pakistan, and secondly 
to restructure it in accordance with the regime's economic and poli- 
tical objectives (discussed in chapter XII below). 
During the first two years of rule, the Bhutto re- 
gime was confronted with severe economic problems caused 
by the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 and the secession of 
Bangladesh. The year long counter insurgency operations in 
East Pakistan and the subsequent war with India had drained 
the state's financial resources and disrupted industrial 
production and trade. Since the costs of war had been . 
met by heavy deficit financing during July-December 1971 
by the Yahya government, this resulted in severe inflation- 
ary pressures on the economy. 77 However, the economic de- 
cline could be traced back even further, to the economic 
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and political uncertainties following the collapse of the 
Ayub government. In particular, the private sector -a 
sector that had demonstrated considerable dynamism in the 
1960's - seemed to lose confidence in the country's 
economic future. This was reflected in the sharp decline 
in savings and investment. Savings as a percentage of GDP 
declined from 13.1% in 1964-65 to 9% in 1969-70.78 Invest- 
ment by private entrepreneurs declined from 8.5% in 1969- 
70 to 5.4% in 1971-72. Overall investment declined from 
22% in 1964-65 to only 13% of GNP in 1969-79.79 This had 
important repercussions on the country's rate of economic 
growth. During the 1960's GDP (gross domestic product) had 
increased at a rate of 7% annually, but from 1969-70 to 
1971-72 it grew at the rate of only 0.5% annually. 
80 Since 
the population growth rate was an estimated 3.5% per year, 
81 
the declining rate of GDP growth meant a drop in per capita 
incomes. For the period 1969-70 to 1971-72 per capita 
'(gross) income fell by 21%. 
82 Thus when the Bhutto govern- 
ment took office, it was not only confronted by this legacy 
but by consequences of the Bangladesh separation - the 
crisis of foreign exchange and commodity markets and disruption 
of inter-wing trade. In the past jute and tea. had been an 
important source of foreign exchange; now alternative 
export commodities had to be developed. Similarly, East 
Pakistan had previously absorbed 40% of West Pakistan's 
manufactures,, now alternative markets had to be found. 
Many of these manufactures could not be exported because 
of their inherently uncompetitive character; by 1965 for 
example 84% of Pakistani manufacturing relied heavily on 
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protection and on an average their products were sold in 
the domestic market at prices 150% higher than the pre- 
vailing market 'prices. 
Faced with these problems, the Bhutto regime took 
a series of measures aimed at rehabilitating the economy. 
Perhaps the most important of these were the exchange re- 
forms announced in May 1972, which devalued the Rupee. - by 
130% from a parity rate of Rs. 4.76 to one U, S, Dollar to 
Rs. 11.00. The reform of a multiple exchange rate system 
(with seven rates) and an overvalued currency was long over- 
due. The pernicious effects of such a system, as the Finance 
Minister correctly pointed out, reached into every corner 
of the economic life of the country: 
84 
encouraging imports, 
discouraging exports, encouraging foreign-made capital 
goods, discouraging domestic, encouraging the flight of 
capital, restricting private freedom. The devaluation aimed 
at making Pakistani exports more competitive in world 
markets.. (It had a number of other objectives, some of which 
are discussed below). At the new rate, the exporters had 
little difficulty in switching from markets in East Pakistan 
to those in Europe, East Asia, the Middle East and U. S. A. 
The rise in export earnings was also facilitated by buoyant 
foreign demand and favourable world prices for Pakistani 
cotton, textiles and rice (the country's major exports). 
85 
Export figures for 1972 and 1973 indicated considerable 
success both in diverting products formerly sent to East 
Pakistan and the boost given to exports by devaluation. 
Pakistan's export earnings in 1972 (upto 15 December) amount- 
ed to $ 640 million compared to $ 660 million for both East 
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and West Pakistan together and $ 461 million for West 
Pakistan in 1971.86 In FY 1972-73, Pakistan had a trade 
account surplus for the first time since the 'Korean War 
Boom' of 1950-51.87 The export boom also reflected a sharp 
jump in the size of the cotton crop due to favourable 
weather conditions. Thus the balance of payments crisis 
expected to follow the loss of East Pakistan was much less 
severe than had been widely predicted earlier, 
88 
owing to 
both governmental policy and a combination of fortuitous 
circumstances. 
The success of the export effort enabled the Bhutto 
regime to direct its attention towards attempting to re- 
structure the economy in line with its political objectives 
and in consonance with the economic interests represented 
by the PPP. This restructuring envisaged a shift from pri- 
vate to public sector domination of the economy in the in- 
dustrial sphere, and a change in emphasis from industry to 
agriculture. The first policy objective was achieved by a 
nationalisation programme, while the latter involved a 
series of measures, described below. The reduction in the 
economic and political power of the industrial elite was 
an important motivation behind the decision to enlarge the 
public sector. This was done through a series of national- 
isation measures that began with the government take-over 
of ten 'basic' industries (in the capital and intermediate 
goods category) under the Economic Reforms Order of 
1 January 1972.89 Almost all of these belonged to the 22 
families. The rhetoric that accompanied the measure in no 
way reflected the importance of these-enterprises or of the 
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industrial sector in the country's economy. 
90 In a country 
where a consumer-good led industrial growth had taken 
place, this measure meant that less than 20% of value 
added of large scale manufacturing was taken over. 
91 In 
1972, the large-scale industrial sector accounted for 12.8% 
of GDP and employed only 3.4% of the total labour force. 
Its contribution to exports was only 8.3% of the total. 
92 
The government also nationalised insurance companies and 
banks, owned for the large part by the 22 families, in 
March 1972 and January 1974 respectively. As with the 
earlier nationalisation, foreign-owned establishments were 
exempted. Later, the government also assumed control 
over the rice and cotton export trades, (June 1973), ship- 
ping (January 1974) and the marketing and distribution of 
petroleum products. It nationalised twenty-six mills in 
the vanaspati ghee (vegetable oil) industry, thus 
assuming control over a number of small-scale enterprises 
producing an item of everyday consumption. 
93 In July 1976 
the government also nationalised 3,000 units in the wheat 
flour, rice husking and cotton. ginning industries. 
94 
The nationalisation measures were accompanied in 
the industrial sphere by the introduction of labour reforms, 
whose major provisions were described earlier. A govern- 
ment report surmised that the total cost far employers of 
implementing these reforms would be in the region of 
Rs. 250 million or 12.5% of the share of wages in the value 
of industrial output, and assumed that "this amount would 
be transferred from industrial profits and would not be 
passed on to the consumer. "95 The new labour legislation 
also enlarged the scope of its applicability, by changing 
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the definition of 'registered' enterprises from 'that 
employing ten or more persons and/or using power' (as 
defined in the 1964 Labour Laws Ordinance) to five persons, 
thus bringing an additional 1.2 million workers within the 
purview of the law. This meant that over a half of 
the 96 
2.2 million persons employed in manufacturing were eligible 
for benefits under the new labour laws compared to the 
previous figure of 25%. 
An important effect of the nationalisation and 
labour policies was a sharp decline in private investment 
as shown in the table below: 
TABLE V. 1 
INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT, 1970-71 TO 1976-77 
(Million Rupees,, constant 1969-70 prices) 
YEAR PRIVATE SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR TOTAL 
1970-71 1,358 65 1,423 
1971-72 1,065 85 1,150 
1972-73 625 68 693 
1973-74 492 188 680 
1974-75 601 446 1,047 
1975-76 700 1,224 1,924 
1976-77 650 1,563 2,213 
Source: Statistical Division, Ministry of Finance 
Thus in the period 1972-1977 total private sector industrial 
investment dropped to less than half of its level in 1971. 
As is evident from the table above, public sector invest- 
ment increased sharply - the public sector's share in total 
industrial investment rose from less than 10% in 1973 to 
70% in 1977. Such investment was, by design, in capital- 
intensive, intermediate and capital goods industries with 
long periods of gestation. 
97 Since public sector savings 
0 
324 
were insufficient (they were negative in 1972 and 1973) 
much of public investment was financed by domestic and 
foreign borrowing. 98 This subjected the economy to severe 
"strains. International factors, such as the 1973 oil price 
rise and the world recession in 1974 also played a sub- 
stantial role in contributing to Pakistan's economic 
problems. 
The Bhutto government's objective of shifting the 
emphasis of the economy from industry to agriculture was 
to be achieved firstly, through devaluation which removed 
the subsidy and protection received by the industrialists 
because of the overvalued exchange rate, and through a 
series of measures such as high support prices for agri- 
cultural commodities, the combined effect of which was fore- 
seen as shifting the terms of trade in favour of agriculture. 
Procurement prices more than-doubled in the period 1972-76 
for major crops like wheat, cotton, rice and sugar cane. 
The government also heavily subsidised agricultural inputs 
such as fertilizer, seeds and provided subsidised credits 
for tubewells and tractors. This, together with the 
expansion of rural credit through the nationalised banks 
and the Agricultural Development Bank, led to a significant 
transfer of resources to the agricultural sector. 
99 
A 
land reform programme was introduced in March 1972, which 
reduced the permitted landholdings from a ceiling of 500 
(irrigated) acres to 150 acres. 
100 
However, the economic 
impact of the reform both in terms of redistribution of land 
and the improvement of agricultural efficiency was limited 
owing to a number of reasons discussed 1n chapter XII. 
101 
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Its political impact is discussed in chapter VII. The 
Land Reform of 1972 also sought to bring about changes in 
the landlord-tenant relationship. Tenants were given legal 
protection from eviction and begar (forced labour). At the 
same time the burden of bearing the costs of inputs was 
shifted from the tenant to the landlord. The new law re- 
quired landlords to pay all taxes and water rents and half 
the costs of fertilizer, seeds and other inputs. 
102 Fur- 
ther agrarian measures were announced on 1 July 1972 with 
the launching of the Integrated Development Programme with 
the objective of transferring technology to the=rural sector, 
to introduce modern programming methods to agriculture and 
to generally bring urban amenities to rural areas. An 
ambitious system of "agrovilles" was an integral part of 
this programme. 
103 The IRDP was much like the former Village 
Aid Programme, envisaging the mobilisation of farmers in 
local units to help bring adequate credit, inputs, know-how 
and marketing opportunities to all farmers. At the same 
time, a People's Works Programme was launched similar to 
the old Rural Works Programme but including urban areas as 
well. 
A major problem faced by'the PPP regime was that of 
rising prices. This resulted in part from the government's 
efforts at rehabilitation and restructuring the economy, 
partly from its policy of monetary expansion - money supply 
rose by 26% in the first year of the PPP government, while 
the annual compound rate of growth in money supply was 
18.2%104 - and to some extent from international factors. - 
In 1973 and 1974, a series of events, both domestic and 
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international further strengthened inflationary pressures 
on the economy on the one hand and harmed the country's 
trade position on the other hand. In August 1973, severe 
floods in the country caused extensive damage to standing 
rice and cotton crops, stored wheat and other commodities. 
105 
As a result the government was constrained to temporarily 
ban the export of a number of commodities, including cotton, 
the major foreign exchange earner. This was done to pre- 
vent domestic prices from rising even further, and to 
ensure domestic availability of essential commodities. earlier 
earmarked for export (such as beef, poultry, vegetables). 
Then in October 1973, the OPEC price rise exacerbated ' 
Pakistan's balance of payments crisis (by absorbing one- 
third of the country's foreign exchange earnings) and con- 
tributed further to inflation. Pakistan's domestic product- 
ion of crude oil scarcely meets 15% of its total require- 
ment. Higher petroleum prices added a further $150 million 
to the trade deficit in 1974.106 Another exogenous source 
of strain on the economy in 1974 was the world recession in 
cotton textiles which resulted in a drastic curtailment of 
cotton exports and led to serious strains in the cotton 
textile industry - an industry which employs about half of 
the total industrial labour force. Thus a series of re- 
verses in 1974-75 - natural disasters and price convulsions 
in the international market - created serious problems for 
the Pakistani economy. 
However, not all such problems were the result of 
events beyond the government's control. The unbridled growth 
of non-developmental public expenditure was an important 
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source of financial problems. Of this, defence allocations 
formed the largest single category - 49% of current non- 
developmental expenditure. 
107 After the 1971 war, the 
Bhutto regime raised defence allocations substantially. In 
1970-71 defence expenditure amounted to Rs. 3,202 million, 
in 1973-74 to Rs. 4,949 million, in 1974-75 to Rs. 6,914 
million and in 1976-77 to Rs. 8,121 million. 
108 This led 
not only to the erosion-of resources that would otherwise 
have been available for development purposes, but also 
contributed to annual budget deficits and the consequent 
increases in money supply. Government subsidies for food 
constituted another part of the non-developmental expen- 
diture. 109 The government attempted in April 1974 to reduce 
the food subsidy, by announcing price increases in three 
basic commodities of everyday consumption, atta (wheat), 
110 
sugar and ghee. This led to mass urban protest demon- 
strations beginning with the railway workers strike in 
Lahore. ill In the event the government did not withdraw the 
price increases, but attempted to soften the blow on the 
consumers by announcing wage increases for industrial labour 
and low-income government employees. 
112 
Thus the entire 
exercise had little impact on the general inflationary 
situation. 
Inflation was a world-wide phenomenon at the time, 
but in Pakistan it assumed threatening proportions during 
the Bhutto years. While prices were rising no more than 
3 to 4% a year in the late 1960's, between January 1972 
and December 1973, prices rose about 20% annually. The 
rate of inflation touched the highest point of 30% ih 1973-74 
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and was 27% in 1974-75.113 Thereafter, partially as a 
consequence of the government's anti-inflationary measures, 
the rate of inflation declined to 6% in 1975-76 and subse- 
quently rose only moderately. 
Other than the issue of prices the Bhutto regime 
was also faced with a situation of a steady deterioration 
in the balance of payments position of the country after 
two relatively successful years, 1972 and 1973. The deficit 
rose from $ 481 million in 1973-74 to $ 1,039 million in 
1974-75. Although it declined to an estimated $ 880 million 
in 1975-76, the deficit remained high. A part of this 
deficit was met by a transfer of funds from abroad in the 
form of remittances home of Pakistani nationals living and 
working abroad. 
114 However this was not sufficient 
to meet the large deficit, thus necessitating reliance on 
foreign borrowing. Dependence on foreign aid increased 
markedly in the 1970's. 
115 An increasing amount of this 
aid has come from OPEC countries - about a third of the total 
aid disbursed during 1974-76.116 The substantial foreign 
borrowing over this period resulted in a major increase in 
debt service payments. These amounted to $ 107 million in 
1973-74, $ 264 million in 1974-75 and $ 295 million in 
1975-76, which accounted for 17% of foreign exchange earn- 
ings inspite of the substantial debt relief granted to 
Pakistan by its creditors. 
117 
Despite this bleak background, by the end of 1976, 
the Pakistani economy showed some signs of recovery - 
although in retrospect this proved to be a transitory 
phenomenon. As mentioned earlier, the rate of inflation 
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declined significantly. GNP stood at a respectable 4.3% 
as compared to 2.1% in the preceding year. 
118 This reflect- 
ed an improvement in the performance of the agricultural 
sector, which registered a 4% increase in 1974-75, after 
several years of negative growth rates in agriculture. 
Favourable weather conditions ensured that wheat harvests 
in the spring of 1976 established a new record of 8.6 
million tons. 
119 This temporary respite from shortages 
and soaring prices, and the expectation that the economy 
was not likely to maintain this performance in 1977120 
evidently persuaded the ruling party that this was the most 
opportune moment to call a general election. (Other poli- 
tical considerations are described below). 
POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION: -THE PPP AND OPPOSITION 
The whole question of building a new political 
structure for Pakistan was tied up with relations between 
the PPP government and the opposition parties and the evo- 
lution of a consensus on issues related to constitution- 
making and governmental form, in particular regional autonomy 
and the role of Islam in the state. What follows is a 
narrative account of these inter-linked issues. 
The political history of the Bhutto period, at least 
from 1972-1975, was dominated by a struggle for power bet- 
ween the PPP government and Wali Khan's National Awami 
Party (NAP). Early moves seemed to suggest that Bhutto was 
anxious to evolve a consensus over the future constitutional 
order with the opposition parties. In December 1971, he 
met with Wali Khan and Mufti Mahmud of the Jamiat-e-Ulema- 
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e-Islam (JUI),. who together commanded the majority of 
the seats in the provincial assemblies of NWFP and 
Baluchistan. 121 Bhutto also kept vacant two ministerial 
portfolios and was reported to have offered these to NAP. 
122 
The tentative , -understanding reached, however, did not last 
long. Relations between the'two became strained largely on 
two issues: the withdrawal of martial law and the appoint- 
ment of governors to the NWFP and Baluchistan. Bhutto pro- 
posed a phased return to democracy, arguing that the 
special powers of martial law were necessary to give effect 
to urgent reforms - an argument that was rejected by all 
opposition parties, particularly NAP, who demanded the 
immediate lifting of martial law and convening of the 
National Assembly (N. A. ). 123 At the same time NAP staged 
protest rallies in Quetta in opposition to the PPP's appoint- 
went of its own governors without NAP's consent, in NWFP and 
Baluchistan. 124 Such demonstrations were forcefully put 
down by the PPP administration. 
125 
In order to undercut the 
influence and popularity of NAP, the PPP, government encouraged 
the Mazdoor-Kissan Party (MKP) in the NWFP to mobilise land- 
less tenants against landowners in the NWFP, many of whom 
belonged to NAP. 126 
It was against this rapidly deteriorating situation 
that the three parties, the PPP, NAP and JUI met again in 
March 1972 to resolve their differences. An agreement was 
finally reached on 6 March when a Tri-partite Accord was 
127 signed between the three. The PPP conceded the NAP-JUI 
alliance the right to govern NWFP and Baluchistan in 
exchange for their support for the continuation of martial 
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law up to 14 August. 
128 The N. A. was to be convened on 
14 April for three days to endorse an interim constitution, 
the main principles of which were agreed upon by the three 
parties. The provincial assemblies were to meet on 
21 April. A constitutional committee of the House was to 
be set up to draft the permanent constitution. 
129 No 
sooner had the Accord been signed than differences again 
arose over the PPP's decision to enter into an alliance 
with the Qayyum Muslim League (QML) under which Qayyum was 
sworn in as Minister of the Interior in exchange for his 
party's pledge of support to the PPP in the NWFP assembly. 
130 
NAP interpreted this as yet another attempt by Bhutto - the 
other being the PPP's tacit alliance with the MKP - to 
circumvent NAP by winning over its enemies. 
131 By the 
middle of April then, on the eve of the first N. A. meeting, 
the Accord stood shattered. 
132 
When the N. A. met for the first time on 14 April, 
angry exchanges, scuffles and a walkout by the opposition 
marked its first day's proceedings. 
133 
However, in a sur- 
prise announcement, Bhutto declared that martial law would 
be lifted on 21 April. 
134 
This unexpected show of tactical 
flexibility on Bhutto's part clearly took the wind out of 
the opposition's sails. 
135 
In exchange, Bhutto demanded 
the immediate adoption of the Interim Constitution. The 
opposition proposed several amendments, but in principle 
agreed to Bhutto's demand for an 'instant constitution', so 
that on 17 April, the Interim Constitution136 was adopted 
by a large majority, with forty opposition members abstain- 
ing and only one dissenting voice - from the PPP itself, 
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Rao Kurshid Ali. 137 At the same time Bhutto was given a 
massive vote of confidence by the House, and elected as 
President by 104 votes to 38.138 A 25 member Committee was 
set up by the House which included nine opposition MNA's, 
and with Mahmud Kasuri as Chairman. 
A new Tripartite Agreement was concluded between 
the PPP, NAP, JUI on 27 April 1972, under which the PPP re- 
cognised NAP-JUI as the majority parties in NWFP and 
Baluchistan, and on that basis allowed them to form their 
own provincial governments and name their own governors. 
139 
Consequently, NAP leaders Ghaus Buksh Bizenjo and Arbab 
Sikander were sworn in as Governors of Baluchistan and 
NWFP respectively on 29 April, while Khar and Talpur were 
made governors of Punjab and Sind. 
140 
NAP-JUI coalition 
ministers were installed in NWFP and Baluchistan on 1 May 
1972. Bhutto's offer of two central ministries to the 
NAP and JUI was, however, declined. 
141 Mufti Mahmud, 
Ataullah Mengal, Mumtaz Bhutto and Meraj Khalid were appoint- 
ed Chief Ministers of NWFP, Baluchistan, Sind and Punjab 
respectively. 
No sooner had the new ministries in NWFP and 
Baluchistan started functioning than relations between these 
two provinces and the federal government became strained. 
The NAP-JUI coalition accused the federal government of 
interfering in their administrations by continuing to aid 
the MKP in inciting landlord-tenant clashes in the NWFP, 142 
by inciting tribes opposed to the NAP against the 
Baluchistan government's authority and by mounting a propa- 
ganda offensive, largely under Qayyum's direction, 
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insinuating that the NAP was "plotting" against Pakistan. 
143 
Wali Khan further accused Bhutto of attempting to 'rule by 
the rod' and warned that his policy of using 'gold and 
guns' to intimidate the smaller provinces would be opposed 
forcefully. 144 The PPP, for its part accused the NAP-JUI 
government of failing to implement the land reforms, of 
distributing arms to its supporters to terrorise the popu- 
lation and carrying out tribal vendettas in Baluchistan. 
145 
However, the confrontation did not reach alarming 
proportions until after July 1972. This was largely because 
the PPP government was facing problems in Sind, where lang- 
uage riots had erupted at the time. And secondly, Bhutto 
was concerned with maintaining a measure of national unity 
and consensus in view of the forthcoming negotiations with 
India at Simla. Indeed, Wali Khan had warned in no uncer- 
tain terms that if Bhutto went to the Summit without con- 
sulting Baluchistan and NWFP, he would be representing only 
"half of Pakistan" at the negotiating table. 
146 Thus 
Bhutto was constrained at this stage from adopting an even 
harsher stance against the NAP-JUI governments which, by 
all indications, had clearly become a source of annoyance 
to him. 
147 
The Simla Accord was generally welcomed by 
the NAP-JUI leadership, even though a number of other 
opposition parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islaami accused the 
government of a "sell-out". 
148 
In a special session on 
14 July, the N. A. ratified the Accord, with NAP-JUI voting 
with the government. 
149 
After this, however, the confrontation between NAP- 
JUI and the PPP government took on a greater intensity with 
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the 'discovery' in September of a second 'London Plot'. 
150 
According to stories of this plot, which were circulated in 
all the government-owned newspapers, Wali Khan and Ataullah 
Mengal who were in London at the time met Mujibur Rahmanr 
also in London, to plan the further dismemberment of Pakistan, 
151 
The well-orchestrated publicity of the 'London Plan' in the 
context of growing confrontation between Islamabad and 
Peshawar/Quetta was interpreted by independent observers to 
be a calculated move to: - stem the tide of opposition in 
general and NAP in particular. 
152 It was also viewed as 
being aimed at tarnishing the image of Wali Khan in the 
Punjab and Sind where after the language riots in Sind he 
was beginning to emerge as an alternate leader. 
153 Although 
Bhutto denied any responsibility for the 'London Plan' epi- 
sode, 
154 
the confrontation continued on other issues. 
Several MKP leaders were arrested by the Mufti government in 
August. 155 In early October, tribal warfare broke out in 
Baluchistan between the Zehri, Bugti and the Mengal 
tribes. The chiefs of the Zehri tribes (who were also impor- 
tant members of the QML) and Salim Bugti (related by marriage 
to the Zehris) alleged that the Mengal government had sent 
156 tribal 'lashkars' to suppress them. Bizenjo on the other 
hand accused these tribes of setting up a parallel govern- 
ment and of attempting to circumvent the government's plan 
to nationalise the marble and coal mines, owned by the 
Zehris and Bugtis respectively. 
157 
Sardar Doda Khan Zarakzai, 
Nabi Buksh Zehri and Salim Bugti fled to Karachi to escape 
arrest, while requests for their extradition were turned 
down by the Sind government. 
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Bhutto now called for all-party talks on 15 October 
to agree upon the principles for the Permanent Constitution. 
158 
As a result of these deliberations - in which all parties 
participated, NAP, JUI, QML, Council Muslim League (CML), 
Jamaat-e-Islaami (JI) and Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) 
and a group of independent parliamentarians - an All-Party 
Constitutional Accord was signed on 20 October. Bizenjo 
and Arbab signed on behalf of NAP, as Wali Khan was still in 
London. The draft constitution agreed upon, provided a 
federal parliamentary system, a substantial concession on 
the part of Bhutto who favoured an American-style federal, 
presidential system. 
159 
Once again Bhutto achieved a 'viable' 
centre, with a Prime Minister as the Chief Executive answer- 
able to the National Assembly. A bicameral legislature was 
provided (N. A. and Senate), empowered to elect a titular 
President. 
Bhutto's achievement in settling constitutional 
controversies, however, appeared to be short-lived. Wali 
Khan declared that as Bizenjo and Arbab had signed the 
Accord as individuals, his party was not bound by it. 
160 In 
a meeting of the General Council of the NAP in Peshawar on 
18 November 1972, the party refused to ratify the agreement, 
expressing great dissatisfaction over many constitutional 
provisions. 
161 
Earlier, on 4 October, on the constitutional 
issue Bhutto also lost the allegiance of his Minister for 
Law and Parliamentary Affairs, and Chairman of the Constitution 
Commission. 162 Kasuri's resignation came after a long per- 
iod of disagreement with Bhutto over various constitutional 
matters - civil liberties, provincial autonomy and the powers 
of the P. M. Kasuri was unwilling to go along with a plan 
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that to his mind resembled a 'constitutional dictatorship'. 
163 
Kasuri was later expelled from the party. - On 29 October, 
another PPP dissident, Ahmed Reza Kasuri was also expelled 
from the party in fairly similar circumstances. 
164 
Meanwhile, the situation in Baluchistan deteriorated 
further in November/December. 
165 
In protest against Central 
interference, the Mengal government "repatriated" 5,500 
(mainly Punjabi) civil employees from Baluchistan, of which 
2,880 belonged to the police force. 
166 At the same time it 
refused to allow federal coa8tguards to patrol the Mekran 
Coast. In the Pat Feeder area of Baluchistan, armed Marri 
and Mengal tribesmen attacked Punjabi settlers, 
167 
while 
armed Bugti tribesmen marched to the provincial secretariat 
and encircled it demanding the resignation of Ahmed Nawaz 
Bugti (a minister of the Mengal cabinet). 
168 The worst out- 
break of violence, however, erupted on 26 December when 
lashkars of Mengal, Bizenjo and nine other tribes attacked 
169 
the Jamotes of Lasbella, forty-two of whom were killed. 
Tribal warfare continued until the Federal government inter- 
vened by sending contingents of the army to restore order. 
The decision was reportedly taken when Bizenjo himself had 
requested federal help. Bizenjo, however, denied having 
asked for army units and said he had requested help from 
federally controlled civil armed forces. 
170 Bizenjo accused 
Qayyum Khan of inciting the armed rebellion under the leader- 
ship of the Jam of Lasbella, 
171 
while the NAP executive 
claimed that at the root of the rebellion lay the opposition 
of the Jamote tribes to reform measures introduced by the 
provincial government to put an end to the Sardari system 
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there. 172 Wali Khan himself described the despatch of 
troops as "naked interference in the internal affairs of 
Baluchistan. " 
173 
Wali was joined in the condemnation of 
Bhutto by Asghar who accused Bhutto of turning Pakistan 
into a "fascist" police state. 
174 
Against this background, the N. A. meeting on 
30 December, was stormy. The opposition parties led by Wali 
Khan (who was also Leader of the Opposition in the Assembly) 
staged a wal, kout. 
175 Bhutto threatened. that in the 
opposition's absence the PPP would prepare its own constitu- 
tion. 
176 
An opposition Co-ordination Committee set up under 
the chairmanship of Wali, announced their boycott of the 
N. A. sitting as a legislature but agreed to attend the N. A. 
sitting as a constituent assembly. 
177 Meanwhile, talks out- 
side the assembly continued in January/February 1973, while 
a barrage of official anti-NAP propaganda continued reach- 
ing a peak with the 'sensational disclosure' made by Akbar 
Bugti, one-time NAP sympathiser, that the Baluch government 
was receiving arms from abroad to help it achieve its goal 
for an 'Independent Baluchistan'. 
178 
On 10 February, the 
authorities raided the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad unearth- 
ing a cache of Russian-made arms, allegedly en route for use 
in Baluchistan. 1'9 Bhutto utilised this incident to dis- 
miss the NAP governors and the Mengal ministry. The NWFP 
ministry resigned in protest. Several NAP leaders were 
arrested in the Punjab by Khar. 180 Bhutto lost no time in 
appointing Sardar Akbar Bugti and Aslam Khattak as governors 
of Baluchistan and NWFP respectively. Bugti hastily set up 
a cabinet headed by the Jam of Lasbella, while Khattak 
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appointed Gandapur as his chief minister. Many Baluchi 
tribes rose in protest over the dismissal of the NAP-JUI 
government, and'a major rebellion developed over the next 
three years which pitted army cgntingents against the in- 
surgent tribes. 
Other opposition leaders also met with strong 
government action. The Punjab chief of the Jamaat-e-Islaami 
was arrested for calling upon the army to take over the 
country. 
181 
Zahur Elahi of the CML was also arrested and 
criminal charges instituted against him. 
182 
Meanwhile the 
NAP forged an alliance with religious and right-wing parties 
in the Punjab and Sind. These elements committed their 
support to NAP's demand for the restoration of its provin- 
cial governments. On 2 March 1973, opposition parties (NAP, 
JUI, JUP, JI, the two factions of the Muslim League, PDP 
and the Khaksar Tehriq) united to form a United Democratic 
Front, (UDF), under the leadership of the Pir of Pagaro. 
183 
Asghar Khan's party, however, stayed out of the alliance. 
During March the UDF held several rounds of talks with Bhutto 
on various issues, particularly the framing of the permanent 
constitution. While they continued to boycott the legislature, 
the UDF put forward 11 non-negotiable points to be included 
184 in the constitution. Many of the proposed amendments re- 
lated to Islamic provisions (as NAP in quid pro quo support- 
ed the demands of the Islamic parties) and to the concen- 
tration of power in the executive. The UDF also decided to 
demonstrate its strength to the PPP at a mass rally called 
on 23 March at Liaqat Bagh in Rawalpindi. The rally turned 
into a bloody clash petween the opposition and PPP supporters 
339 
resulting in twenty deaths. 
185 In protest against 
'official hooliganism', the UDF declared its boycott of 
the N. A., calling for the lifting of Emergency Rule. 
Rejecting pleas to lift the Emergency, Bhutto pointed to 
plots at home and abroad. Claiming that he had already ac- 
commodated most of the opposition's proposals in its draft 
constitution, Bhutto announced his decision to go it alone 
in the N. A. 
186 Consequently, the N. A. began a clause-by- 
clause adoption of the new constitution. Initially the 
UDF stayed away, but at the last minute, after extensive 
back-stage manoeuverings in which the Jamaat played a major 
role, opposition parliamentarians returned to the Assembly 
on 10 April half an hour before the constitution was passed. 
187 
The last minute change in the opposition's attitude took 
place partly as a consequence of timely concessions. made 
by the ruling party and partly out of pragmatic consider- 
ation, in particular the fear that in their absence from 
the Assembly, there would be no restraining influence on 
Bhutto. 
188 
The opposition voted for the constitution to 
make the adoption near-unanimous, but only after the PPP 
agreed to several changes.. The only three MNAs who 
189 
abstained from voting were the two rebel PPP MNAs, (both the 
Kasuris), and Noorani, chief of the JUP. 
190 
The new constitution which came into force on 
14 August 1973, established Pakistan as a federal republic 
with a parliamentary system. 
191. 
The Constitution set up 
the following political structure for the country's govern- 
ance; - 
340 
FIGURE 2 
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On 12 August, Bhutto was voted Prime Minister by 
108 votes to 28, and two days later he was sworn in, while 
Fazal Elahi Choudrey became the titular President. 
, 
Before this, however, several developments occurred 
in quick succession which need to be noted. In March/April 
1973 came the discovery of a coup attempt by junior officers 
of the army "who planned to seize power between 11 and 21 
April, before the constitution was passed., 
192 The group 
involved in the attempt included twenty-one officers of the 
Army, two of whom were brigadiers and fourteen Air Force 
officers. Convinced that Bhutto was responsible for the 
debacle of 1971 and that he was out to dismember the rest 
of Pakistan through his undemocratic activities, and that the 
leadership of the Army was just as corrupt, these, officers 
and generals planned to capture power by arresting all top 
government officers and generals. 
193 
The officers were 
promptly arrested and tried in two separate Courts Martial.. 
194 
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Meanwhile, relations between the government and 
opposition worsened. The NAP's claim to the governments 
of Baluchistan and NWFP, and the issue of the continued 
suspension of fundamental rights under the proclamation of 
emergency remained the major source of conflict. The new 
Bhutto-appointed cabinet in Baluchistan stayed in power only 
by contriving the defection of two JUI members and jailing 
four - Bizenjo, Mengal and Khan Buksh Marri were arrested 
on 16 August on an interesting spectrum of criminal charges. 
195 
This enabled the Bugti government to enjoy the support of 
ten members in the 21 member provincial legislature. Khattak 
used similar tactics in NWFP, obtaining, unlike Bugti, a 
majority in the provincial legislature by freely distributing 
cabinet posts in July 1973.196 In July 1973, a coup in 
Afghanistan brought to power Sardar Daud Khan, a protagan- 
ist of the 'Greater Pakhtunistan' movement. Mentioning the 
Pakhtunistan issue in his very first broadcast, Daud later 
referred to the strife in Baluchistan and expressed concern 
over the conflict between the NAP and the federal government. 
This was sufficient to further strengthen Bhutto's resolve 
not to let NAP regain control of these two provinces while 
at the same time vindicating in his mind the official pro- 
paganda that predated the Bhutto period, that the NAP had 
always acted in collusion with Afghanistan. 
Relations between government opposition in the 
N. A. were continuotfsly strained as the government sought to 
pass legislation strongly opposed by the UDF components. _ 
In May 1973, an ordinance was passed setting up a new para- 
military force to be called the Federal Security Force (FSF). 197 
342 
When the FSF Bill was presented to the N. A., the opposition 
protested at the setting up of what it called personal 
"storm troopers" of the PPP regime, the whole purpose of 
which could only be to terrorise and subjugate the opposit-- 
ion. 
198 
The bill was nevertheless passed, and the opposition's 
fears seemed justified in view of what occurred subsequently. 
In June a UDF rally was broken up by FSF contingents in 
Lahore - setting up a pattern of intimidation that continued 
throughout the PPP's rule. 
199 Stationing the FSF outside 
the N. A. from time to time emerged as another source of 
contention. 
200 
The adoption of the' High Treason Act, the 
Private Military Organisation%' (Abolition and Prohibition) 
Act and the Prevention of Anti-National Activities Ordinance 
gave further cause for concern to the opposition. 
Elections to the Senate in July/August 1973 further 
strengthened the position of the PPP government. The four 
provincial assemblies returned eight PPP nominees from Sind, 
nine from Punjab, six from NWFP and five from Baluchistan. 
The PPP also won the two Federal Area seats, while independ- 
ents elected from the Federal Administered Tribal Area 
aligned themselves with the ruling party. Thus, the oppo- 
sition secured only twelve of the forty-five senate seats. 
The PPP also succeeded in having its candidates elected to 
the offices of Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Senate, 
and Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the N. A. 
On 7 September, a joint sitting of parliament ap- 
proved a presidential ordinance issued the day before sus- 
pending fundamental rights and extended the Emergency to 
13 March 1974.201 The UDF boycotted the N. A. and continued 
II 
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with their civil disobedience movement launched on 
24 August, defying the restrictions imposed on holding 
public meetings and processions. 
202 The Jamaat disassociat- 
ed itself from the movement in view of the devastating 
floods that struck the Punjab and Sind at the time. The 
Jamaat's strategy proved correct as the situation created 
by the floods led to poor public response to the movement. 
As a result the movement petered out by September. The temp- 
orary tranquillity that prevailed was shattered only by two 
political assasinations in the period September-December 
1973 - that of a PPP leader in Sanghar, Ali Junejo on 
6 October, and the leader of the Pakhtunkhwa NAP, Abdus Samad 
Achakzai on 2 December (a PPP sympathiser). 
203 
Enforcement of the constitution necessitated ad- 
ministrative changes in all provinces which Bhutto made in 
December 1973 - January 1974. Khar became Chief Minister 
of Punjab while Sadiq Hussain Qureishi was sworn in as 
Governor. Jatoi replaced Mumtaz Bhutto in Sind as Chief 
Minister. Akbar Bugti on the other hand, submitted his re- 
signation over differences with the chief minister Jam Qadir 
of Lasbella on 31 October. 
204 In a remarkable about face 
Bugti expressed grave doubts about the wisdom of using the 
army to deal with what was essentially a political problem 
in Baluchistan. 205 Bugti was replaced by the Khan of Kalat, 
an appointment which was regarded as a politically astute 
move by Bhutto since the Khan was a widely respected figure 
of his province, often referred to as the 'Khan of Khans'. 
206 
The PPP government had other reasons as well for believ- 
ing that their position was beginning to be secure. In early 
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1974 it won the by-election of a N. A. seat in Quetta, and 
a P. A. seat in NWFP, while all MNAs belonging to the three 
factions of the"Muslim League in the N. A. (except three) 
pledged their support to the PPP. A three-day Islamic 
Summit held in Lahore beginning 22 February, in which 
Bhutto acted as the host to leaders from all over the 
Islamic world, helped to enhance Bhutto's personal prestige. 
207 
It also enabled him to recognise Bangladesh, defusing what 
threatened to become a potentially divisive issue which the 
opposition could exploit. 
208 
Thereafter, he confidently 
announced the further extension of the Emergency on 4 March 
1974.209 Only another political assassination- of Maulvi 
Shamsuddin of the JUI, who was also the deputy leader of the 
Baluchistan Assembly'on 13 March, shattered the euphoria that 
prevailed in the ruling circles in the immediate post-Summit 
Pakistan.. 210 The sense of complacency that prevailed in the 
first quarter of 1974 is best indicated by the lack of 
enthusiasm evidenced in the N. A. which an exasperated news- 
man described in the following manner: 
"It seems that we are here to report 
on the ringing of quorum bells and 
nothing more. "- 211 
However, the N. A. debate on Baluchistan, which the NAP boy- 
cotted in February, ended on an ominous note when Sher Baz 
Mazari, an independent, warned that if a military solution 
was imposed on Baluchistan, the events of East Pakistan 
would be repeated, and he accused the Army of rape, arson 
21 and murder. 2 Nevertheless, the PPP government continued 
in its confident stance and proceeded to dissolve the 
Pakhtun Zalme (the para-military wing of NAP). 
213 The only 
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serious independent newsweekly, 'Outlook' was banned in 
July 1974 for publishing an interview with Wali Khan. 
214 
In what appeared as an even more ominous move, the PPP 
government passed the Constitution (First Amendment) Bill 
on 23 April which limited the freedom of association as laid 
down in Article 17.215 It empowered the government to 
dissolve parties and associations whose object was deemed 
to be against the sovereignty and integrity' of Pakistan. 
Bhutto's attention during the second half of the 
year was diverted to resolving intra-party disputes (dis- 
cussed in chapter VII) and a serious outbreak of violence 
in the Punjab over the Qadiani issue. The Qadianis or 
Ahmeddiyas are a small Sunni Muslim sect who have been tra- 
" ditionally viewed by the more orthodox Muslims (both Shia 
and Sunni) as heretics because of some of their beliefs. 
216 
Consequently, there have been periodic demands from ortho- 
dox sections for the state to declare the Qadianis non- 
Muslims. 217 The agitation over the Qadiani issue began on 
29 May, when a group of students passing through Rabwah - 
the headquarters of the sect - shouted insulting slogans 
against the Qadianis. 
218 
The students were beaten up. 
When the news of the incident spread, anti-Qadiani demons- 
trations broke out chiefly in the Punjab. 
219 
Two weeks of 
rioting led to seventy deaths. Hoping to capitalise upon 
this situation, the UDF - particularly its religious com- 
ponents, demanded that the Qadianis be declared outside the 
pale of Islam, and be sacked from government jobs. The Army 
was called in to help control the riots and by mid-June, 
succeeded in doing so; the political controversy however, 
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continued. Bhutto referred the resolution of the problem 
to the N. A. 
220 After two months of secret deliberations 
and hearings, the N. A. unanimously declared the QadianiE'. _ 
a non-Muslim minority on 7 September 
221 Bhutto declared, 
however, that there would be no "witch-hunt" to force 
Ahmeddiyas out of government jobs as he did not believe in 
religious persecution. The PPP regime credited itself with 
resolving a hundred year old religious controversy. There- 
after, eighteen opposition members of the Punjab Provincial 
Assembly (belonging to JUI, JUP and the Muslim League) 
crossed the floor to join the PPP and the opposition was re- 
duced to 16 in a House of 186.222 
Clearly out-manoeuvred, in October a desperate UDF 
demanded an immediate solution of the Baluchistan problem, 
contacting foreign envoys to "appraise them of the situat- 
ion" and despatching telegrams to the military commanders 
asking them to disobey government orders. 
223 Bhutto res- 
ponded with even harsher measures. An ordinance was promul- 
gated to set up special courts for speedy trial of offences 
of sabotage, subversion and terrorism. 
224 
Another wave of 
official propaganda, led this time by Bhutto himself, 
accused the NAP of wanting "to present half of Pakistan to 
Afghanistan on a silver platter. "225 In November, Ahmed 
Reza Kasuri, a dissident PPP MNA who supported the opposit- 
ion's demand for the restoration of democracy narrowly 
escaped an assassination attempt in which his father died. 
226 
The year 1975 opened with yet another boycott of 
the N. A. by the opposition parties, this time in protest over 
the expulsion from the House of Ahmed Reza Kasuri. 
227 
The 
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opposition also refused to attend Senate proceedings. In 
February, while Bhutto was on a state visit to the United 
States, a bomb exploded at Peshawar University killing a 
senior PPP minister of the NWFP, Hayat Mohammed Sherpao, who 
was officiating at a student function there. 
228 Coming 
after a series of bomb explosions in the NWFP and Islamabad 
over the past few months, this incident was too serious not 
to be taken notice of. Bhutto cut short his tour and flew 
back to Pakistan, ordering the arrest of Wali Khan, 
Arbab Sikander, Gardezi (leader of the opposition in the 
Senate) and Ahmed Nawaz Bugti among other NAP members. On 
10 February NAP was banned and its property and funds seized 
by the authorities. 
229 Addressing an emergency session of 
the N. A. the same day Bhutto declared that 
"all necessary steps have to be taken to 
save Pakistan for all times to come from 
the politics of violence and the scourge 
of secession. " 230 
Some of the "necessary steps" were outlined the same day 
when the N. A. passed two amending bills withdrawing the 
immunity of legislators from arrest. Other steps followed 
rapidly. The Third Constitutional Amendment Bill was passed 
on 12 February at which the opposition walked out of the 
Assembly. 231 This amendment provided for indefinite de- 
tention without trial for persons deemed to be "acting or 
attempting to act in a way prejudicial to the security of 
the state. " The same amendment also removed the requirement 
for approval for the extension of the period of proclamation 
of emergency every six months, thus limiting the amount of 
legislative control over executive action. Police raided 
university campuses all over the country 'uncovering' caches 
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of arms of 'foreign' manufacture. 
232 Ultimately, a son 
of Wali Khan and two other students were convicted by a 
special tribunal of complicity in the Sherpao murder and 
sentenced to ten years imprisonment. 
233 As required by 
law, the case of the dissolution of NAP was referred by the 
government to the Supreme Court in April. 
234 Wali Khan re- 
fused to participate in the proceedings of the Court. 
235 
The ban on NAP was upheld unanimously by the Supreme Court 
in its judgement pronounced on 30 October 1975 'for operat- 
ing in a manner prejudicial to the integrity and sovereignty 
of Pakistan. ' 
236 
Following the ban on NAP in February Bhutto had 
dismissed the PPP-QML-UF coalition in NWFP and imposed 
federal rule. 
237 This was withdrawn on 3 May and Nasrullah 
Khan Khattak was elected as the new chief minister with 
the opposition boycotting. 
238 
Khattak immediately set 
about engineering defections from the NAP, JUI and PPP's own 
ally QML . 
239 By the end of the year he had raised the PPP's 
strength in the Assembly to 22 and dismissed his senior 
colleague, Inayatullah Gandpur. 
In the national legislature, the hurried passage 
of the Fourth Constitutional Amendment on 14 November 
caused an uproar both inside and outside the House. 
240Under 
this Amendment the high courts were deprived of. their rights 
to grant bail to any person detained under preventive de- 
tention laws. Fist fights broke out on the floor of the 
House during the passage of the Bill, while three opposition 
MNAs, Zahur Elahi, Ahmed Kasuri and Malik Suleman were re- 
moved bodily by FSF men and debarred for the rest of the 
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session. 
241 Outside the Assembly, lawyers and journal- 
ists demonstrated against the Fourth Amendment. 
242 
The arrest of the NAP leaders, left the official 
opposition in a state of collapse. At the same time, divis- 
ions developed within the UDF between JI and JUP, with the 
latter walking out of the alliance over the issue of con- 
testing a by-election in Karachi. 
243 Attention now shifted 
to Asghar Khan's Tehriq-e-Istaglal244 and the newly-formed 
National Democratic Party. The NDP was the successor of 
NAP and was formed by Sherbaz Mazari, formerly an independent 
MNA, on 6 November 1975.245 In an obvious attempt to de- 
prive the NDP of parliamentary strength, the government 
issued an ordinance in December 1975, barring NAP members 
from membership of legislaturesfor the next five years. 
246 
Bhutto's own administration in Baluchistan, however, 
became a source of trouble towards the end of 1975 mainly 
due to personal differences between the Governor and the 
Chief Minister. 247 This led Bhutto to dismiss the chief 
minister and his cabinet, dissolve the Assembly and impose 
federal rule on 31 December 1975.248 The cabinet was dis- 
missed on charges of corruption and inefficiency and all 
executive authority was handed over to the governor. All 
the provincial ministers including the chief minister, were 
however, retained as advisers to the governor, in what was 
regarded as a remarkably contradictory move. 
249 
Touring the 
province in April 1976, Bhutto abolished the Sardari system 
of administration-through tribal chiefs, and extended nor- 
mal Laws to the entire province, where-tribal and customary 
laws had prevailed for centuries. 
250 
The relative tranquillity 
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that prevailed in the province as a consequence of con- 
tinued army action led Bhutto to express satisfaction over 
the political situation in Baluchistan. 
251 However, he con- 
ceded that while the back of the rebellion had been broken, 
the germs of the rebellion would have to be fought much 
longer. 
252 
In the rest of the country 1976 saw the imposition 
of even harsher measures on an emasculated and demoralised 
opposition coupled with an even more half-hearted attempt 
by'the government to maintain a parliamentary facade. This 
led Ghafoor Ahmed of the Jamaat to remark: 
"To-day'in early 1976, the country does 
not even have those democratic freedoms 
which it enjoyed in early 1972, when 
Bhutto was Chief Martial Law Administrator. " 253 
Two Muslim Leaguers, Hanif Ramay and Zahur Elahi were arrest- 
ed for making 'objectionable speeches' and sentenced to long 
terms of imprisonment under DPR. 
254 
More NAP leaders, in- 
eluding the leader of the opposition in the Senate, Hashim Ghilzai 
were arrested in April 1976.255 Meanwhile, the UDF could 
still not evolve a common strategy with which to fight back. 
While the UDF had officially decided to resign their seats 
in all the legislatures, the mass resignations did not 
materialise. Faced with fissures in its ranks, the oppo- 
sition called off its long boycott of the legislatures in 
February, in spite of the absence of a single concession by 
the ruling party. 
256 
The opposition fell back on the tac- 
tics of staging walk-outs. The opposition's demoralisation 
was so complete that it convened only two meetings through- 
out the whole year, and these too amidst internal rifts and 
bickerings. 257 A mass exodus of its members began in March, 
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with almost all deserters joining the PPP. What pro- 
bably came as the severest blow was when a veteran Muslim 
Leaguer and deputy leader of the opposition in the N. A. 
Sardar Shaukat Hayat, left his party to join the PPP. A 
vice president of the Muslim League, Yasin Wattoo also 
joined the PPP. Several ex-NAP members also joined the PPP, 
including Barozai, ex-Speaker of the Baluchistan Assembly, 
Ghulam Faruque, ex-finance minister in the NWFP government, 
and Arbab Jehangir Khan (MPA). 
258 Several PPP deserters also 
returned to the fold. Prominent among these were Ahmed 
Reza Kasuri, who had joined the Tehriq-e-Istaqlal, and 
Khurshid Hasan Meer. Many of these people joined the PPP in 
anticipation of the general elections scheduled for August 
1977. 
By the end of 1976 then, the demoralised state of 
the opposition parties (resulting from the jailing of NAP's 
leaders and the increasingly severe restrictions placed on 
political activity), together with the temporary recovery 
in the economic situation (described above), appeared to 
assure Bhutto that he would have little problem in renew- 
ing his party's electoral mandate. 
THE 1977 ELECTION AND THE FALL OF THE PPP GOVERNMENT 
In early January 1977, Bhutto announced national 
and provincial elections for 7 and 10 March respectively. 
Bhutto had begun preparing systematically for the election 
259 much earlier, for he claimed to have "learnt a cardinal 
lessons-from ... (history)... and that was to leave nothing to 
chance and never to be overconfident. "260 Accordingly, during 
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1976, in the P. M. 's Secretariat, "evaluations were made 
and instructions given in order to anticipate issues which 
the opposition might raise ..... Strenuous election tours were 
planned and undertaken, provincial cells were created and 
the party was reorganised. " 
261 In May 1976, Bhutto asked 
his bureaucratic advisers in the P. M. 's Secretariat to pre- 
pare a report on the PPP's election prospects'in the Punjab. 
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The report assured Bhutto that the party would sweep the 
Punjab, although perhaps not in the urban areas. 
263 A note 
of caution was however sounded by Bhutto who was not very 
happy with his party's position in the urban areas of Sind 
and in NWFP in general. This is evident from two letters 
that he wrote to the chief ministers of the two provinces 
on 13 June 1976, in which he asked them to make special 
efforts to strengthen the party in their respective 
provinces. 
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From 1 October 1976, the PPP government launched a 
massive campaign in the official media to highlight its 
accomplishments in office. 
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In connection with this pub- 
licity exercise, the Ministry of Information published a 
lengthy document entitled 'Promises and Performance', catalogu- 
ing the party's fulfilment of the vari&us promises made in the 
election manifesto of 1970.266 At the same time, adminis- 
trative mobilisation for celebration of successive Minorities, 
Women's Services, Labour, Students, Peasants'and Armed 
Force's Weeks began during October 1976. A national charter 
for peasants was announced during 'Peasants'Week'. 267 This 
promised the distribution of state land to landless peasants, 
and was followed by the announcement of a 'second instalment' 
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of agricultural reforms which further reduced the land 
ceiling to 8,000 PIUs. 
268 Accompanying this reform was the 
decision to replace the traditional land tax with a tax on 
agricultural income for all large farms. Substantial in- 
creases in the pensions of military and civil employees of 
the government were also announced. 
Restrictions oh political activity, however, con- 
tinued - the emergency was not lifted, NAP leaders and other 
political prisoners were not released (although some were 
allowed to contest the election from jail), curbs on the 
press continued, 
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and troops were not recalled from 
Baluchistan, which the opposition had demanded as a pre- 
condition for participating in the election in that province. 
These factors together with the ruling party's control of 
governmental resources led most observers to believe that 
the election would largely be a one-sided affair. However, 
the formation of an-opposition alliance, PNA (Pakistan 
National Alliance), consisting of nine parties, changed the 
earlier ass. essment. 
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A disparate group which included 
three Islam-Pasand parties and an avowedly secular party 
(NAP), the PNA was united only by its hatred for the Bhutto 
271 
regime. 
The campaign period saw the two major electoral 
forces locked in intense political debate and bitter attacks 
on one another, much of which revolved around the personality 
of Bhutto. While the PNA concentrated its attack on Bhutto's 
dictatorial, corrupt personalised system of governing, PPP 
propaganda depicted him as the saviour of the nation, a 
statesman, a leader of the Third World, and one who had 
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brought the country both stability and change from the old 
oppressive order. Both parties accused each other of 
being anti-Pakistan - the PNA held Bhutto responsible for 
the breakup of the country in 1971 while Bhutto accused the 
PNA of being "a band of secessionists. "272 
Although the various party manifestos were largely 
obscured by the nature of the political debates and person- 
ality clashes that ensued, the PPP and PNA manifestos re- 
vealed few programmatic differences. What the PNA did was 
to use Islamic rhetoric to promise much the same things as 
27 
the PPP had promised in 1970 and 1977.3 The PPP manifesto74 
was a dull one (compared to the 1970 one) and its emphasis 
on "production goals" made it read much like a state five 
year plan, reflecting perhaps the advice of economists and 
financial experts in the government bureaucracy that Bhutto 
had reportedly sought for the formulation of the party 
document. 275 What was significant was the weak emphasis 
placed on the goal of 'socialism' both in the manifesto and 
the party's policy pronouncements. In its public campaigning 
the word 'socialism' was replaced by the more neutral term, 
Musawaat(egalitarianism) reflecting the party's sensitivity 
to. attacks=- by the PNA's Islamic fundamentalists. The PNA's 
major election slogan was the demand for Nizam-e-Mustttp, )ia 
(Order of the Prophet) but it appeared to gain the campaign 
offensive when it articulated specific grievances against 
the ruling party such as rising prices, corruption and 
suppression of civil liberties, all highly emotive issues in 
urban areas. Forced on the defensive Bhutto pledged to 
launch a crusade against high prices, corruption and mal- 
administration. 
276 
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The two-month campaign period unleashed a massive 
wave of discontent and disillusionment with the ruling 
party. 
277 Encouraged by the large turnout at opposition 
rallies, the PNA declared that the people had already given 
their verdict and that the election was now a formality. 
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But apart from the challenge that the PPP faced from without, 
there was considerable resentment within the party over the 
award of tickets. For the most part, old party workers were 
passed over in favour of members of the feudal* elite and 
other local notables, such as biradari leaders. This was 
in accordance with the decision taken by Bhutto in May 1976, 
when it was pointed out to him by an official of the P. M. 's 
Secretariat that the 'magic' of the party programme had been 
'considerably diluted' and that reliance had to be placed 
on prosperous traditional notables and biradari leaders. 
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About half of the PPP nominees in the Punjab had joined the 
party after it came to power and had contested against the 
PPP in the 1970 election. 
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Leading Punjab feudal families 
like the Legharis, Qureishis, Noons, Gilanis, Hayats and 
Mazaris were all given party tickets. Consequently, in 
several constituencies those refused party tickets either 
rebelled and contested as independents, or worked (either 
overtly or covertly) for opposition candidates. 
On the eve of the election PNA came out with a long 
catalogue of methods that it accused the regime of planning 
to use to 'rig' the result. 
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Doubts about the regime's 
intention to hold a fair poll were further fed when fifteen 
PPP members, including Bhutto and the four chief ministers, 
were elected unopposed to the national assembly. PPP nominees 
3S 6 
elected unopposed to the four provincial assemblies totalled 
fifty-five giving the PPP a majority in the legislatures of 
Baluchistan and Sind. These uncontested elections were 
accompanied by PNA allegations that their candidates were 
kidnapped and forcibly prevented from filing nomination 
papers, including the nominees in Bhutto's own constituency. 
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The result of the election are set out in the table below. 
TABLE V. 2 
RESULTS OF THE N. A. ELECTIONS 1977* 
PPP PNA 
PROVINCE TOTAL 
SEATS SEATS % OF SEATS % OF WON VOTES WON WON VOTES WON 
Punjab 116** 108 60 8 35 
Sind 43 32 63 11, 30 
Baluchistan 7 7 50 - - NWFP 34 8 37 17 48 
* This does not include independents, since none of them won 
any seats in the four provinces - the eight independents 
elected were in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, 
where no political party exists. 
**Includes the Federal Capital seat. 
Source: Dawn, (Karachi), 20 March 1977. 
The PPP won 155 of the 200 seats, polling 58% of the popular 
vote, while the PNA won 36 seats with 38% of the popular vote. The 
few victories of the PNA came in areas recognised as oppo- 
sition strongholds - the NWFP and the urban areas of Sind. 
No sooner had the results been announced than the 
PNA accused the PPP of rigging the election, particularly in 
the Punjab through such devices as bogus votes and the use of 
the FSF to intimidate voters with the connivance of the 
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election staff and the local administration. 
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Bhutto 
denied the charges, arguing that if irregularities had 
occurred they were restricted to isolated cases and were 
the work of overzealous officials. 
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To placate the oppo- 
sition, however, the Election Commission declined (pending 
inquiry) to validate the election results in 24 constituencies 
and annulled the results in another six. 
285 In a newspaper 
interview, the Chief Election Commissioner, (CEC), expressed 
his shock at learning of irregularities in more than half 
the seats. 
286 But when the records of another 85 consti- 
tuencies were called for by the CEC, the special powers of 
judicial enquiry vested in the commission were suddenly 
withdrawn by the Bhutto government. 
287 But whatever the 
precise scale of the rigging and the number of constituencies 
actually affected, the net result was to rob Bhutto of that 
important intangible commodity, political legitimacy. 
288 
The PNA boycotted the provincial assembly poll and 
launched an agitation movement which led to almost four 
months of domestic violence. 
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The nationwide, largely 
urban, campaign to oust Bhutto saw hartals, demonstrations, 
and street violence become the order of the day. Journal- 
ists, orthodox mullahs, lawyers, petty shopkeepers and traders, 
pro-Jamaat students, women and a section of urban labour 
banded together to protest against what they regarded as an 
authoritarian and corrupt regime. 
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Bhutto charged that 
the agitation against him was not a desi (indigenuous) con- 
spiracy, but a massive international conspiracy masterminded 
and financed by the U. S. A., (which he referred to obliquely 
as the power which waged "a cruel and savage war in Vietnam")? 
gl 
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Bhutto's response to the crisis alternated pre- 
cariously between offering concessions on the one hand and 
outright suppression on the other. The PNA rejected 
Bhutto's compromise proposal - referred to as the 'Bakhtiar 
Formula', since it was conceived by the Attorney-General - 
to hold fresh provincial elections, and if the opposition 
gained an overall majority in them to hold a new general 
election. 
292 Bhutto attempted to defuse the conflict with 
timely give-ways -a ban on alcohol, gambling and night clubs 
was announced accompanied by a promise to enforce Islamic 
laws within six months. This device to steal the thunder 
of the orthodox mullahs in the opposition camp failed to 
make any impact. Increases in the pay of the army, police 
and civil service, the grant of property rights to urban 
squatters, and the offer to hold a referendum also failed 
to defuse the crisis. On the other hand, the arrest of all 
PNA leaders and the use of strong arm tactics on the part of 
the law enforcing agencies, the police and the FSF only 
served to escalate the movement. Unable to control the 
rising tide of violence, Bhutto called in the army, imposing 
martial law in the country's three largest cities. 
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The 
opposition regarded this as a tactical victory as they hoped 
that the army would now dust Bhutto. 
While the army initially stood divided on the ques- 
tion of resuming political power, 
294 
it became the key fac- 
tor in the crisis and was instrumental in bringing the two 
parties to the negotiating table and pressurising Bhutto to 
agree to hold fresh elOctions as a pre-condition to a dia- 
logue with the PNA. 
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The dialogue which began on 3 June 
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and lasted four weeks, finally resulted in an accord pro- 
viding for fresh elections under the supervision of the 
army and judiciary. But the central council of the PNA 
refused to ratify the accord making their endorsement con- 
ditional upon the prior settlement of nine points. 
296 Hours 
after Bhutto addressed a press conference in which he 
accused the PNA of going back on the agreement, he was de- 
posed:. in a bloodless army coup on 5 July. The Chief of 
Army Staff, General Zia-ul-Haq, one of Bhutto's own appoint- 
ees, proclaimed martial law, put the constitution into 
abeyance, banned all political activity and dissolved the 
assemblies. 
A contingency plan for a possible military take- 
over - known as 'Operation Fair Play' - was prepared by 
Zia and his corps commanders early in the nation's four 
months of turmoil. 
297 But what precipitated the coup was 
the use of the army to quell the anti-Bhutto opposition. 
Throughout the eleven weeks that the army administered key 
cities under Bhutto's limited declaration of martial law, 
it came under serious pressure from within its ranks for 
allowing itself to be 'misused' for political ends. When 
a number of brigadiers resigned in protest in Lahore, the 
threat to the unity of the army could no longer be ignored 
by the army High Command. Thus the army intervened to 
'save the nation' from chaos and bloodshed and to preserve 
unity within its own ranks. Since the talks between Bhutto 
and the PNA had not actually broken off when the Army inter- 
vened, the justification for-military action rested on the 
argument that even with an agreement, there was every chance 
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of further fighting and bloody clashes, with the army caught 
in the middle. 
The military coup brought to an end the PPP's five 
and a half years in government and placed the country, for 
the third time in its history, under military rule. 
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VI 
THE PPP: PARTY BUILDING AND PATRIMONIALISM 
The following three chapters are concerned with 
analysing the PPP's internal dynamics in the post-1972 per- 
iod. This chapter begins with a discussion of Bhutto's 
beliefs and strategy that are considered relevant to the 
development of the PPP and then examines how Bhutto's patri- 
monial strategy was operationalised. Thus, we are concerned 
here with analysing the building of the party in order to 
assess the PPP's nature, social base and organisational de- 
velopment.. Chapter VII deals with the actual working of the 
party machine through an examination of the nature and 
consequences of factionalism, patronage and corruption. 
Chapter VIII discusses Bhutto's response in the period 1975- 
76 to various developments in the party enumerated in the 
preceding chapters in order to ascertain whether these 
last-minute 're-organisational' efforts signified a reversal 
of the past dominant trend of personalism in the party by 
moving towards institutionalisation, or merely the continu- 
ation of previous trends. This is followed by an assessment 
of the PPP which, by bringing together the perspectives of 
the preceding two chapters, focuses on the phenomena of the 
primacy of personalism over institutionalisation in the PPP 
and its consequences for regime stability and for the broader 
issue of political de'elopment. 
Although the question of the extent to which Bhutto 
succeeded in transforming the PPP from a movement into a 
political party, in the sense of an institutionalised group 
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possessing organisational viability and cohesion, is 
raised specifically in chapter VIII, this broad theoreti- 
cal issue is of central concern in chapters VI and VII 
as well. An examination of the factors that inhibited the 
development of an effective organisation would help to 
illuminate aspects of the general problem of party building 
in the Third World countries. It is suggested in this 
chapter that the dominance of a strong personality over the 
party and the requirements of the patrimonial strategy 
followed by Bhutto strongly inhibited the institutionalisation 
of the PPP as a political party of the kind associated with 
'modern' political systems. It is further argued in chapter 
VII that factionalism, which to some extent was inevitable 
given the heterogeneous membership of the party, but which 
was enhanced by Bhutto's strategy of factional manipulation 
and intra-party competition for patronage, was an important 
factor responsible for the PPP's organisational weakness. 
It is also argued in chapter VII that patronage as a tool 
of party building had only limited efficacy in the case of 
the PPP. The personalism, factionalism and patronage prac- 
tices that are identified as the dominant characteristics 
of the PPP in the following three chapters lead to our de- 
piction of the party in power as a patrimonial-clientele 
type, but which nonetheless exhibits features of the 'mass 
party' type. In this sense the PPP can be viewed as reflect- 
ing both the 'traditional' and 'modern' aspects of Pakistan's 
'transitional' society. 
Much of the literature concerned with the PPP has 
focussed on the party in the pre-1972 period with an emphasis 
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on analysing the party in the Punjab. 
1 A recent study by 
Philip E. Jones also falls into this category, but is none- 
theless an important contribution to the subject of party 
building in the Punjab. 2 We share much of Jones' analysis 
of the party in the Punjab, and are in complete jLgreement 
with his main conclusion that as "Bhutto consistently re- 
jected a party organisational strategy in preference for 
charismatic appeals and highly personalised forms of 
1.9-ade. rship" this prevented the PPP from developing into an 
"institution. "3 At the same time, there are a few areas 
where we do not agree with Jones, which we will deal with 
during the course of this chapter. Anwar Syed's article 
is the only study which examines the PPP as a governing 
party and addresses itself to the question of party building 
in the post-1972 period, although it is limited to what he 
calls-the '-secönd phase' öf the parry's-developmen from 
1972 to 1974. This phase according to Syed is character- 
ised_b_y organisational dobilit esulting from intra-party 
factionalism, corruption and repressive limitations on 
participation. We share Syed's general view for the large 
part, but attempt to analyse such phenomena. through the 
concept of political clientelism, and relate this to Bhutto's 
patrimonial strategy for consolidating power. Moreover, 
while Syed views factionalism as the product of Punjab's 
tradit. Tonal__web_of-. local-rjvalries that have al afflicted 
the Muslim League, Republicans and Conventionalists in the 
past, -we-argue--that... the_-far- . Tonal is , ithin the PPP was 
--distinctive owing to its interplay with Bhutto's patrimonial 
authority. Syed hints at this at one point, but does not 
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follow it through to its logical conclusion. 
Party building is not a mysterious process which 
proceeds independently of human volition; often, the par- 
ticular manner in which a party develops is governed by 
the perception, beliefs and strategies of its leaders. 
Pointing to the importance of the human element in party 
building W. N. Chambers writes: 
"Party as such is a product of human in- 
genuity and not simply a natural growth. 
It must be built by the efforts of skilled 
political craftsmen..... " 5 
The impact of leadership characteristics on party develop- 
ment assumes an even greater importance when a party is 
closely linked with the fortunes of its founder and leader. 
As Lucien Pye explains: 
"When a party is largely the personal pro- 
jection of an individual leader, it is 
usually not just his explicitly political 
views but all facets of his personality 
which are significant in determining the 
character of the movement. " 6 
Similarly, the development of the PPP cannot be analysed 
without reference to Bhutto's personality and his personal 
predilections, for the party was primarily his creation -a 
phenomenon which he quite aptly described in the following 
manner: 
"I am the Peoples Party and they are all my 
creatures. " 7 
Thus the starting point for any discussion of the PPP must 
begin with Bhutto himself. 
In the literature, two views have generally been 
advanced about Bhutto's personality. One view, as represent- 
ed by Taseer, depicts him as a schizophrenic personality and 
refers to the tension within him between the modernizer and 
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9 
traditional wadera, between the socialist and the feudal 
chieftan, and this is used to explain Bhutto's apparent 
inconsistencies and paradoxes. 
8 
This view is shared by 
Piloo Mody, 9 Hugh Trevor-Roper 10 and to some extent Burki, 
who points to the "sharp conflict of interests between the 
social class in which he (Bhutto) was born and the class 
to which he belonged intellectually. " 
11 In contrast, the 
other view, as advanced by Syed and Jones, 
12 
and advocated 
here, depicts Bhutto as pre-eminently a power craftsman and 
a practitioner of Realpolitik, interested in power and 
moving according to the conception of what was most 
advantageous in the gaining and maintaining of it. 
BHUTTO: BELIEFS AND STRATEGY 
From the standpoint of this study, four aspects of 
Bhutto's personal beliefs that had a bearing on the PPP's 
development need to be examined. 
13 These are (i) Bhutto's, 
approach to the mechanics of governance in general and 
institution-building in particular, (ii) his attitude to the 
general question of mass mobilisation, (iii) his concept of 
socialism and 'change', and (iv) the kind of political base 
that he envisaged as providing the essential underpinnings 
for regime stability. 
(i) In a political system of weak institutions, 
shifting alliances, and unpredictability, political survival 
became the most important pre-occupation for Bhutto. Poli- 
tical survival for Bhutto meant the consolidation of his 
control over the political system through personalist - as 
opposed to organisational means -a strategy that has been 
383 
termed patrimonialism, in the literature on comparative 
politics. 
14 
Bhutto's preferance for personalised leader- 
ship was evident throughout the period of his struggle for 
power. Although he founded the PPP, he never attempted to 
organise it into a discrete structure. As has been repeat- 
edly emphasised (in chapters II, III and IV, above) Bhutto 
placed greater reliance on personal appeals and his genius 
for political manouevre than on party organisation. For 
Bhutto, the PPP was primarily an instrument with which to 
challenge the Ayub regime and to win the 1970 election, and 
it remained from the beginning very much a party of personal 
loyalty to Bhutto. Personalised leadership suited Bhutto's 
distinct political skills, and freed him to operate simul- 
taneously at different levels - at the level of the mass 
populace, at the elite level, within the party -a phenomenon 
that we described in some detail in chapter IV above. 
Bhutto's preference for a personalist approach over an 
organisational one has also been noted by other writers. 
Taseer, for instance, asserts that from the earliest days 
of the PPP's existence "attempts at organisation were half- 
hearted and there was no support for this from the upper 
echelons of the party ...... Bhutto's role ....... was never 
organisational. "15 In similar vein, Jones notes that "party 
organisation was not a priority of the chairman, " and that 
Bhutto "consistently rejected a party organisational 
strategy in preference for ...... highly personalised forms 
of leadership. 16 
This preference for a personalised approach was 
reflected after Bhutto came to power in his patrimonial 
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strategy of rule. 
17 Bhutto was acutely conscious of the 
need to link subordinates, both in the government and party 
apparatus to himself through personal ties of loyalty. As 
a political realist Bhutto also realised that such ties of 
loyalty would not only be based on emotional bonds arising 
from a charismatic claim to leadership, but would have to 
be supplemented by patrimonial ties based on personal de- 
pendency. 
is 
What he envisaged was a combination of the 
two in which the latter-predominated since in his mind an 
altogether more tangible and secure footing would be pro- 
vided by a system of rewards and material incentives. This 
suggested then, that Bhutto favoured creating and utilising 
patrimonial linkages rather than taking institutional paths 
as a means of political consolidation. In other words, 
Bhutto envisaged underscoring his supremacy within the sys- 
tem by constantly spawning new relations of dependency bet- 
ween himself and various sectors of society. Such dependency 
was to be maintained by manipulating access to various kinds 
of patronage and prebends. Bhutto's confidence that such a 
strategy would work rested. on a remarkably perceptive 
understanding of the kind of society in which he had to 
function. This needs to be noted briefly as this environ- 
mental variable is central to understanding the choice of 
Bhutto's strategy. 
Pakistan like other developing societies, is charac- 
terised by material scarcity, both real and perceived, so 
that the asymmetry in relations between the powerful and less 
powerful is particularly pronounced. Scarce resources are 
relatively more scarce, and the power derived from controlling 
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them is more extensive and inescapable. The few re- 
sources at the disposal of the powerless can be easily lost 
or destroyed, and awareness of this fact heightens a general 
sense of vulnerability and potential disaster, and sets in 
motion myriads of clients in search of patrons. There*is 
no real escape from the quest until and unless this context- 
ual scarcity is overcome. Networks of dependency are con- 
tinually regenerated. At the same time, the scope for 
patronage can be expanded with the expansion of state 
activities, for it increases the competition for privileged 
access to state services or relief from impositions. Bhutto 
realised that with the expansion of the state sector, the 
need for intercessors, protectors and patrons would only 
increase. 
Publicly, Bhutto repeatedly urged his countrymen to 
build and respect institutions and place less emphasis on indi- 
viduals and personal leadership. 
19 But at other times, he 
publicly expressed cynicism about whether institutions could 
take root in the current Pakistani environment permeated 
as it was by the politics of faction, manoeuvre and person- 
alism. On one occasion he made the following observation: 
"Personal politics would continue to pre- 
dominate until politics had had the time 
to mature in Pakistan. These troubles 
would continue.... until people stopped 
thinking in 'personal'terms. " 20 
On another occasion he explained that institutions in Pakistan 
were always subject to 'collapse', because 
"There are explosions that take place and 
Asia is going through a period of explos- 
ions and upheavals..... Institutions, they 
come into being and before they take root 
they become obsolete because things are 
moving so fast..... Institutions will begin 
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to work and they can settle down gen- 
erally only when we have overcome 
fundamentally the economic challenge. " 21 
Thus Bhutto's attitude towards institution- building in 
general was strongly conditioned by doubts about whether - 
given the existing Pakistani state of economic and political 
'under-development' - attempts at strengthening and extending 
the institution-building process would ever meet with success. 
But perhaps, more importantly, Bhutto's personal 
predilection for centralising power in his own hands, suggest- 
ed that his commitment to institution-building would at 
best be limited. Indeed, Bhutto made no secret of the 
fact. thathe perceived himself as personifying the political 
system in Pakistan, and that the country's stability cor- 
related with his longevity in office. 
22 This perception 
together with his concern with enhancing his manoeuvrability 
in and control over the political system indicated that he 
would not be inclined towards building institutions that 
would impose constraints on his scope for manoeuvre or limit 
his power. As Huntington has noted, 
. 
"The institutionalisation of power means 
the limitation of power which the charis- 
matic leader might otherwise wield per- 
sonally and arbitrarily. The would-be 
institution builder needs personal power 
to create institutions, but he cannot 
create institutions without relinquishing 
personal power. " 23 
Institutional authority is the opposite of patrimonial 
authority, and patrimonial leaders defeat themselves if they 
attempt to create stable institutions. 
Bhutto's attitude towards specific state insti- 
tutions - namely the bureaucracy and the military-was govern- 
ed by his patrimonial conception of authority. While in 
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opposition, he had singled out the bureaucracy for virul- 
ent attack and criticised the military's dominance in 
politics (albeit guardedly), leading some of his radical 
followers to believe that Bhutto intended to significantly 
alter their role in the decision-making arena - even to. 
eliminate them (with the ostensible purpose of replacing 
them with a well-organised party). 
24 
In power, however, 
Bhutto's strategy appeared more limited. His intention - 
far from eliminating their influence - was to establish his 
personal control over them thereby reducing their independ- 
ent discretion and then to utilise them as subordinate 
allies in the process of governance. In other words, Bhutto 
was expected to continue an important aspect of the 
Viceregal pattern of governance, by relying primarily on 
the bureaucratic - military apparatus, albeit under politi- 
cal tutelage, to govern. 
25 
Bhutto's choice to continue 
this aspect of the Viceregal tradition in effect meant 
undermining his own party, and keeping it away from mean- 
ingful participation in policy fbrmilaitin. The PPP's organ- 
isational frailty - which was of course in large part of 
Bhutto's own making - urged Bhutto in this direction and 
away from establishing a genuine party government. Bhutto 
recognised that the PPP had come to power too quickly and 
had to make the change from a movement in opposition to a 
party in power with much of its machinery of organisation 
untested by any long period of trial. As such, the party 
needed considerable time (and governmental help) before it 
could emerge as an organised disciplined entity to be 
utilised as an essential part of the machinery of government. 
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However, as we shall see below, Bhutto's policies towards 
the PPP seriously inhibited such a development, thus serving 
to increase his regime's dependency on the bureaucracy and 
and military. Another clue to what appeared as a self- 
contradictory disposition on the part of Bhutto to accord 
a somewhat low priority to his party (vis a vis the govern- 
ment apparatus), is provided by the fact that the adminis- 
trative and police machinery of the government is so strong 
that a political leader often succumbs to a tendency to 
dispense with the party machinery. Such a development had 
emerged under Jinnah, and since had become a recurring fea- 
ture in the Pakistani political system. 
26 
(ii) The response of parties to the 'development 
problem' of mass participation/mobilisation has been a cen- 
tral concern in comparative studies in political development. 
27 
As we saw in an earlier chapter, while in opposition, the 
PPP and Bhutto had spoken a great deal about fostering mass 
mobilisation and involving the previously passive masses in 
political participation. In power, however, while continu- 
ing to talk about 'mobilising the people'28 Bhutto wished 
to de-emphasise participation and mobilisation. Indeed, 
even before he came to power, Bhutto had, at the party's 
1970 convention separated himself completely from the mili- 
tant, mass-oriented faction of the party that had argued in 
favour of a campaign of mass mobilisation as an alternative 
to contesting the elections. 
29 
The anarchic situation in 
which Bhutto assumed power made him more resolute in his 
general reluctance to foster large scale mobilisation. This 
was the time for 'healing and reconstruction', not extending 
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participation. 
30 To engage in the latter course at this 
juncture would either lead to chaos inviting military inter- 
vention31 or tö adventurism, from which only extreme 
Leftists would benefit. 
32 As it was, Bhutto felt that the 
kind of mass mobilisation that the country had undergone-in 
the period 1968-1970, in which he himself had played a part, 
had gone too far - leading to heightened expectations that 
no government had the capacity to satisfy. Moreover, the 
economic dislocation in the aftermath of the Bangladesh 
war necessitated in Bhutto's mind a cautious and limited 
approach in order to restrict, not extend or accommodate, 
peoples participatory urges. The need of the hour was "to 
consolidate political unity and take strides in the economic 
field, " not to allow divisive tendencies to come forth which 
inevitably a campaign to mobilise the masses would do. 
33 
To some extent the decision to de-emphasise mobilisation was 
a recognition of the underlying weakness of the PPP struc- 
ture, for the pre-1970 mobilisation had demonstrated quite 
clearly that Bhutto, as yet, had not developed an organisat- 
ional base in the PPP strong enough to direct or sustain it. 
34 
However, that Bhutto chose not to build on what after 1970 
emerged as a potential mass base (at least in the Punjab) 
for the party, was less a comment on organisational frailty 
than on leadership value. It reflected Bhutto's deep- 
seated belief that mass-mobilisation, once initiated, would 
be difficult to control and direct, raising mass expect- 
ations. beyond any government's control. The net result of 
such a policy would be highly destabilising: for his regime. 
This also indicated that the role he envisaged for his party 
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was not a 'mobilist' one, as some of his radical party - 
colleagues desired, but an essentially 'adaptive' one. 
35 
(iii) Bhutto always claimed that he was a social- 
ist and that his party was a 'revolutionary' one. He often 
maintained that in the South Asian context, with its over- 
whelming poverty and inequality, one could not but be a 
socialist. He once wrote: 
"On my twenty-first birthday on 5 January 
1948, I received in Los Angeles two birth- 
day gifts from Larkana. One was an ex- 
pensive set of five volumes of Sloane's 
biography of Napoleon Bonaparte. The 
other was an inexpensive __pamphlet 
(Marx's 
Communist Party Manifesto). From Napoleon 
I imbibed the politics of power. From the 
pamphlet.: I absorbed the politics of 
poverty. " 36 
But socialism according to Bhutto had to be adapted "to 
our conditions keeping-our framework of values. "37 It had 
to be Islamicised, as a pragmatic response to Pakistan's 
Islamic identity and dominant ethos. 
38 Bhutto presented 
himself as a socialist but was aware that socialism as a 
doctrine might not be able to withstand the charge of his 
opponents that it was foreign and unIslamic. Therefore he 
constantly emphasised the fact that the Socialism that he 
espoused was Islamic Socialism and that this was exactly the 
same as Musawaat-i-Muhammedi. He held out the vision of 
economic equality as the ultimate goal arguing that this was 
neither inconsistent with Islam nor the political integrity of Pakistan 
But Bhutto's socialism did not go beyond these vague form- 
ulations. His attitude towards spelling out the precise 
form of socialism he claimed to believe in displayed the 
same kind of unwillingness to become tied to specific posi- 
tions that was evident in his public approach to other major 
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issues. In the past, pressure from the party's Left for a 
clearer definition from the Chairman on what he meant by 
socialism had seldom produced a specific response from 
Bhutto. He continued to talk in-general terms about a 
welfare state on the "Willy Brandt model" or the 
Scandinavian model. 
39 
And against those within his party 
who wished to give socialism a more radical interpretation, 
he argued that to do this would mean going against the 
tenets--. of Islam, for Islam recognised private property 
and its responsibilities. 
40 Certainly prior to 1970, Bhutto 
at times had given a radical interpretation (but again in 
the most general terms) of his socialist principles, some- 
times couched in Marxist vocabulary in order to enlist the 
support of radical leftist groups in the country, including 
the communist elements. 
41 Such support, as we saw earlier 
(in chapters II and III) was important in organising the 
PPP against the older politicians and the right-wing par- 
ties. Indeed the enthusiasm of the Left had played an impor- 
tant part in the PPP's electoral mobilisation programme in 
urban Pakistan in 1970. However, such radical pronounce- 
ments clearly had a tactical purpose in the agitational and 
electoral policies of that period and did not in any way 
form part of a systematic philosophy advocated by Bhutto 
that could guide later party and governmental policy. 
After Bhutto's assumption of power, he began to view 
his radical supporters as a liability although he did attempt 
to some extent to satisfy the constituency (see chapter IX) 
they represented. The radical PPP leaders' demands for sys- 
temic change was unacceptable to Bhutto and he probably 
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felt he could dispense with them on the assumption that 
their radicalism exceeded that of their constituencies. 
Indications of Bhutto's desire to shift away from the radical 
left within the party came even earlier, in 1970, immediate- 
ly after his election victory, when he remarked to a foreign 
correspondent that the people most unhappy with his victory 
were the communists: 
"I have stopped the tide of communism 
by introducing socialism in this country. " 42 
In power, Bhutto argued that the ultimate egalitar- 
ian society he claimed to believe in was one which was to 
be achieved through gradual change. Referring to his party's 
manifesto and its programme of socialism, he asserted that 
it could not be implemented in a day: 
"It had to take some time for its imple- 
mentation and this was a phased process. " 43 
One had to proceed cautiously as " we. *can't do anything in- 
sensible and upset the whole equilibrium-"44 "no-one can 
sweep the boards clean in one go. "45 Speedy implementation 
would invite the wrath of conservative interests leading to 
instability which could pave the way for either external 
intervention or a military takeover. 
46 Referring to the 
impatience expressed by left-wing circles within the 
party, Bhutto warned: 
"I won't be dictated like that by any 
elements. I will, in my good judgement, 
consider what is right for the country 
and proceed on that basis. " 47 
He maintained that since he knew conditions in Pakistan 
better than anybody else, the speed and manner of implement- 
ation of socialism had to be left to him. 48 Existing 
conditions demanded cooperation between classes, not enmity: 
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"In our egalitarian society, there is, 
of course a place for everyone - the 
worker and the enlightened industrial- 
ist and businessman, the peasant and the 
fair-minded owner. All can contribute to 
the challenging process of national re- 
construction and national reconciliation. " 49 
Referring to those in the party who desired rapid change and 
wished to mobilise political support through the accentuation 
of class conflict, Bhutto said: 
"If they want me to be a communist, they 
have to join some other party and I will 
be able to deal with them. " 50 
Clearly, Bhutto's conception of gradual change together with 
his vision of an egalitarian society based on collaboration 
between classes working within a mixed economy, suggested 
that Bhutto's aims were not to eliminate or displace property- 
owning power groups such as the industrialists and the land- 
owners, but to establish his control over them. 
51 On one 
occasion he explained that his intention was merely to 
break up the 'monopoly power' of these groups, but other 
than that he wanted 'landlords and industrialists' to 
flourish. 52 The implications of such a strategy for the 
development of the PPP involved a deradicalisation of both 
party rhetoric and structure as we shall see below, and in- 
dicated that the party in power would take on an increasing- 
ly conservative, status quo oriented nature. 
(iv) The above discussion already provides some 
clue to the kind of political base Bhutto considered necess- 
ary for the survival of his regime. Central to his scheme 
for regime-stability was to rely upon landlords as the major 
support base for his party. 
53 
Bhutto saw no contradiction 
between this and his oft-proclaimed socialist beliefs. For 
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I 
he placed primary emphasis on fighting capitalism, since- 
it was the capitalists who exploited the resources of the 
country in a monopolistic fashion and it was capitalism that 
was the ally of imperialism, and not feudalism. These 
beliefs were reflected in the early party documents, one of 
which stated: 
"In the rural areas, in relation to 
agriculture, the cultivator may suffer 
under a feudal system of land tenure and 
be exploited through the. process by which 
his produce is brought to the market or 
the consumer. It is, however, in the in- 
dustrial sector of production, which is 
principally urban, that the problem of 
capitalist exploitation presents itself in 
its typical form. " 54. 
In the several hundreds of statements published in the years 
1967-1970, the PPP Chairman was never reported to have 
taken a public position on the land ceiling question. This 
was so despite pressure from the party's left for whom a 
stand on land ceilings was a crucial test of the real in- 
tentions of a big landholder like Bhutto. The latter's 
standard response was that the fixation of land ceilings was 
5 
a minor issue and that the agrarian problem was more complex5 
In the period upto 1970, Bhutto, on balance, scarcely men- 
tioned 'feudalism' as a national problem and concentrated 
his attacks on the bureaucracy and capitalists. It was only 
in. 1970, after Bhutto's attempts to court the major Punjabi 
landed aristocratic families met with failure that he 
began to make radical statements on the land problem, part- 
icularly in the Punjab in order to recruit the support of 
non-gentry rural elements there. This indicated that his 
anti-feudal rhetoric in the Punjab was more a tactical res- 
ponse than a reflection of his commitment to transforming 
395 
the rural power structure. Bhutto's social origins, as a 
scion of the landed class played no small part in his gen- 
eral reluctance to pursue a radical course of action - vis 
a vis the landed aristocracy. Indeed, Bhutto went further 
and after assuming power, according to one of his cabinet 
ministers, made no secret of his conviction that the feudal 
class alone possessed the competence to rule the country. 
56 
In his view the landed class alone had a positive interest 
in stability and possessed intimate knowledge about the 
mechanics of local administration. On the other hand, Bhutto 
showed little confidence in the ability of the sophisticated, 
urbanised, western-educated middle class to provide leader- 
ship for a number of reasons. Firstly, in his view, this 
class had few tangible resources other than their ideal- 
Ism. 
57 
Secondly, he realised that they would be less 
amenable to his control. Their disillusionment with the 
pace of change outlined by Bhutto had already become notice- 
able when he took over power, and in the event it was from 
them that he perceived that a challenge to his authority 
would come. Landlords on the other hand, traditionally de- 
ferential to whom so ever was in power, provided, a far 
more dependable reservoir of support. Such considerations 
urged Bhutto to place primary reliance on the landlord 
groups, although as we shall see below, he did attempt to 
woo other constituencies. 
However, in Bhutto's patrimonial strategy, what he 
foresaw was not the recruitment of the landlord group as 
an equal ally, but as one subordinated to his personal con- 
trol through a patronage system of rewards and punishments. 
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Thus, those who have viewed Bhutto as merely the represent- 
ative of the landlord class miss the point altogether. 
58 
Bhutto wished to establish a pattern of dependency between 
him, standing at the apex of the government, and the 
landlords, with the latter looking towards him for protect- 
ion (from land reform measures), and favours, in a typically 
assymetrical patron-client relationship. The landlords them- 
selves with their networks of patron-client relationships 
would pledge their support to Bhutto and it is this that 
would provide the building blocs for the PPP in the country- 
side. 
59 
This was clearly reflected in Bhutto's election 
strategy for the 1977 election,, as we shall see below. 
Having said this, however, it is important to note that 
Bhutto's reliance on the feudal support base did not pre- 
clude efforts at cultivating other constituencies in urban 
Pakistan, amongst what we,. in an earlier chapter, called the 
newer social groups, such as labour, urban professionals, 
and amongst the urban poor in general. That these efforts 
met with marginal success will be discussed below, and later 
in chapter XII. It is sufficient here to note that while 
Bhutto wished to make landlords the major support base for 
his regime, he did nevertheless want to maintain his pro- 
gressive image as a populist politician by charismatic 
appeals addressed to the masses through such devices as the 
mass rally. 
Against this background, we can now undertake an ana- 
lysis of the PPP and examine how Bhutto's strategy was 
actually operationalised. 
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PARTY ORGANISATION AND PATRIMONIAL POWER 
The main features that characterised the PPP in 
power weref: lthe failure to take steps to develop an effect- 
ive organisatiorf, > hutto's patrimonial contro over the 
par ,e gradual disillusionment of the Leftist groups 
within-the-party-ani"d-their eventual displacement by con- 
servative, landlord-dominated group ;J he growth of faction- 
alism and tie - ilisation of patronage as a tool for party- 
building. The first three features are discussed below, 
while the two latter characteristics are examined in chapter 
VII. 
The need for reorganisation and restructuring of 
the PPP was evident as soon as the party came to power. The 
hard work of local organisation still needed to be done. 
But as party leaders assumed governmental roles, organisat- 
ional matters of the party were largely ignored in the ini- 
tial period. As in the past, the problem of party organis- 
ation was not given top priority by Bhutto. As we saw in 
earlier chapters (II and III) in the past Bhutto's broad 
coalitional strategy for challenging the Ayub government and 
then contesting the 1970 election had led him to maintain 
the PPP as a loose structure, dominated by him. This meant 
that the PPP was more a 'movement' than a 'party' with a 
well structured organisation. Demands for a more discrete 
party framework had in the past been voiced largely by 
left wing groups in the PPP. But these were consistently 
rejected by Bhutto because they would have meant a lessen- 
ing of the_. 2PP!, s-dependence, 
-Q. n him and also because of the 
problems a rigid organisation would have posed for a party 
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that consisted of disparate and potentially clashing in- 
terests. In power, too these considerations lay behind 
Bhutto's reluctance to strengthen his party organisation. 
It is not as if Bhutto failed to appreciate the critical 
matter of party organisation - although undoubtedly initially 
there were more pressing problems that needed to be dealt 
with (see 'Early Priorities and Dilemmas', chapter V). In 
our interviews with PPP leaders we heard the repeated 
assertion that Bhutto "deliberately ignored the question of 
party organisation" for this would inevitably have limited 
his own scope for political manoeuvre both in the party and 
in the wider political arena. 
60 
In May 1972 the secretary general of the party, 
J. A. Rahim admitted that there had been an "organisation- 
al breakdown" since the PPP took over power. 
61 Rahim 
listed' the following reasons for such a breakdown: 
(i) many leaders had joined the government and thus could 
not devote time to party work; (ii) there had been an enor- 
mous growth in the party (membership) since it came to power; 
(iii) the inability of the central secretariat to coordinate 
party activities. The latter problem arose due to the fact 
that while the central secretariat could only work through 
the provincial set-ups, in Sind the provincial committee 
had not even been formed. 
62 
For many members of the party, 
including Rahim and particularly the leftist groups, holding 
elections within the party was considered as the first, 
necessary step towards restructuring the party and laying 
down the basis for institutionalising the party. However, 
despite the fact that successive central committee meetings 
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'in 1972 promised elections, such pledges never material- 
ised and the party continued to function under the ad hoc, 
nominated bodies created in early 1971. In fact, Bhutto 
deliberately discouraged elections within the party, giving 
different reasons at different times to justify such a 
policy. 
63 Instead, he made the system of nominations the 
central organising principle of the party. Indeed this 
provided Bhutto with the means for establishing his pat- 
rimonial control over the party. 
Bhutto's control over the allocation of party posts 
enabled him to enhance his personal authority within the 
PPP. To have allowed the rationalisation of the party 
structure through the impersonal mechanism of elections 
would have cut off options, destroying the ran om, personal 
quality that was at the core of Bhutto's power. Through the 
allocation of party posts, strategic 'delays' in the re- 
organisation which when it occurred often proceeded in a 
piece-meal fashion, Bhutto maintained the initiative by the 
systematic inculcation of an atmosphere of unpredictability 
and contingency among party office-bearers. With the 
latter's political fortunes always in doubt, he was in a 
position to exert and maintain assymetrical lines of depend- 
ency and protection - the features of patrimonial authority. 
Whenever party posts were allocated the impression conveyed 
to the nominated was that this represented a personal act 
of generosity on Bhutto's part, thus calling forth a sense 
of personal obligation to bind his subordinates to him. 64 
A note circulated by one of Bhutto's political advisers 
(in his personal secretariat) to top members of the PPP 
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hierarchy, is illustrative of this phenomenon. Referring 
to the selection of party candidates for the forthcoming 
general elections, the note set out the following principle: 
"Everyone who gets (a) ticket feels 
directly beholden to the Leader of the 
party. " 65 
A similar note circulated by another member of Bhutto's 
personal staff stated the following: 
"It is extremely essential.... that each 
candidate who gets the party ticket 
either for National Assembly or the 
Provincial Assembly is beholden to the 
Prime Minister personally and considers 
it as a favour from him rather than from 
any intermediatory. " 66 
In the nomination of office-bearers or the selection of 
party candidates for by-elections or general elections, 
Bhutto appeared to act as a patron, in as much as the jobs/ 
tickets he gave out were meant as personal gifts from the 
store of scarce values he controlled and were intended to 
create a feeling of personal debt and obligation among 
recipients. At the same time those given ministerial posts 
or high-ranking party posts were never made to believe that 
they had earned their position; they were often reminded that 
were it not for Bhutto's favour, they might never have made 
it. 67 Conversely, they were always made aware that they may 
rapidly fall from grace no matter what office they 
held. In successfully nurturing this disposition, 
Bhutto maintained the initiative. Rapid and unexplained 
demotions- as for instance, in the case of Mubashar Hasan, 
(one of the senior-most PPP leaders), who was deprived of the 
ministerial portfolio of Finance in 1974 unexpectedly and 
the arbitrary manner in which the party secretary general, 
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Rahim was dismissed (discussed below) - left party leaders 
fearful for their future. Bhutto constantly reminded his 
party colleagues that none of them was indispensible. 
68 
It follows from this that Bhutto's authority in- 
creasingly derived from his skill as manipulator of party patron- 
age rather than from his charisma. If party members made con- 
stant protestations of loyalty in the form of admiration for 
the Quaid-e-Awam (Leader of the People) this was because 
such eulogies had become established as a standard way of 
showing one's sympathies. 
69 The observation Hans Gerth 
makes about Hitler and the members of the 'inner circle' 
of the National Socialist party can equally well be applied 
to Bhutto and the top members of his party: 
"Every suspicious and ever watchful, they 
felt compelled continually to demonstrate 
their unswerving belief in the leader's 
charisma. Even though they might not 
actually believe in Hitler's abilities, 
this necessity makes for the exuberant 
praise and eulogy of the leader's actual 
or imputed virtues and qualities ...... As such each member of the inner circle can 
only legitimise his power by invoking the 
favour of the leader; his exclusion from the 
inner circle can only be interpreted by the* 
party at large as a consequence of disobe- 
dience and unfaithfulness. The weaker his 
position actually becomes, the more ardently 
will he emphasise his belief in the righteous- 
ness of the leader. " 70 
In his study of the PPP in the Punjab, Jones suggests 
that a "structural dualism" existed in the PPP organisation, 
and he differentiates between what he calls a "central cell" 
composed of PPP leaders who had direct access to Bhutto, 
and whose membership was contingent on his good will, and 
a "party cell" of those who had no ready access to Bhutto, 
tended to be ideologically oriented to the left and who 
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depended more on party organisation for their influence, 
and were generally gathered around Sheikh Rashid (Chairman 
of the Punjab Provincial Committee). 
71 
In our opinion this 
formulation tends to attribute a degree of cohesion to party 
groupings that perhaps did not exist. There are also other 
problems in such a formulation. Many members of what Jones' 
calls the "party cell" ... 
did. ". have access to Bhutto, most 
notably Rashid himself. Additionally the elements Jones 
identifies in the "party cell" did not all gather around 
Rashid. As Jones himself points out "the left wing of the 
Punjab PPP was itself a collection of groups of varying 
size, organisational integrity, (and) ideological emphasis., 
72 
Moreover, Rashid was never, despite Jones' claim, "regarded 
by many as the. second most powerful leader in the Peoples 
Party. "73 Thus, there are several problems inherent in 
the criteria and assumptions that Jones makes to differen- 
tiate between the "central cell" and the "party cell". It 
would be more appropriate in our opinion to analyse the 
tensions Jones subsumes under "central cell-party cell clea- 
vage" in terms of intra-party ideological conflict between 
groups rather than fit them into neat organisational cate- 
gories which do not accurately reflect reality (or do so only 
at a very high level of generality). These tensions are 
discussed below. 
THE CHALLENGE FROM THE LEFT AND THE 1972 PARTY CONVENTION 
The main challenge to Bhutto's authority within the 
party - as well as to his approach to Pakistan's problems in 
general - came from the radical leftist groups within the 
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PPP. As we saw in earlier chapters (II, III, IV), the 
Left had from time to time, expressed dissatisfaction with 
many of Bhutto's policies in the past. This had manifested 
itself in the ticketing arrangements for the 1970 election, 
over the issue of electoral participation at the Hala 
Conference (July 1970), over the presence of feudals in the 
party and over Bhutto's attitude towards 'feudalism'. How- 
---ever; "the Left within the party was always an amorphous en- 
tity. It was by no means a united bloc and consisted of 
several groups that had allied themselves to the PPP at 
different stages independently of one another. The Mairaj 
group had close ties with radical labour and student unions 
(Mairaj was a former student leader of the National Students 
Federation) in Karachi, and called for radical change, by 
violence if necessary, to abolish feudalism and capitalism. 
The Mukhtar Rana group enjoyed radical labour union support 
in Lyallpur (Punjab) and can best be described as an in- 
digenous version of Anarcho-Syndicalism. 
74 Both these groups 
were committed to fundamental systemicf. reform. They 
agreed on the need to break up the industrial conglomerates, 
on establishing a Mazdoor-Kissan Raj (worker-peasant rule) 
in drastic reform of the Viceregal institutions (the mili- 
tary and the civil service), as well as a fundamental land 
reform. The Sheikh Rashid group consisted of old communist 
party workers associated with the former Kissan Committee, 
that had some experience of organising peasants in the 
Lahore district. Rashid believed in evolutionary trans- 
formation, with a major emphasis on developing new types of 
rural, social and economic structures ("agrovilles"). 
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I 
Mubashar, J. A. Rahim, Ramay and K. H. Meer (although not 
in one group) represented the urban intellectual social- 
democratic left". They were more moderate than the above 
two groups, but nevertheless believed in major reforms of 
the industrial and agrarian economic and social system to 
create a more equitable society. 
Out of these groups, the -fix-st-three began, immediate- 
ly after Bhutto's assumption of power, to question both 
Bhutto's promise to implement his party's manifesto as well 
as his clear intention to concentrate power in his hands. 
The discomfiture of these groups was enhanced by the new 
wave of entrants into the PPP. More than at any other time, 
the period äfter the transfer of power saw fhe----entry of c; 
several notables into the party. This trend was strongest 
in the rural areas where notable and gentry landlords 
f 
began to flock to the PPP. While this is discussed in some 
detail below, the entry in such large numbers of rural 
notables particularly in the Punjab, was a source of con- 
siderable tension between Bhutto and the leftist groups, and 
led to renewed doubts amongst the latter about the genuine- 
ness of Bhutto's commitment to even a minimal enactment of 
the party's manifesto. 
75 The various reforms announced by 
Bhutto were regarded by these groups as only a start towards 
the implementation of the manifesto. Moreover, many of 
the reforms -. the land reform in particular - fell far 
short of the expectations of these groups. 
The Mukhtar Rana group was the first to part com- 
pany with the PPP. 
76 
Condemning Bhutto for betraying the 
cause of the mehnat kash (toiling people), Rana called an 
, ,\ i 
i ý-- 
.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Awami Adalat (peoples court) in Lyallpur to 'try' Bhutto. 
At the mass rally, Rana accused Bhutto of perpetuating a 
'feudal martial law regime' and called upon him to come 
out of the cordon thrown around him by waderas, while in- 
sisting that-PPP reforms ought to be legislated into law by 
the-N. A. - and not issued as martial law regulations. 
77 
Rana., was 
arrested and subsequently sentenced (in April 1972) to five 
years of rigorous-imprisonment for making an "objectionable 
speech". 
8 
This sentence handed down under a 
martial law regime headed by Bhutto, was intended as a 
severe warning to the radical left, that Bhutto was not 
hesitant in using martial law against those who dared to 
oppose him. Subsequent to his arrest, Rana was stripped of 
his party membership and his seat in the N. A. 
79 
The Mairaj group was the second leftist faction to 
sever its links with the PPP. A minister in Bhutto's cen- 
tral cabinet since May 1972, Mairaj found his position in- 
creasingly untenable in view of what he felt were half- 
hearted attempts at industrial and land-reform. The Bhutto 
regime's use of force against striking workers at Karachi in 
June and October 1972 (see chapter V) precipitated Mairaj's 
break with the PPP. In protest against the government's re- 
pressive policies, Mairaj resigned from the government in 
October 1972.80 The fact that Mairaj's ouster came after 
a public slanging match in the press between him and 
, Kauser__Niazi who represented the Islamic, Right wing in the 
party, demonstrated that the party leadership concurred 
with Niazi's campaign to purge the party of "troublesome 
Communists". 81 Mairaj finally left the party in November 1973, 
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describing-it as a "degenerated form of Ayub's Convention 
League. " 82 Mairaj subsequently met the same fate as Rana. 
In 1974 he was arrested, and subsequently tried and sen- 
tenced to four years imprisonment by a special tribunal 
for making an "objectionable speech. "83 
The exit of these two men from the party, along with 
their respective followings deprived the regime of important 
labour (and in the case of Mairaj, student support as well) 
supporýJ- ät any rate in Karachi, Hyderabad and Lyallpur. 
Other leftist leaders (see below) were to follow suit after 
the Party Convention at Rawalpindi where the left was 
officially disowned. 
The proceedings of the 1972 Convention, 
84 held on 
30 November and 1 December 1972 (the third since the party 
was formed) deserves some attention as it was here that the 
party, under Bhutto's guidance, sought to formally disasso- 
ciate itself from the radical left. In his address to the 
convention as chairman of the party, Bhutto bitterly attack- 
ed the Leftists in the party, declaring that "most of our 
troubles come from----the---Left-; "--5-- -, To--, -the 
3,000 delegates who 
attended-the-convention Bhutto explained that his party's 
programme stood for socialism and not for communism. 
86 So 
far as socialist ideas were concerned, he claimed that his 
,F. government's nationalisation of insurance, the takeover of 
twenty basic industries and the resumption of the land with- 
out compensation and its distribution among farmers were 
all steps designed to establish socialism in the country. 
In this manner, Bhutto separated himself completely from 
the militant factions in the party and put forward a concept 
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of socialism that would be gradual. 
87 Individuals like 
Mairaj, Rashid and M. Kasuri - the latter had recently re- 
signed his ministership (see below, chapter VII) in protest 
at Bhutto's attempt to bring in a presidential structure dis- 
guised in parliamentary clothing - were specifically 
criticised. 
While Bhutto's address indicated deradicalisation of 
party ideology, the social composition of the convention 
---------- --- - ----- --- -- 
delegates i-tself suggested the growing importance of land- 
lord groups and aQnservative members within the party. The 
majority of the delegates came not from the older,, doctri- 
naire elements but consisted of local notables, recent 
'converts' and feudal groups in the Punjab and Sind. Indeed, 
the process of delegate selection before the convention met, 
had led to cleavages between the "bandwagonners" and the 
"original socialists", with intense rivalry and competition 
ý\between the two to gain a greater number of seats. 
88 While 
local committees were given the task of selecting delegates, 
in practice this was controlled by Governor Khar in-the 
Punjab and Chief Minister Mumtaz Bhutto in Sind, both 
close confidants of Bhutto. 
89 Both represented landlord 
groups and were obviously partial to their constituency. 
It was in protest against this bias that Mairaj refused to 
attend the convention, 
90 
while others, Taj Mohammed Langan 
and Mahmud Kasuri criticised this at a public meeting just 
before the convention met. 
91 
It was also largely in protest 
against this that the secretary-general, Rahim tendered his 
resignation to Bhutto at the end of the first session of 
the convention. 
92 
Bhutto, however, tore up Rahim's 
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resignation during his address to the convention, 
93 
while 
privately reassuring him that the PPP's commitment to 
socialism and democracy had not waned. 
94 
The convention's proceedings, despite all the pre- 
cautions taken to exclude 'dangerous theorists' still re- 
vealed differences, and many voices of dissent demanding 
'genuine implementation of the party manifesto' were heard. 
95 
Little was achieved from the debates at the convention in 
the sense of providing policy guidelines for governmental 
implementation. Nor was it intended to, for the convention 
was primarily a "speech-making convention". 
96 The twelve 
resolutions that were passed were vague and general express- 
ions of support fc, r issues ranging from Kashmir and Third World 
Unity, to ending corruption in the administration. 
97 One re- 
solution expressed confidence in Bhutto's leadership, "vision 
and determination". 
98 No committees were set up by the con- 
vention and no organisational plans outlined indi- 
cating Bhutto's unwillingness to dilute his own power of 
appointments and to keep matters of organisation 1 _f i. xmly with- 
in his own hands. The only significant decision taken was 
to make it incumbent upon those who had accepted governmental 
offices to give up their posts in the party. Predictably, 
Bhutto was exempted from this rule, enabling him to retainthe 
chairmanship of the party. The convention while recognising 
the problem of factionalism within the party, (discussed in 
chapter'VYI'below) made no effort to resolve it or even 
address 
itse, li_, to it. 99 This could not but be otherwise 
given Bhutto's desire to retain his personal initiative in 
the resolution of factional disputes. To have allowed the 
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emergence of some kind of institutional mechanism for con- 
flict resolution within the party would have meant under- 
mining his patrimonial position as the Great Arbiter. 
THE SHIFT IN THE PARTY'S SOCIAL BASE 
From the point of view of the PPP's left wing, the 
convention was a clear indication of the party's shift to 
the right, and a confirmation of their earlier apprehensions 
about Bhutto's intentions. Many leftist cadres departed 
from the PPP at this time, some going back into their former 
pursuits (e. g. journalism), while others like Zia-uddin Butt 
(former member of the PPP Punjab Organising Committee) join- 
ed leftist labour organisations like the Mazdur Majl s-e-Amal 
(Workers'Action Committee) of Multan, and the Muttahida 
Mazdur Mahaz (United Workers' Fro t_)--z Lahore, or political 
groups like the Young People's Front and the Mazdoor-Kissan 
Party. Those who stayed on in the PPP joined factional 
groupings around Sheikh Rashid, K. H. Meer, and Taj Mohammed 
Langah (a radical left leader from Multan). This indicated 
that ideological conflicts within the party would continue 
(as we shall see in chapter VII below) even if the exodus 
of many leftists from the PPP meant that such conflicts would 
no longer dominate the party. 
The exodus of several leftist groups from the party 
had other repercussions for the PPP. First, it meant an 
erosion in the party's support amongst the constituencies 
represented by them, i. e. part of the 'new' urban social 
groups that we earlier spoke about. Admittedly, this applied 
to the more radical sections of say unionised industrial 
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labour, but it was nevertheless an important constituency 
in urban Sind and Punjab (see below, chapter XII). Second- 
ly it deprived the party of many of its most active party 
organisers. And thirdly, it signalled a change--in--the 
character of the party's social base, which ultimately re- 
sulted in the domination of traditional feudal groups in the 
PPP. We turn now to a discussion of this transformation in 
the social composition of the PPP after its advent to power. 
As has been repeatedly emphasised throughout this 
study, the PPP had emerged as a coalition of diverse social 
groups, such as landlords, middle class professionals, urban 
socialists, Pdarxis-t_xadical. s. _. and- indu rial_labour. 
Thus, 
it contained both 'modern' and 'traditional' elements. 
Even before the party came to power, larger numbers of 
'traditionals' (landlords and local notables) began to enter 
the party. In an examination of war( 
Lahore district, Jones for example, 
type entrants" outnumbered "modern" 
between the Hala Convention and the 
I level PPP units in the 
found that "traditional 
entrants in the period 
1970 election 
100_ i. e. 
before the PPP won the election. Naturally, this trend 
became more pronounced after the PPP had won the election, 
and even more so once it assumed power. 
101 This phenomenon 
was particularly mar_ke_. _ 
'n the Punjab, where previously 
as we saw in ch pt r III1' he PPP, by and large, represent- 
ec the thrust of the newly-politicised mass sector and did 
f. 1 not (with a few exceptions) enjoy support amongst the Punjabi 
landed aristocracy. Now, leading Punjabi notables and 
gentry landlords flocked to the party. By 1975, these in- 
cluded the Pirs of Makhad, Manki Sharif and Taunsa Sharif, 
r 
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the Legharis and Khosas of Dera Ghazi Khan, the Daultanas, 
Khakwanis and Gilanis of Multan, the Pirachas, Tiwanas, 
Bandials and Qureishis of Sarghoda, the Tammans and Jodhras 
of Cambellpur, the Hayats of Wah, Kalabaghs of Mianwali, and 
the Pirs of Shah Jiwana of Sarghoda. In Baluchistan and 
the NWFP too, many traditional power-holders, tribal chief- 
tans, sardars, and Khans joined the party, giving it a foot- 
hold in. - provinces where prior to 1972, it enjoyed little 
support. 
In one sense the change in the PPP's social com- 
position was a reflection of its new resources. Like most 
other new ruling parties, the PPP was faced with the task 
of accommodating-a-host of new-adherents who were attracted 
-- -- - --- - 
by its control over governmental resources. Many landlord 
families, 
_for___instance, 
joined t_ha-_PPP_to_ both protect them- 
selves against land reform_l-egislat on/. mnplementation and tb 
gain access to decision-makers within the administration 
who made license, permit, quota, and loan decisions. Thus 
the entry of notables was undoubtedly a protective reaction, 
for access to the power system has always been crucial to 
the gaining and holding of land and wealth in the country- 
side. A natural bandwagon effect changed the social base 
of the party particularly in the Punjab (since the Sind PPP 
was already landlord dominated) as local leaders, landlords 
and many others who saw the potential advantage of politi- 
cal influence flocked to its banner. The importance of 
access grew steadily as the public sector of the economy 
expanded and as administrative decisions were increasingly 
politicised. On the one hand, the new adherents were welcomed 
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by the party leädersh-ip-as__add. itions to the party's 
support base; in return for lipservice to the PPP manifesto 
and an expression of loyalty to Bhutto, theyfound easy 
entry into the party. On the other hand, these new allies 
represented a more opportunistic. clientele; they were tied 
to the party largely by the flow of material benefits. 
Compared to many of the pre-1970 leaders and followers, 
the newcomers were conspicuous for their indifference to 
broad ideological issues but intensely moved by the dis- 
tribution of loaves and fishes. New adherents, far from 
being moved by a grandiose vision of an egalitarian society, 
viewed the party as a means of obtaining jobs for friends 
and relatives and of gaining access to the many services 
and material benefits which government at all levels can 
bestow. This indicated that the party would gradually be- 
transformed into a vehicle for the material advancement of 
notables. When leaders like Mubashar protested that 'waderas, 
jagirdars, and capitalists were flooding the party', it led 
to a personal intercession on Bhutto's part, who pointed 
out that he himself was a landowner. 
102 
Bhutto declared 
that political parties were not hujras (private cubicles) 
where paucity of space would occur, and compared his party 
to a great flowing river which was being joined by small 
torrents. 103 
The extent to which landlord and other traditional 
groups came to dominate the party can be demonstrated in a 
number of ways. An inquiry into the social origins of the 
top fifty leaders of the party (in 1975-76)- such a selection 
is based on the importance of the office (party or government) 
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held by them as well as characterisations of these figures 
as 'politically influential' by PPP leaders and workers in 
personal interviews conducted with the latter - reveals the 
following picture: 
BLE VI. 1 
SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF THE TOP 50 PPP LEADERS - 1975-76 
Social Background Number 
I Landlord 
Tribal Chief 6 
Businessman-cum-Contractor "5 
Middle Class Professional (Lawyer, 7 
Engineer, Teacher, etc. ) 
Former Ruler of Princely State 2 
Retired Civil Servant/Armed Force Personnel 2 
Trade Union Leader OD 
An alternative way of demonstrating the same phenomenon is 
to examine the extent to which the party became aligned with 
members__afthe_traditional landed aristocracy in the 
Punjab. In an article on the Punjab squirearchy, Craig Baxter 
lists 33 leading families which have played a dominant role 
in Punjabi politics since the beginning of the 20th Century104 
Taking this compilation of Punjab chiefs as our reference 
point, we find that 28 out of the 33 families had one or 
105 more member represented in the PPP by 1976. The growing 
importance of landlord groups within the party was also 
reflected in the party's representatives in the national 
legislature. In the Senate, for instance, out of the 31 
PPP members elected (in July/August 1973), more than half 
belonged to the landed aristocracy, while the rest were 
either lawyers cum small landlords, or retired civil 
servants. 06 
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In the Punjab, by 1976, the rural elite held the 
posts of the secretary-generalship of the (Punjab) PPP 
(Sayed Nasir Ali Rizvi), the Chief Ministership. (Nawab 
Sadiq Hussain Qureshi) and the Governorship (Amir of 
Bahawalpur). In the country, of the fifty-. two district PPP 
organisations set up in 1975, the chairmanship of thirty- 
two was in the hands of landlords or other notables. How- 
ever, nowhere was this landlord domination of the party more 
evident than in the PPP's list of nominees for the 1977 
election. As one observer has remarked with reference to 
the Punjab: 
"The list of PPP candidates reads like a 
'Who's Who' of the families that dominat- 
ed electoral politics in Punjab from 
1920 to 1958. " 107 
A survey of the PPP nominees from the Punjab reveals that 
about half of them had joined the party after it came to 
power, and had contested against the PPP in the 1970 elec- 
tion. 108 Thus, in 1977, the social base of the party in the 
Punjab was markedly different from that in 1970, when it 
was, by and large, the newer social groups that formed the 
PPP's main pillars of support. The growing dominance of 
the traditional landlord groups led to a concomitan -: -de- 
cline inte importance of the newer social groups, within 
the PPP 
: his__social -träns-1ör, ion of the PPP meant that 
the party's 'traditional' features came to predominate over 
its 'modern' features, indicating that the party would in- 
creasinglyassume the nature of a 'patron party' rather than 
a 'mass party'. 
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VII 
THE PPP: FACTIONALISM, PATRONAGE AND CORRUPTION 
FACTIONALISM IN THE PARTY 
One of the most striking features of the PPP in the 
period 1972-77 was the growth of factionalism in the party, 
- wh-i-ch-ser-iously dämäged its effectiveness as a governing 
party and led to an erosion of its legitimacy in the eyes 
of the public. Factionalism came to dominate the PPP to an 
extent that distinguished it from the factionalism that 
afflicts perhaps all political parties. Indeed, the entire 
history of the PPP in this period is one of intense intra- 
party factionalism, with Bhutto following a policy of fact- 
ional manipulation, producing deleterious consequences for 
the party organisation. 
To some extent, the tendency towards factionalism 
was inherent in the heterogenous character of the party 
membership. Bhutto's movement strategy fn the pre-1972 
period had brought into the party a wide assortment of dis- 
parate elements with potentially clashing interests. -We 
have analysed several cases of intra-party tensions in pre- 
vious chapters (see chapters II, III and IV) and indicated 
that Bhutto responded to the conflicting claims of the 
diverse groups that he had recruited into the PPP, through 
a policy of balance and manipulation. This suggested that 
these tensions far from being resolved, were likely to re- 
surface from time to time. 
After the PPP assumed power, the tendency towards 
factionalism increased as a consequence of the party's 
I 
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social transformation outlined above in chapter VI. The 
influx of "bandwagonners" (traditional power-holders for 
the most part) into the party intensified the heterogenous 
nature of the party's social composition, laying the found- 
ation for two t _pes---. o%fact-ion conflict 
in the party. One 
related to the tension between the older, more doctrinaire, 
söci" ä st-oriented, urban middle class elements (represent- 
a11 ve of the 'newer' social groups) and the_ tradjj; ional, 
feudal-dominated groups; while the other related to con- 
flicts amongst the latter, as they now sought to battle 
with each other over power, influence and the spoils of 
office. The two types correspond closely to the distinc- 
tion made by Giovanni Sartori between "factions of principle" 
(those motivated by ideology or ideas) and "factions of 
interest" (those motivated by immediate and tangible rewards 
such as power or/and spoils). 
' Some cases of factionalism 
in the PPP, as we shall see below, combined elements of 
both types. As a result of the change in the PPP's social 
base, "it was the latter type of factionalism that became 
increasingly frequent, -marked by the intensely personalistic 
character of factional- conflict. Even in cases of what 
appeared on the surface as ideological disputes between 
factional groups, on closer examination these often revealed 
personal enmities deceptively obscured by the ideological 
language in which such disputes were carried out. 
In whatever form in which it manifested itself, what 
Madison two centuries ago called the 'violence of faction'2 
afflicted the PPP at all levels. Disruptive strains were 
inherent not only because of the original make-up of the 
423 
party, but also by virtue of it, being ". the dominant 
party in the country. As Chambers has suggested, 
"the greater the success a party has 
in winning power and achieving a 
position of dominance, the greater the 
effect of this disruptive force is like- 
ly to be, as more and more disparate ele- 
ments find their way into the party's 
structure and power base. " 3 
A second divisive force lay in the tendency, as the party 
encompassed a wider variety of loosely attached elements, 
towards lessened intensity of unifying distinctly partisan 
loyalty among leaders and workers. Moreover, in the absence 
of an external threat (either from another party or as in 
the case of the party in opposition, from administrative 
reprisals), as the party was no longer under pressure to 
distinguish itself sharply from a threatening rival, the 
tendency was for firm, emotional attachments to the party 
to decline and these were often replaced by factional or 
personal attachments among its crucial leaders and workers, 
who no longer placed party welfare so high on the scale of 
values as against other claims. The further a party has 
progressed with the passage of time toward status as an 
institution and toward organisation, the less likely it is 
that such a unifying party spirit will occur or create 
severe damage, but the PPP had hardly reached this stage 
of development. Indeed, it is noteworthy that Bhutto's 
earlier movement strategy and his personalist' approach had 
in large-part precluded any real effort to forge a 'party 
ident-ity'. Disparate elements, often with pre-e)Usting---" 
loyalties to other groups or individuals, were welcomed into 
the PPP with less regard to the-extent-to which they 
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identified with the PPP or its programme in any meaning- 
ful sense, than to their demonstration of loyalty to 
Bhutto. 
Given this background, our concern, below, however, 
is not. merely to show that factionalism existed in the 
party or that such factionalism had a highly personalist 
nature. Of themselves, such characteristics have been 
common in Pakistani party politics as well as in the poli- 
tics of other societies at similar stages of development. 
What was peculiarly distinctive about factionalism within 
the PPP and set it off from, say the factionalism that 
afflicted Muslim League politics in the '40s and '50s, 
4 
was 
the interplay between factionalism and Bh to's patrimonial 
, authority. 
5 Thus, what requires emphasis is the manner in 
which Bhutto sought to manipulate factionalism in order to 
assert his person lY-control over the party, playing a game 
of balancing factions, while paradoxically, calling for 
strict party discipline and attempting to check divisive 
--strains within the party. As we shall see below, by means 
of constant flux and/or shifting of actors from one arena to 
another, Bhutto _sought 
to avoid open contentions for power 
in order to eliminate situations in which any faction or 
factional leader might weaken his own power. By shifting C/ 
political lieutenants, disgracing-those -whö'seemed to be 
gaining popularity, and often bringing them back as 
chastened men, he gave little opportunity for factions to 
_become consolidated. An examination of factionalism in the 
Sind and Punjab would illustrate this pattern of interplay 
between factionalism and patrimonialisrn. 
Iýj f\-. 
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A good illustration of the 'factionalism of 
pn_ ciR le' is provided by the ideological conflict in the 
Punjab between Sheikh Rashid and Mustafa Khar, who were 
president and secretary-general of the Punjab PPP respect- 
ively. The factional feud reflected ideological differences 
with Sheikh Rashid representing a section of the Punjab left 
wing in the provincial party and Khar closely aligned with 
theJPunjabi zamindars. This factional feud had surfaced 
several times in the past, as for instance in the ticket- 
ing arrangements for the 1970 elections, when Khar strongly 
opposed Rashid's (who was President of the Punjab parlia- 
mentary board) policy of "keeping out the feudals" and was 
able, through his membership of the PPP Central Parliament- 
ary Review Board, to manoeuvre many of the reversals of the 
decisions made by Rashid. This, importantly, enabled 
Khar to build up a body of loyal supporters among future 
PPP MNAs and MPAs. 
7 This factional feud had also mani- 
fested itself in a struggle for the chief ministership of 
the Punjab in 1971 when the transfer of power to the PPP 
became imminent. 8 
After the transfer of power to the PPP Khar was 
appointed governor of the Punjab (by Bhutto), and was 
allowed to retain his post as secretary-general. Khar now 
set up his own Punjab PPP headquarters in an apparent act 
of challenge to the Rashid group. This marked the begin- 
ning of a parallel provincial organisation that gradually 
replaced the original Rashid-dominated organisation. 
Rashid's appointment as minister of health in the central 
cabinet meant that he had none of the resources that Khar 
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had as governor, for the latter office controlled not 
only patronage in the province, but also the police 
machinery. With these resources, his support in the Punjab 
PPP legislature, as well as his growing reputation as 
Bhutto's chief lieutenant and close confidant , Khar moved 
quickly to assert control over the Punjab PPP. 
9 
During 
1972 and the first half of 1973, many pro-Rashid elements 
were harassed, intimidated and purged from the party at 
various levels throughout the province. 
10 
In order to 
eliminate his factional rivals Khar undoubtedly enjoyed 
Bhutto's support, as Bhutto welcomed the opportunity as 
a means of controlling radicals in the party. Bhutto 
followed a balance of power strategy which for the moment 
demanded tilting the balance in favour of the Khar faction. 
At this stage, Bhutto needed Khar to establish a strong 
and effective PPP government in a province which the former 
had alluded to as the "bastion of power" in Pakistan. Under 
Bhutto's direction, Khar established what was often refer- 
red to at the time, as a Danda regime (rule by the rod) 
characterised by an authoritarianism that was more reminis- 
cent of the Kalabagh days than that envisaged in the PPP's 
promises of Awami Raj (People's Rule). 
11 
In his activities to purge the party of 'undesir- 
ables' Khar utilised the services of two of his cabinet 
colleagues and personal friends, Choudrey Irshad and 
Iftikhar Ahmed Tari, both of whom were reported to have 
underworld connections. 12 A central committee meeting in 
July 1973, decided to "reorganise" the party (in Punjab 
and Sind) by forming new provincial committees and naming 
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new office-bearers. While elections were promised, for 
the time being, the new bodies would continue to be 
nominated in effect by Bhutto. 
13 In accordance with the 
decision of the 1972 convention, both Khar and Sheikh Rashid 
had to give up their party posts. Khar now prevailed upon 
Bhutto to have his close supporter, Afzal Wattoo nominated 
as President of the Punjab PPP, while ensuring that the 
majority of the 60-member provincial committee was also 
filled with his nominees. 
14 This ensured Khar's total 
control over the Punjab party, a situation created, for the 
most part, by Bhutto's patrimonial designation rather than 
one reflecting the Khar faction's initial numerical super- 
iority or support. Such control was all the more per- 
vasive since according to the party constitution, the pro- 
vincial committees had the task of nominating the party 
tiers at the district level. In this manner, the Khar 
faction could ensure their supremacy at the lower tiers 
throughout the province. As far as Sheikh Rashid was concern- 
ed, it was reported that he had been completely bypassed 
in matters regarding the provincial reorganisation. 
15 
That Wattoo was chosen (a defeated candidate in the 
1970 election), despite numerous allegations of corruption 
against him; while he served as provincial labour minister. 
by a group of Bahawalpur MPA's, promised that factional 
in-fighting in the Punjab would no longer be confined to 
the Khar-Rashid struggle. 
16 Predictably factional war- 
fare broke out between supporters of Wattoo and Manzoor 
Mohal, chairman Bahawalpur district PPP. Their personal 
animosity was based partly on biradari rivalries, but for 
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the most part, reflected a personal struggle over the 
distribution of the 'goods' of office. Wattoo, enjoying 
Khar's backing, was able to assert factional supremacy 
which culminated in the arrest of Mohal in July 1973 on 
charges of corruption. 
17 
That both factions accused each 
other of corruption publicly could only tarnish the image 
of the party in the Punjab. At Khar's insistence, Wattoo 
also moved against other opponents ordering 'inquiries' 
whenever an opponent proved recalcitrant. 
18 Such actions 
brought Wattoo into open conflict with Sheikh Rashid, with 
the latter refusing to attend meetings of the provincial 
committee in-protest. 
19 A reconciliation was brought 
about by Bhutto after Sheikh Rashid was assured that some 
of the old purged officials would be reinstated. 
20 Wattoo, 
however, largely on Khar's instructions, continued to sus- 
pend members in various parts of the Punjab on charges of 
either corruption or indicipline. 
21 The state of factional- 
ism was serious enough to merit a severe, warning by Bhutto 
to party leaders to refrain from criticising one another 
and creating rifts in the party ranks, in February 1974.22 
Bhutto realised that while factionalism could be manipulated 
to an extent to consolidate his own power position, an 
excess of intra-party conflict could only weaken the party 
and erode its legitimacy. The paradox inherent in Bhutto's 
policy manifested itself repeatedly in factional politics 
in- Punjab as we shall see below. However, as far as the 
Rashid-Khar/Wattoo factional struggle was concerned, it 
is apparent that the former suffered a decisive defeat. 
Although the Rashid group would later attempt to regain 
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their influence in the Muhasaba (accountability) 
committees that emerged as a consequence of factional shifts 
and Khar's growing unpopularity in the Punjab, as we shall 
see below, it was never able to recover its original 
strength. 
Another illustration of 'factionalism of principle' 
is provided by the activities of the Manshoor or 'Manifesto 
Group'. This group emerged within the PPP national- 
parlia-mentary party on the eve of the passage4öithe Permanent 
Cons i ution in March i73; --: acnd e'flected ifferences bet- 
ween Bhutto and several party leaders over the former's 
constitutional proposals. Formed on 28 March, the 
Manshoor group which was also known as the 'Democratic 
Group' consisted of eight dissident MNAs 
2A 
socially di- 
verse group, containing both young landlords (Noon) and 
urban middle class elements (Kasuri, Rao), the members were 
united by their opposition to Bhutto's "one man rule" both 
in the party and the country. The main figure behind the 
group was Mahmud Ali Kasuri, one of the vice-chairmen of 
the PPP and an eminent jurist both in the country and abroad. 
In April 1972, Kasuri resigned as Minister for Law and 
Parliamentary Affairs as well as gave up his post as chair- 
man of the constitution committee (an all-party N. A. commit- 
tee set up to frame the new constitution) in protest 
against Bhutto's proposals for a strong executive. 
25 There- 
after Kasuri had repeatedly been harassed by the Khar regime 
through involving him in "false income tax cases. "26 Under 
Kasuri's direction, the 'Manshoor Group' aimed to function 
as a pressure group to force the party to adhere to its 
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manifesto and promised to "fight against Bhutto's attempt 
to establish a fascist state in the country". The members 
of the group, however, were subjected to official harass- 
ment, legal persecution and threats of violence. 
27 Such 
harsh treatment illustrated the manner in which Bhutto 
sought to punish those who dared to challenge his authority 
in the party. In protest against such tactics, two mem- 
bers of-the Group (the two Kasuris) severed their connec- 
tions with the PPP and joined Asghar Khan's Tehriq-e- 
Istaglal party. 
28. Their exodus weakened the group con- 
siderably, although the two Kasuris often aligned with the 
group in the national legislature, and emerged as the most 
vocal critics of the Bhutto regime. The Manshoor group 
attempted to exert pressure on the government to withdraw 
some of its severe proposals designed to curtail civil 
liberties, and was a considerable source of embarrassment to 
the party. At the same time, it often pushed the oppo- 
sition parties in the N. A. into adopting a harder stance against 
governmental proposals. 
From wjthin the parliamentary PPP, other voices 
of dissent, too were-. heard from time to time, from Sheikh 
Rashid and other old, left-leaning members. For instance, 
in August 1973 when the parliamentary. PPP nominated 
Choudrey Fazal Elahi and Sahibzada Farooq All for the office 
of President and Speaker respectively, the leftists ex- 
pressed strong disapproval, pointing out that it was 
embarrassing for them to explain to their constituencies 
why an ostensibly socialist party had nominated a landlord 
(Fazal Elahi) and a landlord-cum-industrialist (Farooq) to 
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two of the highest offices in the country. 
29 In protest 
against these nominations, Rahim had even refused to attend 
parliamentary party meetings in August 1973.30 Similar 
protests were made by J. A. Rahim during the Senate elec- 
tions in July 1973 when Bhutto nominated over fifty per 
cent landlords as the party's candidates. 
31 Outside the 
legislature Rahim protested publicly against the entrance 
to the party of Aziz Ahmed, -32 an old bureaucrat, against 
his election as senator, and his subsequent appointment 
as minister of state for defence and foreign affairs. 
33 To 
Rahim, Aziz Ahmed personified everything that needed chang- 
ing in Pakistan and he also intimated that Bhutto had gone 
back on almost all his promises, seeking to build a cult 
around himself. 
34 
The Rahim-Bhutto conflict deserves some attention ----_ ---------- 
since it reflected important-policy disagreements between 
-35- the two. A former career official of the foreign service, 
Rahim had played a major role in the conception and found- 
ing of the PPP. His evident integrity and his seniority 
made-him one of the most respected figures in the party. 
In the past Rahim"had"been a constant spokesman in the PPP 
___for maintaining 
the ideological and organisational integrity 
of the party, hoping, that. it_would be able to play a major 
role in governmental policy-making. Also, he was one of 
the few central leaders close--to Bhutto, who had repeatedly 
indicated concern about the latter's attempts to build a 
personal following in the party, and had been critical of 
the dominant trend in-the-. PP-P---of putting. loyalty to Bhutto 
above that of the party. This was clearly reflected in the 
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Rahim-Bhutto correspondence of 1970, mentioned earlier(see 
chapter III, note 132). RaY m had also been severely critical 
Of-the entry in the party after 1972 of elements (such as 
feudals) whose commitment to socialist principles was to 
say--he least, highly suspect. 
36--Tn em'Uer 1972, Rahim 
reasser e eed for elections in the party, and 
emphasised the importance of forming "a hard core party 
cadre" while "weeding out undesirable elements of the 
party. "37 Clearly, Rahim's outspoken views on such issues, 
together with his opposition to specific actions taken by 
Bhutto (such as the appointment of Aziz Ahmed), became a 
source of annoyance to Bhutto. The treatment meted out to 
Rahim subsequently amply illustrates the manner in which 
Bhutto dealt with those in the party who held independent 
views. On 2 July 1974, during a dinner party at Bhutto's 
residence, when the guests including Rahim, were made to 
wait for several hours before the host appeared, Rahim 
complained that Bhutto treated his party men like personal 
fiefs and ruled Pakistan like a personal 'Rajwadad' 
38 (principality). Learning of these remarks, Bhutto without 
consulting with anyone, dismissed Rahim from the government 
and the secretary-generalship of the party on the spot. 
Like many other party members, Rahim was thrown out of the 
PPP without the 'consultation' required by Article Ten 
of the party's interim constitution. 
39 
In the early hours 
of the'following day, 
.a 
contingent of the FSF descended 
upon Rahim's residence with the express purpose of serving 
him with a letter of dismissal. Thereafter, Rahim and his 
son were beaten up and driven to the police station. 
40 
433 
Afterwards, when Rahim was released he was continuously 
harassed, tortured on one occasion, while a 'case' was 
registered against him for possessing 'objectionable 
material'. 
41 The Rahim affair amply demonstrated that 
Bhutto was not reluctant to use force to silence intra-party 
crit'1utsns; sin-ee he viewed such criticism as a challenge 
to his authority. 
The arbitrary manner in which Bhutto dismissed 
Rahim did not constitute an exceptional case. Another 
critic, Mubashar Hasan whose views on economic policy did 
not always correspond with Bhutto's was ousted from the 
4 
cabinet in October 1974 in as arbitraryä manner as Rahim. 
2 
UnIi e i-him, Mubashar was placated by his appointment as 
the party's new secretary-general (in January 1975). However, 
the exit of both Rahim and Mubashar from the cabinet in 1974, 
both founder-members of the party known for their progress- 
ive, social-democratic views, was received with undisguised 
satisfaction in the party's right-wing circles (Peerzada, 
Niazi, etc. ),, and marked the latter's ascendancy over the 
'socialist' component. This constituted one aspec. t__o... -. the 
process that was described earlier as the gradual deradical- 
isation of the party, involving a shift to the right in 
terms of ideology and a decisive change in the social make- 
up of its central leadership. 
Before we go on to look at 'factionalism of interest' 
it is appropriate to mention another source of intra-party 
discord that was a hybrid type, i. e. in part ideological and 
in part personal. This relates to the factional struggle 
between Khursh d Hasan Meer and Kauser Niazi, both members 
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of the central cabinet. The conflict was couched in 
ideological jargon with the latter representing the 
'Islamic Socialists' and the former propounding the 'Scien- 
tific Socialist' case, but the conflict also reflected an 
intense personal rivalry for power. 
43 
One indication of 
the latter was that factional followers of both leaders did 
not always fall into the neat Left-Right categories that 
4 
Niazi/Meer -claimed. Thus 
an ideological basis, it 
calls 'power groups' i, e, 
power's sake. 
44 In other 
what we earlier described 
while the factional conflict had 
contained elements of what Sartori 
factions motivated by power for 
words, it combined elements of 
as factions of interest and fact- 
ions of principle. Both factions sought to discredit one 
another, with the Rawalpindi branch of the party split bet- 
ween the rival factions. Both factions appealed to Bhutto 
to dismiss the minister opposed, each suggesting that the 
other was actually conspiring against the Quaid-e-Awam 
(i. e. Bhutto). 
45 This underscored an important aspect of 
factional conflict within the PPP, suggesting that factional 
supremacy depended less on the numerical superiority attained 
by a faction than on gaining Bhutto's favour. The crucial 
factor for each faction was the attainment of Bhutto's 
patrimonial support and correspondingly, the discrediting 
of opposing factions in Bhutto's eyes - hence the accusations 
accompanying most factional conflicts that a rival faction 
represented a conspiracy against Bhutto himself. When a 
member of the Niazi faction levelled charges of corruption 
against Meer, the latter offered to resign and invited an 
open inquiry into such charges. 
46 That Bhutto promptly 
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accepted both the offers was indicative that his sympathies 
at the time lay with the Niazi group. 
47 With Meer's loss 
of office, several members of his faction shifted their 
support to Niazi, declaring that they would shun 'groupism' 
as demanded by Bhutto. 
48 Meer resigned his post in the party 
as well and proceeded to join the 'Manifesto Group' in the 
national assembly (N. A. ) in 1975. By 1975 Niazi appeared 
to have consolidated his position considerably, enabling 
him to emerge as a major figure at the centre. Bhutto now 
proceeded to shift power once again, this time away from 
Niazi. Towards the end of 1975,. a 'reconciliation' was 
reached with Meer, and he was brought again into the 
central cabinet in an effort to countervail Niazi's growing 
influence. 49 Such a balancing strategy ensured that neither 
faction would acquire any significant degree of stability, 
while at the same time creating that atmosphere of insecur- 
ity and unpredictability which we earlier suggested was an 
essential condition for the assertion of patrimonial 
authority. 
As suggested earlier, many of the internal conflicts 
of the party were not related to ideological disputes or, 
for that matter, to disputes over major. questions of public 
policy, but represented 'factions of interest'. Nowhere 
was this more obvious than in Sind where factionalism cen- 
trod around the tussle for power between Jatoi and Mumtaz 
Bhutto on the one hand, and the Talpurs and Jam Sadiq All 
an the other. Factional affiliations in both cases related 
to the need for status and prestige. In the case of the 
former, the factional feud was based not on social cleavages 
436 
I 
nor biradari rivalries, but reflected personal differences. 
50 
For a time, the Mumtaz Bhutto faction gained dominance 
(1972-73) but only as long as Mumtaz enjoyed the support 
of his cousin at the centre. By the end of 1973, Mumtaz 
had gained the reputation of the 'strong man of Sind' 
backed by a growing body of personal followers whose 
allegiance to him was based on personal friendships, biradari 
loyalties, status aspirations and desire for access to the 
wide variety of rewards/favours that he had the power to 
dispense. Bhutto's response t6-what, in one sense, can be 
described as the emergence of Mumtaz's 'personal machine' 
within the party (i. e. the consolidation of personal support 
through patronage) was predictably that which any patrimonial 
leader would follow. 
51 In December 1973, he replaced Mumtaz 
by Jatoi as chief minister in order to check the former 
from entrenching himself and establishing his own personal 
following. Since Mumtaz's power to attract factional follow- 
ers was dependent, for the most part, on his continued 
access to patronage and government largesse a new realign- 
ment of forces followed in Sind leading to some defections 
from the Mumtaz camp. The factional struggle, however, 
continued with Mumtaz criticising the Jatoi government's. poli- 
cies, and the latter retaliating by threatening to "raise 
the curtain from his misdeeds when he was chief minister". 
52 
Mumtaz's influence in Sind was neutralised through party 
"reorganisations" which put Jatoi's supporters in import- 
ant posts, and by instituting 'inquiries' into cases of 
corruption involving Mumtaz's closest supporters 53 At the 
same time Bhutto intervened to placate Mumtaz by appointing 
54 him a minister in the central cabinet. 
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Jam Sadiq Ali's factional feud with Rasul Baksh 
Talpur - both of whom belonged to the wadera class - was in 
part based on family rivalries that predated the party. In 
this case, factional affiliations were based upon personal 
friendship, kinship ties and biradari loyalties. Jam Sadiq 
was also able to attract factional followers from amongst 
those who viewed his close association with Mumtaz Bhutto 
and later, with Jatoi, as a means of gaining access to 
administrative favours and protection. In July 1972, Sadiq, 
through Mumtaz's tacit support, sought to discredit Talpur 
by suggesting that the Talpur family sympathised with the 
Baluchi regionalists and were helping them surreptitiously , 
55 
Coming at the end of what Talpur regarded as a campaign 
of vilification against him, and after his prior protests 
had been ignored by Bhutto, Talpur announced his resignation 
from the governship of Sind. and left the party. As with 
other party deserters, the official PPP press in Sind heaped 
abuse on him, calling him 'corrupt', a 'dope addict', and 
suggesting that the Talpur family's ambitions were insat- 
iable. 56 
Factional conflict in the party increasingly came 
to reflect the 'power' and 'spoils' motivation rather than 
ideology or policy differences, This can be illustrated 
from the case of the Punjab. 
In 1974, with the Khar-Rashid conflict receding into 
the background factional struggles now began between Khar 
and opponent factions consisting largely of landlord groups. 
The rivalry had its basis not in differences over policy, 
but in the competition for the spoils of office (and to a 
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lesser extent, biradari rivalries). Khar maintained that 
opposing groups consisted of those who felt deprived of 
an adequate share in the spoils of office. 
57 Khar's main 
opponents were landed notables (belonging largely to the 
Multani landed. 
_ 
gentry), such as M. K. Khakwani, Khalid 
Malik, Yaqub Maan and Syeda Abida Hussain, who resented the 
centralisation of all patronage in his hands. Khar sought 
to deal with such opponents under the guise of an anti- 
corruption drive in the party, registering cases against 
opposing factions led by Yaqub Maan, Raja Munnawar, 
Khakwani and Khalid Malik (all landlords). 
58 For instance, 
one case against Khalid Malik alleged that he had accepted 
a bribe for interceding with the police administration in 
Lyallpur to 
-free 
a suspected murderer. The Maan-Khakwani 
groups found sympathetic support amongst urban-based PPP 
politicians like Hanif Ramay, Mubashar Hasan and K. H. Meer 
who were strictly opposed to Khar's brand of authoritarian- 
ism and goonda gardi (goonism), which had increasingly de- 
generated into acts of terror. Such acts included cases, 
abductions, threats and alleged political murders, and 
were directed against opponents both in the party and out- 
side, all of which undoubtedly brought the PPP much unpopu- 
larity in the Punjab, especially when this occurred in an 
economic situation of severe inflation and shortages of 
essential goods. Many PPP leaders at the centre, such as 
Hafeez Peerzada, also felt the need to make common cause 
with the anti-Khar elements because of their own personal 
animosities towards Khar. In Peerzada's (a Sindhi) case 
such an animosity had elements of inter-regional rivalry, 
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for the two-had often clashed in meetings of the inter- 
provincial co-ordination committee over issues such as the 
allocation of development funds and division of the Indus 
waters between the provinces of Sind and Punjab. 
59 
Bhutto himself became increasingly concerned over 
what he saw as Khar's efforts to establish his own politi- 
cal fiefdom in the Punjab. His discomfiture was not 
assuaged when he saw Khar assuming the title of Quaid-e- 
Punjab and Sher-e-Punjab (Leader and Lion of Punjab respect- 
ively). At one stage, Bhutto prevailed on Khar to exclude 
Iftikhar Tari (a staunch Khar loyalist) from his cabinet 
(in November 1973), at the request of Ramay. 
60 Now, when 
some of his central ministers, notably Peerzada, pointed 
out to him that Khar, through a combination of terror and 
patronage was building a personal following in the Punjab 
which could eventually be used to threaten Bhutto, this only 
confirmed the latter's own fears about Khar's ambitions., 
61 
That Bhutto was deeply-concerned about the situation in the 
Punjab is indicated by his instructions to his personal 
staff in the P. M. 's Secretariat to look into these factional 
squabbles and suggest ways of dealing with Khar. 
62 
The 
advice of these bureaucrats further reinforced Bhutto's 
belief that the time had come to check Khar's growing 
strength and deprive his faction of his patrimonial favour. 
Accordingly, Bhutto encouraged the Maan-Khakwani group in 
preparing a memorandum against Khar which was signed by 
14 MPAs, and submitted to him towards the end of January 
1974.63 The memorandum alleged several cases of corruption 
and nepotism on Khar's part, as for instance, granting 
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permits to set up mills to his friends and jobs for 
families of his close political associates. 
64 This coin- 
cided with the establishment on an ad hoc basis of several 
Muhasaba committees in the district and city PPP units, 
which denounced the repressive nature of the Khar regime 
and "exposed" widespread corruption among Khar-appointed 
office-bearers of the party. The impetus behind the creation 
of these committees came from members of the Sheikh Rashid 
faction as well as the anti-Khar coalition of PPP landlords 
and urban politicians. 
65 Thus, the Rashid faction, although 
it was only one element in the situation, was nonetheless 
a contributory factor in the pressures that finally ousted 
Khar from office. 
Khar resigned his position as chief executive of 
the Punjab in March 1974, declaring, however his full faith 
in Bhutto's leadership, and stating that he would choose 
death rather than betray Bhutto. Khar explained: 
"Bhutto was the general and we are all 
his soldiers and he has every right to 
assign us soldiers to any post and I am 
there to obey his commands. " 66 
Bhutto replaced Khar with Hanif Ramay in order to neutralise 
Khar's influence in Punjabi politics, for the latter was 
amongst Khar's chief political opponents. While much was 
written in the government controlled press67 about how the 
balance had tilted in favour of the urban, middle class in 
view of Ramay's social background, this change 
_ 
was more 
apparent than real, for Ramay was strongly supported by the 
Maan-Khakwani-Khalid Malik faction. Besides, the overwhelm- 
ing majority of his cabinet consisted of landlords. However, 
that the new chief minister accommodated two Khar supporters - 
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Abdul Khaliq and Afzal Wattoo - indicated that Khar was 
by no means a dead force in Punjabi politics. 
68 This was 
also demonstrated at a Punjabi provincial committee soon 
after when Khar's opponents led by Meraj Khalid (a Ramay 
supporter) tabled a resolution to expel Khar from the 
party; in the event only four members voted for the move, 
while 56 members voted against it. 
69 
This in fact under- 
lined to Bhutto the necessity for purging the party bodies 
of Khar supporters, a move that the former undertook by 
the announcement on 21 May that the Punjab committee stood 
dissolved 70 Bhutto replaced Wattoo with Meraj Khalid as 
president, and sought to balance the Left (factions) with 
the Right by nominating a landlord, Syed Nasir Rizvi as 
general secretary and Taj Mohammed Langah, a radical 
socialist, as deputy secretary general of the Punjab PPP. 
Once again, those who found themselves wielding power 
through Bhutto's patrimonial designation utilised party 
'reorganisation" to settle factional scores, despite Meraj 
Khalid's assurance that there would be no "witch-hunting". 
71 
Such purges of Khar's supporters obviously enjoyed Bhutto's 
blessings. However, his calls for party unity indicated 
his desire to check the violent extremities to which 
settling such factional scores were often taken. 
72 
At 
the same time he seemed to have accepted that disruptions 
in the party ranks were to some extent inevitable when he 
made the philosophic observation that differences within 
the ruling party had been a feature of Punjabi and Sindhi 
politics since the 1940's and that it would take time for 
such (personal) politics to change. 73 
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Khar and Bhutto continued to meet throughout this 
period with the latter privately reassuring the former that 
he still enjoyed his confidence. 
74 However, Khar saw his 
friends and supporters losing more and more offices at the 
district and provincial level as a consequence of the 
party's "reorganisations". 
75 At the same time, the Ramay 
government began to harass and institute cases against 
Khar's closest friends and supporters like Kahloan and 
Choudrey Irshad. This was accompanied by a campaign in the 
official press aimed at discrediting Khar's image. 
76 Khar 
retaliated by criticising the Ramay government, alleging 
victimisation and letting it be known that it was he, not 
Ramay, who commanded the support of the majority of MPAs. 
77 
This was followed by a campaign of innuendos designed to 
create the impression that he had sacrificed public office 
for the sake of Punjab's interests and that the whole campaign 
against him was in fact a sinister Sindhi (Bhutto) conspiracy 
against Punjab. 
78 The justification of loss of office 
(through losing Bhutto's confidence) on the basis of 
policy considerations, was perhaps too belated to sound 
convincing. 
Thatfactionalism remained a persistent feature of 
PPP politics was indicated by repeated warnings issued by 
Bhutto against "dragging personal feuds into politics" 
79 
as well as the growing tendency among party office-bearers, 
MNAs and MPAs to criticisms one another publicly. 
80 
On 
one occasion Bhutto reminded his party members that faction- 
alism was fatal to democracy and recalled how democratic 
institutions in Pakistan had atrophied due to factionalism. 81 
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Bhutto was referring here not only to the Khar-Ramay 
factional struggle, but also to the local conflicts in 
many districts of the Punjab between rival groups on the 
basis of biradarism", personal rivalries and competition 
for the spoils of office, e. g. licences, permits, jobs, 
funds. Bhutto attempted to deal with both in much the 
same manner - through a policy of balancing, and the con- 
stant shuttling of power between factional leaders. This is 
illustrated by the manner in which he dealt with the Khar- 
Ramay struggle. 
The Khar-Ramay tussle which ultimately culminated 
in Khar's open challenge to Bhutto's authority needs to 
be outlined briefly, for this episode helps to reveal all 
the major features characterising factionalism in the PPP 
and the manner in which Bhutto sought to deal with it. It 
demonstrates the intensely personal character of factional 
conflict, Bhutto's constant shuffling of power between dif- 
ferent factions, his attempt to prevent any faction from 
acquiring any degree of stability and his use of force to 
weaken or eliminate factional support when other methods 
failed. Such characteristics are to be found - perhaps 
with various degrees of intensity - in several other cases 
of factionalism that occurred within the party. 
In March 1975, following a period of bestowing 
favour upon the Ramay group, Bhutto suddenly brought back 
Khar, appointing him, to what under the 1973 constitution 
was a largely ceremonial post of governor of Punjab. 82 
Contrary to what Bhutto had privately led Khar to believe, 
83 Ramay remained chief minister. This action can only be 
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interpreted as part of a conscious policy followedby Bhutto to 
engineer and renew the factional conflict between Khar and 
Ramay, possibly with a view to neutralise the influence 
of both protagonists. Predictably, the two, once again, 
engaged in bitter dispute, with Ramay accusing Khar of 
attempting to run a parallel administration. Ramay retalia- 
ted with the now familiar method of instituting corruption 
cases against Khar supporters, Kahloan and Tari. 
84 Ramay 
tried to give what had increasingly become a personal 
struggle with Khar an ideological slant by suggesting that 
this was a conflict between a progressive socialist and a 
reactionary representative of landlord interests - an attempt 
that met with little success. At this point, Bhutto inter- 
vened, removing both from their respective offices - the 
removal of Ramay on 14 July was followed by Khar's depart- 
ure by the end of the month. - Ramay was replaced by 
Sadiq Hussain Qureshi, a member of the Punjabi traditional 
aristocracy, who had earlier given up the governorship to 
Khar in March, while the former ruler of the princely state 
of Bahawalpur was appointed governor. More than at any 
other time, the new Punjab PPP government reflected the 
-dominance of 
the traditional rural elite. 
While Khar was not promised a new post, Ramay was 
assured that he would have a seat in the central cabinet. 
In July he was elected to the Senate in its mid-term 
elections, but the promise of ministership had not mater- 
ialised by October. Meanwhile, the new chief minister who 
was widely described in the official press as a 'neutral' 
figure, who had "stayed clear of factional fights", 85 began 
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a campaign on Bhutto's behest, to root out "goondas, 
exploiters and corrupt elements from the party., 
86 Such 
a campaign was designed to neutralise the influence of 
both the Khar and Ramay factions. In several districts of 
the Punjab, rallies were organised against pro-Khar fact- 
87 ions . 
This formed the background to Khar's eventual de- 
cision to challenge Bhutto's authority. This deserves some 
attention, as it was perhaps the most serious confrontation 
that Bhutto faced from within his party, throughout the 
years that he was in power. In order to regain his in- 
fluence in the Punjab, Khar asked for the PPP's nomination 
in the by--election to the Punjab assembly seat vacated by 
Ramay in Lahore. This request was turned down by the 
party's central executive (i. e. Bhutto), which decided in- 
stead to nominate a minor party worker from Lahore. At 
this humiliation Khar resigned from the party on 24 September 
1975, declaring his intention to contest the election as 
an independent. At the same time he launched a campaign 
against the Bhutto government accusing it of betraying the 
interests of the Punjab -a vaguely worded charge designed 
to whip up emotional chauvinist sentiment, but one which 
promised to have some potency given the declining economic 
situation in the province. This open challenge to Bhutto's 
authority -a situation that Bhutto had always meticulous- 
ly tried to avoid - was viewed with the utmost seriousness 
by the party high command. The government unleashed a 
vigorous campaign in which all central and provincial 
ministers participated, to discredit Khar by issuing a long 
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catalogue of charges against him ranging from murder, 
rape and abduction to corruption. 
88 
: Sheikh Rashid's 
statements that Khar's ouster was "not the exit of an 
individual but of a feudal class" seemed unconvincing in 
view of those Bhutto had picked to-succeed him. 
89 
PPP 
newspapers, like Musawaat, published old pictures showing 
students and lawyers being beaten up by police during what 
was described as Khar's dictatorial rule. 
90 Publishing 
long lists of Khar's 'misdeeds', newspapers conveniently 
forgot that Khar had, after all, run a PPP government. Khar 
and his supporters were meted out the same treatment that 
they themselves had once dealt to ther opponents. When Khar 
addressed an election rally in Tajpura in Lahore, Federal 
Security Forces (FSF) broke up the meeting and several 
people died in the. violence that followed. 
91 Shortly 
before polling, Ramay in an amazing political somersault, 
declared his support for his long time rival, Khar; their 
newfound unity reportedly resting upon the protection of 
Punjab's interests against what they described as the 
Sindhi-dominated Bhutto regime. 
92 
Khar lost the Lahore by-election held on 19 October, 
but amidst widespread reports that the election had been 
rigged with the help of the district administration and at 
the behest of Malik Hayat Tamman who headed the political 
wing in the P. M. 's Secretariat. 
93 The mysterious 'dis- 
appearance' of Khar's close confidants, Tari and Choudrey 
Irshad on 6 October and their eventual transportation to 
a secret detention camp in Dulai by the FSF, was intended 
as a warning to other dissidents to abstain from supporting 
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Khar. 94 For a while, -Khar and Ramay entertained the idea 
of forming a new party and for this purpose sought the 
support of Bugti, Maudoodi and others opposed to Bhutto. 
95 
But eventually both joined the Muslim League. 
96 Ramay was 
later arrested (in March 1976) and charged with making an 
"objectionable speech" under the Defence of Pakistan Rules 
(DPR). 97 He was convinctedby a special tribunal and sen- 
tenced to four and a half years imprisonment. Khar was 
dealt with somewhat differently. According to Khar, he 
was prevented from remaining active in Punjabi politics 
through intimidation, threats of violence, and blackmail 
by the authorities. 
98 The latter tactic involved the 
refusal by Bhutto to release his associates, Tari and 
Irshad, if Khar persisted in his campaign of opposition 
to Bhutto. Thus force remained the ultimate weapon in 
Bhutto's hands to deal with any challenge to his authority. 
THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF FACTIONAL CONFLICT 
What emerges from the discussion of the various 
types of factionalism above, is Bhutto's overriding concern 
with establishing his personal control over the party and 
his attempt to prevent any of his personal I retainers from 
entrenching themselves and establishing their own political 
fiefdoms. Our evidence also shows that intra-party group- 
ings increasingly - as a consequence of the exodus of 
many of the leftist and urban middle-class elements from 
the party - reflected personal rivalries for power, status 
and patronage. As ideological conflicts receded into the 
background, it was conflicts of 'interests' and 'power' 
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that predominantly characterised factionalism in the PPP. 
Although the language of conflict was often phrased in 
terms of important principles and a policy issue was some- 
times seized upon as a pretext for factional struggle, 
factions and factional conflict was organised largely 
around personalities and around personal enmities among 
party leaders. Thus, these factions were characterised 
by a greater concern with power and spoils than with ideo- 
logy and policy. Factional affiliations relating to the 
need for status and prestige or to the desire for material 
rewards became the crucial factor in intra-party conflict. 
Withdrawal from the party was often justified on the basis 
of ideological or policy considerations (e. g. Khar, Ramay) 
but this seldom reflected reality. The major organising 
principle of factional conflict was enmity between party 
leaders. PPP politics became personal politics charac- 
terised by the personal nature of political loyalties. 
For many factional followers, there was no internal conflict 
involved in following leaders whose view-points on impor- 
tant issues differed from their own or in switching alleg- 
iances from one leader to another, regardless of their 
personal ideologies (e. g. Ramay in declaring his support 
for Khar). Many factions reflected not social cleavages, 
for they often cut across biradari lines, but merely the 
personal political ambitions of a particular personality. 
Paul Brass' comment that "factional politics in traditional 
societies is personal politics and status politics" seems 
to apply equally well to PPP politics. 
99 
To weaken rivals, 
factions attempted to discredit opposition faction members, 
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dislodge them from their posts, and 'buy' away their 
allies. This led to a politics of personality in which 
rumour, character assassination, bribery and deception were 
rife. Passions of jealousy and revenge were aroused, 
opportunism fostered, while urgent short-term goals often 
required the compromise of principles (e.. g. Ramay). 
These, in short, comprised what one scholar terms the 
"comic opera" politics or "pure politics" so characteristic 
of factional systems. 
100 
What gave factionalism within the PPP a distinct- 
ive character was not merely its personalist nature - for 
this is a common feature in the political systems of other 
'developing' nations101 - but its interaction with Bhutto's 
patrimonial authority. 
102 For the strength and cohesive- 
ness of a faction within the PPP depended ultimately upon 
the proximity of a factional leader to Bhutto. Power de- 
rived less from attaining any numerical strength in . 
factional competition, than from acquiring Bhutto's support 
and patrimonial designation. Factions tended to be charac- 
terised by unstable membership and uncertain duration - in 
short, by_thei-rfluidity - as Bhutto systematically shifted 
his favour from one faction to another. Maintenance of con- 
trol by a patrimonial leader like Bhutto required the con- 
stant movement of lieutenants, the continuous shuttling 
of power between different fadtional leaders, and rapid 
changes of support for different factions. Such a strategy 
was designed to check the rise of any factional leader who 
could pose a threat to Bhutto's authority, and obviously 
had the effect of preventing factions from acquiring any 
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degree of stability. Factions attained temporary stab- 
ility only as long as the particular factional leader 
enjoyed Bhutto's support. The moment such support was 
withdrawn, factions dissipated as new alliances were formed. 
Moreover, since in the case of 'factions of interest' 
factional affiliations were, for the most part based on 
instrumental ties, for a factional leader to be deprived 
of his office (by Bhutto) meant being cut off from the 
major resource through which factional followers could 
be rallied - i. e. governmental patronage. 
The personal dependence on Bhutto on the part of 
factional leaders together with force as Bhutto's ultimate 
weapon to deal with recalcitrant leaders, resulted in a 
kind of politics that can only be interpreted as one in 
which participation and recruitment was severely limited. 
Since PPP leaders were concerned largely with gaining 
Bhutto's favour for assuming leadership positions, they 
did not always perceive the need to demonstrate majority 
support for themselves to the same extent as their counter- 
parts would in other factional systems. Also, once a fac- 
tional leader had fallen out with Bhutto, he was acutely 
aware that he would face serious consequences if he attempt- 
ed to build support at lower levels of the party. Thus 
the threat of the use of force also prevented factional 
leaders from engaging in political activity at the grass- 
root level. Thus one of the major 'benefits' that, accord- 
ing to some writers accrue from factionalism, in the sense 
that it extends participation and widens recruitment to a 
party by requiring factional leaders to rally supporters 
451 
and followers, was largely absent in the case of the 
PPP. 103 Moreover, in some cases factional leaders often 
considered it more important to acquire the support of 
other notables than to rally support at lower levels. For 
instance, when Khar found his position weakening, he made 
it a point to be 'seen' with Bugti, Maudoodi, Talpur, 
Meraj, etc. in order to demonstrate his importance to 
Bhutto, rather than to garner factional support at lower 
tiers of the party. This kind of factional activity re- 
sembled pre-party politics rather than modern political 
activity. This is because competing factions tended to 
function within what was largely a closed system - an end- 
less round of intermediate manoeuverings in which actors 
continuously shifted partners and antagonists without really 
enlarging the number of participants. At least, as far 
as the top tier of party leadership was concerned, politi- 
cal power was perceived by them as radiating from a single 
point in the political system, i. e. Bhutto. Thus there 
was little incentive for factional leaders at this level 
to engage in political activity at lower levels of the party. 
Bhutto's oft-stated desire to curtail factionalism 
and groupism in the party appeared to be little more than 
political rhetoric. As an astute politician, it is unlike- 
ly that he failed to appreciate that his frequent 
personnel changes, as well as his policy of balance and 
manoeuvre of factionalism in order to prevent a challenge 
to his authority, could only perpetuate this kind of conflict. 
In an interview with the author, one PPP leader suggested 
that as far as the Punjab was concerned, "Bhutto deliberately 
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created and encouraged factional conflict in order to keep 
the Punjab PPP divided. "104 While this view might be 
somewhat exaggerated it points to the disintegrative 
effect inherent in Bhutto's strategy. The constant balanc- 
ing of factions, and playing off one factional leader 
against another produced a disruptive effect from the point 
of view of party cohesiveness and unity. This not only 
resulted in serious dislocations in the party organisations 
but also reduced party effectiveness, in the sense of being 
able-to meaningfully participate in policy-formulation and 
oversee the functions of government. As we shall see in 
chapters VIII and X, this only made the Bhutto regime 
more dependent on the Viceregal institutions - the mili- 
tary and the civil service. 
The intensity of factional conflict also led to 
an erosion of the party's legitimacy in the eyes of the 
public in general, and the urban intelligentsia and the 
military in particular. 
105 
The spectacle of a party ridden 
with warring factions and a leader who showed no confidence 
in any of his lieutenants for any length of time, could not 
have helped the party's image. The acts of factional vio- 
lence and the open charges of corruption and other alleg- 
ations made by PPP leaders against one another, brought 
about as Bhutto recognised himself, public cynicism, and 
even contempt. 
106 This recognition was shared by other 
members of the party high command. On one occasion 
Meraj Khalid remarked: 
"Internal conflicts, mutual wranglings 
and petty disputes had discredited the 
party in the eyes of the general public. " 107 
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On another occasion, Bhutto himself pointed out the 
dangers and its implication for national stability if 
"petty party quarrels" assumed a larger proportion, re- 
marking at the same time that it was no use "trying to 
garb personal ambition and aggrandisement in high sound- 
ing.... (principles)... or in terms of picking up a cause.  
108 
Conscious that the party's links with its rank and file 
and grass roots support were increasingly becoming tenuous 
because of party leaders' preoccupation with factional 
wranglings, Bhutto declared emphatically that "the PPP must 
not turn into a cabal, ""109 
THE POLITICS OF PATRONAGE AND CORRUPTION 
Patronage practices and corruption emerged as 
major features characterising the party in power. Govern- 
mental patronage was utilised as a means to reward the 
faithful, recruit the hopeful and punish the unfaithful. 
As we shall see below, this did not in the case of the PPP, 
prove tobe an efficacious method of party building for a 
number of reasons. Moreover, the frequent abuse of public 
office for personal profit on the part of party men, led 
to a serious erosion of the party's legitimacy amongst the 
general urban public as well as amongst strategic power 
groups (e. g. the military). This was also reflected in 
Bhutto's evident concern, particularly when complaints 
against corruption were voiced during the 1975-76 party con- 
ventions, with the deleterious repercussions of patronage 
and graft for the PPP's public image. However, that Bhutto 
repeatedly chose not to take effective action against such 
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practices indicated that he viewed them as politically 
useful, even if he did at times, albeit largely on the 
eve of the 1977 election, express a desire to keep them 
within publicly accepted bounds. 
The use of governmental power and patronage for 
party-building has been a common feature in many 'new' 
nations, 
110 
a phenomenon which some scholars have termed 
'machine politics' and which they view as closely resembl- 
ing the manner in which political machines were built in 
American cities in the early part of this century. 
ill 
Whether termed 'machine politics, 'political clientism' or 
patronage - as it is here designated - this type of 
politics is characterised by patron-client relationships 
(that is more or less personalised relationships charac- 
terised by unequal wealth/status/influence based on con- 
ditional loyalties and involving mutually beneficial trans- 
actions), 
112 
and refers to "the ways in which party politi- 
cians distribute public jobs or special favours in exchange 
for electoral support..... (and).... seek to turn public 
institutions and public resources to their own ends. "113 
Viewed from this perspective, the 'patronage' or 'clientel- 
ist' concept possesses a heuristic value for understanding 
a wide range of political behaviour often regarded as patho- 
logical or deviant, mostly aspects of political corruption. 
114 
Indeed, the recent growth of studies using patron-client 
relations as a framework for analysis attests to its vitality 
1 as an explanatory vehicle, 15 
It has been rightly suggested that patronage and 
corruption are not unique to the new states but are a 
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generic feature of political systems regardless of their 
stages of development. 
116 However, it is generally agreed 
that patronage, "spoils", and corruption seem to be more 
prominent and pervasive in some societies rather than 
others, because of a variety of conditions which seem to 
foster patron-client relations. What we are interested 
in is identifying and examining briefly some of these 
conditions in Pakistani society as a first step towards 
understanding the operation of PPP as a patronage party. 
Pakistan can be viewed as offering a social con- 
text which in many respects gives rise to patron-client 
relationships. Somo of the features that foster relations 
of personal dependency were outlined in chapter VI above. 
Here it is important to note three important characteristics 
of Pakistani society. First, the persistence of marked 
inequalities in the distribution of wealth, status and 
power. The connection between this and the patron-client 
ties is more or less self-evident. If inequities in access 
to vital goods were alone sufficient to promote the 
expansion of patron-client ties, such structureswould pro- 
dominate almost everywhere. Therefore, a second, and more 
significant condition supportive of patron-client ties is 
the relative absence of institutional guarantees for an 
individual's security, status or position. Where a society's 
impersonal, legal guarantees of physical security, status 
and wealth are relatively weak, individuals often seek 
personal substitutes by attaching themselves to "big men" 
capable of providing protection and even advancement. In 
the words of one writer, a patron-client relationship is 
456 
a "personal security mechanism". 
117 In this context, 
direct personal ties based on reciprocity substitute for 
law, shared values and strong institutions. Thirdly, since 
Pakistani society is characterised by scarcity and in- 
security, political -office is viewed as a major means of 
gaining access to status/security/wealth. 
118 Also, where 
the patrimonial view of office is strong, a public post 
becomes a great client-creating resource. The client- 
creating function of public office has taken on a greater 
importance in Pakistan as state power has expanded through- 
out society. The expanding economic and social role of the 
. state can be seen to underline the spread of patronage. 
The government's discretionary powers over employment, pro- 
motion, assistance, welfare, licensing, permits and other 
scarce values can, in such a context, serve as the basis 
of a network of personally obligated followers. Addition- 
ally, a wide variety of economic measures often serve 
patronage functions. In this respect, programmes of nation- 
alisation, while they may answer economic and patriotic 
needs too, can be tailored to maximise the number of pat- 
ronage posts available to the ruling party. Often rural 
development programmes are designed - as was the case under 
Ayub Khan in 1960 - with this duality of function in mind. 
Given this sort of social context, along with the 
potential for creating political followings through govern- 
mental action, it is easy to understand why short-run 
material incentives and patronage came to be viewed as the major 
adhesive agent by the PPP in power, as it aimed to create 
political bonds through the political distribution of 
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patronage. The bandwagon effect experienced by the 
party after 1972 was largely due to the popular recog- 
nition that the party would control the disposal of tangible 
rewards for some time tocome. An overwhelming concern with 
the-particularistic distribution of rewards 
and the decline of broader policy goals bec, 
marks of this transformation in the party's 
The necessity of generating broad political 
continuing basis meant that the PPP wielded 
scale that was distinctive. 
to supporters 
ame the hall- 
development. 
support on 
patronage on. a 
Nowhere were patronage practices more evident than 
in Bhutto's relationship with the country's landlord groups. 
Bhutto's long-term strategy appeared to be one of establish- 
ing a stable clientelist system in the rural countryside 
by making landlords an important (and perhaps the most 
dominant) element in his regime's support base. However, 
the effectiveness of such a strategy depended not in a 
straightforward, representation of landlord interests, but 
in first curbing the independent power of the landlord class 
and then protecting or advancing their interests. The 
feudal aristocracy, for its part was wedded to an older 
system of spoils that was sustained by aristocratic patron- 
age and social heredity. Bhutto, on the other hand, hoped 
to replace this system with one founded on centralised 
personal patronage and discretionary favours. With land- 
lords made dependent on Bhutto's favour, they could all the 
more be easily controlled. Only by creating such personal 
dependency and by reducing the independent power of not- 
ables could Bhutto place himself effectively at the helm 
of affairs. 
t 
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The major instrument Bhutto and his party utilised 
in pursuing such a strategy was the land reform legislation 
of 1972. The land reform announcement together with the 
radical rhetoric that accompanied it, had given sufficient 
cause for concern amongst the landed groups. In addition, 
before the reform was announced, the PPP's leftist cadres 
had gone about issuing promissory notes to peasants indi- 
eating that they would acquire, free of cost, a certain 
amount of land. 
119 Such actions only served to increase 
the general insecurity amongst landed interests. Indeed, 
as we noted above, this environment of insecurity had 
triggered off a bandwagon effect, bringing into the party 
many landlords and tribal chiefs, anxious to protect them- 
selves from any proposed land reform legislation. After the 
land reform was instituted, 
120 landlords, found that the 
only way to 'save' their lands (above the prescribed ceil- 
ing), was through Bhutto's personal intercession. Files 
relating to numerous cases where the land reform applied, 
were called for (from the Federal Land Commission set up 
for implementation), and kept by Bhutto in his personal 
secretariat at Rawalpindi. 
121 This enabled Bhutto to es- 
tablish himself as the "Grand Patron" and "Ultimate Arbiter" 
of land reform cases using his discretionary power both 
to reward loyals and to coerce when necessary. "Rewarding" 
those who had demonstrated loyalty to him and his party 
manifested itself in a variety of ways. One method was not 
to take action against those individuals who had concealed 
parts of their holdings. 
122 
Referring to the widespread 
practice of the concealment of lands, one writer suggested: 
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"The succeps of landlords in so con- 
cealing lands .... can be construed.. as... 
... the impotence of administrative 
authority in the face of feudal power... 
However, it is more likely that the 
landlords are enjoying official patron- 
age in their efforts at concealment. " 123 
Another device used to reward loyal supporters was to first 
resume the excess land and then re-allot it in the names 
of the favoured landlord's friends or relations 'misrep- 
resenting' them as tenants. 
124 Yet another device was to 
'lease' out land 'resumed' to former owners at ridiculously 
'25 low rents. 
These were only some of the Methods utilised to 
reward loyal supporters of the regime. However, what is 
important is not so much the procedural aspects of the dis- 
tribution of such favours, but its net result, which was to 
tie individual landlords personally to Bhutto (and his party) 
in a typically clientelist manner. If the land reform could 
be used to reward loyals, it could also serve to punish 
those, who, for one reason or another, chose to oppose the 
regime. 
126 It was no coincidence, for instance, that 
punitive action under the land reform legislation was taken 
against Bizenjo, Mengal, Ahmed Nawaz Bugti and Khan Buksh 
Marri, all leading members of the major opposition party 
NAP (National Awami Party). 127 A case relating to Syeda 
Abida Hussain serves as a good illustration of the use of 
the land reform to both reward and punish. Abida had gift- 
ed excess land to a charitable trust. In 1973, an amendment 
in the law made such gifts unlawful, but as Abida had since 
joined the party, the gift made by her was not touched. 
Later, however, when she joined a demonstration against 
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police atrocities in'Lahore in 1977, - the Punjab adminis- 
tration ordered the gift to be void and the land involved 
to be resumed. 
128 Actions against such people were, as 
we have seen, almost always politically motivated. How- 
ever, the official media often characterised these actions 
as a 'socialista-. =:. ' government's attack on feudal inter- 
ests in efforts to rally support of peasants and landless 
labour. 129 Indeed in areas where local power-holders 
(tribal chiefs or landlords) proved recalcitrant, it became 
official policy to encourage and provoke landlord-tenant 
confrontations. This was particularly evident in the 
0 
NWUFP, where tenants and sharecroppers were actively aided 
by the PPP administration in disputes/clashes with land- 
owning sardars who had failed to support the Bhutto regime. 
130 
Even in the Punjab and Sind, the threat to implement the 
legislation relating to the protection of tenants rights131 
was utilised to bring into political submission those land- 
lords opposed to the regime, while at the same time demons- 
trating"to tenants/peasants that the PPP regime was concern- 
ed with advancing the interests of the poor. 
132 In add- 
ition, the settlement of many landlord-tenant disputes was 
a function performed not by the local administration im- 
personally but reserved for Bhutto and his personal 
lieutenants. 133 This enabled Bhutto to enhance his personal 
ascendancy vis a vis landlord groups, and by appearing as 
the 'Great Benefactor' in so far as the landless were con- 
cerned, create the image that he alone was responsive to 
their grievances. This art was perfected in Dhutto's open 
'kutchery' system (open courts), where he personally 
6 
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decided such cases in what often appeared an arbitrary 
manner. 
134 Another instrument utilised was to order "on 
the spot enquiries" into cases of landlord-tenant conflict. 
For instance, on one occasion, when in response to a wave 
of arbitrary ejectments in the Punjab -a matter which 
should have been settled by the local administration - 
Bhutto ordered the Punjab Governor to ask a special Inspec- 
tion Team to make on-the-spot enquiries into such cases. 
135 
In addition to the use of land reform and tenant 
legislation outlined above, several other means were uti- 
lised to set up a system of rewards and material incentives 
to build political support for Bhutto and his party. Policy 
pronouncements such as high subsidies for inputs, cheap 
credit for modern equipment, higher procurement prices - 
were designed to benefit rich landowners. 
136 
While such 
policies provided inducements for landed groups as a whole, 
Bhutto and his party additionally, sought to distribute 
favours/rewards individually (amongst landed groups) both 
to maintain and extend their political support. The nation- 
alisation measures affecting industry and financial institu- 
tions expanded the resource base of the regime considerably. 
This was now used to maximise political support; landlords 
who demonstrated their loyalty were rewarded with cheap 
credit by the nationalised banks, while large loans were 
disbursed to (landlord) leaders of the party; 
137 fertili- 
zer distribution followed similar lines. 
138 
The significant 
aspect of such patronage practices lay in the establishment 
of reward networks linking selected individuals/families 
personally to Bhutto. Bhutto did favours individually 
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rather than collectively because he wished to create a 
personal obligation of clientship. 
139 Access to the 
'spoils system' was always subject to Bhutto's arbitrary 
manipulation and hence, was supportive of patrimonial 
ties. 
140 
The use of material rewards to build and cement 
a political following was reflected not only in Bhutto's 
dealings with landlord groups, described above. Through 
a wide variety of ways, the PPP distributed governmental 
patronage and 'spoils' amongst other groups and amongst its 
own personnel to both extend its support and to furnish 
organisational cement for the party. For this purpose a 
major resource at the party's disposal was that of public 
office/jobs. The nationalisation of various sectors of the 
economy served to expand the structural framework through 
which this type of patronage could be exercised. Conse- 
quently, jobs in the nationalised public sector ranging from 
managerial posts to clerical positions were distributed 
according to political criteria - often leading to over- 
staffing in many establishments. 
141 
Lawyers within the 
party were accommodated by the creation of legal posts in 
all industrial establishments. Further, a law was specially 
enacted making it obligatory for all industrial units over 
142 a certain productive capacity to appoint a legal adviser. 
Predictably, those seeking such posts had to demonstrate 
their loyalty to the party before they could qualify for 
these jobs. In a letter to Bhutto, one of his advisers 
explained how this strategy was to work: 
"It is suggested that a committee be set 
up in the provinces.... to review the 
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distribution-of legal advisers to the 
industrial units and recommend names 
of such other advocates who are pre- 
pared to toe the line of the government 
and will also be prepared to join the 
PPP..... By adopting equitable distribu- 
tion of legal advisers, district-wise, 
pro-government lobby amongst the lawyers 
in the country, can be built up. " 143 
Similarly, jobs in the official media-press, radio, tele- 
vision- came to be filled by party loyals. 
144 
Other than public jobs, an additional source of 
" party patronage derived from the government's discretionary 
powers over promotions and the allocation of development 
funds, licenses , and permits. Party leaders distributed 
permits for ration depots and various categories of licenses 
to reward supporters and to bring into the party elements 
such as contractors who saw the party as principally an 
avenue for material advancement. That this was a policy 
sanctioned by the party high-command is borne out by 
Mubashar's admission, on one occasion, that some ration 
depots had indeed been alloted to PPP supporters-and his 
remark that in other instances the allotment of permits had 
been followed by hoisting of PPP flags on depots. 
145 Such 
'buying' of political"support assumed an even greater 
importance in the NWFP, where the PPP had a relatively weak 
support base. Here, behind (provincial chief minister) 
Nasrullah Khan Khattak's attempts at engineering defections 
from the opposition parties and enlisting the support of 
local notables, lay promises of ministries/ public offices 
and material incentives of permits and licenses. In the 
146 
Punjab and Sind, during the membership campaign launched 
by the party in 1975-76 (see below, chapter VIII) many 
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biradari leaders, contractors, village 'choudries' and 
other notables joined the party en masse in the hope of 
gaining access to the spoils system. 
147 
There seemed little 
doubt that the type of people entering the party were' 
attracted principally by its promise of material rewards 
and incentives. Such persons were all too willingly drawn 
into what had become the PPP's dominant ethos - of self- 
seeking careerism and what can only be called corruption. 
At local levels the PPP required party membership of prac- 
tically everyone who sought dealings with the government; 
for example membership in the PPP was required for trans- 
porters wishing to qualify for road licenses, 
148 
or for 
contractors hoping to acquire government contracts. 
149 
Clearly, politicians and party leaders who exploit- 
ed their office in the manner described above to reward 
clients were violating the legal norms of public conduct 
and their activity can only be termed as corruption. 
ISO 
Corruption, in the sense of "the abuse of public power and 
influence for private ends", 
151 
assumed a variety of forms, 
and consisted of such activity by party leaders as designed 
to either reward supporters/would-be-supporters or aimed at 
direct self-enrichment. 
152 Some illustrations of the former 
have been given above; a few more would help to further 
illuminate such behaviour. As Minister for Housing, 
Jam Sadiq Ali allocated residential and commercial plots at 
officially reserved rates tc reward party supporters, 
153 
while also making several appointments in a government 
organisation at a time when it did not have a single vac- 
ancy. 
154 Another prominent PPP leader, Mumtaz Bhutto, as 
S 
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chairman of the National Shipping Corporation, awarded 
contracts to friends and supporters. 
155 
Another case 
relates to Nasrullah Khattak, who issued car permits to 
influential families to obtain their political support. 
156 
This sort of activity was not restricted to ministers and 
MNAs, but even petty party officials "used the names of 
persons in prominent positions to provide jobs, permits 
and inams (prizes)" to their relatives and friends. 
157 
Indeed, local party workers too expected tacit approval of 
their extra-legal manoeuvres as their price for supporting 
the party's leadership. 
158 The 'buying' of political 
support and manipulation of favours by party leaders at 
almost all levels was of course viewed by the party high 
command as an inevitable and necessary part of the process 
of extending and consolidating political suppor59 This is 
borne. -out by the correspondence between party leaders and 
Bhutto in which the former frequently asked the latter to 
sanction favours, jobs, promotions, and grants of money to 
either reward loyals in their areas or win over the un- 
decided. 160 For instance, on one occasion the Punjab 
chief minister, Sadiq Hussain Qureshi, made the following 
request to Bhutto: 
"One of the sardars of Machka tribe has 
been paid.... by Hasan Mahmood (an oppo- 
sition leader).... to secure their votes.. 
... This man is among other leaders of the tribe. If permitted I intend to buy off the 
whole tribe (as they are only persuadable 
with money) and for this purpose I may re- 
quest for one to one and a half lakhs of 
ruppees. " 161 
But perhaps the most striking illustration of the use of 
cash grants from state coffers for party purposes, was the 
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regular, monthly payments made by Bhutto to major office- 
bearers of the party from state secret funds. 
162 In his 
five and a half years in office, Bhutto is reported to 
have handed over the equivalent of nearly £2 million by 
way of monthly' payments. 
163 
" Instances of the use of public power by party 
leaders and officials to enrich themselves are as numerous 
and varied as those designed to reward clients. Only a 
few can be mentioned here to demonstrate such a phenomenon. 
Interestingly, some of these cases were widely publicised 
by the party itself, either when it sought to discredit 
leaders such as Khar, who had fallen from official favour, 
or when one faction sought to discredit another. For 
instance, in the case of Khar it was alleged by the 
authorities that he had acquired agricultural land at sub- 
sidised rates, had a road constructed out of public funds 
to his ancestral village, and misappropriated public funds 
for personal enrichment, 
164 
(although' it can be argued 
that the construction of a road would benefit not only 
him personally, but also his biradari followers and others 
in his constituency). Another prominent party leader, 
Kauser Niazi derived substantial monetary returns from 
contriving the bulk purchase by the government; of various 
books written by him. 
165 
Abdul Waheed Katpur, a senior 
minister in the Sind cabinet, secured the allotment of 
several plots of land. 
166 Nasrullah Khattak as chief minis- 
ter of the MVFP awarded government construction contracts 
to family members. 
167 
A minister of the Sind cabinet 
accepted a substantial bribe in awarding a contract to a 
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private commercial firm. 
168 Jhang district PPP officials 
obtained loans from a state body ostensibly for flood 
relief purposes, which they misappropriated rather than 
disbursing among flood-affected people. 
169 More generally, 
public development funds earmarked under the Peoples Works 
Programme for particular areas were utilised by local 
MPAs and MNAs who were expected to oversee such projects, 
for personal benefit. 
170 In some instances, funds were 
misappropriated while in others they were misused, e. g. 
building a road to the MNA's/MPA's own village. 
171 
The incidence of such abuse of power for personal 
profit had reached wide enough proportions to : elicit 
severe warnings from Bhutto172 and successive provincial 
committee meetings. 
173 However, that such warnings and 
public admonishments were never backed by any concrete 
action demonstrated the unwillingness of those at the top 
to actually do something about the situation. There is 
little doubt that Bhutto regarded a certain amount of politi- 
cal graft and corruption as useful, but there is indication 
that an excess of such practices, and particularly the 
blatant manner in which they were carried out was". " a source 
of some concern to him. As a way out of this dilemma, one 
of his advisers suggested the following course of action: 
"There is..... need to take drastic 
action in certain cases of flagrant 
corruption by the politicians in each 
province.... Prime Minister might like 
to ..... select a few cases and take immediate.... action. " 174 4 
However, that Bhutto did not even take such selective action 
suggested that even his concern over "cases of flagrant 
corruption" was more apparent than real. 
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As the PPP prepared to go to the polls, complaints 
of corruption in the party appeared to be a major source 
of anxiety for the central leadership. Indeed, the com- 
plaint Bhutto most frequently heard during the pre-election 
175 
party convention of 1975-76, related to corruption. It 
was in response to these complaints that Bhutto declared 
that "the corrupt will not be given party tickets in the 
next elections". 
176 While on another occasion he remarked 
that if his party did not meet with success at the polls, 
it would be on account of some of his colleagues, and'not 
owing to the opposition's strength. 
177 Files kept in the 
Prime Minister's secretariat show that corruption in the 
party and its repercussions for the party's public image, 
occupied a central place in the correspondence between 
Bhutto and his political and bureaucratic advisers in 1976 
on the eve of the election. 
178 It would be useful to 
cite parts of such correspondence for not only would this 
help to describe the general pattern of such corruption 
but indicate the recognition, albeit a belated one, on 
the part of the policy makers that this had led to con- 
siderable erosion of the party's legitimacy. 
In July 1976, a member of Bhutto's personal staff, 
Rao Abdur Rashid submitted a report to Bhutto describing 
"factors that contribute to corruption in the ppp". 179 
Rashid mentioned "allotment of ration depots, grant of 
car permits, plots and arms licences, special quotas given 
to the MNAs for admissions to schools and colleges. "180 In 
addition, he pointed out that "government servants are 
demoralised because a lot of transfers take place on the 
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recommendation of the PPP workers, MNAs and MPAs when 
the government servants do not listen to their unreason- 
able demands. "181 In a similar note written to Bhutto, 
Rashid explained that "malpractices committed. *. by its (the 
party's) second and third liners, members of the assembl- 
ies and local office-bearers has earned a bad name for the 
party and tarnished its image considerably.... As the pinch 
of petty favours like the allotment of a ration depot or 
a route permit is felt at the mohallah level, its adverse 
effects are fairly widely spread... . Many of these leaders 
were nonentities before associating themselves with the 
ruling party, their present financial well-being is in 
sharp contrast to their previous not very enviable state 
of affairs. " 
182 Significantly, Rashid pointed out that 
"Much as one would like the situation to be otherwise, 
the fact remains that this 'reaping of the spoils' by 
partymen had done more harm to its cause than any other 
single factor. " In May 1976, Pir Rashidi, Bhutto's in- 
formation adviser wrote to him of "corruption.... by swarms 
of 'party workers'.... MMany of these worthies have already 
become widely 'badnam' (notorious).... and are more despised 
than even corrupt officials. "183 In early 1977, an 
opinion poll conducted by the research cell of the P. M. 
secretariat showed that 95% of the people interviewed men- 
tioned corruption as their second major criticism of the 
party (the first being rising prices). 
184 
Explaining this 
finding, an official of the research cell wrote; 
"The issue which seems paramount in the 
common mind is the prevalent corruption... 
... people's representatives have made this deep-rooted evil a widespread .; phenomena 
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in every walk of life. The role of 
MNAs and MPAs has come under sharp 
criticism. Their political favouritism, 
bribery and malpractices have created 
general discontent. " 185 
Any assessment of the impact on the party of the 
politics of patronage and corruption must begin with the 
recognition that such practices cannot merely be dismissed 
as deviant or morally reprehensible and left at that. As 
several studies of political parties in other societies have 
attempted to show, patronage and corruption can be a 
useful instrument of party building. 
186 
According to one 
writer this is because "Few, if any, durable political 
bonds except that, of material self interest are available 
to build a large political party among poor, heterogenous, 
transitional populations.... Self-interest thus provides 
the necessary political cement when neither a traditional 
governing elite nor a ruling group based on ideological 
or class interest is available. "187 Another writer has 
argued that "a smattering of corruption may help keep the 
masses politically satisfied" and aid development efforts. 
188 
Others have sought to demonstrate how parties sustain them- 
selves and win electoral support primarilythrough the 
distribution of patronage and spoils. 
189 
While recognising the potential of patronage for 
party-building and its success in many 'new' nations, our 
s 
contention is that in the case of the PPP, the politics of 
reward appeared to be disfunctional for party development. 
This contention rests on a number of factors. The first and 
most obvious factor was the relative scarcity of patronage 
and spoils to distribute. Undoubtedly the expansion of 
government activities under the PPP regime enlarged the 
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party's resource base, but it was nevertheless subject to 
what Zolberg terms "an inflationary process of demand- 
formation, One favour may have made a friend, but 
alienated all those who hoped to get it and were passed 
over. There were often more disgruntled lieutenants than 
those who received rewards. 
191 Since the supply of material 
rewards was limited, competition within the party was in- 
tense and manifested itself in factional warfare. That 
factionalism in the PPP was increasingly based on rivalries 
for the 'spoils' of office has already been noted. What 
needs emphasis here is that behind the intense factional 
warfare lay the basic problem that demands were greater 
than could be met. As one PPP leader, G. M. Khar, explained: 
"There just weren't enough jobs to go 
around..... the disappointed took to 
challenging my authority and getting 
together with others whom I had at some 
time or other refused favours. " 192 
Businesses could be nationalised, new franchises and licen- 
ses could be let, older civil servants replaced by loyal 
workers, but the supply of such material incentives was 
soon exhausted in the context of growing demands. The in- 
flationary nature of these demands was a natural consequence 
of the PPP's mode of operation - its promise of material 
benefits meant that almost all who joined the party expect- 
ed favours as a perfectly normal price for supporting the 
party. Those who were disappointed or not adequately reward- 
ed either began to engage in disruptive factional activity 
or to rally behind the opposition. Thus the benefit one 
writer ascribes to rewards/corruption, in that "it tends 
to make the elite more cohesive"193 does not appear to apply 
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to the PPP's experience. The shortage of disposable 
rewards, far from leading to party cohesiveness, resulted 
in serious splits within the party, as epitomised in the 
Khar episode described earlier. 
Another factor that reduced the effectiveness of 
patronage as an instrument of party building was the tend- 
ency bf PPP leaders, most notably of Bhutto himself, to 
develop their own personal followings. With patronage and 
spoils frequently delivered through personal connections 
to augment personal power, the loyalty that was called 
forth was loyalty not to the party but to individuals. As 
Bhutto's dealings with landlords demonstrate, what ulti- 
mately emerged was a personal network linked to Bhutto as 
well as a party organisation. As far as other party leaders 
were concerned, many (e. g. Khar, Mumtaz Bhutto) dispensed 
rewards to build up their personal support, rewards which 
aimed at the creating of clienteles who owed their alle- 
giance first to the particular leader who had showered them 
with : -material rewards, and then to the party. The allo- 
. cation of political goods was in such cases dictated not 
by what was good for the party as a whole, but what would 
benefit a particular leader. Such a phenomenon has been 
characterised thus by G. A. iieeger: 
"The system is not to be likened to a 
machine so much to a multitude of machines 
frequently competing against one another. " 194 
The distribution of rewards through personal machines yielded 
a political process that was hostile to party institutional- 
isation. Building up individual personal support as opposed 
to developing organisational loyalty through patronage 
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could not but lead to weak institutional development. 
Another aspect of the personalism permeating the 
party was the use of public office by some party leaders 
to reward themselves, i. e. self-enrichment. This phenomenon 
which one writer terms "non-machine corruption" and which 
we discussed earlier, could not by its nature, aid party 
development. Such corruption was, as is obvious, not fine- 
ly articulated and organised to maximise party support, but 
reflected random greed. To the extent that such personal 
greed and appropriation constituted a fairly widespread 
phenomenon, it led to a channelling of resources that the 
party could otherwise have utilised to meet the demands of 
a broader stratum. For example, the case cited above of 
the pocketing of funds by PPP leaders which were really 
intended for "party work" amongst those affected by 
floods in the Punjab meant depriving the party of already 
scarce resources. 
Finally, it can be argued that the benefits 
accruing to the party from patronage and corrupt practices 
were far outweighed by the costs in terms of the erosion of 
party legitimacy. Writers who have pointed out the bene- 
ficial effects of patronage vis a vis party development, 
typically base their argument on examples drawn from early 
twentieth century American history. Wielding patronage in 
the 'new' nations, however, occurs in a markedly different 
legal and social context than it did in much of urban 
U. S. A. Saddled with the "very latest" in terms of public 
office regulations, politicians in Pakistan find themselves 
denied by law many of the spoils that aided the building 
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of strong parties in the U. S. A. At the same time, while 
it is true that the patrimonial view of office still sur- 
vives to predispose most Pakistanis to tolerate a certain 
amount of corruption, politicians have to reckon with 
"modern" groups such as students, army officers and the 
small but strategically placed middle class of civil ser- 
vants and professionals (who have profited from achievement 
and universalism) in whose eyes such activity can be highly 
objectionable. Additionally, the serious scarcity of re- 
sources in developing countries like Pakistan also means 
that patronage practices occur in an economic environment 
markedly different from that of early twentieth century 
urban America. In a growing and prospering economy 
patronage can perhaps be "accepted" to a greater extent 
by a public, which is suffering no great economic hardship. 
However, in a deteriorating economic situation, as was the 
case in general in the Bhutto years, (see above, chapter V) 
such practices acquire a more sinister meaning than they 
would perhaps do otherwise. Indeed in such situations, 
people are not unlikely to perceive a connection between 
their own declining economic position and corruption. 
The fact that the Bhutto regime evinced much con- 
tern, albeit at the time of election, about the problem 
of corruption shows that they themselves perceived limits 
to the public's tolerance. Indeed, towards the end of the 
regime's years in power, party leaders, Bhutto included, 
11 recognised the fact that corruption within the party was 
one of the major reasons for its decline in public esteem. 
The party admitted that the loss of legitimacy among middle 
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class groups was reflected in the erosion of its support 
throughout urban Pakistan. 
195 Any loss of legitimacy 
is perilious - but if a party loses legitimacy in the 
eyes of a politically important group, such as the Army, 
the consequences can be disastrous. As Nye argued, in so 
far as corruption destroys the legitimacy of political 
structures in the eyes of those who have power to do 
something about the situation, it contributes to instab- 
ility. 196 In the case of the PPP, there are no.. empirical 
indices to establish a reliable measure of the relation- 
ship between corruption and the 1977 coup d'etat.. Although 
corruption figured prominently in post-coup rationalisations, 
the degree to which corruption was itself a major cause of 
the military take over is, however, open to question. 
197 
It may be that for army officers, the perception of a 
rigged election in March 197.7, constituted the ultimate 
corrupt act on behalf of a party that they had seen engag- 
ing in the most blatant forms of corruption over the years. 
198 
It can, nevertheless, be argued that corruption contributed to 
the aura of disillusionment that preceded the coup of 1977, 
and made it difficult for the PPP to find popular (or elite) 
support when the chips were down. 
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VIII 
THE PPP: PERSONALISM OR INSTITUTIONALISATION? 
THE PARTY 1975-76 
Partly as a response to the serious dislocations 
caused in the party organisation by the factionalism des- 
cribed in the preceding chapter, Bhutto took several steps 
in 1975-76 aimed at a major overhaul of the PPP organisation. 
This indicated that Bhutto appreciated how critical the 
matter of party organisation was, especially with the gen- 
eral election approaching in 1977. But how far can the 
efforts made by Bhutto to improve the party machinery be 
regarded as encouraging the development of the PPP as an 
institution, thus, reversing what has been characterised as 
the dominant trend of personalism in the PPP? As we shall 
see below, Bhutto's last-minute efforts, as it were, only 
confirmed the trends in the party that have been analysed 
above in the preceding two chapters and reinforced Bhutto's 
personal dominance over the party. Thus these efforts did 
not constitute a significant move towards institutionalis- 
ation of the party. Nonetheless, these organisational develoj 
ments need to be noted as they were obviously taken with an 
eye to the coming general election, and hence they deter- 
mined the kind of structure Bhutto had in the PPP to contest 
the 1977 election. That such steps were taken on the eve 
of the election perhaps also indicated that Bhutto had come 
to regard the PPP as little more than an instrument to 
win elections. 
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First, in keeping with past tradition, Bhutto de- 
cided to postpone party elections until after the general 
elections. 
1 This, together with the fact that the promised 
party constitution to replace the 1967 interim constitution 
(that had been rendered obsolete by subsequent events) 
never materialised, 
2 
in effect meant that Bhutto could re- 
fashion the party in accordance with his own personal dic- 
tates. This signified a continuation of personalism in the 
party. In early 1975, Bhutto ordered the "reorganisation" 
of the Punjab PPP, and new working committees were set up 
under his personalised direction at the provincial, district, 
town and municipal levels? The membership'of the new 
committees reflected the recent shifts in'factional per- 
mutations at the cabinet level in Punjab and showed the 
dominance of landed groups, again representing a continuation 
of past trends in the party. 
Preparatory work for a major reorganisation of the 
party throughout the country was, however, only undertaken 
between November 1975-July 1976. "Reorganisation tours" 
were undertaken by Bhutto beginning with the Punjab districts 
in November 1975, followed by Sind in January 1976, the 
NWFP and Baluchistan in February-April 1976. Sixteen party 
conventions were held throughout the country on a divisional 
basis. The aim of these conventions was officially describ- 
ed as enabling Bhutto "to listen to the complaints and 
suggestions of party workers" with a view to helping him re- 
organise the party. 4 Clearly then, the purpose of these 
conventions was 'consultative' at best, a continuation of 
past tradition in the party. It is significant that no 
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national convention was held. Perhaps the state of fact- 
ionalism in the party urged Bhutto not to hold one; 
'divisional' conventions were more manageable and gave him 
greater scope for manoeuvre. 
Significantly the responsibility for organising 
these tours and conventions lay not with the party branches 
but with the respective district administrations, while 
Bhutto's bureaucrat' advisers from the Prime Minister's 
Secretariat travelled with him. 
5 
This reflected Ehutto's 
increasing dependency on the bureaucracy, and left the party 
leaders responsible only for amassing large crowds - even 
that function was shared with the administration. At the 
same time it was reported that preparatory work for the 
formulation of the PPP's 1977-election manifesto was entrust- 
ed to Bhutto's bureaucratic advisers, rather than his party 
men. 
6 There were also growing signs that bureaucrats - 
cynically called "Bhuttocrats" - from his P. M. Secretariat 
were involved in backstage manoeuvrings and in the mediation 
of factional disputes and bargaining. While this phenomenon 
is also examined in chapter X, it is necessary to note here 
the growing role played by these bureaucrats in party 
affairs, a sign perhaps that the bureaucracy under Bhutto's 
direction had begun to penetrate the party. 
The party tours were accompanied by a mass member- 
ship drive which saw many notables entering the party. In 
August 1976, a nationwide membership drive was launched. 
7 
The membership fee was fixed at 50 paisa and the doors of 
the party were open to all who had faith in 'Islam, Social- 
ism and Democracy'. 
8 A Central Enrolment Committee was set 
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up under Sheikh Rashid, while the basic enrolment was to be 
carried out by primary enrolment committees (PEC), each 
having five members. Members of the PECs were to be 
nominated by Tehsil Enrolment Committees, which were chosen by 
the District Enrolment Committees, which in turn were the 
creation of the provincial bodies. In addition, Bhutto 
directed provincial office-holders to authorise any party 
office-bearer to enrol new members. 
9 As a result of the 
membership campaign which ended on 20 December 1976, the 
party claimed that its membership stood at 10 million. 
10 
The membership drive saw a wide variety of individuals and 
groups entering the party, including landlords, tribal 
sardars, film stars, sports personalities, shopkeepers and 
contractors. Many of those who joined the party did so in 
the hope of sharing in the 'spoils of office', and in this 
sense represented a somewhat opportunistic clientele. No 
day passed without the announcement of this tribe or that 
biradari joining the party. PPP committees vied with one 
another to demonstrate to the central leadership that they 
had brought in the largest number of supporters. That 
figures were often inflated in the competitive struggle was 
indicated by Meraj Khalid's sarcastic comment that if these 
figures-were to be believed, the population of the country 
had suddenly registered a rapid increase. 
11 
View Point, 
a weekly generally sympathetic to the PPP, implored the 
Chairman to "save the party" from "self seekers" and pointer 
out that the growing membership figures through the influx 
of such people was actually weakening the party. 
12 That 
the PPP committees were openly enrolling members by appeals 
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to biradarism intensified the emergence of particularistic 
cleavages. 
13 Meraj Khalid, pointing to the "emergence of 
clannish trends" in the party issued a strong warning to 
party workers operating on biradari lines. 
14 But the 
influx of feudal oligarchs, biradari leaders and tribal 
chiefs continued leading to a resurgence of factionalism at 
all levels of the party in the country. No district of 
the Punjab was free from factional conflict based on biradari 
or personal enmities. In the NWFP where the party, as in 
Baluchistan, was essentially a creation of the federal govern- 
ment and was built from the top downwards, factional in- 
fighting was everywhere. In D. I. Khan the tussle was 
between Gandapur and Makhdoom Rahman, in Bannu it was bet- 
ween Humayun Saifullah and Habibullah Khan, in Mardan bet- 
ween Abdul Samad Khan and Abdul Razik Khan, and in Kohat between 
Gilani and Moshin Ali. Examples can be multiplied ad 
nauseam to show that while the PPP was increasing in numbers, 
factionalism was becoming equally widespread. Thus problems 
of organisational weakness, far from being resolved, were 
in fact exacerbated by these developments. 
On 7 December 1976, Bhutto announced a comprehensive 
reorganisation of the party at the provincial, district, 
tehsil, town and city level, to give "a new impetus and 
vitality" to the party"15 While Bhutto himself selected the 
office-bearers at the provincial level, the district office-' 
bearers and lower tiers were selected by the political wing 
of the Prime Minister's Secretariat, headed by Tamman. The 
composition of the new structures gave due recognition to 
new entrants, with clan and biradari leaders, feudals 
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tribal chiefs and village chaudaris being predominant at 
all levels. 
16 
This reflected the culmination of the 
gradual shift in the party's social base, towards a great- 
er dependence on 'traditional' power holders. 
The structure itself, was a multi-tiered one con- 
sisting of provincial, district, tehsil city/town and 
village/mohalla (urban precincts) units. 
17 A national ex- 
ecutive committee was set up to coordinate the activities 
of the various units. The village and mohalla units were 
put under the control of district units, while district 
units were placed under the control of provincial units. 
This structure was not unlike that of the Ayubian Basic 
Democracy (BD) system. Like the BD system, the PPP was 
given a multi-tiered and pyramidal shape. The important 
difference was that the-lowest tiers of the PPP had far less 
autonomy than the union councils (the lowest tier of the BD 
system). 
To sum up, then, these organisational endeavours did 
little to reverse past trends in the party, indeed, they 
signified a continuation of the tradition of the primacy 
of personalism over institutionalisation in the PPP. Thus 
even Bhutto's belated efforts at improving party machinery 
did not significantly aid the PPP's development as an 
"institution". 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PPP 
Two major inter-related conclusions emerge from the 
discussion of the PPP in chapters VI, and VII above. Both 
are related to and were a consequence of Bhutto's preference 
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for a patrimonial - as opposed to an organisational - 
strategy for consolidating political power. The first con- 
cerns Bhutto's"failure to develop the PPP into an institut- 
ion, while the second conclusion relates to the character 
of the party's social base. We turn now towards consider- 
ing these and their consequences both in terms of regime- 
stability and from the broader perspective of political 
development. 
Clearly, Bhutto's patrimonial approach resulted in 
a failure (or unwillingness) to develop the PPP into an 
institutionalised political group possessing a degree of 
organisational viability and autonomy. Bhutto attempted to 
enhance his personal authority over the party through the 
manipulation of patronage and the calculated use of un- 
predictability - the hallmarks of a patrimonial strategy. 
He tried to fashion the PPP into his personalised instrument 
through creating and utilising patrimonial linkages based 
on personal dependency. -This resulted in a political party 
in which its chairman became the source of all authority, 
and who expected unquestioning obedience and subservience 
from other party leaders and members. Those who tried to 
question Bhutto's authority faced serious consequences, as 
the numerous illustrations above show. In terms of party 
building, the kind of loyalty Bhutto expected - which 
placed the individual above that of party - clearly prevent- 
ed the PPP from developing any measure of organisational 
viability and autonomy. Additionally, Bhutto's unwilling- 
ness to take effective steps to strengthen the party organis- 
ation and give it a more discrete structure strongly inhibited 
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the PPP's institutional development. This paradox of a 
leader downgrading his own party can be explained in terms 
of Bhutto's overriding concern - common to patrimonial 
rulers - to prevent the emergence of an organisation that 
could serve to limit his power and his scope for political 
manoeuvre both inside the party and outside in the wider 
political arena. 
Bhutto's patrimonial policy of factional manipulat- 
ion contributed further to the PPP's organisational weak- 
ness. Of course intra-party factionalism to some extent 
afflicts most political parties, and in the PPP's case was 
to some extent inherent, given the heterogeneous composition 
of the party. Indeed, intra-party factionalism based on 
ideological differences, biradari rivalries, personal 
enmities and competition for patronage threatened to cause 
serious disruptions in the PPP's organisation. However, 
instead of evolving a formula or mechanism to resolve such 
conflicts, or to contain it within reasonable bounds, Bhutto's 
patrimonial policies served to exacerbate such factionalism. 
Bhutto's policy of factional manipulation which was one of 
balancing factions and of constantly shuttling power bet- 
ween different factional leaders perpetuated this kind of 
conflict, with deleterious consequences for party cohesive- 
ness and unity. At the same time, Bhutto's use of govern- 
ment patronage as a cement for party organisation had only 
limited efficacy for a number of reasons discussed above. 
In the PPP's case, patronage intensified factional conflict 
and led in some instances to the emergence of "personal 
machines" in the party. Additionally, the scale of 
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"non-machine" corruption in the party seriously damaged 
the PPP's legitimacy in the eyes of the public and strategic 
power groups in 'the country (e. g. the military and the urban 
intelligentsia). 
The second major conclusion that emerges from our 
analysis of the PPP concerns the character of the party's 
social base. This, again, was a consequence of Bhutto's 
patrimonial strategy. According to the evidence presented 
in chapter VII and above, there was a decisive shift in 
the party's social make-up while it was in power. Bhutto 
chose not to build on what after 1970 had emerged as a 
potential mass base - at least in the Punjab - preferring 
instead to adopt a patrimonial policy of cooption of tra- 
ditional power holders in all four provinces. In the Punjab 
specifically, this meant a decisive shift away from the 
party's original mass constituency of 'modernised' newer 
social groups towards a greater reliance on 'traditional' 
rural notables. Under Bhutto's direction, the PPP, instead 
of developing the organisational and institutional frame- 
work for organising mass support (a development precluded 
by Bhutto's patrimonial strategy) resorted to coopting 
locally influential leaders with their own groups of 
supporters. This policy of recruitment brought into the 
PPP all types of locally notable people whose loyalty to the 
party was based not on programmatic principle but on the 
personal gain they could derive from such an alignment. 
With party leaders becoming increasingly aligned with tra- 
ditional local power holders, the party lost much of its 
'popular' 'mass' character. Bhutto's patrimonial policy of 
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creating a clientelist base of support amongst rural 
power holders meant that the PPP increasingly became a party 
of notables. In this way, the PPP's "patron party" fea- 
tures gradually came to predominate over its "mass party" 
characteristics. 
" 
This change in the party's social base obviously 
had an important impact on the party's goals, as indeed on 
the party's role as a governing party. While the question 
of the extent to which the PPP acted as a 'modernising' 
party is examined in chapter XII, it is necessary to note 
here that the domination of traditional power holders in 
the party inevitably inhibited its espoused 'modernising' 
aims and robbed it of its 'populist' appeal. Far from 
acting as a 'mobilist' party, the PPP increasingly became 
an avenue for the material advancement of notables. 
The PPP's organisational weakness also seriously 
affected its role as a governing party in the sense of 
acting as a two-way channel of communication between the 
rulers and the ruled. The party failed to develop the 
organisational capabilities or the institutional mechanism 
necessary to accommodate and aggregate political demands 
emanating from the citizenry and to project these upwards in- 
to the process of governmental policy formulation. Indeed, 
the PPP acted more as the legitimising instrument of an 
autocrat than as an aggregative party functional to a party 
system. Certainly individual party leaders in their capa- 
cities'as ministers did participate in policy making, but 
this is quite different from a party as an organised entity, 
responding to pressures from below and influencing governmental 
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policy formulation and implementation. A party that does 
this can become a crucial element in the political system 
and perform a wide range of functions such as integrating 
the citizen body with the ruling elite in a common policy 
process, accommodating the demands of rising social groups, 
aggregating diverse interests, and asserting control over 
the formulation of governmental policy. But the PPP did not 
come anywhere near acquiring such a pivotal role in the 
Pakistani political system under Bhutto. Indeed, the poli- 
cies followed by Bhutto with regard to the party did not 
enhance the likelihood of the PPP's even approaching such 
a position. This meant that the crucial function of com- 
municating political demands in the political system through 
the party as a middle level organisation linking government 
and citizenry, was, in the case of the PPP, weakly perform- 
ed, at best. This had important repercussions, for it re- 
sulted in a greater dependency-of the Bhutto regime on the 
bureaucratic instruments of rule. This signified a contin- 
uity with the Viceregal pattern of governance, in the sense 
of relying primarily on bureaucratic instruments rather 
than representative institutions. ' 
Viewed from a broader perspective, Bhutto's failure 
at middle-range institutionalisation had far reaching con- 
sequences for both regime stability and the development of 
the Pakistani polity. That the emergence of stable middle 
range institutions, such as political parties, have an 
important bearing on the establishment of a stable political 
equilibrium has been the subject of many studies of political 
development and decay. 
18 
Samuel P. Huntington, for instance, 
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suggests that instability and political decay in transit- 
ional societies often results from an absence of strong 
political institutions. 
19 
Thus if a leader fails to under- 
stand the 'organisational imperative' or as in Bhutto's case, 
fails to act on it, -the consequences can be disastrous. The 
crisis of 1977 and the subsequent military coup that toppled 
Bhutto-' amply attests, in our opinion, to the validity of 
this hypothesis. As Huntington has pointed out a situation 
of high politicisation and low institutionalisation provides 
fertile ground for military intervention. The crisis of 
1977 represented this kind of situation. Thus "when 
Chairman Bhutto needed a party, he found to his dismay that 
there was practically none. " 
20 The Bhutto regime's inability 
to deal with the situation produced by the aftermath of the 
March election was in large part, due to Bhutto's failure 
or unwillingness to develop the PPP into an effective 
institution. In this sense, the 1977 crisis which culminated 
in the coup d'etat of July can be viewed as largely re- 
affirming Huntington's thesis that the "causes which produce 
military intervention.... lie in the absence or weak- 
ness of effective 21 political institutions in the society. " 
Viewed from this perspective Bhutto's failure to develop 
the PPP into an effective political institution was an 
important factor which paved the way for military interven- 
tion and contributed to the demise of his regime. 
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IX 
THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the 
nature of government-opposition, inter-party relations 
under the Bhutto regime, with a view to assessing the 
kind of political structure that emerged in Bhutto's 
'New Pakistan'. An important theme of this chapter is 
the nature of the political opposition in Pakistan under 
Bhutto and how it was perceived by the, party in power. 
The main conclusion reached here is not a surprising one 
in view of Pakistan's past political experience (see 
chapter I, and below). We find that the Bhutto regime 
while espousing principles of open, democratic and com- 
petitive politics, instituted policies that crippled the 
freedom of political expression through narrowing and then 
eliminating the scope for opposition activity. Such 
policies, whether termed 'authoritarian' or designated as 
tendencies towards setting up a one-party state, involved 
a concentration of executive power and disregard for 
parliamentary institutions on the one hand, and the 
suppression of opposition activity on the other hand. 
Inasmuch as the PPP regime placed severe restrictions on 
political participation1 and gave precedence to executive 
instruments of rule over representative institutions 
(parliament), it can be viewed as continuing an important 
element of the Viceregal tradition. The PPP regime sought 
to monopolise power through suppressing the opposition 
parties, which it viewed as disruptive of national 
501 
fr, 
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stability and often, also as inimical to national 
integrity. This perception of the political opposition, 
as we shall see below, was not always justified by the 
facts. Nevertheless, the PPP regime's policy of sup- 
pression, produced a desperate opposition, which, deprived 
of all channels of legitimate political action resorted 
in the wake of a disputed general election, to bringing 
about the downfall of the Bhutto government through the 
only method that was likely to succeed -a military 
coup d'etat. 
The plan of this chapter is as follows: we will 
consider first, the notion of 'opposition', and then 
examine this in the context of Pakistan's cultural and 
historical tradition. Such a background is considered 
necessary for understanding PPP/opposition relations, not 
only because, as we shall see below, government/opposition 
conflicts centred on issues (e. g. provincial autonomy, 
religion ) that have plagued all successive goverments 
since the country's inception, but also because elements 
in the Pakistani political culture and structure have 
produced a tradition of intolerance of opposition. Thus 
we will give a brief resume of the country's historical 
tradition relating to these inter-provincial rivalries 
and religious controversies that in the past, made inter- 
elite consensus-building difficult. 
Bhutto's personal beliefs and attitude towards 
'opposition' are equally important in order to understand 
his policies of centralisation and restrictions on the 
opposition; hence some space will be devoted to this 
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within the context of the situation he faced on assuming 
power before undertaking an analysis of how the PPP dealt 
with political opposition and its consequences for regime- 
stability. 
THE NOTION OF 'OPPOSITION' 
The process of opposition may be regarded as a 
universal one, characteristic of all political systems, 
but its importance and the forms which it takes vary 
widely from country to country and from period to period. 
The notion of an institutionalised, recognised and 'loyal 
opposition' has become an integral part, of western liberal 
democracies. However, as Robert Dahl has shown in his 
study of political opposition in the leading liberal 
democracies, this notion is a relatively recent and rare 
phenomenon in historical experience. 
2 The studies edited 
by Dahl also show that even where' opposition is an 
integral and legitimate part of the political system,: the 
patterns differ fundamentally. The nature of opposition 
and the forms of its expression in communist states are 
markedly different. The crucial difference between 
communist and western regimes is that in the former, rival 
political parties are not permitted either by law or 
custom. 
3 This does not make such regimes "oppositionless", 
but as Leonard Schapiro has demonstrated in his study of 
political opposition in communist one-party states, 
4 
'opposition' takes other forms and expresses itself in a 
variety of ways, such as 'power struggles' within the 
" 
higher echelons of party and/or government, or 'pragmatic 
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dissent' constantly exercised as a means of pressure 
by scientists and professional experts. 
5 
The new states of Asia and Africa present a 
variegated picture with respect td the nature and forms of 
opposition. Many of these states began their independent 
political career with their political structures modelled 
on the pattern of the political system of the departing 
colonial power, i. e. on the pattern of the western 
parliamentary liberal democracies. Indeed, the colonial 
rulers themselves introduced some form of parliamentary 
government. However, as has been noted by numerous 
studies of post-independence political developments in 
new states, the great majority of these states soon 
departed from the western parliamentary pattern and chose- 
for themselves different modes of government, which varied 
from country to country in the nature and degree of com- 
petitiveness permitted, and in their tolerance of opposit- 
ion. 6 In very few of these states, was 'opposition' 
accepted as an integral and legitimate part of the 
political system. 
7 This did not always mean that authority 
was exercised without a sense of responsibility or without 
channels of communication between the governor and governed; 
it did mean that the leaders of these states regarded the 
notion of institutionalised opposition as practised in 
western democracies as somewhat alien to their way of con- 
ducting the business of government. In some of these 
states politics was still competitive, but dissent was 
no longer expressed through the channel of public 
opposition parties. 
8 
In some of the African one-party 
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states, as for instance Tanzania, it was found that 
'opposition' was expressed within the 'open' structure 
of a single party. 
9 In some instances, the federal 
structure was seen as providing an important outlet for 
the expression of 'opposition', thus contributing, even 
though rival competing parties were outlawed, to the 
process of consensuäl-and competitive politics. 
Amongst the few states in Asia that permitted 
opposition to exist in a public and institutional form, 
but where one party dominated the political system, such 
as India (until the Emergency in 1975), the nature and 
function of opposition was quite different from that in 
western parliamentary democracies. In the 'Congress 
system' that prevailed in India in the first three decades 
of its existence, 
10 'opposition' was expressed in the 
competition for power and status within the dominant 
party, as well as in the attempts by the opposition 
parties to influence sections within the Congress. 
" 
Thus, as Morris-Jones has pointed out: 
"the opposition parties neither alternate 
with the Congress in the exercise of power, 
nor do they shale power in any coalition 
form; rather they operate by conversing with 
sections of Congress itself. " 12 
Although the 'Congress system' no longer exists in India 
in this form as a consequence of the defeat of the Congress 
in the 1977 election, a continuing feature of the Indian 
political system (notwithstanding the brief period of 
Indira Gandhi's Emergency' Rule) is its competitive nature 
and its acceptance of political opposition as a legitimate 
activity. Many characteristics of India's history and 
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culture have informed this tolerance of dissent and 
opposition, and enabled it to develop what has been 
called 'a consensual style' in dealing with problems and 
13 issues. 
Within South Asia, Sri Lanka, like India, has 
adapted and operated the parliamentary model of competi- 
tive politics reasonably well. The habit of toleration 
as well as a measure of agreement over a fairly wide 
range of fundamentals have helped to establish the notion 
of opposition as a legitimate form of activity. 
14 In 
marked contrast, no such tradition has developed in 
Pakistan. Indeed, intolerance of opposition has been a 
feature of all governments - civilian and military - in 
Pakistan from the time of independence. Several elements 
in Pakistan's history and culture help to explain this 
tradition. We turn therefore towards a consideration of 
these structural and cultural characteristics. 
THE HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL LEGACY: THE LIMITS OF TOLERANCE 
Since 1947 the concept of public tranquiliityAn 
the country has been understood by those in power to in- 
clude suppression of political adversaries who were often 
designated as 'trouble makers'. Successive governments 
frequently equated opposition with treason. This habit 
of intolerance of opposition can, to a large extent, be 
explained by a number of factors. Of these, the first 
relates to Pakistan's colonial heritage. The British 
colonial system in India had many facets, but it would not 
be inaccurate to suggest that the imperial legacy was 
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strong in the instruments and lessons of control and 
administration and comparatively weak in the practices 
and institutions of representative government. This 
seemed to apply even more to the areas that came to con- 
stitute Pakistan. As one writer has correctly suggested: 
"The strongest traditions and structures 
of politics that were inherited by 15 
Pakistan were autocratic and Viceregal. " 
The areas comprising Pakistan were those which had little 
experience in even the limited self-rule introduced by 
the British in India. For instance, the North West 
Frontier Province was ruled as a special area till the 
mid-Thirties, while Baluchistan had no representative 
government of any sort during the entire period of British. 
rule. As we saw earlier (see chapter I) the provinces 
that constituted Pakistan were ruled (with the exception 
of Bengal) as 'non-Regulation' provinces, a system that 
was authoritarian and barely conducive to the development 
of a democratic participatory culture. Thus the areas 
that constituted Pakistan were little accustomed to repre- 
sentative institutions. 
Another aspect of Pakistan's pre-partition history 
that helps to explain the tradition of intolerance relates 
to the particular manner in which the Muslim nationalist 
struggle under the Muslim League developed in the sub- 
continent. The Muslim League claimed to be the sole repre- 
sentative of Muslims - in contrast the Congress party 
considered itself the sole representative of all Indians, 
regardless of community. Congress accepted any groups 
which favoured independence, no matter what methods they 
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wanted to use or what kind of society they envisaged 
after independence; it even permitted them to maintain 
their identity., The League tolerated only those groups 
or individuals who supported the idea of Pakistan. 
Nationalist Muslims who were anti-British but who advo- 
cated independence but not a Pakistani state, were not 
only excluded from the League, but viewed as 'traitors' 
to the cause of the Muslim Community. The attitude thus 
formed towards the opposition continued in the post- 
independence period and was reflected in the League's 
exclusivist claim to rule. Undoubtedly the position of 
the League, a minority group uncertain-as to whether it 
would obtain its demands for a separate state from the 
British had a profound effect upon its attitude towards 
diversity. 
The League's position as a minority group also 
conditioned its attitude towards parliamentary insti- 
tutions. -While in India and Ceylon the struggle of the 
nationalist movements centred on demands for greater 
participation by Indians and Ceylonese in representative 
institutions, i. e. the struggle for parliamentary govern- 
ment was part of the struggle for independence - the 
Muslim leaders were long wary of what would happen if 
India gained a democratic government. Sir Sayyed Ahmed 
Khan argued in the late nineteenth century that the 
application of the principles of representative and par- 
liamentary government in Indian society would mean the 
permanent subordination of the Muslim minority to the 
Hindu majority. Therefore, unless the special position 
508 
of the Muslims was secured, and ultimately unless the 
British granted a separate state to the Muslims, the 
strengthening of parliamentary institutions meant a 
weakening of the Muslim position vis a vis the Hindu. 
The Muslim League, consequently, was perhaps less 
enthusiastic about parliamentary institutions as 
either the Indian National Congress or the Ceylonese 
nationalist leaders. In addition, the Muslim League, did not 
have as much experience in running provincial govern- 
ments as did the Congress Party, which ran seven pro- 
vincial governments from 1937 to 1939. or the Ceylon 
National Congress, many of whose members had been in the 
Assembly for twenty years. Muslim leaders who did have 
some experience in running provincial governments - as for 
instance Sir Sikander Hayat Khan in Punjab - were in par- 
ties which, prior to 1947, were in provincial opposition 
to the League. All these factors, undoubtedly affected 
the character of the Pakistan political system and the 
place of opposition within that emerged after indepen- 
dence. 
If there was little in Pakistan's colonial heri- 
tage that can be seen as aiding the growth of represent- 
ative institutions, there was equally little in the 
Pakistani culture to have encouraged a habit of tolerance 
of opposition. Two aspects of political culture that 
have a bearing on the tradition of intolerance need to 
be noted briefly. Firstly, the predominantly rural 
feudal nature of Pakistani society gives rise to a 
political culture in which the notion of opposition as a 
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legitimate activity, is not readily accepted. In 
Pakistan's rural-dominated political culture, the 
accepted norms of resolving disputes do not exclude 
violence. Indeed, physical violence against rivals/ 
opponents is part of the landlords' customary conduct, 
enabling him to maintain his prestige and honour among 
peers and clients who would lose faith in him if they 
were to know that he was weaker than his rivals. Thus 
it is not difficult to see why such a cultural environ- 
ment has not encouraged the development of habits of 
tolerance of opposition and dissent. 
Another aspect of political culture that can to 
some extent explain the tradition of intolerance relates 
to its Islamic ethos. Although in general Quranic doc- 
trine preaches tolerance, aspects of Islamic teaching 
and tradition have produced a tendency towards authori- 
tarianism. The controversy within the Islamic world as to 
whether western constitutional/representative government 
is compatible with Islam need not detain us here. 
16 
it 
is sufficient to note that Islam emphasises the essential 
unity of all Muslims, which results in a unitary rather 
than a pluralist conception of politics. Thus when 
leaders like Ayub and General Zia have proclaimed the 
imcompatibility of Islam with multi-party politics, they 
have (whatever their political motives) stressed albeit 
in exaggerated form a central tenet of the Islamic faith - 
the notion of unity of the Islamic community or umma. One 
writer in contrasting the differing experiences of India 
and Pakistan explains thus: 
II 
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"The integrative capacity of Congress 
first as a national movement, and since 
independence as a political party, is 
analogous to the integrative capacity 
of Hinduism and its notion of many paths 
to truth; the League's incapacity to 
integrate diversity and its history of 
destroying competition are analogous to 
the schismatic tradition of Islam which 
acknowledges only one path to truth, the 
truth given by Allah, and the need for 
submission. " 17 
In addition, as the history of Islamic states amply 
demonstrates, the weight of Islamic tradition (as dis- 
tinct'from teachings of the Quran and Sunnah) is on the 
side of concentration of authority in the hands of one 
man. These elements in Islamic teaching and tradition 
have undoubtedly influenced and conditioned Pakistani 
political culture, contributing to the tendency to 
authoritarianism and intolerance of opposition. 
As is evident from the discussion above, conditions 
that may have encouraged the development of representative 
institutions along with an acceptance of the notion of 
opposition as a legitimate activity, were not present in 
Pakistani history and culture. However, as Morris-Jones 
has suggested 
"no 'objective' variable has an impor- 
tance comparable to one of a more sub- 
jective kind: the degree of serious 
commitment to liberal democracy on the 
part of those in charge in the formative 
stage of a new state. " 18 
When one looks at the record of Pakistan's founding fathers, 
it appears to be a poor one from the point of view of 
encouraging representative institutions and establishing 
a tradition of tolerance of opposition. However, as we 
shall see below, this was due to a number of factors, of 
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which the "degree of serious commitment" was undoubted- 
ly ly an important one. Of these factors, one related to 
the circumstances surrounding Pakistan's birth. A 
nation born out of the fear of Hindu domination found 
that its psychological insecurity did not disappear with 
partition. Indeed the widespread disruption which accom- 
panied partition only heightened its sense of insecurity 
and had an immediate and permanent impact on the percep- 
tions of Pakistan's rulers. It encouraged a 'seige' 
mentality, mutual suspicion, an intolerance of opposition 
and a tendency to interpret all dissent as disruptive, 
the result of a conspiracy and foreign inspired. Irri- 
dentist claims by Afghanistan based on the ethnic similar- 
ity of tribes on both sides of the border and calling for 
a 'Pakhtunistan', homeland of the Pathans (discussed below), 
only served to confirm the fears of Pakistani leaders that 
"Pakistan was surrounded on all sides by forces which were 
19 
out to destroy her. " Jinnah, himself, in his speeches, 
repeatedly identified all opposition activity with an 
external enemy, i. e. India. 
20 Thus when General Yahya 
called the Awami League leadership in East Pakistan 
'traitors' and 'agents of India'21 he was following a 
tradition set by none other than Jinnah himself. 
Another factor that conditioned the response of 
Pakistan's founding fathers towards representative insti- 
tutions was the belief - given the economic and adminis- 
trative dislocations caused by the partition - that the 
first need of the country was 'strong' government, not an 
effective political system. Pragmatic considerations of 
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political survival also lay behind such a belief, 
since many of the leaders of Pakistan in the formative 
stage came from areas that did not form part of Pakistan. 
Leaders, who, like Liaqat All Khan, found themselves 
without constituencies in Pakistan, were hardly likely 
to press urgently for a system of representative govern= 
ment that could have challenged their leadership positions. 
Attitudes of intolerance can also be traced to 
Jinnah's practice of identifying the party of indepen- 
dence, the Muslim League, with the state. 
22 Anyone who 
stood against the League was called a traitor or a. quisling 
by Jinnah. 23 Since the Muslim League perceived itself as 
representing the entire Muslim nation, opposition was 
ruled out as anti-national. Liaqat Ali Knan, the first 
Prime Minister, even went to the extent of denigrating 
parliament by pronouncing that the council of the Muslim 
League carried 
"more weight than the Parliament .:... its (Muslim League's) strength is equal 
to the existence and strength of Pakistan. ' 
24 
The League's exclusivist claim to rule was conditioned by 
the belief both Jinnah and Liaqat shared, that western- 
style, competitive politics was a luxury Pakistan could 
not afford. 
25 The seeds of an authoritarian tendency 
were quietly but firmly set by none other than Pakistan's 
founding fathers. Jinnah and Liaqat centralised all power 
in the executive and used this against political opponents. 
26 
The elimination of dissent was exemplified by such legis- 
lation as the Public and Representative Offices Dis- 
qualification Act (PRODA) 1949, the Security of Pakistan 
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Act of 1952, the frequent interventions of the central 
government in provincial affairs, the banning of the 
opposition party in the NWFP, the Khuda-i-Khidmatgar 
(popularly known as the 'Red Shirts') and the Communist 
party. 
Clearly then, Pakistan's colonial and cultural 
heritage together with the practices of its founding 
fathers, helped to establish a tradition of intolerance 
of opposition. Subsequent regimes followed in this tra- 
dition and reinforced the authoritarian tendency. But 
what lay behind the attempts of successive regimes, from 
Jinnah onwards, to curb and restrain opposition activity, 
was their repeated failure to resolve the two major 
problems that have beset the country since its inception. 
These are the provincial autonomy issue which centred 
around the need to establish amicable mutually satisfy- 
ing working relationships between the centre and the pro- 
vinces (how much provincial autonomy against how much 
centralisation) and the religious issue, i. e. the role of 
Islam in the state. The settlement of these two issues 
was closely related to the larger problem of creating a 
national identity which could transcend provincialism and 
become rooted in positive rather than negative concepts 
(such as the fear of Hindu domination that had formed the 
motive force of the demand for Pakistan). The provincial 
autonomy issue reflected Pakistan's ethnic diversity and 
brought to the fore difficulties associated with the 
assimilation of the six major linguistic groups (Bengalis, 
Punjabis, Baluchis, Pathans, Muhajirs and Sindhis) into 
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a single national identity. On the other hand the 
'Islamic' issue reflected the clash of two value systems, 
the 'modern' secular and the traditional, Ulema-dominated 
Islamist, and manifested itself as a struggle between 
ulema and secular oriented politicians on the role of 
Islam in a state that had come into being on-the basis 
of religious nationalism. 
27 Successive political and 
constitutional crises since 1947 arose from a continued 
lack of consensus over these issues. 
28 Successive re- 
gimes were characterised by their tendency to provoke 
but not control sub-national, ethnic, and religious group 
controversy. Since these two issues formed the major 
source of conflict between successive governments and 
opposition, they need to be outlined briefly prior to a 
consideration of PPP/opposition relations. This is not 
to suggest that personal rivalries and struggles within 
elites did not play any part in engendering conflicts bet- 
ween governments and oppositions. Indeed the cleavages 
that gave rise to opposition were often personal ones 
among the elites. Here, however, we are concerned with 
focussing upon the more 'stable' opposition groups, that 
have been a continuing feature in Pakistan's history - 
i. e. those that have been generated by social or cultural 
groups - regional, ethnic, linguistic, religious. 
One of the continuing tragedies of Pakistani 
politics was the failure to establish a permanent, mutually 
satisfying working relationship between the Centre and the 
provinces. -The 'provincial problem' involved the demands 
for greater autonomy by the four linguistic regions of 
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Bengal, Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan from what the 
regional leadership of these provinces saw as a 
Punjabi-Muhajir dominated centre. 
29 Provincial leaders 
from these regions blamed their economic and cultural 
troubles on the Punjab and tried to nurture anti- 
Punjabi sentiments in their regions. The response of 
successive central governments from that led by Jinnah 
through Bogra's upto Yahya Khan's regime was to view 
such demands as running counter to the ethos of Muslim 
nationalism, i. e. that the Muslims composed a single 
nation. This is best exemplified in a speech made by 
Jinnah: 
"(Provincialism) was a disease and a 
curse ....... I want the 
Muslims to rid 
themselves of the disease of provincial- 
ism. A nation can never make progress 
unless it marches in one formation. " 30 
It is relevant to point out that central leaders, even when 
they were non-Punjabi (Liaqat, Ayub, Yahya, and later 
Bhutto) recognised that maxim of Pakistani politics: "He 
who controls Punjab, controls Pakistan", and attempted to 
represent Punjabi interests. The Sindhi, Bengali, Baluchi 
and Pathan elites' attempt at self-assertion was met with 
greater centralisation of power by successive Punjabi- 
dominated central governments. Thus regional and provin- 
cial dissatisfaction with central government policies and 
the attempts of the central government to control political 
opposition based upon regional movements have been central 
31 to the history of Pakistan. 
The major challenge to central authorities came 
from regionally-based opposition parties in East Pakistan 
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(the Awami League) and from protagonists of 'Pakhtunistan' 
in the west. The demands for provincial autonomy from 
Bengali regionalists has been dealt with in some detail 
in Chapter IV. 32 In West Pakistan inter-provincial ten- 
sions arose between central authorities and Päkhtun leaders 
of Baluchistan and the NWFP, and focused around the 
'Pakhtunistan' issue. Pakhtunistan was at once an irri- 
dentist as well as a regional movement. Both aspects de- 
serve to be noted briefly. Before partition, the demand 
for Pakhtunistan, i. e. an independent homeland for the 
Pathans, 33 was raised by Ghaffar Khan's Khudai Khidmatgars 
(popularly known as the Red Shirts) and the Wrore Pashtoon 
movement in the Pushto speaking areas of Baluchistan led by 
Abdul Samad Achakzai. 34 As a leading Congressite of the 
Frontier, Ghaffar Khan had opposed the partition of 
Pakistan. 35 After boycotting the referendum held in the 
NWFP in 1947 to decide its political affiliation (which 
gave a verdict in favour of Pakistan) Ghaffar Khan modified 
his position on Pakhtunistan saying that it meant autonomy 
for the Pakhtuns within the framework of Pakistan. Autonomy 
was felt to be indispensable for the Pakhtuns in order to 
escape Punjabi domination. From Jinnah onwards, success- 
ive regimes in Pakistan viewed Ghaffar Khan's activities 
with suspicion,, which were only accentuated by his ambi- 
valent stance towards Pakistan. 36 Successive governments 
dealt harshly with him, keeping him in jail intermittent- 
ly for 15 years, and finally forcing him to seek political 
asylum in Afghanistan in December 1964. His party was 
banned in 1948 while attempts were made to neutralise 
his influence in frontier politics by utilising the 
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services of Ghaffar's premier political foe in the 
Frontier, Qayyum Khan, who headed the Frontier Muslim 
League and became chief minister of the NWFP after the 
dismissal of Ghaffar Khan's ministry by Jinnah in 1947.37 
The issue of Pakhtun autonomy was consequently never 
seriously faced in Pakistan's first two decades. Success- 
ive governments tried to handle it by suppressing its 
advocates and by integrating the NWFP into the unified 
province, öf West Pakistan in 1955 ('one-unit'38). 
Neither approach achieved its desired end. Indeed, 'one- 
unit' merely stirred the embers of anti-Punjabi sentiment 
in Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan and led directly to the 
formation of the National Party of Pakistan in which the 
Red Shirts coalesced with five other regional parties 
from Sind and Baluchistan in opposition to 'one-unit'. 
39 
After several transformations, Ghaffar's party was 
reconstituted in 1967 as the National Awami Party led 
by his son, Wali Khan. 
40 The suspicion with which central 
authorities viewed Ghaffar were'now transferred to his son, 
as his organisation was regarded as the direct lineal des- 
cendent of the Red Shirts. Harsh central government action 
continued to characterise relations between successive re- 
gimes and the regional. opposition in the NWFP and Baluchis- 
tan. Pointing to the tribal nature of both the NWFP and 
Baluchistan', and the fact that historically Pakhtun and 
Baluch tribes had always tried to resist conquest or inte- 
gration within a larger nation, 41 central leaders from 
Jinnah to Ayub maintained that the demand for provincial 
autonomy did not reflect progressive nationalism but 
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rather medieval particularism. 
42 
of Pakhtun/Baluch demands with tr 
tral authority that led Ayub Khan 
justify the despatch of troops to 
The irridentist aspect of 
It was this equation 
ibal resistance to cen- 
(and later Bhutto) to 
Baluchistan in 1958.43 
'Pakhtunistan' became 
evident at the time of partition when Afghanistan oppos- 
ed Pakistan's entry to the United Nations and declared 
its support fdr Pakhtunistan, 
44 
although Afghan interests 
in the area go back into the nineteenth century. 
45 The 
transnational dispersion of the Baluchis and particularly 
the Pakhtuns across the Afghan border encouraged the 
Afghanistan government to press irridentist claims against 
Pakistan, as exemplified in the Afghan demand for the 
creation of a 'Pakhtunistan'. 
46 The Pakhtunistan issue 
became even more complex in 1955 when the Soviet Union 
expressed support of Afghan claims. 
47 
A further complicat- 
ing factor was Pakistan's contention that India was giving 
both moral and financial support to Afghan efforts regard- 
ing 'Pakhtunistan'. 48 The attitude of the Afghan govern- 
ment itself has varied from time to time and from one 
regime to another. At times it has given loud and vocal 
support to the conception of Pakhtunistan and eulogised 
Ghaffar Khan as its main champion, while occasionally the 
official attitude toward 'Pakhtunistan' seemed to cool. 
49 
Details of such developments need not detain us here. It 
is sufficient to note that the irridentist aspect of the' 
issue made regional parties like the NAP doubly suspect. 
The perceptions of central leaders of the 'regional 
threat' always appeared to be closely associated with the 
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internationsl dimension of the problem accentuating the 
above-mentioned fears of dismemberment of the country. 
It was these perceptions that, for instance, lay behind 
Yahya Khan's banning of the NAP in 1971. 
The other issue, apart from-regionalism, that 
successive regimes faced, was that of Islam. The debate 
over the role of Islam in the state was perhaps conduct- 
ed with less intensity than that over 'provincial auto=nomy', 
but nevertheless the continuing, occäsionally vio- 
lent contention between the modernists and traditionalists 
was a critical factor in relations between successive 
governments and oppositions in Pakistani political his- 
tory. The struggle for Pakistan was led by 'modernist' 
lawyer-politicians rather than 'traditionalist' ulema. 
Indeed some sections of the latter had opposed the creation 
of Pakistan onthe doctrinal ground that true Islam had no 
territorial bounds and hence secular nationalism was in- 
compatible with Islam. The leaders of the Pakistan move- 
ment had advanced the idea of Muslim nationhood as an 
axiom, but exactly what this implied in terms of 'Islamic 
statehood' was not stressed at the time. After the 
achievement of a state that was predicated on the basis 
of its Islamic identity, political leaders in Pakistan 
were faced with the problem of defining the role of 
Islam in the structures of the new state. The leading 
personalities who dominated national decision-making from 
Jinnah onwards were for the most part westernised and 
secular, seeking to reinterpret Islam in terms of con- 
temporary conditions rather than to fit society to the 
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doctrines of religion. Thus Jinnah declared that he 
wanted a democratic constitution, incorporating "the 
essential principles of Islam" but Pakistan would not 
be a "theocracy or anything like it", 
50 "to be ruled by 
priests with a divine mission. "51 As one scholar has 
stated, 
"after the creation of Pakistan, its 
ruling elite was content to see that 
Pakistan had an external Islamic person- 
ality, but that government was run on 
lines as close to British Indian secular 
principles as possible. " 52 
In contrast stood the traditionalist religious leaders 
(the ulema) and the non-ulema Islamic reformers (like 
Maudoodi) who demanded the establishment of an Islamic 
state, and the restructuring of society in accordance with 
Islamic precepts. Although there was often little agree- 
ment amongst them on the nature of the Islamic state they 
wished to establish or in their approach towards problems 
like secular democracy and the rights of property, there 
was a measure of consensus on the need to establish a 
regime similar to what used to obtain in the early days 
of Islam -a demand, therefore, for a rigorous return to 
classical standards. Such religious fundamentalism thus 
formed a major source of opposition to successive regimes 
in Pakistan. Through political organisations such as the 
Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP), Jamiät-e-Ulema-e-Islam 
(JUI), the Ulema sought to exert pressure on the ruling 
elites. The latter on their part, aware of the dangers 
of being denounced as un-Islamic and yet unable to concede 
to fundamentalist demands continually wavered between 
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accommodation and repression of such groups. 
The nature of such opposition is best exempli- 
fied in the religious fundamentalism of the most well- 
organised of the Islamic parties, the Jamaat. 
53 Under 
Maudoodi's leadership, the Jamaat has advocated a fund- 
amental transformation of Pakistani society in accord- 
ance with classical Islamic doctrine (as interpreted by 
Maudoodi). In particular, the Jamaat has expressed its 
distrust of both western parliamentarian methods and 
western-educated political elites in effecting such a 
transformation. Maudoodi, for instance,. believed that 
only men with intensely religious personal lives could be 
trusted to rule the country. 
54 Otherwise, he questioned 
"who will build the required Islamic atmos- 
phere? Can än irreligious state with west- 
ernised persons at the helm do the job? 
Will the architects who are all versed only 
in building bars and cinemas spend their 
energies in erecting a mosque? If the ans- 
wer is affirmative, it will indeed be a 
unique experiment in human history. Godless- 
ness fostering Godliness to dethrone itself. " 55 
Inasmuch as the Jamaat is committed to a fundamental alter- 
ation of the Pakistani political system, its opposition 
closely resembles what has been referred to elsewhere as 
'integral'56 or 'structural' opposition. 
57 It was such 
opposition which brought the Jamaat into conflict with 
successive regimes. In 1953, Maudoodi was sentenced to 
death for inciting religious disturbances, although the 
sentence was later commuted. 58 In 1964, the Ayub regime 
banned the party and imprisoned Maudoodi on charges of 
'subversive activities against the state. ' 
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What emerges from our discussion of political 
opposition above is a clear and unbroken tradition of 
intolerance of opposition on the part of both civilian 
and military regimes and the accompanying suppression of 
it throughout Pakistani political history. Thus, when 
Bhutto achieved political power, Pakistan's twenty-five 
year heritage was one of varying degrees of authoritarian- 
ism. Clearly, it was difficult to see that these trends 
could be reversed. 
BHUTTO'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS OPPOSITION 
Bhutto's attitude towards opposition and democracy 
did not . suggest that he would seek to reverse the trends 
outlined above. Indeed many aspects of his personal 
beliefs/perceptions establish him firmly within the his- 
torical tradition described above. Since many of Bhutto's 
personal beliefs have been discussed earlier (see chapters 
-Hr; and VL) it is necessary here only to briefly recall 
some of these. 
Bhutto's preference for a centralised and 
authoritarian political system became evident when he was 
a member of the Ayub regime, and particularly in the ad- 
vice that he had given in his capacity as a member of 
the cabinet sub-committee set up in 1962 to examine the 
report of the constitution commission. 
59 
Bhutto had 
argued for an authoritarian one-party'system in which the 
roles of the judicial and legislative branches of govern- 
ment were to be completely subservient to an all-powerful 
central authority. As Burki points out in his study, a 
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number of Bhutto's close party followers, aware of his 
advice to Ayub, nevertheless expected that the 1968-69 
political movement would have converted him into a demo- 
crat who, when placed in power would bring about the 
return of representative democratic institutions to 
Pakistan. 
60 Certainly Bhutto encouraged this belief, and 
in his campaign against the Ayub regime and during the 
elections of 1970, he often spoke of the need for open, 
democratic and competitive politics. In 1969, challeng- 
ing his own imprisonment under a preventive detention 
law, he presented a glowing defence of democratic rights 
before the Lahore High Court in the following manner: 
"Yes, my Lords, democracy is certainly,... 
like a breath of fresh air, like the fra- 
grance of a spring flower..... But more than 
a feeling, democracy is fundamental rights, 
it is adult franchise, the secrecy of the 
ballot, free press, free association, inde- 
pendence of the judiciary, supremacy of the 
legislature, controls on the executive and 
other related conditions which are conspic- 61 
nously absent in the (present) regime's system. " 
The Foundation Documents and later the Election Manifesto 
of the PPP promised democratic politics. "Democracy is our 
polity" formed the second avowed principle of the party. 
But such assertions of commitment to representative 
institutions remained largely on the level of rhetoric. 
And they appeared to be inconsistent with Bhutto's other 
statements in which he strongly expressed his distaste 
for western-style democracy, holding that this was not 
"suited to our genius., 
62 
Indeed Bhutto frequently spoke 
of a 'disciplined' democracy63 which he felt was more 
appropriate to the 'peculiar conditions of a backward 
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country'64 - an idea strongly reminiscent of Iskander 
MMirza's 'controlled deomcracy' and Ayub's 'guided demo- 
cracy'. Bhutto was informed by his learning and exper- 
ience to hold the view that the country could only be 
governed by a determined and, if need be, ruthless leader. 
65 
According to him, Pakistan had historically five of the 
most "difficult provinces" to govern: "the peoples of 
these provinces were more individualistic, society was 
more tribal, every individual wanted to exercise a veto. "66 
Such a country needed "firmness", not unfettered democrary. 
67 
Thus, Bhutto, like his predecessors, saw the first need of 
the country as 'strong government' rather than represent- 
ative institutions. For Bhutto, the 'peculiar conditions' 
of the country compelled the use of forceful measures. 
Thus he declared: 
"If they (i. e. the opposition) expect that 
I am sitting in Westminster, well I am not 
sitting in Westminster, I am sitting in 
Pakistan, and I know how our politics go... 
.;; to expect in our conditions a kind of 
politics of lavender and lace, it is being 
unrealistic..... if ruthless measures are 
required, I have no hesitation in taking 
them.... I am not a half-measure man. " 68 
The need for discipline was reinforced in Bhutto's 
mind by the events of 1971. Given Pakistan's ethnic di- 
versity, to allow unfettered democracy would only bring 
to fore, divisive provincial sentiments. 
69 Such, Bhutto 
believed, had been Yahya's mistake in allowing unrestrict- 
ed political activity during the election campaign period 
in 1970.70 "The result" according to Bhutto, "was the 
division of the country., 71 Pakistan was not yet suffi- 
ciently 'Politically mature' to permit undisciplined 
525 
democracy, 72 for this would only "let loose.... all the 
emotional questions, all the hatred, all the wild alle- 
gations" intrinsic in a backward country. 
73 It would take 
time for "the democratic set-up to take root"; until then 
stability has to be ensured through 'controls' and 
'firmness'. 74 
Bhutto's preference for strong centre, so drama- 
tically illustrated during the East Pakistan crisis (see 
chapter INaz), indicated that his approach towards the 
question of provincial autonomy would not be significantly 
different from that of previous regimes. Indeed, the 
secession of Bangladesh gave further impetus to Bhutto's 
fears regarding the further disintegration of the country 
through the secession of the NWFP and Baluchistan. But 
more importantly, it'"perhaps reinforced Bhutto's per- 
ception that political opponents who represented regional 
interests were actually involved in treasonable conspiracies. 
This is borne out by the following statement made by him 
im 1975: 
"When I talk about these intrigues I am not 
dramatising the situation..... Only four years 
ago our country was dismembered and that dis- 
memberment was due to internal and external 
conspiracies..... These conspiracies and those 
involved in them are still active.... against 
this background out vigilance has to continue 
unabated and we shall not allow it to be 
eroded by accepting a concept of political 
permissiveness which would allow anti-state 
elements to work for the disintegration of Pakistan. " 75 
Bhutto's attitude towards his political opponents 
was one that scarcely revealed a tolerant approach. Prior 
to assuming power, Bhutto characterised his opponents as 
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hypocrites, intriguers, cowards, and above all, as 
traitors. 76 While it may be suggested that such charac- 
terisations of his opponents as traitors to the country 
may not have reflected any deep-seated belief on the part 
of Bhutto but merely political tactics to discredit and 
defame rivals, nevertheless such characterisations reveal 
an attitude that was essentially antagonistic rather than 
tolerant. Bhutto scarcely disguised what he himself des- 
cribed as an "intellectual contempt" for the opposition. 
77 
He found bargaining and negotiations tiresome with mem- 
bers of the opposition whom he found 'mentally inferior', 
"senile and completely decrepit., 
78 His contempt for 
opposition leaders was frequently reiterated in his 
speeches; he often referred to them as "hollow men, 179 
"devoid of imagination", and "bankrupt of principles". 
80 
In the past, there was little evidence of any cooperative 
activity between Bhutto and opponent parties. Bhutto had 
resolutely refused to cooperate with any party (except 
for a limited period with Bhashani's NAP) during the anti- 
Ayub agitation81 and subsequently. Indeed during the 
events leading up to the Bangladesh crisis, his party 
had stood alone, while his West Pakistani opponents, at 
some time or the other, extended their support to Mujib's 
Awami League. 82 This fact was not lost on Bhutto. Later 
he frequently and bitterly recalled how "The rejected par- 
ties of the West wing, smarting with defeat, inveighed 
bitterly against the People's Party" and had supported the 
Awami League. 83 Thus, not only was there a complete ab- 
sence of any record of cooperative activity between Bhutto 
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and other parties/leaders, but' a schism had developed 
which only widened with time. Such a background - 
characterised by bitterness and mistrust - was bound to 
have an impact on government-opposition relations once 
Bhutto was in-power. 
A number of writers have attempted to explain 
Bhutto's proclivities for authoritarianism in terms of an 
"intense personal insecurity" which resulted from the fact 
that he was born into an aristocratic Muslim family from ' 
a woman of low social origins who had been converted 
to 
Islam from Hinduism. 
84 Writers like Burki and Taseer 
have also suggested that Bhutto inherited his autocratic 
nature from the social class that he belonged to - the 
Sindhi wadera -a class that remained authoritarian in 
outlook. The position taken in this study is somewhat 
different. Our contention is that Bhutto's preference for 
an authoritarian political system is to be understood not 
in terms of contradiction in his character, but as an ex- 
pression of his beliefs, outlined above, as well as his 
political strategy in the face of constraints imposed by 
the political environment, discussed below. 
PPP AND OPPOSITION: THE POLITICS OF CONTROL AND SUPPRESSION 
Despite its emergence as the pre-eminent political 
organisation in the election of 1970, the PPP assumed 
governmental power very much limited by its political en- 
vironment. The party had achieved electoral success in 
only two of the four provinces of Pakistan - Baluchistan 
and NWFP having rejected the PPP for the NAP and JUI. 
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On an all-Pakistan basis, the PPP had received only 
38% of the popular vote with the rest going to the 
opposition parties. Even in the Punjab, which Bhutto 
frequently described as the "bastion of power" in the 
country, the PPP's support base in terms of actual vote 
percentages was not as secure as was perhaps indicated by 
the percentage of seats gained (see above, Table 111.6). 
Indeed, although the PPP emerged as the majority party in 
both Sind and Punjab, yet the combined vote of the opposit- 
ion parties was higher than the PPP's in Punjab and only 
slightly lower in Sind. This suggested the extent of 
opposition strength and the constraints that this situat- 
ion was perceived as imposing on the Bhutto regime's 
ability to govern. In addition, the circumstances in 
which Bhutto assumed power were marked by economic and 
political chaos. (see chapter V) which imposed its own 
imperatives, aptly summed up by Bhutto as the task "of 
picking up the pieces". Relations between the PPP regime 
and the opposition can thus partly be viewed in terms of 
the Bhutto regime's increasing concern over the constraints 
on its ability to rule and its attempt at enhancing its 
control'over a restrictive political environment. Such 
attempts were increasingly marked by the use of coercion 
against parties perceived as hampering Bhutto's exercise 
of power. The PPP regime's perceived need to enhance 
its capacity to govern became a major reason for its shift 
to an authoritarian pattern. 85 The PPP regime attempted 
to narrow and then eliminate the scope for opposition 
activity, establishing a steady trend towards, what many 
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observers characterised as a de-facto one-party state 
within a parliamentary framework. 
86 
When Bhutto came to power, ethnic and religious 
problems posed serious questions about Pakistan's unity. 
Much depended on arriving at a consensus and establishing 
amicable relations between Bhutto and opposition parties 
representing regional/ethnic, religious and other inter- 
ests. The attitude of the opposition towards the Bhutto 
government varied from one party to another. Some oppo- 
sition leaders, like Asghar Khan were sceptical about 
Bhutto's promise of wanting to "break away from the past 
and lay the foundation of a just and democratic order in 
Pakistan. " 87 Others, like the Jamaat leaders viewed the 
new regime with grave apprehension on account of the 
latter's espoused 'socialist' beliefs. 
88 
However, it 
would not be inaccurate to suggest that in general the 
opposition attitude was one of qualified acceptance of the 
Bhutto government, i. e. the majority of opposition spokes- 
men were anxious and willing to cooperate with the new 
regime on the proviso that the latter would take immediate 
steps to demonstrate its 'sincerity' for returning the 
country to a democratic and parliamentary system of govern- 
ment. On the part of some opposition leaders, like Wali 
Khan, a conciliatory approach was clearly evident initial- 
ly - which was predicated on, the belief that after the trauma 
of Bangia Desh a demonstration of national unity rather 
than partisan loyalty was the need of the hour. 89 
Drawing on the lessons of past failures at con- 
sensus-building, Bhutto was acutely aware of the need to 
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arrive at some sort of an understanding, especially 
vis 
ä vis framing a new constitution, with opposition 
parties. 
90 The need for consensus was also urged by his 
fear of possible military intervention. 
91 Bhutto believed 
that the military would be reluctant to overthrow a politi- 
cal structure that had the support of most political par- 
ties. This concern for consensus on the future consti- 
tutional order, however, was accompanied by the equally 
pressing but conflicting need to establish control over 
the political system in order to enhance his capacity to 
govern. The compulsion of seeking control was manifested 
in Bhutto's reluctance either to share power or to allow 
any dilution of his personal authority. The need for a 
powerful central figure can to some extent also be attri- 
buted to Bhutto's concern with curbing the power of the 
military, for he believed that only through a strong per- 
sonalised executive could the military be subjected to 
civilian control (see chapter X). 
The regime's initial steps, thus, reflected this 
dichotomy between seeking control and consensus, revealing 
a curious mixture of freedom and control. For instance, 
the ban on NAP imposed by Yahya Khan was lifted, but legal 
steps were taken that placed restriction on political 
activity. Bhutto kept in force the state of emergency 
with all its preventive detention provisions, and continued 
martial law for four months using it to silence dissent 
within his own party. 92 Indeed in the eyes of the opposit- 
ion Bhutto's initial moves, his lifting of the ban on NAP 
notwithstanding, were a clear demonstration of his desire 
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to monopolise power and his insincerity about introducing 
democracy in the country. Bhutto's appointment of his 
party men as governors in NWFP and Baluchistan, his re- 
liance on martial law to enact his reforms, his proposal 
for a 'phased'. return to democracy built up opposition 
suspicion about his intentions in an environment already 
characterised by an absence of mutual trust. Thus, as 
early as January 1972, Asghar Khan, a leading member of 
the opposition announced his resolve to remove Bhutto from 
power, since the latter had "no intention of restoring 
democracy., 93 Asghar Khan declared that 
"suppression and intolerance has hastened 
the journey towards a fascist society 
which Mr. Bhutto ironically appears to 
have fixed as the ultimate goal for a 
194 people who had voted for democracy..... 
In similar vein, Wali Khan threatened to withdraw the 
support he had offered Bhutto, 
95 
accusing the latter of 
trying to impose a dictatorship in the country. 
96 
The lack of mutual trust was amply demonstrated 
during negotiations between the PPP and opposition parties 
over the future constitutional set up throughout 1972. 
Three 'Accords' between the government and opposition were 
swiftly broken, with each side accusing the other of bro- 
ken promises. 
97 Given this initial lack of mutual respect 
and trust and Bhutto's desire for control, government/ 
opposition relations were bound to be stormy, characterised 
by a lack of restraint on both sides. The PPP regime moved 
within a small orbit of toleration and repression: as 
tolerance began to set free the -'. cforces of opposition, the 
regime became fearful and clamped down. In such an 
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atmosphere it made little difference whether such fears 
were real or imaginary; because toleration was perceived 
as sowing the seeds of the regime's destruction, it contain- 
ed the seeds of its own destruction. The regime in other 
words, created a self-fulfilling need for repression. In 
this vicious circle, fear of challenges to its authority to 
govern led the regime to adopt repressive action, which in 
turn (as we shall see below) left opposition little choice 
but to become violent, thus apparently justifying repress- 
ion after all. 
98 
Initially however, Bhutto was able to achieve a 
measure of consensus, however temporary, with opposition par- 
ties which led, first to the adoption of an Interim Consti- 
tution in Arpil 1972, and then the Permanent Constitution, 
which came into effect on Independence Day, 14 August 1973.99 
The Interim Constitution represented a mixture of the 
Government of India Act (1935) and the Independence Act with 
some amendments. It offered a peculiar combination of pre- 
sidential and parliamentary forms of government, with pro- 
visions for a strong centre. The President was the central 
figure in the Interim Constitution, not answerable to the 
legislature, and possessing sweeping powers - of appointment 
of governors and other high offices, the right to dismiss or 
summon the N. A. and the right to assent to all legislation. 
100 
The political structure under the Interim Constitution was 
essentially Viceregal. As Burki has also pointed out, 
"Bhutto, as President of the republic was vested with the powers that the British 
viceroys had enjoyed under the crown rule. " 101 
Governors in the provinces were to be appointed by the 
President and were responsible to him. The provincial 
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ministries were made responsible not to the legislatures 
but to the governors. As in the Ayubian constitution of 
1962, the President was given emergency powers whereby he 
could suspend fundamental rights and legislate on matters 
reserved for the provinces. It may appear difficult to 
understand how Bhutto was able to get opposition support 
for a system that was clearly Viceregal in its essentials. 
The answer to this lies partly, as Burki has suggested, 
in Bhutto's promise that this was an interim measure 
necessitated by the grave crisis that the country was 
passing through at the time. 
102 Another explanation is 
Bhutto's display of tactical flexibility for he 
made opposition acceptance of the Interim Constitution 
a condition for the withdrawalof martial law. For the 
opposition it appeared that even the strong, centralised 
government provided by the Interim Constitution was pre- 
ferable to the continuance of martial law which they felt 
enabled Bhutto to wield power arbitrarily. 
103 
To produce the 1973 Constitution, 
104 
which was 
widely described as a 'document of national unity', 
Bhutto conceded to some of the demands of the parliament- 
ary opposition, which consisted of NAP, JUP, JUI, JI and 
the Muslim League. The PPP had the parliamentary majority 
to go it, alone, but Bhutto realised that such a constitut- 
ion would lack the legitimacy which he deemed indispens- 
able for his authority to govern as well as acting as 
a check upon possible military intervention. Through a 
combination of adroitly-timed manoeuvres aimed at detach- 
ing the Jamaat from the opposition (so that hardliners 
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like Wali Khan-could only follow the majority), 
105 
intimidation and harassment of opposition members out- 
side the assembly, 
106 
and selective concessions that he 
was certain a frustrated opposition would accept, Bhutto 
achieved the near unanimous confirmation of the 
constitution. Concessions to opposition demands related 
to the issue of provincial autonomy and Islamic provisions - 
the two issues on which there had been heated debates, 
negotiations and much last-minute haggling. The Consti- 
tution attempted to reconcile the conflicting claims of 
the central government and of the provinces by demarcat- 
ing two formal areas of legislation in the Federal Legis- 
lature List and the Concurrent Legislature List. 
107 
Residual powers rested exclusively with the provinces. 
Undoubtedly the federal list went somewhat beyond the 
narrow confines of "defence, foreign affairs and currency" 
desired by the NAP, giving the Centre adequate financial 
and administrative power that Bhutto sought. Nevertheless, 
in the reservation of a wide range of powers to the pro- 
vinces, a symbolic move towards provincial autonomy was 
made. 
108 Despite this enumeration of legislative juris- 
diction, the central government, in accordance with 
Bhutto's desire, possessed ultimate authority over the 
provinces through its powers to take over the executive 
and legislative functions of provincial governments. and 
to suspend their administrations in times of emergency, 
and also by virtue of the Centre's financial functions 
(e. g. disbursement of development funds). Partly miti- 
gating this situation,; was the provision that income 
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from certain natural resources, for example electricity 
in the NWFP and natural gas in Baluchistan, must revert 
to the provinces in which exploitation has taken place. 
Concessions to the religious Right were reflected 
in the Islamic provisions in the Constitution. 
109 For -' N 
the first time in its history, Islam was made the state 
religion of Pakistan. 
110 In order to appease the relig- 
ious opposition, Bhutto dropped the word 'socialism' or 
"Islamic socialism'. The Constitution enshrined the 
principle that all laws would be brought into conformity 
with the Quran and Sunnah, and that no law shall be 
enacted which was repugnant to Islam. 
ill A Council of 
Islamic Ideology would be set up to advise the national 
and provincial legislatures as to the adherence of a law 
proposed or already enacted to the injunctions of Islam. 
But the advice of the council would not be binding, and 
would be sought only if 40% of the members of the legis- 
lature so desired. Although the Constitution received 
heavy doses of formal, emotional Islam, (as was the 
case in 1956 and 1962) such 'Islamic' provisions only 
served to bring the state into external conformity with 
Islam, For instance, the "Repugnancy Clause" (Article 
227) is productive of secular law, not of Islamic law, 
since in order for a law to be Islamic it is obviously not 
sufficient that it not be "repugnant to Islam" but that it 
be derived from Islamic principles. 
112 Moreover, many of 
the Islamic provisions remained statements of goals rather 
than programmes of action. As with the constitutional lang- 
uage defining the relationship between the Centre and 
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provinces, much-depended on interpretation and implement- 
ation. 
Bhutto's real victory, however, was reflected in 
the special powers given to the prime minister by the 
Constitution. Bhutto's oft-stated preference for a pre- 
sidential system had led to a controversy involving not 
only the opposition but also leading members of his own 
party. who demanded the parliamentary form of government. 
Indeed, Bhutto's desire to concentrate wide-ranging powers 
in the chief executive led to the resignation of his law 
minister, and chairman of the constitution committee 
Mahmud All Kasuri in October 1972.113 In the face of such 
pressure, Bhutto backed down from his proposal for a pre- 
sidential system, but nevertheless sought special powers 
and protection for a prime minister (P. M), which the oppo- 
sition maintained would establish the P. M. as a 'constitut- 
ional dictator,. 114 After acrimonious debate, the formula 
which emerged indicated that Bhutto's view had prevailed. 
While the Constitution provided a parliamentary system 
of government, with the executive responsible for the 
legislature 
,a number of unique provisions established 
the P. M. 's supremacy to compensate for what Bhutto saw as 
the weakness of the parliamentary system (in terms of 
the frequent toppling of P. M. s). These were contained in 
the clauses relating to no-confidence motions. According 
to these, a no-confidence motion could not be moved during 
a budget session and had to include within the text the 
name of a successor. 
115 
If unsuccessful, another motion 
could not be moved for six months. Further, for a period 
538 
of ten years or from the holding of the second general 
election to the national assembly, which ever occured 
later, a vote of no=confidence cast by a party member 
elected to the national assembly had to be disregarded 
if the majority of that member's political party in the 
N. A. cast their votes against the adoption of the resolut- 
ion. The P. M. was thus provided with security against minor 
dissidence within his own party and against motions by 
the opposition who had to agree firmly on a successor 
before moving a resolution. In sum, the P. M. 's hold on 
office was made so unusually strong for a parliamentary 
form of government as to constitute a contradiction in 
terms. With the president given minimal powers, and the 
advice of the P. M. binding on him in the performance of all 
functions, the clear intent of the Constitution was to 
make the P. M. the focus of all power. Wide-ranging emer- 
gency and preventive detention powers (Articles 232-236 
and Article 10 respectively) provided the P. M. with ample 
constitutional means to control and restrict political 
opposition. The vagueness of such clauses permitted the 
government a great deal of latitude in the exercise of its 
power to curb dissent and political expression. 
116 The 
emergency provisions together with the P. M. 's unassailable 
position (as a consequence of the no-confidence motion 
clauses) placed substantial constitutional powers at the 
disposal of the central executive to use against political 
opponents and to make its exercise of power almost un- 
restricted. Thus, the political structure established 
under the 1973 constitution had many features of the 
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Viceregal system, and was not too different from the 
authoritarian structure built by Ayub in his 1962 con- 
stitution. How Bhutto sought to operationalise this 
system and dealt with political opponents, and the con- 
sequences that ensued, forms the concern of the remainder 
of this section. 
The major opposition to the PPP regämee came 
from: (1) the forces of Pakhtun and Baluch regionalism 
as represented by NAP (2) the forces of religious tra- 
ditionalism as represented by Islam-Pasand parties such 
as the JI, the JUI and JUP and (3) parties representing 
feudal factions in the Sind and Punjab such as the Muslim 
I League (Pagaro group) and (4) smaller parties, that were 
largely built around personalities, such as Asghar Khan's 
Tehriq-e-Istaqlal (TI). 117 The Bhutto regime's response 
to the various sources of opposition followed an identi- 
cal pattern and was characterised by intolerance which 
manifested itself in the use of coercion and repression. 
The underlying motives of adopting such a policy towards 
the four kinds of opposition outlined above also appear to 
be the same: a general reluctance to share power coupled 
with fears of the 'divisive' effects of opposition activity. 
Tactics, too were identical - the regular characterisations 
of opponents as "enemies of the state" or "secessionists" 
followed by harassments, prosecution, imprisonment and 
on occasion torture. 
118 In some instances, repression 
followed when earlier attempts at winning support through 
the 'carrot' technique (rewards, ministries, etc. ) failed. 
Since the various kinds of opposition raised somewhat 
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different questions it would be more appropriate to 
deal with them separately, despite the similarity in the 
treatment meted out to them. More attention needs to be 
devoted to the regional and religious opposition, for it 
was from these two sources that Bhutto perceived that the 
major challenge fh his authority came. The constitutional 
'settlement' of the 'regional' and 'Islam' issue was one 
thing, but the practical working out of these issues was 
entirely a different matter, and it is to the latter as- 
pect that we now turn our attention. 
THE REGIONAL OPPOSITION 
The practical problem of evolving a mutually satis- 
factory relationship between the ruling party and NAP 
turned, naturally, on the extent of provincial autonomy 
and decentralisation that Bhutto was willing to permit in 
practice, and NAP to accept. Bhutto's approach to the 
problem of 'provincialism' was quite different from that 
of 'autonomists' like the NAP. Although Bhutto had fre- 
quently reiterated his support for a genuine federalist 
scheme as best suited for Pakistan given its ethnic and 
linguistic diversity, this was always qualified by his 
insistence on a 'viable' and 'strong' centre. 
119 NAP, on 
the other hand, advocated substantive devolution of power 
to the provinces as the only way to protect the rights of 
the smaller units. Indeed, at the time of the 1970 elect- 
idn, NAP's views on the degree of provincial autonomy to 
be provided to the units in a federal system were close 
to those of the Awami League. However, after the 
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secession of Bangladesh, NAP moderated its stance. 
According to Wali Khan, in view of the grave crisis facing 
the country after 1971, his party "compromised part of (its) 
own party manifesto" in demonstrating its willingness to. 
accept a quantum of provincial autonomy that was consider- 
ably less than what his party had previously advocated. 
120 
There is some validity in such a claim. NAP's assent to 
the 1972 and 1973 constitution, both of which as we saw 
above, provided for a strong centre, was one indication 
of the change in NAP's stance. Nevertheless, Wali Khan 
still demanded considerable de-centralisation involving a 
broad sharing of power between the federal government and 
the federating units. This seemed to be incompatible with 
Bhutto's emphasis on the need for a strong Centre. 
Given the choice between control and sharing of 
power that decentralisation inevitably involved, Bhutto 
preferred the first, following in the tradition of his 
predecessors. But where he departed from the tradition 
of the past was in his attempts, as we shall see later, to 
create a sense of 'distributive justice' amongst the feder- 
ating units in order to allay the fears of the smaller 
units of being dominated by the Punjab. The latter was 
part of a long-term political strategy. In the short term, 
Bhutto's concern was to maintain the provinces within the 
Pakistani union without having to share his authority or 
power, that is to avoid a shift of power from the centre 
to the provinces. Such a strategy clearly meant that 
political opponents such as NAP, could, at best, exercise 
limited power and authority even though they possessed an 
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electoral mandate in their respective provinces. That 
combination of fear of Balkanisation of the country and 
a reluctance to share power that had characterised 
Bhutto's attitude towards the Awami League during the 
East Pakistan crisis now exhibited itself in his dealings 
with NAP. 
NAP on its part, by advocating the concept of 
"four nationalities", i. e. that Pakistan is a coalition 
of four linguistic 'nations; claimed for itself a position 
of parity with the PPP, the former being the majority 
party in Baluchistan and NWFP and the latter being the 
dominant representative organisation of the Punjab and 
Sind. 121 The PPP regime by maintaining that such a con- 
cept"is nothing but the sowing of the seeds of secession" 
which denied "the very basis of Pakistan" questioned both 
NAP's claims and the reasoning behind them. 
122 Further, 
Bhutto regarded Wali Khan's demand for central non- 
interference in provincial affairs as the first step of 
part of a calculated strategy aimed at establishing an 
indepepdent Pakhtun state. 
123 
In pursuing this goal, 
Bhutto asserted that the NAP was operating simultaneously 
on two planes - as an opposition party within the parlia- 
mantary framework and as an underground group "serving.. 
... as the front-line organisation for Afghan territorial 
designs on Pakistan.,, 124 NAP viewed such allegations as 
part of "a bogey raised by the centre to tarnish their 
image and deprive them of their rights as the chosen rep- 
resentatives of the people. ' 125 
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It is important to note here that the PPP's 
allegations of NAP's "treasonous activities" and par- 
ticularly of "collusion with Afghanistan" have never been 
adequately and conclusively substantiated despite the 
Supreme Court verdict of 1975 (see below). Although NAP's 
historical antecedents (e. g. the pre-partition role played 
by Ghaffar Khan) have made the party suspect in the eyes 
of successive regimes, the allegation of NAP's 'secession- 
ist aims' is far from being proven. 
126 Indeed, Wali Khan's 
beliefs and actions do not easily establish him as a 
'secessionist'. 127 While, as we indicated earlier, his 
father remained quite equivocal about whether 'Pakhtunistan' 
meant a separate state or greater autonomy within Pakistan, 
Wali Khan's approach was significantly different. While 
still espousing the cause of Pakhtun autonomy and advanc- 
ing the theory of "four nationalities", Wali Khan was 
always at pains to point out that the regional autonomy 
demanded was within the context of united Pakistan. 
128 In 
March 1972 Wali even went as far as to say that 'Pakhtunistan' 
was not an issue with his party. 
129 
Such statements as 
well as Wali's efforts to cultivate support in the Punjab 
and Sind after 1971 were perhaps evidence of his desire 
to disassociate himself from a narrow provincial identity 
and pursue a national political role. Indeed Wali and 
others, both inside his party and outside, believed that 
it was because such efforts were beginning to bear fruit - 
with Wali emerging as a potential alternative national 
leader to Bhutto - that finally became a source of uneasi- 
ness for Bhutto and accounted for his subsequent harsh 
treatment of Wali, 
130 
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Bhutto initially permitted NAP to form govern- 
ments (in coalition with JUI) in the NWFP and Baluchistan 
in 1972. This had been a tactical ploy to gain NAP's 
assent for the Interim Constitution. But at the outset 
it was clear that Bhutto's strategy was to circumscribe 
NAP's ability to govern with the goal of replacing these 
governments with those of his own party. The PPP entered into an 
alliance with Qayyum's Muslim League, NAP's traditional 
political foe in the Frontier - an action which the NAP 
claimed demonstrated that Bhutto was not anxious for its 
cooperation for he had made cause with the main factor, 
(i. e. QML) that had historically been responsible for 
giving NAP its 'secessionist' image in the rest of 
Pakistan. 131 For Bhutto the alliance with Qayyum was 
aimed at enabling his own party to gain a foothold in the 
Frontier as a counterweight to NAP. Several other actions 
taken by Bhutto also indicated that his primary aim was 
to engineer the downfall of the NAP-JUI governments. A 
concerted campaign in the official press accused Wali Khan 
of "plotting" against Pakistan (the so-called 'London Plan'), 
and insinuated that NAP envisaged the creation of two 
autonomous states. 
132 
This was accompanied by frequent 
"tours" of the two provinces by PPP ministers, 
133 
insti- 
gation of the Mazdoor Kissan party militants against the 
NAP government's authority, and a 'divide and rule' 
strategy aimed at eliciting the support of tribal leaders 
(particularly in Baluchistan) traditionally opposed to 
NAP. 134 Following a variety of Centre-provincial con- 
flicts and a general deterioration of law and order in 
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both provinces (discussed above, chapter V) Bhutto 
used emergency powers to remove NAP leadership'in both 
provinces and replace them with his own nominees. 
Clearly, Bhutto had found intolerable the bar- 
gaining process in which his government and the two pro- 
vincial governments had engaged, perceiving this as a 
dilution of central government authority. His response 
followed the pattern of predecessor regimes: suppression 
of regional opposition amidst charges that such opposition 
was actively plotting the dismemberment of Pakistan in 
collusion with 'foreign powers'. When such suppression 
led to violent resistance in Baluchistan (on the part of 
tribes loyal to NAP) Bhutto's answer was to send in the 
Army to crush the insurgency, again resorting to a 
method frequently utilised by his predecessors. Bhutto's 
short-term objective of establishing political control, 
it appeared, took precedence over the risks inherent in a 
policy that involved bringing the army back into the 
political arena. 
135 
Bhutto's attempt to impose a military 
solution to what was essentially a political problem was 
reminiscent, as the NAP repeatedly pointed out, of 
Yahya Khan's action in East Pakistan. 
In spite of the anxieties of the PPP leadership 
about the dangers of disintegration because of NAP's 
espousal of ethnic nationalism, the suppression of NAP 
in order to avoid such disintegration was not justified 
in the result. Indeed, the removal of NAP governments led 
directly to open rebellion in Baluchistan in 1973 and 1974, 
constituting a self-fulfilling prophesy on the part of the 
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Bhutto regime that we mentioned earlier. In the 
violence that followed, both sides showed an equal lack 
of restraint. With Sherpao's assassination, Bhutto felt 
justified in imposing a ban on NAP in 1975.136 Bhutto 
further justified this action by alleging that NAP was 
working in collusion with Afghanistan in its aim to set 
up a 'Pakhtunistan' - an allegation that previous regimes 
had also made while seeking to contain NAP's predecessors. 
137 
As required by the law, the case of the dissolution of 
NAP was referred by the government to the Supreme Court. 
The ban on NAP was upheld unanimously by the Supreme Court 
in its judgement given in October 1975 for "operating in 
a manner prejudicial to the integrity and sovereignty 
of Pakistan. "138 This action of, the Supreme Court was, 
again, reminiscent of the country's political past when 
all available legal resources were employed by the central 
authorities to control regional opposition. The obser- 
vations made by an Amnesty International report are worthy 
of note: 
"we believe that the (Supreme) court 
reached conclusions on evidence that did 
not inevitably point to the NAP acting in 
a manner contrary to the security and 
integrity of Pakistan. " 139 
Bhutto jailed all leading NAP figures, including Wali Khan. 
The 'Hyderabad Conspiracy trial' that followed became the 
latest in a series of political trials that, as we saw 
earlier, began soon after independence. 140 Sustained 
official propaganda, as reflected for instance in the 
White Paper on Baluchistan, emphasising NAP's links with 
Afghanistan, attempted to detach NAP from other opposition 
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parties in the rest of the country -ä policy that, as 
we shall see below, met with failure. Indeed, NAP's 
successor group, the National Democratic Party (NDP) 
found sympathetic support amongst opposition groups in 
other provinces who were united in their resolve to oust 
the Bhutto regime. 
Bhutto followed the methods and tactics of his 
predecessors in seeking to contain regionally-based 
opposition but where he departed from the practice of 
the past was to recognise that such containment had to be 
followed through by attempts to create a sense of 'distri- 
butive justice' for the smaller provinces on the one hand 
and to build up his own party in these provinces as an 
alternative to the banned NAP, on the other hand. Thus 
force was accompanied by a long-range strategy of incen- 
tives and patrimonial manipulation of the traditional 
sardari (tribal leader) system. In a sense, Bhutto 
followed a policy much like the British in manipulating 
the sardari system with a view to allowing Baluchistan's 
traditional rulers to neutralise one another. By playing 
off one sardar/tribal leader against another through 
judicious shifts in favouritism (reflected in part, in 
the frequent change of governors/chief ministers in 
Baluchistan), Bhutto attempted, in patrimonial style, to 
keep tribal leaders from mounting a united challenge to 
central authority. For instance, Bhutto capitalised on 
traditional rivalries between the Bugti and Mengal tribes 
in Baluchistan and between Pakhtun (Afridi tribes) speak- 
ing tribes and Hindko-speaking tribes in the Frontier. 
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And while the sardars were engaged in protracted con- 
flict with each other, the PPP regime attempted to pro- 
mote economic development in these areas, long neglected 
by previous regimes, in the hope that this would weaken 
the tribal structure of society which formed the basis 
of support for NAP. 
141 
Bhutto increased development 
funds to the two provinces substantially. 
142 In addition 
to programmes for developing roads, electrification and 
new water supplies, the PPP aimed at weakening tribal 
institutions. The "Sardari system" - under which tribal 
chiefs operated their own laws, courts and jails and 
exacted a variety of levies and taxes - was abolished by 
official proclamation in 1976.143 Meanwhile, immediate 
financial incentives were employed to 'win' political 
support for the party in both provinces. This was reflect- 
ed in the several defections that were engineered from 
amongst members of NAP, JUI and QML by the ruling party. 
Such tactics enabled the Bhutto-appointed provincial 
government to obtain a majority in the NWFP provincial 
assembly (see above, chapter 'V ). But in Baluchistan, 
such tactics were less successful. (A notable defection 
was that of Barozai once NAP speaker of the Baluchistan 
Assembly who became PPP chief minister in 1976). There, 
the Bhutto-appointed cabinet had to resort to force (by 
jailing NAP assembly members), but even this did not give 
the cabinet majority support in the provincial assembly. 
This led Bhutto to dissolve the assembly and impose 
federal rule in 1975. It was only in 1976, on the eve of 
the general election that the Baluchistan provincial 
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assembly was revived, with the PPP enjoying a 
majority in the legislature -a majority achieved through 
the use of force (jailing opposition members and dis- 
possessing them of their assembly seats that in sub- 
sequent by-elections, which the opposition boycotted, 
were won by PPP men) rather than persuasion. 
The success of Bhutto's long-term strategy of 
financial incentives rested on a number of factors of 
which perhaps the most important was the immediate estab- 
lishment of public tranquillity in these provinces. For 
the present, the central government's display of economic 
generosity was not adequate to quell the tribal unrest 
which followed in the wake of NAP's ouster and ban. 
Moreover, the PPP regime's attack on sardari privileges 
obviously met with resistance. This tactic represented 
a significant departure from the Viceregal tradition. The 
British and predecessor regimes had sought to maintain 
political tranquillity in the usually turbulent tribal 
areas of the Frontier and Baluchistan by leaving un- 
disturbed the domination of the traditional interests. 
Bhutto sought to challenge the traditional interests 
through measures such as abolition of the sardari system. 
This was met by stiff resistance from the tribal leaders 
and produced much bitterness, especially since many of 
the tribal leaders believed that Bhutto's attack on feudal 
privileges in the Sind and Punjab was far from being as 
thorough-going as that in the other two provinces. 144 
It came as little surprise then that violence increasingly 
characterised the tone: of politics in both provinces. To 
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meet this dilemma, Bhutto placed final reliance upon 
the military (in Baluchistan), an action that only ex- 
acerbated the problem. The use of force to bring about 
ethnic integration, as we saw earlier, never met with 
success at any point in Pakistan's history. 
THE RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION 
The second major source of opposition to the 
a 
Bhutto regime came from the religious parties, the JUP, 
JUI and in particular the Jamaat. Although all these par- 
ties represent the'forces of religious traditionalism, the 
Jamaat distinguishes itself from other Islamic parties by 
calling itself a non-ulema organisation. Such a distinction 
is meant to emphasise the 'reformist' nature of Jamaat, 
since ulema are to be found in all three organisations. 
For the orthodox ulema, Islam is a perfect and eternal 
religion from which laws can be derived for all time to 
come. For the Jamaat the orthodox ulema's call of 'back 
to the Quran' is not enough, because there are wide 
areas of modern life for which the Quran does not legis- 
late. Thus, as one writer has suggested the orthodox 
ulema are essentially "reiterators", while the Jamaat 
leaders like Maudoodi are "rethinkers" for they are trying 
"to rethink Islam in modern terms. "145 However, despite 
this difference, the Jamaat's views "shorn of their 
modern trappings and the jargon of social sciences" were 
"similar to those of ulemäs he (i. e. Maudoodi) criticised 
for being out of date and reactionary. " 146 Relations 
between the Jamaat and the two ulema organisations have 
varied from time to time, but the latter have often 
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willingly allowed Maudoodi to be their spokesman. 
Since the Jamaat is by far the most well organised of 
the religious parties, which also explains why success- 
ive regimes have taken it more seriously than other 
parties, we will focus on the Jamaat to illustrate the 
nature of religious opposition. 
147 
The activities of the Jamaat cannot be understood 
without addressing attention it its founder and leader, 
Maulana'Abul al Maudoodi. Maudoodi was not a professional 
man of religion, but a profoundly religious man, who 
founded the Jamaat in 1941 with the aim of establishing 
an Islamic system. During the period preceding partition, 
Maudoodi opposed the Pakistan movement, for he regarded 
territorial nationalism as contrary to the tenets of 
Islam, although he emphasised the separate identity of 
Muslims as a nation and thus provided ideological sus- 
tenance to the Two-Nation theory. After partition the 
Jamaat in Pakistan constituted itself into a separate 
organisation with Maudoodi as Amir (leader). Maudoodi re- 
conciled himself to the creation of Pakistan and began 
to assume an active political role to pressurise success- 
ive regimes to frame a constitution and build a political 
system in accordance with Maudoodi's concept of an 
Islamic system. One difficulty in explaining Maudoodi's 
ideas is that they have changed quite rapidly from time 
to time (he has written over a hundred and twenty books 
and .; 
pamphlets) - changes that are not unconnected with 
the imperatives andvicissitudes of Pakistani politics. 
148 
However, Maudoodi has consistently opposed westernization 
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and secularism and has advocated an Islamic state that 
is "universal and all-embracing", an ideological state 
to be run only by those who believe in the ideology, and 
based on the Divine law. 
149 
However, Maudoodi has argued 
that such an Islamic state is not theocratic, because it 
is not ruled by a priestly class, but by the umma (the 
community of Muslims). At the same time it is not 
democratic in the western sense, because the people in an 
Islamic state are not completely sovereign, their sovereign- 
ity being limited by the divine law of Islam. He suggests, 
therefore, that an Islamic state is a "theo-democracy" 
or a divine deomcratic government. 
150 Despite the fact 
that his doctrines have appealed only to a particular 
section of the urban community (see below), Maudoodi has 
been highly respected even amongst his political opponents, 
for his integrity and intelligence. 
Maudoodi built the Jamaat into a well-knit, 
tightly-organised party, on the lines of the Ikhwan-ul- 
Muslimun (The Muslim Brotherhood), with all power vested in 
the Amir. Like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Jamaat has always 
given prededence to organisational efficiency and loyalty over 
strength in numbers. Its small membership - 35,000 in 
1978151 is due to a high measure of selectivity, granted only 
after a long period of probation. This has led many obser- 
vers to suggest that the Jamaat has modelled its organisat- 
15. ional structure on the pattern of Leninist communist parties. 
The Jamaat's associate members are believed to number 
close to half a million. 
153 
The Jamaat's discrete and 
wide-ranging organisational network and its highly 
trained and disciplined cadres give it a depth of 
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power that is reflected in the common assertion made by 
Pakistanis that the Jamaat is the most well-organised 
party in the country. The Jamaat has always placed great 
emphasis on penetrating - some say in a semi-conspirator- 
ial fashion (aspects borrowed perhaps from the Brother- 
hood) - strategic power groups in the country, such as 
the military and the civilian bureaucracy. 
154 At the 
same time, pro-Jamaat groups are to be found amongst 
lawyers, teachers and other professional groups. It has 
also sought to organise parallel unions within the labour 
movement -a policy that, as we shall see below, played 
an important part in ensuring the success of the Piya- 
Jam (wheel-jam) strikes (in Karachi) in the 1977 anti- 
Bhutto agitation. The Jamaat has also built considerable 
support amongst the student community through its student 
auxiliary, the Jamiat-e-Tuleba-e-Islam, which has branches 
in colleges and universities throughout the country. 
Against this background, we can now turn our 
attention towards analysing relations between the Bhutto 
regime and the religious opposition. As we saw earlier 
(see chapter I"Ir and the hostility between the 
PPP and the religious leadership had originated in the 
Ayub period and had manifested itself in several violent 
clashes between PPP and Jamaat workers. After Bhutto 
assumed power, the religious parties, in particular the 
Jamaat, condemned the regime, regarding it to be socialist 
and therefore inconsistent with Islam. 155 Maudoodi, who 
by now had given up leadership of the Jamaat to Mian Tufail 
Ahmed, but who continued to dominate the party's 
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activities, expressed strong disapproval of Bhutto's 
'socialist policies' for he saw these as leading to an 
increasing secularisation of the state. 
156 Initially, 
Bhutto sought to placate the religious opposition, and 
is reported to have assured Maudoodi - in-a series of 
Bhutto-Maudoodi meetings in late-1972 - that he would 
take necessary action to 'control' radicals and communists 
within his party. 
157 These meetings took place in the 
period in which Bhutto officially disowned the radical 
left within the PPP (see above, chapter VI--). Indeed, 
such Bhutto-Maudoodi contacts played an important part in 
finalising a constitutional settlement in 1972 and 1973. 
However, the, temporary truce did not last very long, The 
Jamaat did not believe that the Bhutto regime would imple- 
ment many of the Islamic provisions in the constitution 
that had been conceded by the regime, which we discussed 
above. Indeed, the religious opposition viewed with 
increasing alarm what they regarded as a steady trend 
towards secularism and godless socialism under the auspic- 
es of the Bhutto government. In 1973, the Amir of the 
Jamaat declared that the Bhutto regime was illegitimate 
and called upon the military to seize power. 
158 
Bhutto's 
response followed predictable lines: the arrest of Jamaat's 
leader and harassment of other Jamaat leaders and workers. 
At the same time Bhutto tried to placate the religious 
opposition through a number of actions. He lifted res- 
trictions - imposed by the previous regime because of a 
shortage of foreign exchange - on pilgrims going or the 
Haj. He founded various government organisations for 
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propagating Islamic teaching and encouraging the 
learning of Arabic, and introduced the Quran into 
school curricula. In 1974, following violent anti- 
Ahmeddiya agitation in the Punjab (see chapter V above) 
he deferred to orthodox Muslim sentiment by declaring the 
Ahmeddiyas a non-Muslim minority. This action was taken 
despite the fact that the Ahmeddiyas as a community had 
voted for the PPP in the 1970 election. However, such 
concessions were viewed by the religious parties as 
"cheap gimmicks" and an "exploitation of the name of Islam", 
and as hypocritical window dressing, rather than a demonstrat- 
ion of sincerity to Islamic principles. 
159 
. What 
intensified the opposition of religious 
parties to the Bhutto regime was the fact that a number 
of reforms and actions taken by the latter appeared to 
seriously threaten the social and economic interests of 
the constituencies represented by the former. Thus the 
social base of the religious parties is crucial for under- 
standing the intense hatred exhibited by these parties 
against the PPP regime. As indicated in an earlier chapter 
(see above, chapter Mc-) in Sind, support for religious 
parties (Jamaat and JUP) comes predominantly from the 
Urdu-speaking muhajirs who are concentrated in the urban 
centres of Karachi and Hyderabad. Jones' analysis of 
ward-level constituency returns of the 1970 elections in 
the Punjab provides us with a useful insight into the 
160 social base of religious parties in that province. 
Jones' data shows that support for the religious parties 
came 'primarily from urban middle and lower middle class groups 
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engaged in trade and commerce such as merchants, traders, 
shop-keepers and arhtis (in the mandi towns). These 
groups are predominantly East Punjabi Muslim muhajirs 
from India who replaced the Punjabi Hindu trading and 
money lending castes and took over commercial and arhti 
establishments and other ventures in many cities and 
towns in the Punjab after partition. Within certain 
cities and towns, the East Punjabi muhajirs also belong- 
ed to certain biradaris, such as the Sheikhs, Ansaris 
and Qureishis- with a strong internal discipline (which 
was indeed an important factor in their business success). 
In many of these Punjabi towns then, the religious par- 
ties like the Jamaat, can, as Jones has suggested, be 
viewed as representing a coincidence of biradari (Sheikh), 
sub-ethnic group (muhajir), class (trading) and ideological 
(Islam) interests. 161 
Having identified the support-groups of the 
religious parties, it remains to be explained how the PPP 
regime's policies harmed the social and economic interests 
of such groups. While the PPP's economic and social 
policies and their impact is discussed in greater detail 
below (see chapter . 
XII:: ), it is necessary here to briefly 
mention two sets of policies that appeared to threaten the 
interests of the constituencies represented by the 
religious-parties. The first of these relates to the 
government's decision in 1972 to make Sindhi the official 
language of Sind. As the violent reaction of the muhajir 
community in Karachi and Hyderabad (see chapter 
demonstrated, this move was viewed by the refugee settlers 
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as a grave threat to their interests and as part of a 
broader strategy of a Sindhi-led government to deprive 
them of their dominating position in the economic and 
commercial life of urban Sind. The Jamaat and the JUP, 
representing the muhajir community, organised several 
pro-Urdu demonstrations. Although a political settlement 
was quickly reached, this only partially alleviated the 
fears of the muhajirs and the entire episode only seemed 
to antagonise the muhajir group. Another action of the 
PPP government which hurt the interests represented by: the re- 
ligious parties relates to its nationalisation measures. 
In particular, the nationalisation in 1976 of the agro- 
based industries (and earlier of rice and cotton trading) 
affected the economic interests and in some instances the 
livelihood of small merchants, traders and arhtis (see 
below, chapter Me). As we shall see below, it was 
these groups, as a number of other observers have also 
pointed out, that provided much of the sustenance for 
the opposition's anti-Bhutto agitation in 1977.162 
As is clear from the illustrations above, economic 
and social factors reinforced the religious factor in 
arousingthe intense animosity of the religious parties 
towards the Bhutto government. Bhutto responded by re- 
calling that those who opposed him were the same people 
who had opposed Jinnah and his struggle for Pakistan. 
"They did not want Pakistan then and...... they are still 
opposed to Pakistan and want to weaken it. ""163 In 
addition to labelling such opposition as "reactionary" 
and "anti-Pakistan, " he also resorted to banning 
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newspapers sympathetic to the Jamaat, 
164 
arresting 
political workers and student leaders belonging to 
Islam-pasand parties, 
165 
and a general tightening up of 
restrictions on political activity. Such repressive 
measures only led to further intransigence-and drove the 
religious parties into seeking cooperation with other 
parties including the self-avowedly secular NAP, with 
whom they shared little other than the common desire to 
destroy Bhutto and the PPP. Although poles apart in 
philosophy and national outlook, NAP and Jamaat came 
together within the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1973 
and later the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), their 
unity resting on a common resolve to oust Bhutto"s 
government. 
OTHER SOURCES OF OPPOSITION AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
SUPPRESSION 
Bhutto's dealings with other opposition parties - 
the Muslim League and TI - were characterised by the same 
features that had increasingly marked PPP/NAP, PPP/Jamaat 
relations = the use of government intimidation and often 
violence. Of these parties, the TI, led by Asghar Khan 
was evidently the source of much concern for the Bhutto 
regime. Asghar Khan, a retired Air Marshall, who is 
generally credited with building the Pakistani Air Force 
into an effective and modern fighting force, entered 
politics in opposition to the Ayub regime and had played 
some part (see above, chapter -IIc) in the anti-Ayub move- 
ment. Then and subsequently, Asghar Khan has advocated 
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the establishment of a genuine parliamentary democracy 
and a true federal system combined with an attack on 
the repressive policies of successive regimes. 
166 His 
political and economic philosophy places him at the right 
of centre on an ideological spectrum in Pakistani politics. 
A Kashmiri, domiciled in Hazara, Asghar Khan has the 
advantage of not being identified with any of the major 
ethnic groups in the country and hence can transcend the 
provincial antipathies that make a Pakhtun - like 
Wali Khan - unacceptable in other provinces. However, 
his party has had limited appeal - enjoying some support 
amongst urban middle-class professionals and traders, 
and sections of the military and civilian bureaucracy. 
Nevertheless, its appeal does appear to cut across ethnic 
boundries. The Bhutto regime's attitude towards Asghar 
Khan was essentially repressive - police harassment, deny- 
ing access to the media and preventing public meetings, 
and at times forcibly disrupting these, were some of the 
methods utilised against the Tehriq. 
Apart from Asghar Khan, other critics of the 
regime, such as those belonging to the Muslim League were 
dealt with in much the same way as Asghar Khan. Many faced 
official charges ranging from sanguinary ones such as 
murder to farcical ones such as stealing a buffalo. 
167 In 
one instance, opposition leader and MP, Zahur Elahi of the 
Muslim League was tried for murdering a man who later 
appeared in court and disclosed that he had been abducted 
by the police. 
168 
Charging political opponents with : 
ordinary criminal offences, such as complicity in murder 
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and theft became a prime weapon for dealing with dissent 
both within the PPP and outside. 
169 Referring to this 
phenomenon, a leading newsweekly made the following 
observation: 
"It is a trifle bit bizarre to discover 
that members of the national legislature 
are subjected to ..... detention on such 
elevated charges as cattle pilferage, 
murder, forgery of property transfer 
documents .... there seems to be (a) link between petty crime and political intrans- 
igence. " 170 
In addition, the Defence of Pakistan Rules (DPR) was often 
utilised to detain political opponents, who were then tried' 
before special courts and tribunals set up under special 
and emergency legislation. 
171 Several constitutional 
amendments and a host of legislative measures such as the 
High Treason Act (1973), Prevention of Anti-national 
Activities Ordinance (1973), the Suppression of Terrorist 
Activities Act (1975)-, - increased substantially the legal 
powers at the disposal of the regime to deal with politi- 
cal opponents and establish its dominance. 
172 The manner 
in which the regime dealt with opposition protest over 
such constitutional and : legal measures designed to give 
the former immense powers to contain dissent, is best ex- 
emplified by recalling the circumstances surrounding the 
passage of the Fourth Constitutional Amendment. 
173 
When 
the PPP sought to rush the controversial amendment . through 
parliament, opposition members were not only prevented 
from speaking but three of them, Zahur Elahi, Ahmed Reza 
Kasuri and Malik Suleiman were bodily removed from the 
assembly by Federal Security Force (FSF) officials in the 
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midst of fist fights. 
174 The disregard, not only for 
opposition views, but for the sanctity of parliament, 
demonstrated in this incident was characteristic of the 
regime's methods. 
In addition to the use of legal and constitutional 
powers. derisively referred to as "black laws" against 
political opponents, the regime also resorted to extra- 
legal methods to contain opposition. The FSF was often 
used to break up opposition rallies, 
175 (when they were 
allowed to be held) on: -the justification that "the people 
did not want to hear the rejected leaders of 1970.11176 
Opposition leaders alleged that their party offices were 
often burnt by PPP thugs. 
177 Police harassment extended 
not only to opposition leaders but also to their 
families. 178 At times, dissident politicians'"disappeared" - 
the opposition alleged that such politicians were in fact 
abducted by police authorities. 
179 The use of such re- 
pressive tactics led to an increase in political violence 
to which both the PPP and the opposition contributed. 
There were several assassination attempts on Wali Khan, 
Asghar Khan and Ahmed Reza Kasuri. In one incident the 
latter escaped an assassin's bullet, which however, killed 
his father. ISO Political assassinations of both leading 
opposition figures (e. g. Maulvi Shamsuddin, Khwaja Rafique) 
and PPP leaders (Sherpao) or sympathisers (Abdus Samad 
Achäkzai) made the government/opposition confrontation an 
increasingly violent and bloody one, 181 
Coercive measures against political opponents also 
included preventing public meetings through the imposition 
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of section 144 (barring public assembly) denying access 
to the media and even (by intimidation of press owners) 
preventing the publication of opposition party litera- 
ture. Through a combination of legal and extra-legal 
methods, the ruling party sought to prevent opposition 
views from reaching a wider public, and opposition leaders 
from mobilising support. Despair and discouragement about 
their prospects for growth drove the opposition into 
making wild accusations, walkouts, boycotts of parliament- 
ary sessions, obstructive actions and often, triviality. 
182 
Such behaviour not only doomed the opposition to ineffect- 
iveness, but the aggressiveness of opposition rhetoric, 
which such conditions prompted, also laid them open to 
charges of subversive'intent. This, the PPP was ready to 
exploit at every opportunity. A few examples showing the 
opposition's aggressive language and behaviour would suf- 
fice. At a press conference in April 1973, Asghar Khan, 
describing Bhutto as a 'sick man', 'thoroughly evil' and 
'insane' warned that if the ruling party adopted the 
'language of bullets' it should remember that a bullet 
could also turn towards Bhutto. 
183 
Predictably, Asghar Khan's 
statements were followed by reprisals and further re- 
pressive measures by the ruling party. Similarly when 
Tufail Mohammed of the Jamaat warned that the PPP govern- 
ment's un-Islamic measures would not be obeyed but 
resisted by force, 
184 
PPP leaders accused the Jamaat of 
preaching violence and characterised them as 'traitors' 
seeking to bring about national discord and disunity 
185 
The opposition's aggressive behaviour was reflected in its 
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frequent resort to agitational activity and acts of 
deliberate provocation of the government. A good 
example of the latter phenomenon was the repeated prac- 
tice after 1975 of opposition leaders in addressing 
letters to the three chiefs of the armed forces asking 
them to "save the country from Bhutto's fascist dictator- 
ship. "186 Another example was the attempt by opposit- 
ion leaders to establish liaison with foreign embassies 
in Islamabad and abroad, "to appraise the outside world 
of the regime's true nature. "187 Such activity only led 
to more repressive measures by the regime which the latter 
found completely justifiable. 
THE OPPOSITION'S CHALLENGE TO THE BHUTTO REGIME 
It was against this background of suppression of 
opposition that Bhutto, evidently convinced that he had 
little to fear from a divided and demoralised opposition, 
decided to seek a fresh mandate from the people. But when 
he called a general election in March 1977, a desperate 
opposition quickly-forged an alliance - the PNA - to pose a 
united challenge to his regime. However, there was little 
doubt amongst opposition politicians that there was only 
one way in which Bhutto's regime could be brought to an 
end short of his demise - through a military coup d'etat. 
The opposition was convinced that the election was merely 
a re-legitimising device for the Bhutto government to 
enable it to reinforce its control over the country, and 
could not, by virtue of the regime's control over the 
administrative (civil-police) machinery, be a fair one. 
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Citing the futility in opposing the PPP at the polls, 
an opposition leader argued the following: 
".... taking an over-all view, the elec- 
tions are more a part of the internal re- 
organisation of the People's Party than an 
open reference to the people for a renew- 
al of the mandate ...... However fair the 
elections are made to be, the people have 
nothing to choose from ....... " 188 
Although the opposition decided to contest the election, 
it stated in no uncertain terms that the result would in- 
evitably be 'rigged'. 
189 Thus even before the election, 
a desperate opposition (united in the nine-party 
Pakistan National Alliance, PNA, which represented the 
regional, religious as well as other sources of opposit- 
ion) had decided that the election would be rigged, but 
envisaged the possibility of utilising the opportunity 
provided by the election to dislodge the Bhutto government 
by contriving a situation in which the military would have 
no option but to intervene. 
The opposition's new found confidence rested not 
only on their ability to forge a united front against 
Bhutto, bringing together parties as divergent in outlook 
as the secular,. National Democratic Party (NAP's successor), 
the Jamaat and TI, but also on the fact that the campaign 
period had unleashed a massive wave of anti-government 
discontent and disillusionment, albeit largely urban, that 
the opposition was able to capitalise, and direct. In its 
campaign to oust Bhutto, the opposition alliance adopted 
the slogan of Nizam-e-Mustapha (the demand for an Islamic 
system or Order of the Prophet), in the belief that an 
appeal to Islam would not only stir the public, but find 
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a receptive ear within those segments of the army who 
were known to be Islam-Pasand (i. e. the Army Chief of 
Staff himself). Clearly, for the regional opposition 
(NDP) and the secular parties in the PNA (Tehriq, Muslim 
League) the issue of Nizam-e-Mustapha was less an ideo- 
logical commitment than a tactical means of challenging 
the Bhutto regime. The demand for Nizam-e-Mustapha and 
an attack on Bhutto's one-man, authoritarian rule con- 
stituted the two main planks of the PNA's election 
campaign. 
No sooner had the results been announced that 
the PNA accused the ruling party of having rigged the 
election. The election was undoubtedly rigged, and whet- 
her the PPP majority "was more padded than stolen"190 
mattered little in the public furore that followed the 
announcement of the result. 
191 Whatever the precise scale 
of the rigging, the net result was to bring into doubt 
the legitimacy of the entire electoral exercise. The 
PNA sought to capitalise on the initially spontaneous ur- 
ban protest that developed, calling for a nationwide agi- 
tation movement to bring down the government. The issue 
of election rigging was seized upon by the opposition--as a 
catalyst to oust Bhutto. Bhutto's later allegation that 
the PNA embarked on a "pre-planned conspiracy" to oust 
him has, therefore, some validity, although the accompany- 
in'g charge that the PNA movement was part of a "massive 
international (U. S. ) conspiracy" in which the military 
acted as an accomplice is more difficult to substantiate. 
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The PNA's four month campaign of hartals, riots, 
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-demonstrations, street violence, piya-jam (wheel jam) 
strikes was aimed at creating national dislocation and 
disorder, which would destroy the legitimacy of the 
Bhutto government in the eyes of the military, forcing 
the latter to intervene. Given this strategy, Bhutto's 
offer of concessions (judicial inquiry into electoral 
malpractices, new provincial elections, a ban on alcohol, 
gambling and night clubs) were repeatedly spurned by the 
opposition. Having come this far, the opposition was not 
likely to be satisfied with anything short of Bhutto's 
removal. 
The volume of protest manifested in the predominant- 
ly urban anti-Bhutto movement was larger than what the 
heterogeneous collection of opposition parties could com- 
mand through their constituencies. This indicated that a 
wide range of economic and social grievances lay behind 
the revolt. Since this aspect of the movement is discussed 
in detail in chapter MI., it. would suffice to note here 
that the PNA movement reflected the social and economic 
frustrations of broad sections of urban society. The use 
of a volatile religious issue (Nizam-e-Mustapha) as a 
carrier for economic and social frustration is part of a 
political tradition in Pakistan that reaches back through 
the religious agitations of the 1930's and the Khilafat 
movement to the Great Rebellion of 1857. 
The key to understanding the organisational strength 
of the PNA movement and Bhutto's inability to contain this, 
lies in the nature of the support groups of the PNA and 
PPP. As we explained earlier, amongst the constituent 
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elements of the PNA, the religious parties like the 
Jamaat and JUP drew much of their support from Urdu- 
speaking muhajirs concentrated in urban centres of Sind 
and from urban middle and lower-middle class groups con- 
sisting of small merchants, traders, shopkeepers and 
arhtis which in many Punjabi cities and towns tended to 
belong to a particular ethnic group (East Punjabi muhajirs) 
and to particular biradaris (Sheikhs, Qureishis and 
Ansaris) within this. As Sayeed has rightly suggested, 
it was these groups that provided much of the sustenance for 
the PNA movement in the Punjab. 
193 The PNA's support 
amongst such groups (principally through the Jamaat and 
JUP) enabled it to gain access to arhti associations and 
other commercial associations giving it a depth of 
organisational power that was difficult to match in the 
cities and mandi towns. The local organising capabili- 
ties of parties like the Jamaat and JUP was thus a key 
factor in sustaining the anti-Bhutto movement'in urban 
centres. The support of traders associations meant that 
the PNA "could'have..... shops closed within a few hours" 
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This ensured the success of the numerous hartals organised 
by the. PNA. In addition, the Jamaat through its 'front' 
organisations amongst for instance lawyers and students 
was able to ensure the participation of these groups in the 
movement. There were 94 demonstrations by lawyers and 
283 by students in the anti-Bhutto movement. 195 The PNA's 
links with some trade unions (in cities like Karachi and 
Hyderabad) also ensured the participation of sections of 
urban labour. The pro-Jamaat Pakistan National Federation 
of Trade Unions which had 264 trade unions affiliated to 
i 
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it organised a successful piya-jam strike in Karachi. 
Above all, the religious parties' links with mosques 
up and down the country put at the PNA's disposal a power- 
ful instrument for organised political action. Since the 
mosque was the one place where meetings were not banned, 
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it emerged as a formidable centre for political agitation 
and the starting point for the protest marches. 
Clearly the PNA with the kind of organisational 
strength described above, had enormous 'street power' 
in the urban centres that could and was used to bring 
widescale disruption and disorder. In contrast, the 
PPP's major support groups were predominantly rural. 
The assessments we made earlier (chapters VI and VII) 
regarding the party's weak organisational nature and the 
character of its social base are crucial in explaining 
why the PPP's power could not be mobilised to counter 
the PNA movement. 
Political arithmetic gave Bhutto majority sup- 
port, but it was the PNA which had urban 'street power'. 
The importance of the latter phenomenon derives from the 
fact that in the Pakistani environment, as in Third World 
countries in general, urban unrest of objectively small 
dimensions often has an excessive political influence. 
197 
In the recent past, it was a predominantly urban agitation 
that had toppled the Ayub regime. This and the anti- 
Bhutto agitation clearly demonstrated the importance of 
urban 'street power' in dislodging an incumbent regime. 
As one writer has noted: 
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"On a head count a party may have 
millions of rural voters but a scream- 
mob of five thousand on the streets of 
Karachi can bring down a government. " 198 
Although this statement is somewhat exaggerated, it 
nevertheless serves to underline the phenomenon of the 
disproportionate influence of the urban milieu in Third 
World societies. 
The PNA with its forces concentrated in the urban 
centres was able to mount and sustain an agitation move- 
ment that seriously challenged the legitimacy of the PPP 
government. Bhutto, on the other hand, had few resources 
with which to contain this movement, other than the instru- 
ments of state power (police and FSF). The desperate re- 
sort to repressive measures not only served to escalate 
the agitation, but involved calling in the military into 
the political arena. Bhutto was forced to impose martial 
law in three major cities to contain the violence. For 
the PNA this was a partial victory for it marked the 
beginning of the dilution of Bhutto's authority. The PNA 
hoped that the army would oust Bhuttb and call new elect- 
ions - having been asked by Bhutto to rescue the country 
from a state of bloody disorder they were not likely to 
hand it back to the man whose regime provoked the blood- 
shed. The opposition's strategy was to continue to stage 
strikes and demonstrations in defiance of martial law, 
thereby demonstrating to the military that Bhutto had 
lost all credibility as a leader and pressurising it into 
withdrawing its support from the regime. The PNA played 
its dangerous hand to the utmost - in effect provoking armed 
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troops into firing on'unarmed civilians in street 
demonstrations. This was accompanied by direct appeals 
to the military to take over power (see Appendix IC) as 
evidenced in Asghar Khan's letter addressed to the three 
chiefs of staff. That the PNA was not, at this stage, 
anxious to reach an understanding with the PPP regime was 
indicated by the fact that even when a final accord had 
been negotiated in PNA/PPP talks, the PNA council refused 
to ratify the accord. 
199 In the light of existing infor- 
mation, it is difficult to substantiate Bhutto's allegat- 
ion of prior complicity between the army leadership and 
the PNA in contriving a situation which would justify 
military intervention. However, there seems little 
doubt, that a desperate opposition, given the opportunity 
provided by the controversial election, did its utmost to 
engineer a situation in which the military would have no 
option but to remove Bhutto. The PNA attempted to destroy 
the legitimacy of the PPP government in the eyes of the 
army, and embarked on a collision course aimed at creating 
public disorder, chaos and bloodshed - circumstances 
within which the military would be pressurised to exercise 
its 'saviour' role. Such a strategy culminated in the 
military coup of 5 July 1977. In this sense Bhutto's 
alienation of the opposition through his authoritarian and 
repressive tactics, led indirectly to his eventual fall. 
eONCLUSION 
As noted earlier, intolerance of opposition has 
been a continuing characteristic of Pakistani politics. 
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Regional dissatisfaction with the concentration of power 
at the Centre and the demands of fundamentalist Islamic 
groups, coupled with the tendency of previous regimes to 
suppress such opposition and equate it with treason, gave 
a special character to political opposition in Pakistan. 
The Bhutto regime did not significantly depart from 
established government practices in dealing with regional, 
religious and other opponents. Bhutto's preference for a 
Viceregal system, together with a fundamental distrust of 
all opposition activity led his regime to continue many of 
the Viceregal features of previous regimes in terms of the 
restrictions on political participation and concentration of 
executive power and its use against political opponents. In 
so far as opposition was felt to be akin to treason, PPP 
leaders saw no harm in destroying the opposition. Certainly 
01 
drawing on the lessons of earlier failure, the govern- 
ment showed signs of being more responsive to regional 
sentiment in the use of development funds (in Baluchistan 
and NWFP) to create a sense of justice and to quell the 
fears of the smaller provinces of Punjabi domination. As 
a long-term strategy this may have worked well in bring- 
ing together ethnically disparate groups into a common 
national framework. However, Bhutto's short-term strategy - 
partly dictated by a personal reluctance to share power 
and partly by his constituency support (i. e. the Punjab - 
as in the case of all previous regimes) - of preventing 
the elected leaders of Baluchistan and NWFP from partici- 
pation and using the army to crush the resistance that 
subsequently developed, created serious strains, making 
the goal of national integration more elusive. Bhutto's 
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resort to using the army to bring about ethnic assimilat- 
ion firmly established him within the historical tradition 
of his predecessors who too had utilised force as the 
ultimate tool of nation-building. 
Bhutto's policy of suppression did not eliminate 
opposition, but only made it more intransigent and its 
actions and activities more questionable. The PPP regime, 
in fact, created a self-fulfilling prophecy; repression 
produced a desperate and violent opposition whose "no holds 
barred" approach only justified the need for greater re- 
pression. The necessity of contending with an incumbent 
elite, so distrustful of opposition, rendered the situation 
of opposition parties difficult. Where the regime believes 
that those who oppose it in-particular matters are their 
enemies in all that counts in life, a corresponding 
attitude is bred in the opposition. If enmity is cultiv- 
ated enmity is harvested. Such was the case under the 
Bhutto regime. Bhutto's policy of suppression had a two- 
fold effect: it led the opposition to adopt an intrans- 
igent and extreme political position, and by excluding 
the opposition from participation it created a dangerous 
void in the political communication of the system. Thus 
an alienated opposition felt that it was not transgress- 
ing any political norms - for there were no agreed funda- 
mental rules of political competition - in its appeal to 
the military to oust Bhutto. Had not Bhutto himself used 
the army to crush political opposition? That both pro- 
tagonists sought to involve the army in politics under- 
scored the failure to evolve any accepted rules of the 
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political game -a failure that has been one of the 
continuing tragedies of Pakistani politics. 
It is important to note that the PPP's policy of 
suppressing political opponents, with all that this in- 
volved in terms of curtailment of civil liberties, and 
violation of democratic values, had little impact on 
Bhutto's major constituency in the rural countryside of 
Punjab and Sind. As indicated earlier, in Pakistan's 
rural culture, the accepted norms of dealing with oppon- 
ents do not exclude violence and other illegal measures. 
Indeed physical violence against rivals/opponents is part 
of the landlords' customary conduct. 
200 In this environ- 
ment, Bhutto's harsh treatment of political rivals was 
not only acceptable but perhaps not illegitimate. It was 
the urban middle class and the intelligentsia who became 
agitated over the infringement of democratic norms. It is 
unlikely that Bhutto's banning or disrupting of opposition 
meetings and other violations of democratic values offend- 
in any great degree his supporters within the rural 
landed-gentry and peasants. Indeed, the opposition parties 
repeatedly failed to arouse any sympathy from these 
groups - its drawing power remained limited to regional 
groups in Baluchistan and NWFP on the one hand (which had 
its liabilities since Bhutto could raise the bogey of 
'secession' to justify repression before his Punjabi 
supporters) and to urban groups in the Punjab and Sind 
such as the disenchanted professional intelligentsia, the 
maulanas, industrialists, merchants and traders, and sec- 
tions of the labour'and student community. In this setting, 
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Bhutto probably had the numerical majority, but the 
opposition had the urban power which could be used to 
cause widespread disruption and dislocation. But the 
crucial factor in this dynamic, as far as the opposition 
was concerned, was winning the military's support, for 
an urban agitation movement could not itself topple the 
Bhutto government. It was the politics of desperation 
par excellence - for the same parties that had cried 
themselves hoarse protesting about the army's 'presence' 
in Baluchistan, were calling upon the same army to remove 
Bhutto. 
The political crisis of 1977 and the trials and 
tribulations of evolving democratic politics that preceded 
it merely highlight what appears to be a persistent feature 
of Pakistani politics - the seeming impossibility of es- 
cape from a recurring cycle of limited politicisation, 
oppression, divisiveness, turmoil, military intervention 
and depolitidisation. The Bhutto regime displayed"a 
continuity with the Viceregal tradition in its central- 
isation of power and in the severe restrictions imposed On 
political participation. Bhutto continued the tradition 
of executive supremacy over representative institutions. 
The political system he built was Viceregal in its essen- 
tials - with a powerful and autocratic central figure, a 
disregard for the practices and institutions of represent- 
ative politics and the use'of executive power to curtail 
political participation. There was a strong irony in the 
fact that as the only leader in Pakistani history who can 
be credited by virtue of his populist role in the period 
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1968-1970, with involving the masses in national poli- 
tics, he should have sought, once in power, to revert 
to the Viceregal practices of his predecessors. As one. 
observer has also noted: 
"Certainly it was a tragedy for Pakistan 
that the one politician who did involve 
people in democratic dialogue should have 
had such a cavalier approach to democracy. "201 
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X 
BHUTTO AND THE CIVIL BUREAUCRACY 
INTRODUCTION 
The most outstanding feature of Pakistan's politi- 
cal system from the time of independence was the dominant 
and decisive role played by the civilian bureaucracy and 
the military in national decision making. 
l Whether such 
pre-eminence was a logical concomitant of the asymmetry of 
institutions inherited from the colonial past (i. e. the 
organisational superiority of the civilian and military 
bureaucracy vis a vis political institutions), 
2 
or result- 
ed from the "pre-emption and monopolisation of key govern- 
mental offices in the political system by bureaucratic 
elites" in the immediate post-independence period, need 
not concern us here. 
3 It is sufficient to note the pri- 
. macy and autonomy of the civilian and military bureaucracy, 
4 
a phenomenon which led observers to characterise Pakistan 
as an "administrative state", 
5 
or one in which the Viceregal 
pattern of authority prevailed. 
6 
When Bhutto assumed power in 1971, he recognised 
that both the military and civilian bureaucracy could 
seriously limit his capacity to govern and his freedom to 
manoeuvre. This indicated that given Bhutto's concern to 
widen and ensure his control over the political system, 
the legacy of bureaucratic and military dominance could not 
survive intact. The sheer survival of the new regime 
depended, in the perception of Bhutto and his party lead- 
ers, on taking prompt and effective action to curb the 
autonomous power of the military and bureaucracy.? 
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In his endeavours to establish political control 
over what were viewed as rival centres of power, Bhutto's 
task was eased by the circumstances surrounding his access- 
ion to power. Bhutto had come to power at an extraordinary 
juncture in Pakistan's history, when the separation of Bangla- 
desh had brought about a national crisis characterised by 
a power vacuum, in which the two traditional bases of power, 
the army and the bureaucracy had suffered an immense loss 
in public prestige. The PPP, on the other hand possessed 
considerable legitimacy. The 1971 war had not only ex- 
ploded the myth of military invincibility, but had adverse- 
ly affected the civilian bureaucracy. Indeed, some 
observers pointed out that the civil bureaucracy (especial- 
ly its elite corps, the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) ) 
had suffered an even greater loss of, prestige and status 
than the military. 
8 The close identification of CSP 
bureaucrats with the policies followed by the previous 
regimes made the bureaucracy the target of vehement pub- 
lic criticism. In the case of the military, such critic- 
ism was to some extent moderated by the traditional rever- 
ence for the military as an institution, and public attacks 
were directed largely-at a coterie of generals identified 
with the Yahya regime. But in the case of the civil 
service, the past record as we shall see below, was less 
one of public respect than of disillusionment and discontent. 
Disarray in the army and bureaucracy gave Bhutto 
unparalleled leverage. 9 The weakness and despair that grip- 
ped these institutions thus set the scene for Bhutto to 
consolidate his personal authority. Bhutto was anxious to 
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exploit this relatively favourable position to re- 
fashion these Viceregal institutions, and to re-define 
their role in the political system. The manner in which 
Bhutto sought to establish political control over the 
civilian and military bureaucracy forms the major concern 
of this and the following chapter. 
' To what extent did 
the Bhutto regime alter these institutions, and to what 
effect? Our analysis of such questions shows that Bhutto 
followed a paradoxical policy by attempting to curtail 
the power, prestige and status of the civil-military 
bureaucratic apparatus, while placing considerable reliance 
on such machinery for the process of governance (which only 
served to strengthen such machinery). Those who envisaged 
Bhutto as radically altering the traditional configuration 
of power and introducing a new style of governing by, for 
instance, replacing the bureaucracy with the PPP in the 
national decision-making arena were disappointed. 
11 In 
dealing with the military and the bureaucracy, Bhutto re= 
lied on patrimonialism as a means of establishing control 
but having established this personal control, Bhutto 
attempted to make the bureaucracy (albeit a 'reformed' and 
politicised one) and especially the expanded police com- 
ponent, and the military, important pillars of his regime. 
Bhutto's attempts to curb the autonomy and primacy of 
the military-bureaucratic apparatus represented a signifi- 
cant departure from one aspect of the Viceregal tradition, 
i, e, the independent power exercised by the military and 
bureaucracy. But his dependence on such machinery, 
especially the bureaucracy, for governance, represented a 
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reversion to Viceregal practice in the sense of relying 
on bureaucratic rather than representative institutions 
for operational activity and daily control. Thus while 
Bhutto probably went further than anyone else in Pakistani 
history in seeking to curb the independent power of the 
military and bureaucracy, his goal was not to eliminate 
their influence altogether, but to reduce their powers 
and to compel their obedience to his personal authority. 
In pursuing this goal, while Bhutto was decidedly more 
cautious in his dealings with the military, he appears to 
have followed a common strategy (of patrimonial control) 
with respect to both power groups. This was coupled with 
structural reforms that further enhanced his personal con- 
trol over these institutions. We turn now to a more de- 
tailed discussion of these efforts with the case of the 
civilian bureaucracy being examined in this chapter, and 
the military in chapter eleven. 
PPP AND THE CIVIL SERVICE: THE BACKGROUND 
In order to understand the implications of the 
policies followed by the Bhutto regime with regard to the 
civil service, it is necessary to give a brief overview 
of the nature of the public bureaucracy from independence 
upto 1971.12 Two features stand out in sharp relief in 
this period: firstly, the unchallenged dominance of the 
elite cadre (CSP) within the administration; and secondly, 
the need for administrative reform as expressed in numer- 
ous 'reform commissions' (set up under successive regimes) 
and in public criticism (public refers both to the general 
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13 
public and to political leaders) of the bureaucracy. 
The system of administration inherited from the colonial 
era underwent little. fundamental change after 1947, des- 
pite the need expressed by successive regimes to bring the 
administrative structure more in line "with the demands of 
an independent society. "14 Indeed, the first five year 
plan claimed that the inadequacy of Pakistan's administrat- 
ive apparatus was the most serious single impediment". to 
development. " 
15 The need for reform was clear from the 
establishment of several reform commissions - from 1947 to 
1962, twenty-eight such commissions were set up for the 
purpose of reforming, reorganising and improving different 
aspects of the administrative system. 
16 However, despite 
such reform efforts (predictably resisted by the higher 
bureaucracy), 
17 the essence of the system was not touched 
but often warmly defended. 
is 
The system of administration - so resistant to 
reform-was a highly complicated and cumbersome one. A 
major "orgänisational feature was the fractionalisation of 
the public services. 
19 
There were class divisions of rank 
(I, II, III, IV), with each class recruited separately, 
20 
and 
spatial divisions (central and provincial). The public 
services were further divided into some twenty-six central 
services ranging in prestige from the Civil Service of 
Pakistan (CSP) to the Central Engineering Service, Class 
H. Beneath these superior services were Class III and 
IV services, the latter comprising menial help. Each of 
the provinces had a comparable service structure assigned 
within the province (discharging roughly comparable 
592 
functions, but in terms of status, not comparable). 
In each province the provincial service roughly compar- 
able to the CSP was known as the Provincial Civil Service (PCS). 
Recruitment to the central services was a function of the 
Central Public Service Commission. 
21 
Each of the provinces 
had a comparable commission for recruitment to the provin- 
cial services. There was no unified public service unit 
in control of all aspects of employment, discipline, 
salaries, and structure - these functions wers shared by 
the Federal Public Service Commission, the Ministry of 
Finance, and the Establishment Division. 
22 It is impor- 
tant to note that there was virtually no interchange of 
personnel between the various (functional) cadres of the 
central services on the one hand, and between the central 
and provincial services on the other hand. On an overall 
basis then, the public services revealed no less than 
600 different scales of pay and grades, and fifty separate 
cadres, each 'closed' and compartmentalised with separate 
rules-and regulations. 
23 
Capping the entire public service structure in 
bureaucratic power and prestige, was the elitist cadre, 
CSP, lineal descendant of the Indian Civil Service -a 
group of 300 - 500 "generalists", representing no more than 
0.07 per cent of the entire bureaucracy. 24 Members of the 
CSP were recruited by means of a competitive examination 
conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC), 
the examination itself based on Macaulay's famous assert- 
ion that "the persons who excel over others in academic 
learning also excel over them in other walks of life. "25 
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The CSP was a distinctive, cohesive entity with a high 
degree of elan, and was characterised as "unique among 
the systems inheriting the imperial tradition of the ICS 
in the sense that its sense of exclusiveness and imperious- 
ness have been only slightly affected since independence. "26 
Basic to the CSP ethos was the classical-literary-generalist 
educational bias presumed to impart the virtues of Platonic 
guardianship, which, indeed, was the distinguishing feature 
of the imperial Indian Civil Service. 
27 Further, the now 
classic formulation of Macaulay, calling for a class of 
administrators "Indian in blood and colour, but English 
in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect" could 
appropriately be applied to the CSP. 
28 
Members of the CSP were posted to assignments 
both in the central secretariat and in local administration 
in the provinces. 
29 Indeed all members of the CSP started 
their careers as district officerp, as did ICS officers 
before partition. CSP officers usually headed divisions 
and districts and held posts on the staff of divisional 
commissioners and in the departments of the provincial 
secretariat30 thus setting the tone of local and provincial 
administration. 
31 
The CSP certainly constituted the 
"pivotal service around which the entire administrative 
edifice at the centre. and province-was organised, 1132 
Through a system of "reservations" the CSP monopolised 
the top administrative jobs at the centre, and strategic 
positions in the provinces. Two-thirds of all posts of 
secretaries, joint secretaries, and deputy secretaries, 
(of the central secretariat) and three-fourths of the 
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'cadre posts' in the provinces (such as chief secretary, 
divisional commissioners, etc) were reserved for the CSP. 
33 
In a study of the power of the higher bureaucracy of 
Pakistan, Ralph Braibanti found that in 1964,89 per cent 
of (central) secretaries, 66 per cent of provincial secre- 
taries, 75 per cent of divisional commissioners and 51 per 
cent of district officers were members of the CSP. 
34 A 
natural corollary of this phenomenon was that technical 
experts and other "specialists" found that key policy 
posts were closed to them. 
The CSP's hold over the administrative system was 
so firm that it was able successfully to resist any attempt 
at reform perceived as harming its elite nature or inter- 
ests. 
35 It prevailed on successive governments to shelve 
reports which were adverse in their comments on its role 
and efficiency. It was for demonstrating such power that 
the CSP was derisively termed the Central Sultans of 
Pakistan by critics. 
36 The CSP's power was confined not 
only to the administration but extended also to the country's 
political system. The role of the CSP in the political 
arena has been dealt with in considerable detail else- 
where. 
37 
It is sufficient to note here that after the 
death of both Jinnah and Liaqat, the CSP - as the bureau- 
cracy in general - in filling the power vacuum which was 
created by the turbulence of the parliamentary period (the 
disintegration of the Muslim League, factional in-fighting, 
etc) actively participated in political affairs. This role 
earned for it the title of the "best organised political 
38 party of Pakistan". The CSP was often described as the 
r 
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hotbed of political intrigue and manipulation. 
39 
The 
powerful position of the CSP in national decision-making 
was little affected by the military takeover in 1958. 
There was no overt supercession of civil authority by the 
military; on the contrary, the civil bureaucracy, rid of 
political harassment, became stronger than ever. 
40 The 
Ayubian regime essentially represented a partnership bet- 
ween the army and the CSP. 
41 
Moreover, Ayub's reliance 
on the bureaucracy as the major tool for 'nation-building' 
activities only served to enhance the power and prestige 
of the CSP. 
42 
The performance of the bureaucracy in general and 
the status of the CSP in particular met with severe critic- 
ism from different sources on several grounds, from inde- 
pendence onwards. For instance, criticism has been voiced 
about the CSP's exclusivity and its alleged arrogance, and 
debates of the Constituent and National Assemblies are 
replete with such references against the cadre. The 
following remarks of one member of the Constituent Assembly 
exemplify such sentiments: 
"Our civil service has been formed and 
drawn up by the best talent in the coun- 
try, yet what is the training that is 
imparted?.... They are being taught the 
same tradition as in the'British day... 
.... They are inaccessible people ..... Is it that you are going to train your own 
people to hate your own system, to hate 
your own civilisation and culture? " 43 
The same sentiments were expressed by another politician 
who declared that: 
"All the hatred in the hearts of the 
people against any government is due main- ly to the self-conceited and haughty be- 
haviour of the functionaries. " 44 
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Civil servants in general were frequently criticised in 
the press and in parliament for being arrogant and aloof 
from the common people. 
45 Officials were accused of be- 
having like "brown Englishmen" and treating the ordinary 
man in the street with contempt. 
46 A different kind of 
criticism was that the CSP placed the generalist executive 
in positions of power above the technical experts, even in 
agencies where technical matters were dominant. 
47 Members 
of the rival PCS frequently expressed the need for alter- 
ing the monopolistic hold of the CSP. Thus criticism of 
the administrative system came from both within and out- 
side the service. 
48 
Much of this criticism, particularly that pertain- 
ing to the exclusivity, aloofness and arrogance of the 
higher bureaucracy, was justified by the facts. The elite 
nature of the civil service and its reverence for its 
colonial antecedents and practices has not been disputed 
or denied even by defenders of the civil bureaucracy. 
Indeed, CSP representatives have conceded that the bureau- 
cracy has been arrogant, and non-responsive to the public. 
49 
However, they have argued that these features are not 
limited to the public bureaucracy but are in fact trans- 
mitted to the latter by the political system. In other 
words, public officials become non-responsive and arrogant 
when the political government is non-responsive and arrogant. 
As a senior member of the CSP stated: 
"The administrative system partakes of the qualities of the political system.. 
..... the bureaucracy is not designed to be a check against the political head. " 50 
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Thus although the CSP accepted much of the public 
criticisms directed against it, by holding that "the 
corrective has to be found at the political level", 
51 it 
blocked any significant effort to reform the administrative 
system. At the same time, the higher bureaucrats' deter- 
mination to cling to their historic privileges and to re- 
sist any diminution in'their status obviated any endeavour 
that could redress public grievances as reflected in the 
criticism of the bureaucracy noted above. 
-Public criticism of the bureaucracy reached a 
peak towards the end of Ayub's regime. 
52 Indeed popular 
resentment against the civil service was a significant 
element in the anti-Ayub agitation of 1968-69.53 Two slo- 
gans of the 1968-69 mass movement were directed specifically 
against the bureaucracy - 'Nauker Shahi Murdabad' (death 
to the servant-kings) criticised the concentration of pol- 
itical power in the hands of the bureaucrats, while 'Rishwat- 
sitani Khatum Karo' (end corruption) criticised widespread 
administrative corruption. 
54 A government announcement3in Novem- 
ber 1969 (under the military regime headed by Yahya) recognis- 
ing the role played by anti-bureaucracy sentiments, stated 
that: 
"among the causes of public resent- 
ment which led to country-wide demon- 
strations during the period preceding 
the imposition of martial law on 25 
March 1969, resentment against the 
structure of administration figured 
prominently. " 55 
The announcement further stated that the condemnation of 
the administrative structure had been based on complaints 
that: 
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"it was a relic of the colonial past 
in which the relationship between 
government functionaries and the 
people was that of the ruler and the 
ruled",..... 
that it had contributed 
"to sustain and even strengthen the 
ruling elite within the service cadres 
which had sacrificed administrative 
neutrality for political partnership" 
and that it had 
"helped to promote corruption, in- 
efficiency and selfishness. " 
The announcement also noted the discontent within the 
civil service itself, an obvious reference to the resent- 
ment amongst non-CSP groups and "professionals" (engineers, 
college teachers and doctors) against the generalist CSP's. 
For instance, in 1969, the Rawalpindi-Islamabad PCS 
Association declared that the CSP's "colonialist mentality" 
had contributed to the current political unrest and that 
its hegemony had demoralised the other services. 
56 These 
views were echoed in a meeting of the representatives of 
the five 'financial services' in March 1969 where a re- 
solution was passed which stated the following: 
"At present, the CSPs are more equal 
than others, not due to any intrinsic 
. merit 
but owing to an outdated colonial- 
istic system of imperial preference. " 57 
Yahya responded to this upsurge of condemnation of 
the bureaucratic structure by dismissing 303 class I 
officers, including 38 CSP members on grounds of corruption, 
misuse of office and misconduct. 
58 
Yahya also set up a 
Services Reorganisation Committee (SRC) under the chairman- 
ship of Justice Cornelius. 59 The choice of Cornelius was 
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significant, for it was his vocal criticism of the CSP as 
contained in the (1962) Cornelius Report that had earlier 
led to the Report's suppression. Yahya's pre-occupation 
with the crisis in East Pakistan, however, did not give 
him the opportunity of implementing the proposals of the 
SRC. It was left to the new regime to grapple with the 
problem of administrative reorganisation. 
BHUTTO'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CIVIL BUREAUCRACY 
It was against this background that the PPP assumed 
power. Before undertaking an analysis of the PPP's dealings 
with the civil bureaucracy, we will first refer. briefly 
to the views held by Bhutto and his party as regards the 
civil service. It is important to note at the outset that 
Bhutto, as a minister in the Ayub cabinet for eight years 
(serving in a variety of portfolios - Commerce, Fuel, Power 
and Natural Resources, Kashmir, National Reconstruction 
and Information, Tourism, Minority Affairs and Foreign 
Affairs) - had had the occasion to observe closely the 
inner workings of the administrative system. His personal 
observations probably conditioned his later responses and 
strategy, and had a significant impact on the evolution of 
his party's programmatic position on administrative 'reform'. 
Bhutto had both noted the CSP's powerful 
., position 
and what he saw as their exercise of unrestricted power as 
well as their proclivity for political intrigue. 
60 
From 
1959 he had closely watched how the CSP (as represented by 
men like Altaf Gauhar and Fida Hussain) had first supported 
Ayub and then withdrawn their support as they saw his 
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regime weakening. He identified the CSP's formidable 
power as the major obstruction to any regime's ability to 
govern effectively. As a result, he was determined "to 
break the back of the CSP". 
61 Bhutto was also keenly 
aware of inter-service rivalries and jealousies, particular- 
ly the tension between CSP's and non-CSP's and between 
the central and provincial bureaucracy (PCB); he had noted 
in particular, the frustration of technical experts and 
'professionals' vis ä vis the generalist'administrators. 
More importantly, Bhutto held the concept of administrative 
neutrality in contempt. He explained the'rationale behind 
the 'myth' of administrative neutrality thus: 
"The myth of the segregated, neutral 
civil servant was needed by colonialism.. 
... The imperial power had created a cast iron framework of civil servants to be 
unavailable, and hence faceless, to the 
natives; to be neutral in the feuds of 
the natives and in dealing with the 
communal and political problems of the 
natives.... Even this neutrality was 
tilted from time to time, in favour of 
one faction or another, to serve the 
ends of the Raj. " 62 
For Bhutto, the neutrality of civil servants was a myth, 
perpetuated by them into the post-colonial era, to protect 
their own interests at the expense of those whom they 
claimed to serve. In many of his public speeches Bhutto 
attempted to show that the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan 
had in fact worked hand in glove with "capitalists" and 
"big business" to preserve the status quo. 
63 
On other 
occasions, he warned the "bureaucracy of this country to 
change its behaviour. "64 Some of these statements have to 
be taken at face value, since they were made with an eye 
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for public consumption. After all, as we shall see below, 
Bhutto was to put the civil bureaucracy to his own 
purposes. 
Many of Bhutto's stated beliefs were reflected in 
party documents. The PPP's Foundation Papers severely 
criticised the administrative structure, 
65 
while another 
document reiterated the belief that the higher bureaucracy 
"have a big stake in the maintenance of the status quo, 
which is to say free field for predatory capitalists. " 
66 
The PPP's election manifesto (1970) underlined the need 
for reform of the administrative system by declaring that 
"The present system of administration 
is a legacy of colonial rule ... what= 
ever modifications have been introduced.. 
... have been done to meet the needs of the rising indigenous capitalist class 
and to promote the interest of the 
groups that were acquiring wealth by 
holding the levers of power within 
government and administration... . The 
administration then became its own 
master. " 67 
The manifesto further stated that "the socialist regime will 
need a different structure of administration", a reflect- 
ion of the belief that unless 'modified' the bureaucracy 
would obstruct the PPP's 'socialist reforms. '68 In calling 
for public accountability of official actions, the mani- 
festo declared that "the present rule of anonymity will 
have to be drastically modified., 
69 
PURGES, REFORM AND PATRIMONIAL CONTROL 
In his first address to the nation, on his assump- 
tion of power, Bhutto emphasised the need for administrative 
reform to put the colonial legacy to rest. 
70 Subsequent 
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actions reflected Bhutto's concern with establishing his 
personal control over the bureaucracy through a variety 
of methods, including structural reforms. The following 
section is concerned with analysing the mechanics of such 
control, and the relations that ensued between politicians 
and administrators as a consequence of this control. As 
we shall see below, in order to establish control over the 
civilian bureaucracy, Bhutto relied on "personalist" - as 
opposed to organisational means -a strategy that was 
earlier termed as 'patrimonialism', and one we earlier 
suggested he utilised to establish his personal control 
over the PPP. (See chapter VI). As we shall see presently, 
both the "purges" and structural reforms enhanced Bhutto's 
personal control over the bureaucracy. 
One of Bhutto's first actions after assuming 
power was the purge under a martial law regulation in March 
1972, of 1,300 (later the list was increased by another 
700, but this also included those who were demoted rather 
than dismissed) public servants on grounds of corruption 
or inefficiency. 
71 
The list of dismissed civil servants 
included several CSP's (a breakdown by service is not 
available. ) While it is difficult to estimate whether 
those dismissed were in fact corrupt or inefficient or both, 
since the announcement did not substantiate such charges 
in individual cases, 
72 there is little dispute over the 
fact that this move was meant to convey to the public ser- 
vants the need to fall in line with the wishes of the new 
regime. Part of the reason behind the move was the need to 
respond to public criticism of the bureaucracy as discussed 
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earlier. But the strongest motive appeared to have been 
Bhutto's desire to establish his personal supremacy over 
the bureaucratic structure. By inculcating a sense of 
insecurity and vulnerability amongst the officials, Bhutto 
was in a position to exert the asymmetrical lines of depend- 
ency which forms a necessary condition of any system of 
"personal rulership" or "patrimonial" control. 
73 The purge 
had the desired effect of leaving high-ranking bureaucrats 
fearful of the future, and the fact that one hundred and 
fifty of the dismissed were later reinstated (through re- 
commendations from influential PPP sources) 
74 
was a clear 
enough reminder to the bureaucrats of both the desirability 
of following the regime's dictates if they wished to 
remain secure, and on gaining either Bhutto's favour or 
those close to him, if they were to survive in office. It 
may be relevant to mention that the dismissed public ser- 
vants were given no legal recourse (i. e. there was no 
provision for a show-cause notice) -a factor which only 
served to highlight the officials' dependence on Bhutto 
for 'Justice'. 75 The lack of due process afforded to the 
dismissed bureaucrats not only initiated a wave of fear 
and insecurity within the (higher ranks) of the bureaucracy, 
but alarmed even members of the PPP, like Mahmud Ali Kasuri 
(Minister of Law and Parliamentary Affairs until October 
1972) who, ironically was known for his disdain for the 
76 civil servants, and in particular the CSP. 
Two further purges were conducted in August 1973 
and October 1976. The former affected fifteen senior 
officers of whom ten were CSP's and included the president 
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of the CSP Association, Qamar ul Islam (whom Bhutto had 
himself appointed as head of the Planning Commission in 
1972). The action of October 1976 affected 63 officers 
who were compulsorily retired and 95 officers who were 
served with show cause notices. 
77 It is difficult to de- 
termine the number of CSP's amongst these officers since 
breakdown by service was not given. Other than these bulk 
retirements a number of officers were also individually 
retired on different occasions. These included notable 
CSP officers such as Zafar Iqbal (see below), Afzal Agha, 
and Aslam Bajwa, with the official reason for their dis- 
missal varying from case to case. 
The combined effect of such purges and dismissals 
was to enhance the sense of vulnerability amongst the 
civil servants. 
78 This sense of insecurity was intensi- 
fied by frequent threats by Bhutto and his ministers of 
further "screenings" of "the corrupt", 
79 
as well as by re- 
ports that "lists" were being prepared of government officials 
"who had acquired land by dubious means. "80 Thus were 
created the ideal conditions for Bhutto to bring into play 
his patrimonial strategy. The message was effectively 
communicated and comprehended: rewards/punishments, pro- 
motions/demotions within the administrative sphere were 
dependent upon the will of Bhutto. As one civil servant 
put it "total submission (to Bhutto) was indicated as a 
requirement to survive in office. " 
81 The situation was 
succinctly summed up by an opposition leader, who noted 
that the government servants 
"have learnt to their utter confusion, 
like Pavlov's dogs that there is no': knowing when the hands that brings to 
them the sweets and the meats can also 
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deliver a stinging smack on the cheek 
or a box on the ear.... Bewildered and 
confounded, they have surrendered them- 
selves to the whims of the one who 
feeds them, and to accept the blows 
as part of the game, in the hope that 
next time, or the next, it will be 
sweets..... " 82 
The use of the 'stick' approach indicated above, 
was accompanied by the 'carrot' technique, 'to consolidate 
Bhutto's personal control over the bureaucracy. This 
involved rewarding those loyal to his regime - often pro- 
moting them over the heads of their superiors to ensure 
their personal indebtedness. 
83 Patrimonial control was 
thus assured through the placement of officials in strategic 
positions within the administration. In making such appoint- 
ments, Bhutto, initially, was often careful to exclude CSP 
members as indicated for example, by his selection of 
Vaqar Ahmed (of the Audit and Accounts Service) as Cabinet 
and Establishment Secretary, Afzal Saeed, secretary to the 
P. M. (who also headed the P. M. 's secretariat), Rao Abdur 
Rashid, special secretary (cabinet division) and Saeed Ahmed 
Khan, chief security adviser, who emerged as the more power- 
ful of Bhutto's bureaucratic advisers, were all non-CSP 
officials who received rapid promotions through demon- 
strating their personal loyalty to Bhutto. When a senior 
CSP official, Zafar Iqbal wrote a letter of protest to the 
establishment secretary, asking for the grounds on which 
he had been superceded by a junior officer, (Afzal Saeed) 
he was summarily dismissed on Bhutto's instructions. 84 
The Zafar Iqbal Case, as this incident came to be called, 
was clearly intended as a warning to those who dared to 
question Bhutto's personnel procedures. "I will not", 
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Bhutto is reported to have declared on this occasion, 
"tolerate impertinent individuals like this malapert 
civil servant., 
85 
In his efforts to curtail the power of the CSP 
Bhutto withdrew the constitutional security of tenure pre- 
viously enjoyed by the service and guaranteed by all pre- 
vious constitutions. 
86 When the opposition parties protest- 
ed, pointing out that constitutional guarantees were 
necessary as a protection against arbitrary dismissal, 
Bhutto condemned this as "a legacy of the past", holding 
that "as in all countries this has been left to ordinary 
legislation. "87 Within his own party, Kasuri too register- 
ed a strong note of protest stating that "servants of the 
state, who are dismissable at the pleasure of their super- 
iors, will tend to lose their independence and will become 
obliging instruments in the hands of their ..... political 
superiors. "88 The Civil Servants Act, 1973, provided a 
simplified disciplinary procedure, under which civil ser- 
vants above the rank of additional secretary could be 
retired at any time without assigning any reason, while 
officers in grade 20 (see below, for grading system) and 
below could be retired at any time after completing twenty- 
five years of service. 
89 Indeed the purge of August 1973 
discussed earlier was intended to let the senior officers 
know the cutting power of the teeth put in the new 
'simplified' disciplinary procedure - to remind them of 
their precarious tenure under the PPP regime. 
The promised administrative reforms, announced on 
20 August 1973 paved the way for the politicisation of the 
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civil service, and provided Bhutto with further means of 
establishing his personal control over the bureaucracy. 
90 
The principal target of Bhutto's reforms was the CSP. The 
CSP which consisted of 320 members in 1972, was disbanded 
along with all the other services, in order to be integrated 
into the new All-Pakistan Unified Grades. The CSP's pro- 
tected status was terminated, and new functional categories 
were introduced. 
91 Over 660 different scales of pay were 
replaced by a simplified and unified 22-grade national pay 
scale structure. 
92 Equivalent grades were developed so 
that no officers in the pre-reform era would lose position 
or pay which indicated that the government fully intended 
to retain the great majority of officers associated with 
the now defunct services (e. g. CSP). Corresponding grades 
for the classes were as follows: 
93 
Gazetted 
Class I Grades 17 to 23 
Non-Gazetted 
Class II Grades 11 to 15 
Class II Grade 16 Class III Grades 3 to 10 
Class IV Grades 1 and 2 
Grades 16 and above were to be appointed by the 
prime minister; grades 3 to 15 by Grade 20 officers or 
above; and grades 1 and 2 by deputy secretaries, heads of 
departments or heads of offices. Provision was made for 
horizontal movement between cadres, and thus for technical 
personnel to take up senior management positions that in 
the past were reserved for generalists. This also'made 
it possible for entry into the government service through 
lateral appointment.. 
94 Introduced with the ostensible 
purpose of bringing in talent at all levels from the private 
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sector and the professions, the scheme clearly had the 
potential to develop into a major instrument of political 
patronage. That Bhutto wished to monopolise the power of 
lateral appointments was suggested by the fact that the 
Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) was given no con- 
trol or say in such appointments. Indeed, the powers of 
the Public Service Commissioners were considerably trimmed, 
so that they "were reduced, in effect, to mere shadows of 
their former selves. "95 For instance, under the Federal 
Public Commission Act, 1973, the President was empowered 
to terminate the appointment of a member (of the FPSC) 
before the expiry of his term. In addition, the FPSC's 
consultative functions did not extend to disciplinary 
matters. Indeed, the FPSC's functions were largely 
limited to conducting tests and examinations for recruit- 
bent to the unified grades. 
It should be noted that the administrative reform, 
besides providing Bhutto with the instrument (indeed the 
legal provisions) of consolidating his patrimonial control 
over the bureaucracy, served a number of other functions. 
It enabled Bhutto to demonstrate to his left-wing support- 
ers within the party, that, as promised he had humbled what 
he termed Pakistan's 'Brahmins" and 'Mandarins'. It 
enabled him to meet the demand for change in the adminis- 
trative machinery voiced from within the civil service and 
from without. Above all, it helped enlist popular support 
from people in practically all walks of life who had grown 
weary of administrative inaction, indifference and corrupt- 
ion The language in which Bhutto's speech announcing the 
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reform was couched, the deliberate use of slogans such as 
putting an end to*'Naukershahi' (rule by civil servants), 
was clearly aimed at reinforcing his popular standing. 
"No" Bhutto declared in the course of his speech, "we 
cannot retain such Barra Sahibs in a peoples government.. 
.... (we)'cannot but liquidate the casteism and snobbery 
bred by Pakistan's present structure. "96 Press reports 
indicated that "Bhutto's announcement evoked glee among 
large numbers of people who were thrilled by the spectacular 
downfall of the CSP. "97 This was especially true among 
segments of the intelligentsia who sensed new opportunities 
when Bhutto noted that 
"the country could no longer condone 
a system which elevated the generalist 
above the scientist, technician, pro- 
fessional expert, artist or the teacher. " 
Press reports, however, did not indicate the demoralisation 
and sense of insecurity amongst the senior bureaucrats 
about the intentions of the regime. 
98 
The nature of the 'new structure' soon became 
apparent. The influence of the (former) CSP initially 
declined appreciably, while strategic positions in the 
bureaucracy came to be occupied by Bhutto's personal 
appointees. Bhutto's power over appointments, dismissals, 
promotions, and transfers became the prime instrument 
through which control over the bureaucracy was established. 
The new flexible rules of promotion - now rid of the 
seniority principle, enabled Bhutto both to punish and 
to reward. Files in the P. M. 's secretariat show Bhutto's 
personal supervision over transfers even at relatively 
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lower levels of the district administration. 
99 Even 
the selection of persons for routine assignments (within 
the central secretariat) was referred to him for final 
approval. Additionally, his personal appointee, Vaqar 
Ahmed who occupied the crucial post of Establishment and 
Cabinet secretary, was used as a channel for the exercise 
of this patrimonial strategy. 
100 Vaqar both put up the 
cases of appointments/dismissals, promotions/demotions to 
Bhutto (in accordance with the political criteria out- 
lined by him), and in many instances, used his own discretion 
to reward those loyal to the regime (through appointments 
and promotions) and punish the 'unreliables'101 An inci- 
dent concerning Dr. Tariq Siddiqui, education secretary 
(Punjab Government) helps to illustrate the latter phenomena. 
In a departmental meeting, Dr. Siddiqui was reported to 
have expressed doubts about implementing a particular as- 
pect of the regime's educational policy by the date speci- 
fied. Within hours, these comments were reported to 
Vaqar, who proceeded to dismiss Siddiqui immediately. 
102 
However, as Vaqar himself later pointed out, Bhutto "did 
not believe in working through one man..... such'a person 
could become very powerful and embarassing to him.... He 
believed in working through a number of persons. , 
103 
Accordingly, Bhutto kept in constant and direct touch with 
various (central) secretaries and provincial chief sec- 
retaries. 
104 
"He would go down even to I. G. s (Inspector 
General) and commissioners. "105 In addition, he selected 
key individuals such as Afzal Saeed Khan, Rao Abdur Rashid, 
(Retd) Major-General Jilani (director-general military 
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intelligence) and Saeed Ahmed Khan to keep a close watch 
over the activities of bureaucrats in various government 
departments. The point to be emphasised here is that 
Bhutto sought personal as opposed to institutional party 
or parliamentary supervision over the civil bureaucracy. 
Certainly ministerial control was exercised over individual 
departments, but the main lever of control and supervision 
was through the personalised process described above, 
As a consequence of the phenomenon described above, 
parliamentary supervision of the administration was virtual- 
ly non-existent. The concept of public accountability of 
civil servants that emerged could only be interpreted as 
accountability/loyalty to Bhutto. While the office of 
a prime minister's ombudsman was created in 1972,106 it 
scarcely emerged as a significant force. 
107 Instead, in 
utilising the kutchery system, ('open courts') Bhutto 
sought to operationalise a personalised device of dealing 
with public grievances with the administration. The kutchery 
system, which originated in Moghul days but which was also 
utilised by the British under the Raj, has traditionally 
been a method by which the monarch/ruler has sought to 
redress public grievances by holding 'open courts', where 
people brought their complaints. Bhutto frequently held 
kutcheries, often in far-flung rural areas. 
108 Since public 
complaints at such kutcheries typically related to (local) ad- 
ministrative inaction or inefficiency (at times corruption), 
Bhutto utilised these occasions to dispense 'administrative 
justice'. 109 For instance, in response to public repre- 
sentations, he would on some occasions direct local officials 
to expedite land settlement claims, or to look into, for 
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instance, property disputes that had allegedly been 
decided unfairly by the district magistrate. 
110 On other 
occasions, he would direct a local official to be trans- 
ferred elsewhere in response to public complaints about 
him. ill Obviously, Bhutto could only deal with a limited 
number of such complaints at any given time, but the point 
to be emphasised is that he utilised these occasions to 
institute the idea of accountability of officials to his 
personal authority. At many of the kutcheries held in 
rural Sind for instance, Bhutto directed the chief secret- 
ary (Sind), the local I. G. (Police) Commissioner and Deputy 
commissioner to be present so that these officials could 
answer complaints and he could direct them in public view 
to take remedial action. 
112 In dispensing 'administrative 
justice' in this manner, Bhutto reduced the whole idea 
of public accountability of administrators to a personal- 
ised venture. 
113 This was the supreme, symbolic manifest- 
ation of the idea of bureaucrats' 'accountability' to 
Bhutto. The kutchery system brought other benefits as well. 
It helped reinforce Bhutto's personal popularity in the 
rural countryside (where, typically such 'kutcheries' were 
held) by communicating the idea that he took a personal 
interest in the problems and grievances of ordinary folk 
vis a vis the administration. 
The politicisation of the bureaucracy was under- 
taken through the system of lateral entry. This measure 
promised certain advantages for the growing body of technocrats 
over the traditional bureaucracy (and was one reason why 
it was strongly opposed by the latter), but the main 
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purpose was to expand the loyalist base in the bureau- 
cratic structure. The first two hundred appointments 
suggested that political affiliation rather than merit 
was the major criterion. 
114 Subsequent appointments -a 
total of 5,476 were made in grade-16 and above between 
August 1973 and July 1977 - followed a similar pattern. 
115 
The scheme turned the bureaucracy into a fertile field for 
political patronage. It enabled Bhutto to staff the 
bureaucracy with those personally loyal to him. Such 
appointments were made at all levels of the civil service, 
including strategic, senior posts, as exemplified by Bhutto's 
appointment of Nasim Ahmed as secretary, ministry of infor- 
mation (grade 22) and Shahzad Sadiq as secretary, ministry 
of natural resources (grade 22) - appointments which caused 
considerable resentment amongst career bureaucrats. As the 
(former) Establishment secretary explained, 
"In matters of appointments he (Bhutto) 
was the competent authority. He could 
appoint on his own initiative and he did. 
He could overrule the Selection Board and 
even the Federal Public Service Commiss- 
ion. " 116 
The lateral entry scheme was also used as an instrument of 
party patronage, to reward party faithfuls or their friends 
and relatives. Party MNA's and other party leaders for- 
warded their own lists of candidates to Bhutto who then 
dispensed offices and posts. 
117 
Special posts were often 
created - 'advisers' and 'officers on special duty' 
(O. S. n. ) - to accommodate the new entrants. 
118 
A critical 
monthly identified more than a hundred senior-level lateral 
appointees as close relatives and associates of the ministers 
in the central cabinet. 
119 
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The above factors conditioned the relations 
that developed in general between politicians and adminis- 
trators at different levels. In relations between minis- 
ters and higher civil servants, who were career officials, 
several patterns can be discerned. In some instances re- 
lations remained uneasy in view of the frequent public 
declarations made by some ministers and Bhutto himself ex- 
pressing hostility and distrust towards bureaucrats, and 
a determination to clip their wings. 
120 Mubashar Hasan, 
as finance minister, for instance, did not disguise his 
antipathy towards the traditional bureaucrats, whom he 
considered were reactionary and had to be bullied into 
executing 'progressive policies'. 
121 Strong and determined 
ministers like Mubashar were often able to limit the 
officials' policy-making role. In general, however, the 
lack of experience of the majority of ministers, both at the 
central--. and provincial level, made them considerably de- 
pendent on officials. 
122 On the other hand, the sense of 
insecurity that pervaded career officials made some of them 
over-adjust to the new regime - to the extent of being 
willing to do and say all that would please and nothing 
that would displease their political masters. 
123 Many an 
official turned 'courtier' in an effort to consolidate his 
own personal position. 
124 
Vaqar Ahmed was perhaps the 
best example of a courtier official - others included 
Rauf Sheikh (secretary, finance), and Munir Hussein (chief 
secretary, NWFP). Non-courtier officials who offered out- 
spoken, independent advice were transferred elsewhere from 
their departments (e. g. Qamarul Islam and M. Imtiazi), and 
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in some cases dismissed (e. g. B. A. Qureishi, secretary 
Punjab Planning and Development). The courtier phenomenon 
produced immediate harmony between ministers and officials 
but did not necessarily provide the official with any 
reason to be complacent about the future. This was parti- 
cularly the case when the ministers' own fortunes remained 
in doubt at the hands of Bhutto. Senior officials thus 
often sought protection at the highest levels (Bhutto, 
Vaqar, Afzal Saeed) rather than risk aligning themselves 
too closely with ministers whose position seemed precarious. 
125 
At the district level, the administrative machinery 
was subjected to particular strain. It was at the district 
level that a large part of party patronage was dispensed. 
Party men received benefits - on the recommendations of the 
deputy commissioners - in the form of loans, fertiliser 
facilities, permits, jobs, licenses, public roads, etc. 
126 
District officials had to respond to such demands made by 
local PPP men for they knew that behind the pressures of 
local politicians was the support of higher level politic- 
ians like MNA's and ministers. As one deputy commissioner 
described the situation: 
"ministers and party workers.... used 
to visit various (district) offices 
with several demands..... they were 
generally concerning ration depots, 
plots, permits for sugar, etc. " 127 
The demands of local party leaders also related to institut- 
ing 'cases' against political opponents and other forms of 
harassment and intimidation. District officials found it 
difficult to resist such political interference from local 
MMNAs, MPAs and other party leaders, except in: those,: cases 
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where such officials had direct access to Bhutto or the 
P. M. 's secretariat. (asSin the case of the Rawalpindi 
district commissioner) and could therefore assert their 
own authority. 
128 The frequency and intensity of such 
interference had an adverse impact on the normal and 
effective functioning of the district administration. That 
Bhutto exhibited some concern over this phenomena was in- 
dicative of the fact that he wished the district adminis- 
trators to preserve some measure of autonomy that would 
facilitate the smooth functioning of the local adminis- 
tration. 
129 An opposition leader summed up the problem: 
"Interference of party workers had re- 
duced..... the effectiveness of the ad- 
ministrative machinery, without dis- 
ciplined party cadres, indiscriminate 
interference with the normal function- 
ing of the administrative machinery is 
creating ..... confusion. " 130 
With district party organisations often ridden with factions, 
each advancing its own demands (at the expense of the 
opposing faction) local officials were clearly faced with 
a dilemma. While some district commissioners were able to 
manipulate such PPP disorganisation to their personal or 
official advantage, others were inevitably drawn into these 
factional quarrels. 
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FROM CONTROL TO RELIANCE 
It has been argued above that Bhutto sought, through 
a variety of methods, to curb the independent power of the 
civil bureaucracy. Such actions which curtailed the auto- 
nomous discretion of the bureaucracy represented a fundament- 
al departure from one aspect of the Viceregal heritage i. e. 
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of bureaucratic independence. However having done this, 
he made the 'reformed' and politicised bureaucracy a major 
pillar of his regime. This signified a continuity with 
another aspect of the Viceregal tradition, i. e. the pri- 
mary reliance on bureaucratic rather than representative 
institutions. Thus the Bhutto regime's relationship with 
the civil bureaucracy demonstrated both continuities and 
discontinuities with the practices of predecessor regimes. 
This section is concerned with highlighting the essential 
continuity with past tradition as reflected in the Bhutto 
regime's dependence on bureaucratic instruments of rule. 
It was the civil bureaucracy (rather than rep- 
resentative institutions like the party) that emerged as 
the Bhutto regime's instrument for dealing with the prob- 
lems of governance - whether it was the implementation of 
the regime's reforms, or dealing with domestic unrest and 
political opposition, or providing information and options 
for policy making or even for advancing the interests of 
the party. While it is true that "the final decision.... 
(was)... made by a political rather than administrative 
ruler 
132 
the political ruler was nevertheless primarily 
dependent on the administrative machinery for the manage- 
ment of state affairs. This was reflected in a variety of 
ways. To begin with, the professional civil bureaucracy 
was given the task of implementing various reform measures 
of the government. The only attempt to involve the party 
bureaucracy with the implementation - in the People's Works 
Programme, was as we noted in an earlier chapter, abandoned, 
when it led to mismanagement, misappropriation, corruption 
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and graft. 
133 Vesting responsibility for implementing 
the regime's reforms upon the civil service inevitably 
meant providing the latter with some leverage. Referring 
to this development 'Outlook' pointed out that 
"like the previous revolutions, when 
the dust of rhetoric settled down, one 
found another quantum increase in the 
powers of bureaucrats..... for example, 
the deputy commissioners now have 
powers and responsibilities of super- 
vising housing programmes, acquiring 
land with uncontestable powers to de- 
termine compensation, and managing rural 
works programmes. These responsibilities 
are in addition to those which have cumu- 
lated in their hands over the past twenty- 
five years. There has been no concern 
with reviewing what deputy commissioners 
have done so far...... Yet the peoples 
government has, once again, put its faith 
in them to implement its revolution. " 134 
Bhutto relied on the bureaucracy not only to 
implement his regime's reform proposals, but also to deal 
with political opposition and intra-party dissent. It was 
suggested by one scholar that Bhutto's stated hope for 
Pakistan rested "not on the use of state power but on the 
efficacy of politics, of an open political process to res- 
cue the country from its colonial and neo-colonial heri- 
tage. "135 Such a hope was evidently not translated into 
practice, for Bhutto increasingly relied primarily on 
traditional enforcers of public tranquillity i. e. adminis- 
trative agencies like the police, FSF, etc. for solving 
his problems with the political opposition. As one obser- 
ver remarked, 
"The response of the PPP government 
to its political opponents both at the 
centre and in the provinces has been 
bureaucratic and reminiscent of the 
era of Ayub Khan and Kalabagh. " 136 
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The use of bureaucratic machinery to deal with opposition 
and dissent has been analysed in considerable detail in 
chapter IX'. It is sufficient to point out that Bhutto 
expanded and strengthened the existing police and intelli- 
gence machinery (e. g. Intelligence Bureau) and established 
new bureaucratic devices (the FSF and the Federal Invest-. - 
igation Agency) both to consolidate his power and to strike 
out against the regime's real or imagined enemies. 
137 It 
was reliance on such coercive instruments of state power 
which led a dissident PPP leader to proclaim in 1975 that 
"today the source of the government's power is the FSF and 
the police. 
138 
Bhutto came to rely on the bureaucracy in a more 
fundamental way than that discussed above. Selected 
bureaucrats, notably those in the prime minister's secret- 
ariat who had daily and direct access to Bhutto, became, 
increasingly involved in policy-making and influencing 
party affairs. 
139 Although Bhutto after his fall from 
power emphatically denied such involvement, 
140 
the evidence 
at hand does not support Bhutto's claim. There were during 
the middle and latter years of Bhutto's rule, many indicat- 
ions of the regime's dependency on the bureaucracy. This 
was a natural consequence of Bhutto's inability or unwill- 
ingness to develop the PPP into an organised and well- 
structured entity that could occupy a crucial position in 
the policy-making process. Certainly individual party 
leaders in their capacities as ministers did participate 
in policy making but this is quite different from a party 
as an organised, institutionalised entity, responding to 
I- 
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pressures from below and influencing governmental policy 
formulation and implementation. As a result of Bhutto's 
policies towards the PPP discussed earlier (see chapters 
VI and VIII) the party's role in decision-making remained 
marginal at best. Thus policy making increasingly devolved 
on bureaucrats. occupying strategic positions, as for 
example those in the P. M. 's secretariat and in the important 
economic ministries- (such as finance, planning and develop- 
ment). This represented a reversion to the practices of 
predecessor regimes. Our contention finds support in 
Jones' analysis of the PPP in the Punjab. 
141 Jones writes: 
"The shift to a greater dependency on 
the bureaucracy was everywhere evident.. 
.... the bureaucracy had taken over the 
crucial functions of formulating policy 
and drafting legislation - if, indeed, 
it had ever relinquished these functions. " 142 
Important policy decisions, such as the nationalisation of 
the agro-processing industries (see chapter V, 'Economic 
Reconstruction') in 1976, were reportedly formulated by 
the bureaucracy. 
143 
Significantly, Bhutto brought back many (perhaps 
now chastened) CSP s into important bureaucratic positions. 
In the central secretariat, the important economic minis- 
tries were headed in the latter years of the Bhutto govern- 
ment by former CSP, s.. For example, Ejaz Naik as commerce 
secretary, Wasim Jafri as secretary, planning division, 
A. G. N. Kazi as head of finance, planning and economic 
development, all had a CSP background. In addition, the sec- 
retaryships of foreign affairs and defence were also held 
by former CSP's - Agha Shahi. and Ghulam Ishaq respectively. 
In the district administration, the preponderant majority 
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of commissioners and deputy commissioners (D. C. s) were 
(as in the past) all CSPs. This phenomena reflected 
the growing rapprochement between the traditional bureau- 
cracy and the Bhutto regime, as well as the increasing 
dependency of the latter on the former. 
In addition to these developments, there were 
increasing signs that the bureaucracy had begun to pene- 
trate the party itself - in particular bureaucrats-:: in the 
P. M. 's secretariat --(many of them lateral entrants called 
officers on Special Duty) - cynically referred to as 
'Bhuttocrats' - were increasingly involved with influencing 
party affairs. In a letter addressed to Afzal Saeed (who 
headed the P. M. 's secretariat) Bhutto himself referred 
to the secretariat as "a machinery" set up to deal with 
"party matters. "144 Not surprisingly then, important 
decisions concerning the party (matters of party re- 
organisation, selection of party office-bearers, nominat- 
ions of candidates for parliamentary seats) were taken 
here rather than in the party's central committee. 
145 
Bhutto did not deny the association of bureaucrats in for 
instance the 1976 re-organisation of the party, but argued 
that this was done only to get "impartial and disinterested 
advice. " 
146 'Bhuttocrats' such as Rao Abdur Rashid and 
Afzal Saeed Khan also began to mediate factional disputes 
in the party and to control the channels of communication 
and patronage between various party groups and Bhutto. 
147 
In addition, under the direction of bureaucrats in the P. M. 's 
secretariat, intelligence agencies (Intelligence Bureau, 
FSF) and the district administration were involved in the 
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party's candidate selection for the 1977 election. 
148 
At the local level, the reliance on the administrative 
machinery was clearly evident even in relatively routine 
matters, as for example on occasions when a political 
meeting had to be organised. Typically police and other 
officials rather than party officials were given the task 
of assembling the required crowd. 
149 The Party conventions 
of 1976 similarly, were organised by district state rather 
than party officials. 
150 
Responsibility for organising 
Bhutto's district tours also lay with the local adminis- 
tration rather than the local party units. 
The reverse side of Bhutto's policy of reliance on the 
bureaucratic machinery was obviously a downgrading of his 
own party, a fact that demoralised and disillusioned his 
party men. 
151 Indeed, one PPP leader suggested that by 
surrounding himself by bureaucratic sycophants Bhutto 
increasingly became isolated from his real power base i. e. 
party, and this spelt the beginning of his regime's decline. 
152 
It was suggested earlier that reliance on traditional 
instruments of rule was in large part the result of Bhutto's 
failure to develop the PPP into an effective institution. 
But this dependence served to further inhibit the PPP's 
growth as an organisation that could in future be utilised 
as an essential part of the machinery of government. Viewed 
from this perspective, Bhutto's increasing reliance on 
essentially bureaucratic instruments resulted in the post- 
ponement and prevention of building a political organisation 
capable of functioning as an alternative to the bureaucracy. 
The temptation to dispense with party machinery and rely 
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on the administrative and police machinery has been a 
persistent'and recurring phenomenon not only in Pakistan 
but in other new states as well. 
153 One writer has 
suggested that 
"The Pakistani political scene has 
always been dominated by a single 
personality who has governed with the 
help of the civil-police and military 
bureaucracies. " 154 
Bhutto seems to have been no exception to this character- 
isation. 
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I 
XI 
BHUTTO AND THE MILITARY 
The single most outstanding feature of Pakistan's 
political system has been its praetorian nature, both in 
the narrow sense of military political involvement and rule, 
and in the broader sense of the lack of effective politi- 
cal institutions capable of mediating group conflict. 
1 
This chapter examines civil-military relations under the 
Bhutto regime against the background of this praetorian 
tradition and offers an explanation for the militaty coup 
in 1977 which toppled the Bhutto government. It is argued 
here that while Bhutto sought to curb the power of the 
military, the patrimonial method of control that he devised 
to ensure civilian supremacy proved to be fragile, and was 
for that reason, inadequate. At the same time, a number 
of actions taken by Bhutto, such as relying on the mili- 
tary to deal with domestic discord, did not serve to erode 
the military's position as the "core group" in the 
Pakistani polity. Bhutto's failure to create viable poli- 
tical institutions as "countervailing" forces to the mili- 
tary meant that he was also unable to modify the prae- 
torian tradition in the broader sense of the term. Before 
undertaking a detailed analysis of these developments, we 
will briefly examine the various models of civil-military 
relations and the Pakistani experience upto 1971, to high- 
light the praetorian legacy inherited by Bhutto. 
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MODELS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
Amongst the industrialised nation-states it is 
possible to identify two major models of civilian-mili- 
tary relations - the democratic and what has been called 
the totalitarian model. 
2 Under the democratic model the 
civilian and military elites are sharply differentiated. 
Civilian political elites exercise control over the mili- 
tary through a formal set of rules which specify the 
functions of the military and the conditions under which 
the military may exercise its power. In particular these 
rules exclude the military from involvement in domestic 
partisan politics. Military leaders obey the government 
because they accept the basic national and political 
goals of a democracy. Professional ethics, as well as 
democratic parliamentary institutions guarantee civilian 
political supremacy. Elements of this model have been 
achieved only in certain western industrialised countries 
since it requires viable parliamentary institutions and 
broad social consensus about the ends of government. The 
totalitarian model, as it developed in Nazi Germany, in 
Soviet Russia, and, to a lesser extent in Mussolini's 
Italy, rests on political control of the military by a 
centralised and authoritarian one-party political system. 
Political control here, is enforced by the secret police, 
by infiltration of party members into the military heir- 
archy, by the party's arming its own military units, and 
by control of the system of officer selection. 
Neither the democratic nor the totalitarian model 
adequately serves to describe civil-military relations in 
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the countries of the Third World. These models are not 
applicable because the military has wider involvement in 
domestic, economic, social and political change. Funda- 
mentally this derives from the weakness of civilian politi- 
cal institutions as described by Samuel Hüntington, 
3 
Edward Shils4 and others. Morris Janowitz has identified 
five types of civil-military relations amongst new nations: 
(1) authoritarian-personal control, (2) authoritarian-mass 
party, (3) democratic competitive systems, (4) civil- 
military coalition and (5) military oligarchy. 
5 Although 
the first three differ markedly in the form of internal 
political control, they have the common feature that the 
military's involvement in domestic politics is at the mini- 
mal level; thus Janowitz describes the military's activities 
as "limited to the mark of sovereignty". 
6 In other words, 
the military is not involved in domestic partisan politics 
but functions as an institution symbolising the indepen- 
dent and legitimate sovereignty of the new nation, both at 
home and abroad. The mark of sovereignty includes the 
military's contribution to internal law and order and to 
the policing of the nation's borders. Amongst these three 
types, the methods of control by which the military is 
limited to the role of a mark of sovereignty, vary. In 
the first case, control is exercised by an authoritarian 
regime which is based on traditional and/or personal power, 
as in Saudi Arabia. This type of control is likely to be 
found in countries just beginning the process of modern. - 
isation. In the second type, labelled authoritarian-mass 
party, the military is excluded from domestic politics by 
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the power of the civilian authoritarian political system 
which rests on a one-party state, under strong personal 
leadership without parliamentary institutions. This is 
the case in countries like Guinea and Tanzania. In 
democratic-competitive systems, which includes semi- 
competitive states, civilian control of the military rests 
on the strength of competitive democratic institutions, 
and in some cases on a mass political party as well, which. 
dominates domestic politics but permits a measure of pol- 
itical competition. India, Malaysia and Israel exhibit 
this type of civil-military relations. 
In the fourth and fifth model of civil-military 
relations, the military becomes a political actor. In the 
case of the civil-military coalition, the military does 
not directly assume governmental power, but serves as an 
active bloc in its support of civilian parties and other 
power groups. The civilian elite remains in power only 
because of the military's passive assent or active assis- 
tance. This has been the case for instance, in Turkey. 
The military oligarchy represents a direct take over of 
governmental power, with the military becoming the ruling 
group. 
'DHE PAKISTANI EXPERIENCE UP TO 1971 
Having identified the various models of civil- 
military relations in the Third World, it would be appro- 
priate to see which of these models adequately describes 
the Pakistani experience in the pre-Bhutto period. Clearly, 
the first three models in which the military is excluded 
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from domestic politics, are not applicable. With the 
exception of the first few years of Pakistan's existence, 
the country has had a clear and unbroken tradition of 
military involvement in politics. As discussed in an 
earlier chapter (see above, chapter I), after the deaths 
of Pakistan's founding fathers, Jinnah and Liaqat, the 
military had increasingly expanded its political role so 
that from 1953 to 1958, the pattern of civil-military re- 
lations can be described as a civil-military coalition. 
Indeed, as one writer has pointed out, even in the pre- 
ceding period - the so-called parliamentary period - 
Pakistan's armed forces were never completely subjected to 
strong political or governmental control. 
7 From 1953 on- 
wards, the expansion in the military's political role was 
in large part the result Of the efforts of civilian elites 
to enlist the military's support in factional conflict. 
8 
In 1958, the military assumed direct governmental power 
thus formalising a situation that had existed since at 
least 1953. For the next thirteen years, until 1971, the 
political system of Pakistan clearly fell into the category 
of a military oligarchy. 
A detailed examination of the reasons behind 
Pakistan's praetorian tradition is beyond the scope of 
this study. 
9 However, we can briefly summarise some of the 
arguments advanced by scholars to explain the phenomena of 
military intervention in politics, that are particularly 
germane to the Pakistani experience up to 1971. Many 
inquiries into the phenomena of military intervention - as 
for instance reflected in the works of Huntington, 
10 
and 
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Amos Perlmutter 
11 
- stress the importance of evaluating 
the military's potential political role in developing 
countries in relation to salient features of the political 
system, rather than in relation to the military's own 
intrinsic characteristics. Thus attention is directed to 
the social (lack of community) and political conditions 
(lack of effective political institutions) that contribute 
to praetorianism. In other words, the fundamental weak- 
ness of civilian political institutions and the inability 
of civilian elites to legitimise their rule provokes mili- 
tary intervention. However, despite the utility and 
applicability of the position which finds the reason for 
military intervention in the pull effect of systematic 
weakness and the interrelated push effect of military 
organisation (the military being a "heavy" institution on 
account of its organisational superiority vis 
a 
vis all 
other social and political organisations), this view is 
not without its critics. Samuel Decalo, for example, 
writing on the African experience has argued that: 
"It is both simplistic and empirically 
erroneous to relegate coups in Africa to 
the status of a dependent variable, a 
function of the political weakness and 
structural fragility of African states and 
the, failings of African civilian elites. "12 
There is certainly a case to be made, on the basis of this 
argument, to be careful not to "overhomogenise" the Third 
World states. As a way out of this dilemma, it is useful 
to refer to the distinction made by Janowitz, between 
"reactive militarianism" and "designed militarianism", 
13 
The former refers to the premeditated search for political 
power by the military, while the latter refers to the 
640 
expansion of military power that results from the 
weakness of civilian institutions and the pressure of 
civilians to expand the military role. Although, 
Janowitz argues that "reactive" rather than "designed" 
militarianism is the usual case in new nations, by 
suggesting that many seizures of power are in reality a 
mixture of both types, 
14 he underlines the need to combine 
the two perspectives in order to arrive at a more compre- 
hensive and satisfactory explanation for military inter- 
vention. 
With respect to the Pakistani experience, we can 
attribute the military's role expansion in large part 
to the inadequacy of civilian political institutions. 
In this sense, the "reactive" dimension in the military's 
political role was clear enough. But we can also discern 
a "designed" dimension in the military takeover of 1958 
as reflected in Ayub's view that the politicians had 
brought the country to the brink of disaster and that 
only the military could bring stability and progress to 
Pakistan. 
15 
But whatever the reasons for the military's pre- 
eminence in Pakistani politics, there is little dispute 
over the fact that the long history of military involve- 
ment in politics posed a serious problem for any civilian 
successor. Such a: legacy was described by Bhutto in the 
following manner: 
"The army was in politics up to its neck.. 
.., it was an unpleasant and disconcerting 
reality, but pleasant or unpleasant, it 
was a reality. " 16 
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We turn now to an examination of how Bhutto, faced 
with such a legacy, attempted to deal with the military 
and to the kind of control he devised to ensure the 
military's subordination to civilian authority. 
BHUTTO AND THE MILITARY 
Bhutto was determined to end what he called 
"Bonapartism" in the armed forces17 and to curtail their 
influence, but he was also acutely aware of the constraints 
imposed by the legacy of military pre-eminence. Given the 
political tradition of the military's "right" to intervene 
in civilian affairs, any drastic alteration in the power 
and status of the military establishment could well have 
invited another coup. 
18 The conflicting imperatives of 
curbing the power of the military on the one hand and of 
avoiding antagonising the armed forces on the other, pro- 
duced what appeared on the surface as an erratic pattern 
of civil-military relations, with Bhutto attempting both 
to neutralise and to appease the military establishment. 
As we shall see below, Bhutto attempted to use both the 
carrot and stick techniques with the military. 
Although Bhutto rightly acknowledged that it was 
"not a simple task to end Bonapartism after fifteen years 
of Bonapartism, 1119 initially this task was made consider- 
ably easier as a consequence of the military debacle in 
Bangladesh. The 1971 war with India and the resulting 
loss of East Pakistan severely tarnished the image and 
prestige of the army. 
20 Our interviews with senior mili- 
tary officers indicate that respect - both public and 
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self-respect - declined rapidly. 
21 Referring to this 
phenomenon, one writer has gone so far as to suggest that 
the "most outstanding" political consequence of the 1971 
war was "the total eclipse of the army" as a political 
force. 22 Demoralised and discredited, the military was 
certainly in no position to reassert its supremacy over 
a people demanding vengeance for the shame and humiliation 
that had been inflicted upon them. 
23 
The public outcry 
against the military was accompanied by a growing body of 
opinion at senior levels within the army24 that argued 
that its professional competence as a fighting force had 
suffered as a consequence of its long involvement 
in politics. 
25 Such a view argued against the military's 
becoming embroiled in domestic politics. 
26 Indeed, these 
were important factors behind the military's decision to 
remove itself from politics and hand over power to Bhutto. 
These factors together with the fact that Bhutto's 
claim to power rested on an election victory, and not on 
support from the civil-military bureaucracy (as in the case 
of previous civilian regimes from 1951-1958), initially 
gave. Bhutto a relatively free hand in re-fashioning civil- 
military relations. Bhutto exploited this favourable 
situation by conducting two purges of the military in 
quick succession and by introducing structural changes in 
the military command structure. The combined effect of 
these actions, as we shall see below, was to enhance 
Bhutto's personal ascendancy over the military. 
The first purge in December 1971 was aimed at 
removing those senior military officers who had been part 
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of Yahya Khan's caucus. Since many of the officers 
sacked were implicated in the humiliating military defeat 
in Bangladesh, Bhutto's action against those he described 
as "fat and flabby generals" appeared to be a popular one 
amongst the general public. 
27 The second purge in March 
1972 led to the ouster of Gul Hasan and Rahim Khan, 
commanders-in chief of the army and air force respectively, 
who had been instrumental in the transfer of power to 
Bhutto himself and had been appointed to their posts only 
recently. 
28 That Bhutto was able to get rid of opponents 
and benefactors alike indicated that top military leader- 
ship was not as strong, organised or confident as it once 
was. The personnel changes represented reforms in the 
sense of re-asserting civilian control over the military, 
but they functioned primarily to render the military more 
vulnerable to Bhutto's personal influence and power. Few 
of the retirements and replacements followed existing 
personnel procedures. Rather, Bhutto repeatedly emphasised 
the importance of filling these posts with nominees who 
demonstrated their personal loyalty to him. 
29 The reliance 
on patrimonialism which was an integral part of Bhutto's 
strategy in establishing control over the military will be 
discussed in more detail below. Here what needs to be 
noted is that what was perhaps more important than the 
actual number of senior officers (see Table XI. 1 below) sacked 
was the manner in which this was done. 
The two purges were utilised as occasions to 
criticise publicly the role of the armed forces in politics 
and to deliver strongly-worded warnings. In his address to 
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TABLE XI. 1 
SENIOR OFFICERS RELIEVED FROM SERVICE 
(during the first four months of the Bhutto government) 
No. of Officers Total No. of 
Dismissed or Senior 
Retired * Officers ** 
ARMY 
General 2 2 
Lieutenant-General 11 12 
Major General 10 32 
Bragadier 6 136 
NAVY 
Vice Admiral 1 1 
Rear Admiral 4 4 
Commodore 2 12 
AIR FORCE 
Air Marshall 1 1 
Air Vice-Marshall 2 2 
Air Commodore 3 7 
Group Captain 1 70 
Total I-- 43 I 279 1 
-1 
*Source: H. A. Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 
(Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1974). 
**Estimated Figures. 
the nation on 4 March, 1972 announcing the dismissal of 
military commanders Bhutto declared..... 
"What has happened in Pakistan since 
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1958 is that some professional gen- 
erals turned to politics not as a 
profession but as a plunder and as a 
result the influences that crept into 
Pakistan's socio-political life des- 
troyed its fabric. " 30 
On other occasions, Bhutto and other PPP leaders publicly 
criticised the role of a coterie of generals, who in 
collaboration with "vested interests" had brought the 
country to its present malaise. 
31 As one observer noted, 
such public admonishments were partly "aimed at a diminut- 
ion in the almost sacrosanct status of the armed forces 
before the public", and in part "designed to warn other 
military leaders who might entertain political ambitions. "32 
Although Bhutto and his ministers were careful not to 
criticise the military as an institution, the widespread 
publicity given in the government-controlled media to the 
dismissal of senior military officers and to their public 
censure by civilian leaders caused some disquiet in army 
circles. 
33 For a significant section of senior army 
officers, subjecting their former commanders to public 
ridicule was tantamount to humiliating the armed forces in 
the eyes of the public. 34 Army resentment was aroused 
further when: a documentary on the military surrender at 
Dacca was telecast, which was viewed as another attempt 
on the part of civilian authorities to malign and de- 
moralise the military. 
35 
That the film was hastily with- 
drawn was indicative of the fact that Bhutto recognised 
that there was a limit to which he could risk antagonising 
the military. 
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In addition to the purges, Bhutto took several 
steps to erect further barriers against the return of the 
generals-to Pakistan's political stage. Structural changes 
were announced in 1972 with a view to strengthening civil- 
ian control over the military. The post of commander-in- 
chief was abolished and replaced with chief-of-staff. 
36 
Henceforth, the president was vested with "the supreme 
command of the defence forces" -a ceremonial supercession 
that symbolised civilian control. 
37 Later, the command of 
the armed forces was divided functionally between the 
chief of'staff who was responsible for strategy and co- 
ordination between the army, navy and air force; the de- 
fence adviser (to the prime minister ) who was responsible 
for internal security; and the defence secretary, respons- 
ible for military administration. Under previous regimes, 
all three functions had been vested in the commander-in- 
chief. Thus this reorganisation was aimed at the dis- 
persion of power and responsibility which would serve to 
limit the power of any single individual. However, as we 
shall see later, the army chief of staff still wielded 
enough authority to enable him to execute a coup, without 
the active concurrence of either the defence adviser or 
the defence secretary, both of which were essentially 
bureaucratic offices somewhat removed from the army's 
effective command structure. A new joint chiefs of staff 
structure was also created, with a new office, that of the 
chairman, to head it. This was again an effort to disperse 
power and authority as the chairmanship was given to a :" 
senior army officer, but not the army chief of staff. This 
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reorganisation was also aimed - at least symbolically - 
to bring the air force and navy to par with the army, 
which can again be interpreted as an effort to reduce the 
power of the army chief of staff. Such administrative 
changes did not please the senior army leadership, but 
they were in no position to challenge these because of 
the severe demoralisation and disarray within the army in 
the wake of the military defeat of 1971.38 
These structural reforms were accompanied by the 
enactment of provisions in the 1973 constitution to check 
military involvement in politics. Article 244 provided 
for an obligatory oath to be taken by members of the armed 
forces to "uphold the constitution" and "not to engage in 
any political activities whatsoever. " Article 6 in the 
39 
constitution held that any attempt to abrogate or subvert 
the constitution by use of force or by other unconstitution- 
al means "shall be guilty of high treason". 
40 Article 6 
(3) stated that "parliament shall by law provide for the 
punishment of persons found guilty of high treason. "41 A 
powerful source of (legal) support at this juncture for 
Bhutto's efforts at preventing military transgressions into 
politics, was the Supreme Court judgement in the 1972 
Asma Jilani Case. 
42 
This unanimously reversed an earlier 
decision (in the Dosso Case) 43 justifying military inter- 
vention, and held that the martial law regime of General 
44 Yahya had been an unconstitutional usurpation of power. 
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court ended his judge- 
ment with a stern warning to any would-be coup, -makers: 
"Let it be laid down firmly that the 
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order which the usurper imposes will 
remain illegal and the Courts will not 
recognise its rule and act upon them 
as de jure. As soon as the first oppor- 
tunity arises, when the coercive appa- 
ratus falls from the hands of the 
usurper, he would be tried for high 
treason and suitably punished. This 
alone will serve as a deterrent to 
would-be adventurers. " 45 
Despite these warnings and Bhutto's efforts des- 
cribed above, the PPP regime was faced with an abortive 
conspiracy of junior military officers to overthrow the 
civilian government in March 1973.46 The group involved 
in the conspiracy included twenty-one officers of the army, 
two of whom were brigadiers, and fourteen air force offic- 
ers, one of whom was a group captain. The conspirators 
appeared to have been motivated by a spirit of revanchism 
against India and held that Bhutto along with senior mili- 
tary officers had been responsible not only for the humiliating 
surrender at Dacca, but for subsequently discrediting the 
military. 
47 In interviews conducted with some of the 
alleged conspirators, it was claimed that the attempt was 
aimed as much against senior military, especially army 
officers, as against Bhutto. 
48 However, it was said that 
the conspiracy did not seem to have gone beyond a rather 
rudimentary planning stage before the authorities were 
"tipped off" presumably by an "informer" amongst the group 
itself. According to senior military officers interviewed, 
the views expressed by the conspiring officers did not 
reflect the general opinion in the armed forces. 
49 
We 
might add that the conspiring officers could hardly have 
expected support or sympathy from amongst senior generals 
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since the conspiracy in part represented an abortive 
mutiny against the latter. Lack of support from upper 
echelons of the military reduced the likelihood of the 
attempted coup succeeding. But the event undoubtedly had 
a significant impact on Bhutto insofar as it accentuated 
his fear of a military coup. The attempt, whatever its 
chances for success, at least held out the possibility of 
a reversion to the praetorian tradition. Bhutto described 
his reaction to-the attempted coup thus: 
"I was struck by the personal and selfish 
factor that aroused the conspirators ... 
.. what made 
it more melancholy was that 
it came so soon after the dismemberment 
of Pakistan in 1971. This meant that the 
historical tragedies arising out of 
military rule meant nothing to power 
blind individuals. The flow of blood 
was like water down a duck's back. The 
blunder of military regimes, both inter- 
nal and external were not eye openers. 
The pollution of the armed forces by its 
involvement in politics had not conveyed 
any message. The catastrophe of East 
Pakistan and the surrender of 90,000 pri- 
soners of war did not teach a single ele- 
mentary lesson. " 50 
The conspiring officers were tried in two separate 
courts martial - one for the army officers and the other 
for air force personnel. The Attock Conspiracy Case - as the 
trial of army officers came to be called - took place in 
an army court presided over by Brigadier Zia-ul-Haq. It 
culminated in the conspiring officers being sentenced to 
heavy terms of imprisonment. For Bhutto, the coup attempt 
underlined' the need for being more cautious in his dealings 
with the armed forces. At the same time, the fact that 
one of the conspirators (Alim Afridi) had family connect- 
ions with leading members of the opposition (Asghar Khan) 
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made Bhutto overly sensitive to civilian attempts to 
incite the armed forces. 
51 
But above all, it reinforced 
in Bhutto's mind, the need to devise an effective method 
of civilian control over the military. The nature of 
control that Bhutto operationalised forms the concern of 
the next section. 
THE PATRIMONIAL METHOD OF CONTROL 
The method that Bhutto utilised in establishing 
control over the military was a patrimonial rather than an 
institutional one. The emphasis on this kind of control 
meant that of the various models of civil-military relations 
that were discussed earlier, the pattern of civilian control 
of military under Bhutto outwardly resembled that designated 
as the 'authoritarian-personal' type. However, since this 
type is generally to be found in traditional/monarchical' 
type regimes, the model is not strictly applicable to the 
Bhutto regime. This suggests the need to create a new 
model or category, which can be termed 'patrimonial: ';, 
Gerald A. Heeger has also noted the patrimonial 
aspects of the Bhutto regime, but he does not elaborate on 
the phenomena in any detail. 
52 
We also differ from Heeger 
in the emphasis given to Bhutto's personality to explain 
Bhutto's preference for a patrimonial strategy. Heeger 
has argued that Bhutto's patrimonial strategy was less a 
function of personality than of circumstance, since the 
"(preceding) periods of military or quasi-military rule 
are 'de-developmental', functioning to undermine the basis 
of future institutionalisation. " 53 We, on the other hand, 
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while recognising that institutionalising authority in 
the "post-military state" is a problematic and difficult 
endeavour for the same reason as that given by Heeger 
above, have argued that Bhutto's choice of a patrimonial 
strategy was in large part the result of his desire for 
maximum freedom of manoeuvre. As has been repeatedly 
emphasised throughout this study, Bhutto's approach to 
political power was never organisational or institutional, 
but personalised. Even when he had the opportunity, he 
consistently refused to follow the institutional path 
(e. g. strengthening his party or parliamentary institutions). 
In other words, we lay more emphasis than Heeger does, on 
Bhutto's personality to explain his choice of a patrimonial 
strategy for political consolidation. The implications of 
Bhutto's strategy are discussed later. Here it is necessary 
to direct attention to how Bhutto attempted to ensure 
civilian domination through patrimonial control. 
To begin with, the combined effect of the purges 
as well as the structural reforms discussed above, was to 
enhance Bhutto's personal ascendancy over the military. 
This is because both the dismissal of military officers 
and the personnel changes necessitated by the administrative/ 
functional reorganisation gave Bhutto the opportunity of 
filling the new appointments with his personal nominees. 
The policy Bhutto followed in making appointments showed 
little regard for existing promotional and seniority pro- 
cedures. He often passed over senior officers in making 
appointments in order to ensure the personal loyalty of 
the promotees. For instance, in appointing General Gul Hasan, 
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Air Marshals Zafar Choudray and Zulfiqar Ali Khan, 
several senior officers were passed over. Tikka Khan, 
at first passed over for his next promotion, in spite of 
his service seniority, was retrieved from the shelf and 
appointed army chief of staff. 
54 In 1976, upon his retire- 
ment, Tikka Khan was appointed as defence adviser (later 
in 1977, Tikka Khan was to join the PPP) as a reward for 
his intense loyalty to Bhutto. - Tikka Khan was replaced as 
army chief of staff by Zia-ul-Haq, whom Bhutto promoted 
over the heads of several other generals as a reward for 
his services during the Attock conspiracy trial. Bhutto's 
selective promotions policy was aimed at placing apparent- 
ly loyal officers in strategic positions. He often chose 
pliant and unambitious individuals for rapid promotions. 
55 
For instance Zia was reportedly appointed because of his 
reputation as a 'simple soldier' who was uninterested in 
politics. 
56 Similarly, General Mohammed Sharif, not an 
obviously distinguished military officer, was appointed as 
chairman, joint chiefs of staff. The emphasis was on 
personal loyalty to ensure military subordination, rather 
than on any institutional checks. 
In pursuing a patrimonial strategy, - promoting 
officers because of their personal and political loyalties 
to him - Bhutto was injecting politics into the military 
and flouting the accepted promotional criteria of com- 
petence and seniority. This bred insecurity in the upper 
echelons of the military. The consequences of this kind 
of civilian interference in the internal affairs of the 
military have been summed up by one scholar thus: 
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"Such actions generally lower the 
professional competence and self- 
image of the officer corps by sub- 
stituting political for achievement 
criteria, call into doubt the soldiers' 
identities as independent and respect- 
ed officers, factionalise an otherwise 
cohesive officer corp, warp the heir- 
archical structure and weaken the 
officers' power to defend their other 
corporate interests. " 57 
By interfering in military affairs and interjecting pol- 
itical considerations into the armed forces, Bhutto was 
flouting one of the cardinal rules of a harmonious civil- 
military relationship: no trespassing on the military 
reservation. 
58 
Bhutto's reliance on personalist rather than 
institutional means of political consolidation over the 
military as indeed over his party and the civilian bureau- 
cracy (and the Pakistan political system in general) had 
important implications. With regard to the military, the 
precariousness of such a strategy was underlined by a mili- 
tary officer we interviewed in the following manner: Such 
civilian supremacy was "likely to be temporary and personal 
affair -, a superficial gimmick to win over key officers 
through promotions and favours, and not a permanent arrange- 
ment that could govern civil-military relations. "59 
Viewed from-a'broader perspective, the personalised nature 
of Bhutto's rule inevitably meant weak institutional 
development. The failure to develop viable civilian pol- 
itical structures meant that there were no institutional 
checks on the power of the military. If the susceptibility 
of a political system to military intervention varies in- 
versely with the strength of its political institutions, 
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as has been argued by many scholars, then the Bhutto 
regime remained potentially open to the threat of 
praetorianism. Making civilian supremacy dependent in 
large measure on a highly personalist, and therefore 
transcendent sense of loyalty on the part of senior mili- 
tary officers to Bhutto, was a fragile and tentative 
arrangement. That the military remained potential inter- 
veners in politics if domestic discord prevented Bhutto's 
efforts at governing effectively, was a fact recognised by 
observers as well as Bhutto himself. One observer noted 
that 
"in a situation marked by a lack of 
political and constitutional consensus 
(there is) the danger of military 
intervening. " 60 
Another noted that 
"the only possible alternative to Bhutto, 
recognised by the Pakistanis and Ameri- 
cans alike, appears to be some form of 
military leadership. " 61 
Bhutto recognised this too; on one occasion he stated; 
"Looking into the future, if we messed it 
up, if we didn't make the parliamentary 
system work, if our constitution breaks 
down, then there's a possibility of the 
army stepping in again. " 62 
BHUTTO AND THE MILITARY'S POSITION AS A "CORE GROUP" IN 
THE POLITY 
If the fragility of the patrimonial method of con- 
trol indicated that the military remained potential inter- 
veners in Pakistani politics, Bhutto's inability significant- 
ly to erode the military's position as a "core group" also 
pointed towards the possibility of a reversion to the 
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praetorian tradition. The fact that Bhutto perceived 
the need to obtain military acquiescence in his rule was 
indicative of the military's continuing importance in the 
Pakistani polity. But why, notwithstanding the initial 
brandishing of the stick, was Bhutto unable significantly 
to erode the military's position as a formidable institut- 
ion? The answer is to be found in two sets of factors: 
(1) foreign policy needs, which urged Bhutto to accord the 
armed forces an important role in terms of priority, for 
instance, with regard to public expenditure, (2) domestic 
needs, in particular the need to rely on the army to con- 
tain domestic turmoil. 
Beginning with the first factor, that Bhutto con- 
tinued to accord prime importance to the military's status, 
needs and interest was a function primarily of his per- 
ception of the security needs of the country. Since inde- 
pendence, fear of India and the aim of "liberating" Kashmir 
have been the main explanations for the growth of the 
military and for giving defence matters top national prior- 
ity. Among the civilian leaders, none had advocated the 
military's case more forcefully than Bhutto himself. 
During the 1965 war he had implored the people to continue 
fighting India for a thousand years and to "eat grass" in -order to 
to continue arming the military. In his book, The Myth 
of Independence, he wrote: 
"Pakistan's security and territorial 
integrity are more important than eco- 
nomic development. Although such de- 
velopment and self-reliance contribute 
to the strengthening of the nation's de- 
fence capability, the defence require- 
ments of her sovereignty have to be met first. " 63 
656 
Bhutto had also advocated establishing an "industrial 
war base", 
64 
and the development of a "nuclear deterrent" 
against India. 
65 The Foundation Documents of the PPP 
stated plainly that 
"the only answer to an armed India is 
an armed Pakistan", 66 
and called for an increase in the strength of the armed 
forces. 
67 Despite, steps taken by Bhutto after coming to 
power to normalise relations with India, 
68 
his perception 
of Pakistan's 'security problem' i. e. military vulnerability 
vis a vis India, 
69 led him to rebuild and rearm the mili- 
tary.? 
0 The task of rehabilitating the military was con- 
sidered no less important than that of rebuilding the war- 
ravaged economy. So long as the perception of the Indian 
'threat-''- remained there was little likelihood of a cut in 
defence expenditure. The domestic impact of the national 
security problem inevitably involved giving prominence to 
military opinion and leadership. Except for occasional 
remarks that in the event of Indo-Pakistan disputes being 
resolved amicably "we may not have to spend so much on 
defence, "71 Bhutto repeatedly emphasised the need to give 
priority to defence matters. In a speech in 1972, he 
declared his intention to raise "the finest fighting- 
machine in Asia., 
72 On another occasion, he pointed out 
that "the present government is spending much more on mili- 
tary preparations for defence than the regimes of Ayub and 
Yahya Khan. "73 That the Bhutto government continued the 
tradition of making large budgetary allocations for defence 
is evident from the figures given below (Table XI. 2) - 
Defence Expenditures continued to form the largest single 
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item in the government's budget. 
TABLE XI. 2 
GNP, GROSS REVENUE RECEIPTS AND DEFENCE EXPENDITURES 
(Rs. in millions) 
TOTAL 
REVENUE EXPENDITURE 
. YEAR GNP REVENUE AMOUNTS AS % OF RECEIPTS AS % OF REVENUE GNP RECEIPTS 
1968-69 37955 5774 2427 6.4 42.0 
1969-70 43348 6665 2739 6.3 41.3 
1970-71 45620 6021 3202 7.0 53.2 
1971-72 49268 6065 3726 7.6 61.4 
1972-73 61258 7533 4440 7.3 58.9 
1973-74 81058 11048 4949 6.1 44.8 
1974-75 105787 12980 6914 6.5 53.3 
1975-76 124415 15204 8103 6.5 53.3 
11976-77_ 1141166 17787 8121 5.8 45.7 
Source: Computed from Pakistan Economic Survey 1978-79, 
(Islamabad: Finance Division) 
On account of the 1971 war, defence spending rose 
considerably in the first few years of the Bhutto government. 
But even after making good the losses incurred in the 
Bangladesh war, military expenditure remained high. Such 
a policy obviously strengthened the military's position. 
The dilemma in reconciling the need to re-equip and 
strengthen the military and to keep it under civilian con- 
trol was brought out clearly in an interview given by 
Bhutto in 1972, which is worth quoting at some length: 
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Interviewer: How can a humiliated army be made the 
finest fighting machine in Asia and 
also be made to stay as a dumb servant 
of the nation? 
Bhutto: It is a question of necessity because 
our problems and our disputes have not 
yet been resolved..... Once problems 
which have led us into conflict (are 
resolved), then the people would not 
feel the need of maintaining a large 
army ...... If the people are satisfied, if the government is discharging its 
duties and fulfilling its responsibil- 
ities then.... the army.... (has) to re- 
main in line and under a democratic 
discipline. " 74 
Thus, Bhutto faced an important dilemma in reconciling 
domestic and foreign policy pressures. The allocation of 
scarce national resources to defence inevitably meant that 
less was available for economic development and to imple- 
ment many of the PPP's social and economic reform proposals. 
75 
There seemed to be no easy way out of this dilemma, given 
Bhutto's perception of Pakistan's security problem. 
Domestic needs, in particular what Bhutto referred to 
as his'"lingering fear"76 of a coup if he antagonised the 
military, also urged him towards adopting policies that had 
the effect of reinforcing rather than eroding the military's 
position as a "core group" in Pakistani society. That Bhutto 
felt the need to accommodate the military's views and needs 
can be demonstrated in a number of ways. Economic incen- 
tives included generous pay and service benefits. - Mili- 
tary personnel were given two pay increases during the PPP 
rule. 
77 Another aspect of the same policy involved the 
promise of meeting the military's requirements for modern 
and sophisticated weapons. Bhutto's efforts at getting 
the United States to lift the arms embargo (imposed in 1965) 
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in 1975 was an important step toward fulfilling this 
promise. 
78 The PPP government spent over a billion and 
a half dollars on armaments. 
79 At the same time, efforts 
were directed toward developing a nuclear capability80 and 
in March 1976 Bhutto negotiated an agreement with France 
to acquire a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. 
81 
The attempt to appease the military was not only 
reflected in economic incentives such as those described 
above, but was also demonstrated in the psychological 
assurance to military status given by Bhutto in many of 
his speeches. He frequently paid glowing tributes to the 
"valour and professional competence of the armed forces", 
and expressed his "full faith" in them. 
82 Whether in his 
public speeches or when addressing army officers and 
jawans, Bhutto repeatedly expressed his respect and support 
for the armed forces, often in the following language: 
"(Since).... you are the custodians of 
our frontiers.... to us - to me and to 
the government of Pakistan, you are not 
ordinary individuals. " 83 
"I took pains, " Bhutto later declared, "to uphold the pres- 
tige and reputation of the armed forces., 
84 However, 
Bhutto, at time*, utilised such occasions to define the 
role of the military and to reiterate the elected nature 
of his government in order to emphasise the norm of 
civilian supremacy. 
85 
Several instances can be cited to demonstrate that 
Bhutto accorded considerable. weight to military opinion. 
" Bhutto deferred to the wishes of the military when he de- 
cided not to publish the Hamoodur Rahman Report. 86 The 
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report, which dealt with the causes of the military 
debacle in East Pakistan, was according to Bhutto "a 
story of rape, plunder and loot" and would have irrepar- 
ably damaged the name of the armed forces. 
87 
All the sen- 
for military officers who had access to the Report were of 
unanimous view that it should not be published. 
88 
Bhutto 
later explained: 
"In deference to their wishes and out 
of respect for the army, I did not re- 
lease the Report despite the enormous 
pressure from the public and the oppo- 
sition parties. " 89 
Another illustration of Bhutto's desire not to 
antagonise the military is provided by the cautious manner 
in which he approached the whole question of normalising 
relations with India. To begin with, he delayed the re- 
cognition of Bangladesh until he secured the release of 
the prisoners of war from India. 
90 
Secondly, before the 
summit meeting at Simla with Indira Gandhi, Bhutto not 
only went out of his way to sound and prepare public 
opinion for peace with India, 
91 
but assured senior mili- 
tart'-officers that he would never accept Indian hegemony- 
92 
Bhutto was anxious to avoid another Tashkent. 
93 Although 
negotiating from a position of weakness, Bhutto refused 
to give in to the Indian demand for a no-war pledge and a 
formal treaty of "non'agression". 94 Bhutto was aware that 
such a treaty would be unacceptable to the armed forces. 
95 
He had the lesson of 1950 - when the last no-war pact was 
signed - before him. This had led to an abortive coup 
(known as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case) against the then 
prime minister, Liaqat All Khan. 96 The Accord reached 
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at Simla in July 1972 was sufficiently nebulous to allow 
both sides to interpret its clauses to suit their indi- 
vidual position, 
97 but the two sides nevertheless agreed 
to settle all differences amicably through a step-by-step 
approach. 
98 
On his return, Bhutto made strenuous efforts 
to reassure the military, as the public in general, that 
he had not compromised on the vital question of Kashmir, 
and further, that he had outwitted the Indians at the 
Conference table. 99 The National Asssembly met to ratify 
the agreement, legitimising the actions of Bhutto. 
100 The 
official media, on the other hand, publicised the idea that 
while Pakistan had gone to Simla a defeated country, she 
had come away with an agreement that involved no further 
compromise. 
101 As one observer wrote, 
"This time, unlike after the Tashkent 
Declaration, the people of Pakistan 
did not imagine they had won a war which 
was later compromised on the negotiating 
table. They had this time lost a war, 
but were regaining their pride at the 
peace table.... The Simla Accord, unlike 
Tashkent, had been properly packaged and 
properly sold. " 102 
Another illustration of Bhutto's caution in threat- 
ening the interests of the military was the exemption of 
military officers' holdings from his land reform programme. 
103 
While Bhutto was prepared to risk alienating the left-wing 
within his party, as represented by men like Sheikh Rashid 
who opposed such a move, he did not wish to antagonise the 
senior military leadership. 
104 
Such appeasement policies 
clearly served to reinforce the military's power and status. 
Another policy that also served to strengthen the 
military's position'as a core group was Bhutto's frequent 
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use of the army to contain domestic turbulence. During 
the first two years of PPP rule, troops were called out 
on five occasions to deal with various kinds of public 
disorders - language riots, an industrial strike, and 
tribal 
unrest. 
105 Thus while civilian leaders decried military 
intervention in civilian affairs, the fact that they relied 
on the military for purposes of internal control inevitably 
meant drawing the army back into the political arena, al- 
beit 'in aid of the civilian authority. '106 The conse- 
quences of the use of the army for police functions has 
been noted by many scholars. 
107 The consensus of opinion 
is that such action tends to enhance the role of the mili- 
tary, 
108 
politicises it, 
109and breaks down the boundaries 
between the civilian and military spheres. 
110 As one 
scholar has stated: 
"When a shift from power to force 
occurs, it is accompanied by a shift 
in the relative 'market value' of ex- 
isting structures: in the case of the 
new African states, the value of politi- 
cal parties and of civil administration 
has undergone a sort of deflation, while 
the value of the police and of the mili- 
tary has been vastly increased. " 111 
Additionally, whep the military is repeatedly called upon 
to put down strikes or to deal with disorder in a dissident 
region, officers and men at all levels become acquainted 
more intimately with the seamy side of political life in 
their country. 
112 
This can lead to an erosion of respect 
for the civilian rulers, and more generally toward politic- 
ians as a class. Our interviews with senior military 
officers indicate that the PPP government's reliance on 
the army for internal control not only enhanced the problem 
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of legitimacy (of the rulers in the eyes of the 
military) but reinforced the self-image of the military 
as the 'saviour' of the nation. 
That Bhutto was sensitive to the dangers of ex- 
cessive reliance on the military is demonstrated by his 
decision in 1972 to set up a para-military force, the 
Federal Security Force (FSF) to deal with domestic unrest. 
113 
In fact it was thethen army chief of staff, Gul Hasan' s 
refusal to supply troops to break up a police strike in 
early 1972114 which necessitated (and was probably also 
a factor in his dismissal) the creation of a special civil 
task force, in order 'to reduce the reliance of the civil 
government on the military in a law and order situation! 
115 
However the attempt to balance one instrument of force 
which was thought to be unreliable by means of the creat- 
ion of another, the FSF, only exacerbated the problem for 
116 Bhutto vis 
ä 
vis the military. The creation of a force 
(18,500 strong by the end of 1976) outside the command 
structure of the regular army117 was viewed with alarm not 
only by the regime's political opponents, but also by 
members of the armed forces. 
118 
Critics claimed that the 
FSF was modelled upon Hitler's SS. 119 Military officers 
resented the establishment of a parallel force, but were 
further incensed when the force was provided with modern 
and sophisticated arms and equipment. 
120 As a mark of pro- 
test, FSF recruits were refused training in army units as 
desired by Bhutto. 121 The activities of the FSF122 _ such 
as the illegal abduction of dissident politicians and 
intimidation of political opponents - further reinforced 
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the view held by military officers that it was a per- 
sonal, Gestapo-style instrument of the prime minister. 
123 
Thus the creation of the FSF emerged as a major source of 
grievance within military circles against the Bhutto re- 
gime. 
124 This is borne out by the fact that one of the 
first actions of the military regime that replaced the 
PPP government was to disband the FSF entirely. 
125 
Despite Bhutto's stated desire to reduce reliance 
on the military, 
126 
he nevertheless utilised them in con- 
taining tribal turbulence in Dir in 1976 and in Baluchistan 
from 1973-1977.127 In sending 70,000 troops to Baluchistan 
to deal with a guerilla insurrection of Baluchi autono-: 
mists, 
128 Bhutto was in effect enlisting the military to 
settle a political conflict with his opponents in that pro- 
vince. 
129 (See above, chapter IX). This again meant draw- 
ing the military back into politics. Bhutto's attention 
was drawn to the 'adverse repercussions' of 'the army's 
prolonged stay' in Baluchistan, by one of his advisers in 
1976.130 In a comprehensive note on the civil-military 
problem in Baluchistan, Bhutto's adviser informed him that 
increasingly the army had begun to act as an independent 
force in the province; army officers had developed a taste 
for power and relished it in the form of arrests, searches' 
and interrogation. which gave them a feeling of authority. 
131 
This was accompanied by their contempt for the ways of the 
politicians and by the general impression that civil 
administrators and politicians were corrupt and incompetent 
and that only the military could deliver the goods. 
132 The 
author of the note added that it was this feeling which had 
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ushered in the first martial law in the country. 
133 
The note stated starkly and clearly the danger posed to 
civilian authority by the military's long involvement in 
Baluchistan. Despite these warnings, the PPP government 
did not follow a policy of gradual withdrawal of the army 
from Baluchistan. 
134 
This could only result in giving the 
military additional leverage and added pre-eminence in the 
national arena. The lack of concern shown by Bhutto at 
this juncture was perhaps a reflection of his confidence 
in the methods he had devised to control the military. 
THE MILITARY COUP OF JULY 1977 
There were several factors behind the military 
takeover of 5 July that toppled the Bhutto government. As 
is evident from the discussion above, the inadequacy or 
fragility of Bhutto's patrimonial method of control together 
with policies that served to strengthen the military's 
position as a "core group" meant that the military remained 
potential interveners in civilian affairs. In this sense 
the military's seizure of power in 1977 was in many ways 
related to various developments during the preceding five 
and a half years of PPP rule: Bhutto's failure to create 
viable political institutions; his inability, notwith- 
standing his early actions significantly to erode the 
military's power and status; and his reliance on the mili- 
tary to deal with 'domestic unrest; a policy that can be 
viewed as leading to "role expansion" on the part of the 
military. Against this background, a number of additional 
factors, including those arising from the exigencies of 
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the crisis situation in 1977 need to be examined to 
arrive at a comprehensive explanation for the July coup. 
The four months of domestic turmoil that followed 
the opposition's charge of election rigging (see above, 
chapter IX), presented a serious challenge to the legiti- 
macy of the PPP government and put the loyalty of the armed 
forces to the civilian authorities under a severe test. 
135 
Significantly, both protagonists in the political conflict-- 
the opposition alliance (PNA) and the PPP government - 
viewed the military as the key variable in resolving the 
crisis. On the one hand, Bhutto needed the support of the 
army if he was to retain his position in the face of really 
determined opposition agitation. On the other hand, the 
opposition recognised that the only way to remove Bhutto 
was through a military coup. 
136 Capitalising on a massive 
wave of anti-government sentiment in the urban centres the 
PNA's four month campaign of hartals, riots, demonstrations, 
street violence, piya-jam (theel jam) strikes was aimed at 
creating national disorder and turmoil in order to destroy 
the legitimacy of the Bhutto government in the eyes of the 
military. Bhutto's repressive measures only served to 
escalate the movement while his offers of concessions 
(spurned by the PNA) did not enable him to gain his lost 
authority and credibility. Unable to control the rising 
tide of violence, Bhutto played his last card in a des- 
perate situation by calling in the army and declaring 
martial law in the country's three largest cities. 137 This 
action was flagrantly in violation of the terms of his own 
constitution that made no allowance for martial law at all. 
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For many military off icerq, this action demonstrated 
Bhutto's duplicity - while decrying military involvement 
in politics in the strongest of terms, Bhutto evidently 
had no qualms about inviting the military to act in a 
political role in order to save him. 
138 
As one military 
leader later explained to us in an interview: 
"We (i. e. the military) were expected 
to become an arm of the PPP.... we are 
a national institution..... we cannot 
take sides. " 139 
The use of the army to quell the anti-Bhutto move- 
ment was an important factor that precipitated the coup. 
The Bhutto regime's shift away from political power as a 
technique(-of rule to a reliance on force produced a typical 
situation, described earlier, in which a "deflation" of 
civilian political structures vis a vis coercive (police 
and military) structures occurs. Paradoxically then Bhutto 
resorted to force when power and legitimacy failed, but 
the use of force to implement authority only enhanced the 
problem of legitimacy of his regime in the eyes of the 
military to whom-the implementation had necessarily to be 
entrusted. Military officers are generally averse to 
being forced to act as policemen. 
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Moreover, this time 
what is predominantly a Punjabi army was being asked to 
undertake the unsavoury action of shooting their own 
Punjabi brethren. 
141 
If Bhutto retained the loyalty of 
key senior officers at this juncture, this was not necessari- 
ly true of the junior officers many of whom were reported 
to have disobeyed orders to shoot at unarmed civilians. 
142 
In Lahore, a number of brigadiers resigned in protest 
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against the government's policy of repression, while the 
military commander'in Lahore expressed serious misgivings 
at the tasks the civilian authorities expected the army 
to perform. 
143 The threat of disunity in the army ranks 
was therefore a significant interventionist motive. 
144 
Additional pressure was brought to bear upon the military 
high command by a group of senior retired officers includ- 
ing Gul Hasan, Rahim Khan (who, as we saw earlier had been 
dismissed by Bhutto in 1972)145 and Asghar Khan, who 
appealed to the army to desert Bhutto. 
146 
An important additional factor that helps to 
explain the military's decision to intervene, was the 
appeal of the PNA's slogan of Nizam-e-Mustapha (the demand 
for an Islamic system) to important segments within the 
armed forces. 
147 In order to understand this it is impor- 
tant to look at the changing social background of the 
officer corps. Firstly, the generational shift in the high 
command from the British-trained, secular-minded officers 
to the more traditional officers drawn largely from either 
the migrants from East Punjab (for example, the leaders 
of the July coup, Generals Zia, Chisti and Arif) or the 
unirrigated Potwar region appears to have given rise to 
a group of generals who are socially conservative and 
susceptible to a puritanical ideology of the type which the 
Jamaat-e-Islaami (major element in the PNA) professes. 
148 
Similarly, patterns of general recruitment have also under- 
gone some change whereby not only the jawans but even the 
junior officers tend to come increasingly not from 
relatively affluent rural families of Central Punjab, but 
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from among farmers of the backward northern districts, 
subscribing to a fundamentalist religious ethos. Con- 
sequently, the PNA's emotional appeal to religion to over- 
throw a corrupt and un-Islamic government could not fail 
to attract sympathy within the armed forces. It is diffi- 
cult to imagine that Zia's religious conservatism did not 
prejudice him to viewing the opposition's appeals with some 
degree of sympathy. This is not to suggest PNA/army com- 
plicity - as Bhutto later alleged 
149 
- for which we found 
no evidence, but that sympathy with the religious fundament- 
alism espoused by the PNA may have been a factor in the 
army's decision to withdraw its support from the Bhutto 
regime. 
Initially, the military pressurised Bhutto and the 
PNA to negotiate a political agreement. The deadlock in 
the talks that followed in June clearly exasperated the 
patience of the military. Hours after Bhutto had 
addressed, a press conference in which he accused the PNA 
of going back on the agreement, he was deposed in a blood- 
less army coup. For the third time in Pakistan's history, 
the military intervened to 'save the nation' from chaos 
and bloodshed. 
150 The fact that Zia and his corpscommanders 
were able to execute a successful coup without the partici- 
pation of the defence adviser (Tikka Khan) and the chairman 
joint chiefs of staff (Mohammed Sharif), both intensely 
loyal to Bhutto, was indicative of the fact, that despite 
the reorganisation in the military described earlier, the 
army chief of staff wielded crucial power. From a broader 
perspective, the fact that the military took power so 
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easily, without any resistance, was a reflection of 
the 
widespread disillusionment with the record of the PPP 
government that made it difficult for it to find either 
popular or elite support. It was only when the military 
were convinced that the PPP government had lost its 
legitimising mantle that it decided to intervene. Just 
as civilian political failure had largely paved the way 
for the army's involvement in politics in the 1950's, so 
the PPP government's performance failure (e. g. the inability 
to preserve public order in March-June) resulted in the 
military intervention of 5 July. In this sense, the 
'reactive' dimension in the coup of July 1977 was clearly 
evident. 
CONCLUSION 
To sum up, it is evident that a number of factors 
lay behind the military takeover that toppled the Bhutto 
government. In his five and a half years of rule, Bhutto 
failed to develop alternative political structures, at times 
threatened the corporate interests of the military and yet 
relied on it to contain domestic discord, and was unable to 
erode significantly the military's position as a core 
group in the Pakistani polity. The method of control he 
devised to ensure civilian supremacy was not institutional 
but personal, and for that reason fragile and transient. 
Against this background, the mobilisation of large numbers 
of people in the March 1977 election and the serious 
damage to government legitimacy and prestige which result- 
ed from the rigging charges and the ensuing civil turmoil 
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encouraged the opposition parties to invite military 
intervention. That both the PPP and the PNA sought mili- 
tary support to eliminate the other was both indicative of 
the absence of a fundamental consensus on the rules and 
norms of a civilian democratic polity, and a tacit recog- 
nition of the military's role as the final arbiter of 
Pakistani politics. In the absence of any institutional 
restraints, and given the grievances and critical atti- 
tudes of many of its officers, the military finally removed 
the Bhutto government. 
As discussed earlier, political activity by the 
men on horseback within the Third World is often explained 
in terms of the societal crises of legitimacy and stability. 
From this broad perspective it is both the fundamental 
weakness of the civilian institutions of state and their 
inability to legitimise their rule which promote action on 
the part of the military. Given the failure or, if one 
prefers, the instability of civilian regimes, the men on 
horseback act to fill the void. 
151 
Underlying this 
position is the view that "the most important causes of 
military intervention in politics are not military but 
political, and reflect not the social and organisational 
characteristics of the military establishment but the 
political and institutional structure of society. "152 
While our examination of the Coup in Pakistan, in general 
reaffirms this thesis, it also directs attention to vari- 
ables - such as the threat to the corporate interests of 
the military, the religious outlook of military officers - 
that are related to what can be called the military's 
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disposition to intervene. This indicates as S. E. Finer 
has suggested that the reasons for military intervention 
are found in two sets of forces: the capacity and dis- 
position of the military to intervene, and the structure 
of society in which the military operates. 
153 In the 
literature on comparative studies of military intervention, 
the two perspectives have often been viewed dichotomously. 
154 
While the focal point of each perspective is different, - 
our analysis suggests that the two views can be combined 
to complement one another. Therefore, in looking for the 
reasons behind military intervention in politics, it is of 
the greatest importance to examine the position and moti- 
vation of the armed forces, the nature of the total societ- 
al context and the linkages that exist between society and 
the men on horseback. 
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XII 
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE PPP GOVERNMENT 
This chapter is concerned with analysing the eco- 
nomic and social policies of the PPP government, for which 
the narrative detail was provided in chapter V. In assess- 
ing the performance of the PPP, we address ourselves to 
two sets of questions: the extent to which the PPP regime 
acted as a vehicle for transforming the socio-economic order 
and secondly, how far its policies helped or hindered its 
efforts to establish legitimacy. In answering these ques- 
tions it is important to recall that the PPP emerged and 
developed as a vehicle not only for the modernists and 
idealists, but also for the traditional and self-seeking. 
l 
In as much as the PPP represented a coalition of land- 
lords, sharecroppers, urban middle-class professionals, 
students and industrial labour, it enjoyed the support 
both of traditional and modern elements. The PPP was origin- 
ally advertised as a revolutionary party that would abolish 
the existing system and build a new one along the lines of 
democracy, Islam and socialism. But it was difficult to 
see how a party, whose major support - especially in the 
post-1970 period - increasingly came from a conservative 
social group (landlords), 
2 
would take any measures which 
would reduce the power of its prime constituency. The. 
heterogenous membership of the PPP not only indicated that 
the modernising aims of the party could be seriously in- 
hibited, but underlined the dilemma of reconciling the 
divergent interests represented by the party in order to 
sustain the uneasy coalition. 
683 
Before analysing the PPP's social and economic 
activities, two background factors which had an important 
impact on the Bhutto government's general policy direction 
need to be mentioned. These are the 'development strategy' 
followed in the 1960's and its consequences, andthe social and 
economic environment in which the PPP assumed power. During 
the 1960's, Pakistan followed a strategy of economic develop- 
ment based on what Angus Madison has described as the 
doctrine of 'functional inequality', because of the alleged 
conflict between equity and growth. 
3 Such a strategy was 
marked by the fostering of a private industrial sector 
through state subsidies and other encouragements, emphasis- 
ing gross economic increase without regard to income redis- 
tribution or other considerations of social justice. 
4 
This had, according to one commentator, the following re- 
sult: 
"In Pakistan, which experienced a 
healthy growth rate in the 1960's, un- 
employment increased, real wages in the 
industrial sector declined by one-third, 
per capita income disparity between East 
and West Pakistan nearly doubled, and 
concentration of industrial wealth be- 
came an explosive economic and political 
issue. " 5 
Public disenchantment with the unbalanced economic growth 
in the sixties, became, a's we saw earlier, a major factor 
in the political unrest of 1968-69, which culminated in 
the fall of the Ayub regime. 
6 Ayub's development strategy 
stood discredited not only in the eyes of those who took 
to the streets in 1968-69, but even amongst the very 
authors of the policy who admitted its failings as a model 
for development? not only in its neglect of equitable 
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distribution but also on its own terms of economic 
efficiency. 
8 
The disenchantment with the unbalanced growth in 
the sixties indicated that any new government would have 
to pay heed to questions of social justice. The economic 
thinking of the PPP followed directly from the emphasis 
on growth and neglect of distributional questions during 
Ayub's 'development decade'. Indeed, as we suggested in 
an earlier chapter in many respects the party itself was a 
product of the social and economic tensions generated by 
Ayub's economic strategy. 
9 It was swept into power largely 
on the support of those groups that had suffered during 
Ayub's development decade - industrial labour, urban pro- 
fessionals and landlords (because of the pro-industrial 
sector bias of Ayub's economic policies). Bhutto, recognis- 
ing that dissatisfaction with the economic policies of the 
Ayub regime was one of the major reasons for his party's 
election victory in 1970, repeatedly stressed the need to 
rectify the imbalances created by the Ayubian strategy of 
putting growth before equity. 
10 
The change in economic 
thinking was reflected in the party's manifesto which em- 
phasised distribution and sharing the fruits of development, 
albeit, in the most general terms. 
11 
PPP thinking further 
indicated that the orientation of development policy would 
shift from private to public sector domination of, industry, 
from income growth per se to income growth in tandem with 
redistribution and that emphasis would shift from industry 
to agriculture and basic (industrial) infrastructure. 
According to Bhutto, ' 
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"these (principles) spring not from 
any abstract doctrine or ideological 
dogma but from the imperatives of pro- 
gress.... Our target in our socio-economic 
programme is not only a gratifying in- 
crease in the GNP but an improvement in 
the lot of the common man, in the living 
standards of workers and peasants and a 
radical change in the social millieu. " 12 
The immediate circumstances surrounding the PPP's 
accession to power also had a perceptible impact on the 
party's policies and actions in office. When the PPP 
assumed power, the country was gripped by widespread indus- 
trial strikes and (though less intense) tenant/peasant un- 
rest. 
13 Such militancy was partly the result of post-war 
economic conditions and partly the result of heightened ex- 
pectations associated with the PPP's ascent to power. Sig- 
nificantly, however, this unrest did not cease with the 
establishment of the PPP government. To give but one ex- 
ample, between July and December 1972, it is estimated that 
1.25 million man days were lost as a result of strikes and 
other disruptions. 
14 
Moreover, PPP leaders' protestations 
that "there was no need for labourers to indulge in gheraos 
and alaos because the country was being ruled by their 
government' 
seemed 
to meet with little response. The 
widespread urban and rural land seizures were perceived by 
PPP leaders as the top of a massive iceberg of growing eco- 
nomic and political pressures that could engulf and over- 
whelm the PPP government. 
16 This anarchic environment imposed 
its cwnimperatives. The government had to move towards re- 
forms to preserve its legitimacy. As Bhutto explained, 
"the political and social fabric would explode unless cer- 
tain basic reforms were undertaken. "17 The need for 
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reforms aimed at removing some of the grievances of the 
protesting groups was apparent. But so also was the need 
to curtail the high level of mobilisation sustained by 
groups such as the trade unions. For example Bhutto argued 
that the announcement of a new labour policy warranted an 
end to militant union activity: 
"...... Activities like gherao and jalao 
would have to terminate..... (otherwise) 
the full weight of the law will be visit- 
ed upon such forms of. illegal demonstra- 
tion. " 18 
The threat of the use of force was aimed at discouraging 
participation, for Bhutto saw in this the unravelling of 
his own authority. 
19 In other words, the environment im- 
pelled the PPP government to emphasise rule rather than 
reform, order rather than change, and indicated that the 
regime would assume an "anti-mdbilist" character. Bhutto 
was particularly interested in stabilising the agrarian 
scene and putting an end to peasant seizures of landlord's 
holdings. 
The preoccupation with stability was in large 
measure necessitated by the economic collapse that followed 
in the wake of the secession of Bangladesh. The need to 
rebuild a war-ravaged economy, and to adjust to the economic 
consequences of the loss of East Pakistan (e. g. as a mar- 
ket for W. Pakistan exports) imposed its own imperatives. 
With the economy in considerable disrepair, the election 
promises of the PPP had justifiably to be considered by 
Bhutto and his party leaders in a somewhat different light. 
The regime argued that the situation when it acceded to 
power had altered drastically from the time the party 
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manifesto was drafted. 
20 The war and its effects on the 
economy had created a different set of circumstances in 
which it would not be possible to proceed too rapidly with 
the party's programme of social and economic change. 
21 
The net outcome of the above developments was a 
de-radicalisation of the PPP's aims and objectives, a fac- 
tor that was examined in some detail in chapter VI above. 
As we noted earlier, the radical leftist groups in the 
party immediately expressed their disenchantment with the 
slow pace of change outlined by the government and severed 
their links with the party in 1972.22 The PPP government 
maintained that its ultimate aim was the establishment of 
an egalitarian society, but while its manifesto had stated 
that the principal aims of the party "are +unattainable by 
petty adjustments", 
23 it now favoured a cautious, reformist 
approach. It was repeatedly emphasised that the government 
was committed to a mixed economy rather than total social- 
isation. 
24 
The regime would attempt to break the monopoly 
power of vested interests, but otherwise it wanted "land- 
lords and industrialists to flourish and contribute to the 
national economy. "25 This was a far cry from the vision 
of a'classless society' held out by the manifesto. It 
appeared that socialism, which had served well as an ideol- 
ogy of protest when the party was in opposition, seemed to 
lose its programmatic quality once the party assumed power. 
26 
Certainly the regime continued to use socialist vocabulary 
to legitimise its actions, and moved in the direction of 
implementing some of the programmes promised in the mani- 
festo. However, as we shall see below, the regime's actions 
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and policies were increasingly directed less by ideology 
than by consideration of the preservation of political 
power and pragmatic adjustments to the demands of its 
constituency support. Indeed, the PPP's record in office 
was increasingly characterised by a reluctance to reconcile 
socialist pronouncements with practical performance. This 
marked the PPP's transformation from a movement ostensibly 
seeking radical change to a pragmatic, 'umbrella' party 
attempting to allay discontent through limited reform and 
seeking to satisfy the demands of the divergent elements 
that constituted its support-base. We turn now to a detail- 
ed discussion of the PPP's strategy of rule. 
In the industrial sphere, the PPP's reform measures 
were aimed at implementing some of the promises made in the 
manifesto to enlist popular support as well as to widen 
the regime's control over the economy. In the national- 
27 isation measures. Bhutto combined his concern with reduc- 
ing the economic and political power of the industrialist 
elite with the pursuit of social legitimacy amongst the 
broad masses. In this sense the nationalisations resulted 
as much from Bhutto's determination to enlarge his govern- 
ment's control over societal interactions and to curtail 
the power of the industrial elite, as from any ideological 
commitment. After a political campaign that had stressed 
the unjust concentration of industrial wealth by the 
twenty-two families, it was not surprising that the first 
wave of reform in 1972 was aimed at nationalising those 
sectors associated with such monopolisation. This was 
intended to demonstrate the regime's commitment to the 
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goal of equity. The following table shows the assets lost 
by the major twenty-six industrial families as a con- 
sequence of nationalisation. 
TABLE XII. 1 
POSITION OF MAJOR INDUSTRIAL FAMILIES: IMPACT OF NATIONAL- 
ISATION 
(Rupees in millions) 
FAMILY 
Pre 
Nationalisation 
Post 
Nationalisation 
Position Net Assets* Net Assets Position 
Saigol 1 529.8 165.3 3 
Habib 2 228.0 68.8 11 
Dawood 3 210.8 767.54 1 
Crescent 4 201.7 201.7 2 
Adamjee 5 201.3 146.3 5 
Colony (N) 6 189.7 95.8 6 
Valika 7 183.5 62.2 12 
Hoti 8 148.6 148.6 4 
Amins 9 137.9 137.9 - Wazir All 10 102.6 87.6 
Fancy 11 102.4 - - Beco 12 101.4 - - Hussain 13 81.7 81.7 9 
Colony (F) 14 89.9 19.8 - Ghandara 15 79.9 25.8 - Hyesons 16 79.4 83.51 8 
Zafar-ul-Ahsan 17 77.2 22.1 - Bawany 18 69.3 69.3 10 
Premier 19 56.1 56.1 13 
Nishat 20 54.3 54.3 14 
Gul Ahmed 21 52.3 52.3 15 
Arag 22 50.1 50.1 16 
Rahimtoola 23 49.9 49.9 17 
Noon 24 48.8 48.8 18 
Shahnawaz 25 46.0 46.0 19 
Monnoo 26 45.0 45.0 20 
Notes: * Includes Non-Manufacturing, Banking and Insurance. Includes Dawood-Hercules (1971) 
Includes Hyesons Sugar Mills (1974) 
Source: Rashid Amjad, 'Industrial Concentration and Economic Power', Pakistan Economic and Social Review, Vol. XIV, 
Nos. 1-4 (1976), p. 254. 
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The attack on the industrial elite reflected both the 
regime's desire to enlist popular support as well as the 
need to establish its control over the 'commanding heights' 
of the economy. The former was visible in Bhutto's 
seizure of passports belonging to the twenty-two families 
and the handcuffing of one of the big industrialists for 
television display. This was intended as a symbolic demons- 
tration of the regime's contempt towards such forms of 
wealth and was meant primarily to impress the public, es- 
pecially its leftist supporters. The actual reform mea- 
sures the Economic Reforms Order, on the other hand nation- 
alised the firms in the area of 'heavy industry' (capital 
and intermediate goods), giving the government control over 
the 'commanding heights' of the economy (one-third of 
fixed assets in large-scale manufacturing industry now be- 
longed to the public sector). The subsequent nationalis- 
ation of'banks and insurance companies (again both largely 
the private preserves of the economically powerful families) 
served to break the link between industrial and financial 
capital which had helped foster the concentration of econo- 
mit power in a few families. 
The second wave of nationalisation - of rice and 
cotton export, vegetable ghee, rice husking, cotton ginning 
and flour mills - extended beyond the emphasis on the major 
industrial families. The second wave seemed impelled by 
the exigencies of the situation rather than prior design 
or ideological considerations. For example, rising prices 
and unavailability in the domestic market prompted the 
government's move to nationalise the ghee industry. 
28 
Similarly, the nationalisation of agro-processing units 
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was necessitated by alleged hoarding and profiteering 
on the one hand and failure to give the (rural) producer 
a fair price on the other hand. 
29 
What was the impact of the nationalisation measures, 
both in the economic and political sense? Economically, 
the reform reduced the concentration of ownership in the 
manufacturing sector. However, the reform fell short of 
the basic transformation of the economic structure envi- 
saged by the PPP manifesto. It certainly enlarged the pub- 
lic sector, but over 75 per cent of the industrial sector 
remained in private hands, including the important textile 
sector. 
30 The assault on the industrial elite left much 
of their economic power untouched, mainly because of their 
dominating position in cotton textiles and the sugar indus- 
try (with the former contributing almost a third of the 
total value added in the large scale manufacturing sector 
and being the largest single employer of industrial labour). 
31 
Thus the act had a limited impact in terms of bringing 
about a more equitable distribution of industrial wealth. 
The nationalisation measure (since it exempted textiles) 
was clearly aimed at reducing the economic power of the 
industrial elite and not at eliminating it. The national- 
isation of banks and insurance companies represented a more 
fundamental change since it severed the link between indus- 
trial and financial capital which had been built up over 
the last twenty years and which fostered the concentration 
32 of economic power in a few families. 
The psychological impact of the nationalisation was 
greater than its economic impact (in terms of restructuring 
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of the economy). In a country which had a past history 
of industrial plant being built at state expense and then 
being sold to private investors, the idea of nationalisa- 
tion, however limited and bureaucratic, was explosive, 
sending a wave of fear amongst the industrial propertied 
class. When the government wished to operationalise 
its 
concept of a mixed economy by calling for cooperation from 
the industrialists, this was not forthcoming. 
33 Despite 
promises of compensation for the take-over of industries, 
private industrial initiative was paralysed by the fear of 
further nationalisation. 
34 The government's subsequent 
nationalisations, despite assurances given by the regime 
that there would be no further nationalisation, (see above, 
chapter V) accentuated the suspicions of the business 
community. 
35 In this sense, the uncertainty created by 
the government's actions would probably have been less and 
its psychological impact of shorter duration if the nation- 
alisations had been carried out all at once. 
The business community had other sources of griev- 
ances against the PPP government. On the one hand, they 
felt that the PPP leaders had singled them out for public 
abuse, 
36 
while on the other hand they held the government 
The latter responsible for encouraging labour indiscipline 
37 
factor was viewed by the business community as having an 
adverse effect on industrial productivity. For instance, 
a government survey conducted on forty-three manufacturing 
enterprises in ten major industries (including textiles, 
edible oils, cement) in Karachi showed that inter alia, 
management viewed 'labour indiscipline' as the single most 
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important factor hindering productivity. 
38 In addition, 
the government's labour policies (see below) were viewed 
by the business community as eroding profit margins in 
those industries left in private hands. 
39 
Despite assurances given to industrialists by 
Bhutto that "private enterprise had a distinct part to 
play" in the kind of 'mixed' economy envisaged by his re- 
gime, the industrialists' uncertainties and anxieties were 
not allayed. 
40 Conciliatory measures taken by the govern- 
ment, including the decision to remove Mubashar Hasan as 
minister of finance (in 1974) who was known for his anti- 
pathy towards the private sector, also failed to assuage 
the doubts of the business community. 
41 The lack of busi- 
ness confidence in the government was reflected in the dec- 
line in private sector industrial investment. Total private 
sector industrial investment dropped to less than half of 
its level in 1971. (See chapter V, Table V. 1). Total 
private investment in 1974-75 was only Rs. 601 million 
compared to Rs. 1,358 in 1970-71.42 The adverse consequences 
of this for economic progress in general and employment 
opportunities in particular can hardly be overstated. Al- 
though public sector investment increased substantially 
43 
from less than 10% of total industrial investment in FY 
1973 to 70% in FY 1977, this was, by design, in capital- 
intensive, long gestation 'infrastructure' projects (e. g. 
steel), thus severely reducing for instance, the employment- 
creating impact of public investment (see below). At the 
same time the insufficiency of public sector savings meant 
that the increase in public sector investment had to be met 
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in large part by domestic and foreign borrowing, 
44 thus 
subjecting the economy to severe strains, at a time when 
the country was facing adverse international conditions 
(see below). 
It is important to note that the government's ac- 
tions not only alienated the big industrialists, but the 
merchant and trading community in general which included 
small manufacturers, shopkeepers and arhtis (middle men). 
The second wave of nationalisation affected these groups 
in particular. The nationalisation of the vanaspati ghee 
(vegetable oil) industry affected small and medium sized 
entrepreneurs. 
45 The nationalisation of the agro-based in- 
dustries also hurt small and middle-class entrepreneurs in 
the towns and mandi (market) towns. 
46 
Similarly, state 
control of the rice and cotton trade significantly reduced 
the role played by traders and middle men. The cumulative 
impact of the nationalisation measures, the fall in private 
investment, government intervention to ensure minimum pri- 
ces to the grower (farmer), and the fixation of wages and 
quantitative targets was to curtail the commercial activities 
of the arhtis and merchants on the one hand, and affected 
the monetary interests of the shopkeepers on the other 
hand. 47 A household survey conducted in Rawalpindi by"a 
government-backed research institution in 1975 for instance, 
showed a sharp deterioration in the real incomes of shop- 
keepers in the 1970's. 48 In addition, the trading and 
merchant community found that they often had to pay fines, 
bribes and payments to local PPP men in order to get things 
done. 49 The importance of these groups - both in terms 
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of numbers and organisation - in the urban areas can be 
demonstrated by the fact that commercial trade comprises 
25.9 per cent of the urban labour force (as compared to 
manufacturing which constitutes 25.7 per cent of the urban 
labour force) and that in Punjab alone there are several 
thousand arhti associations. 
50 
This suggested the kind of 
danger Bhutto and the PPP faced by alienating this middle 
and lower-middle class group. 
If we add to these groups the small and medium 
industrial entrepreneurs mentioned above, it is clear that 
a sizeable section of the urban middle class suffered as a 
consequence of the PPP regime's economic policies. Although 
some of the small industrial owners had been affected by 
the nationalisations, many more - one writer has calculated 
the owners of 155,000 small enterprises51 - were affected 
by the regime's labour legislation (see above, chapter V, 
and below). The PPP's labour laws extended not only to 
larger enterprises (as under previous labour laws) but to 
smaller units as well. The owners of small industrial units 
(concentrated for the large part in the Punjab) argued 
that the costs of implementing the new labour regulations 
would be much higher for them than for owners of large 
enterprises. 
52 Thus one effect of the government's labour 
and nationalisation policies was the alienation of these 
middle class entrepreneurs. 
If the government found that its nationalisation 
policies created animosity amongst the above mentioned 
groups, it nevertheless hoped that it would be able to mo- 
bilise alternative bases of support amongst those groups 
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which would benefit from the efficient functioning of the 
nationalised industries. This hope was not always borne 
out. For instance the government take-over of the vege- 
table ghee industry was justified on the grounds that the 
private sector had failed to hold the price line and 
to provide an efficient distribution system: However, pub- 
lic sector managers soon discerned that it was equally 
difficult for them to hold down prices of vegetable oil. 
53 
Henceforth, price increases and shortages of this essen- 
tial commodity - whatever the difficulties - could lead 
only to fingers pointed directly at the PPP administration. 
In this sense, the government succeeded only in eroding its 
credibility (indeed its legitimacy) with the industrialists, 
middle and low-income urban consumers (the latter forming 
an important part of the PPP constituency). 
The vegetable oil industry, however, was an 
exception amongst the nationalised enterprises, in that it 
produced an item of everyday consumption. The rest of the 
industries taken over were those concerned with the pro- 
udction of capital and intermediate goods. Such industries, 
by definition, could not have had a direct, short-run impact 
in terms of providing visible benefits to the populace. 
Thus the nature of these industries did not entirely jus- 
tify the rhetoric that accompanied their nationalisation. 
For-: instance, Bhutto had proclaimed that the nationalisation 
of these industries was meant "to eliminate, once and for 
all, poverty and discrimination in Pakistan. "54 Clearly 
since these industries could not have performed these 
functions, the regime's rhetoric only served to raise public 
expectations. 
I 
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It can be argued that even if the nature of the 
industries nationalised precluded any short-run benefits 
to the people, the government could generate public 
support by demonstrating that these industries were run 
more efficiently under the public sector than they were in 
private hands. However, this did not prove to be an easy 
task, for three major reasons. Firstly, most of the in- 
dustries nationalised were amongst the most inefficient in 
the industrial sector. In making itself the owner of 
such units the government unwittingly assumed responsibility 
for all past wrongs. Secondly, adverse international con- 
ditions, such as the 1973 oil price hike and the subse- 
quent world recession seriously aggravated the problems in 
the nationalised sector. Thirdly, the nationalised sector 
was given a number of conflicting tasks and objectives. 
55 
Dividend payments were to be maintained. Taxes and duties 
were to be paid in full. Workers were to be given a "fair 
deal", and wages and benefits increased rapidly. Prices 
were to be reduced or held down despite inflation. As a 
result of these factors, the government faced serious prob- 
lems with regard to improving the economic efficiency of 
the nationalised industries. But the impression which 
gained currency amongst the general urban public was that 
of government mismanagement and inefficiency. 
56 
Thus the 
regime drew animosity rather than the praise and support 
expected. At the same time, declining profits in the 
nationalised units proved a heavy burden on the Exchequer. 
57 
It is self-evident that for public sector industries, 
financial profitability cannot simply be taken as an 
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indicator of economic efficiency or social profitability, 
but it is nevertheless important if only because it has a 
direct bearing on the public sector's ability to finance 
its investment expenditure. Such an ability is of major 
concern in view of the resource limitations of the govern- 
ment. The public sectort'", § own contributions towards finan- 
cing its investment expenditure out of internally generated 
funds was extremely low in the 1970's - on average only 
7%. 58 Their investment expenditure was therefore depend- 
ent on government budgetary allocations (financed through 
a combination of foreign aid and deficit financing - the 
latter adding to inflationary pressures in the economy). 
It is important to note that the major proportion 
of public sector investment was in capital-intensive-pro- 
jects with long periods of gestation - the Karachi steel 
mill, fertilizer and cement projects accounted for more 
than 70% of total public sector investment. This meant 
that the government committed a large proportion of its re- 
sources to projects which would not yield economic results. 
in the near future. But more importantly, the decision to 
commit the economy to the building up of a heavy industry 
base was made at a time when the economy was being sub- 
jected to the adverse conditions created by international 
factors, in particular the oil price hike of 1973. Thus, 
however, laudable the government's long-term objective in 
laying the foundation of a capital goods industry, the 
immediate impact of such an objective was to create serious 
strains on the economy. Combined with the decline in real 
private sector industrial investment, the nature of 
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public sector investment was one of the major reasons 
for the slow rate of industrial growth in the Bhutto 
years. In the period 1971/71 - 1976/77, the rate of in- 
dustrial growth averaged 1.9% per annum compared with 
8.7% (for West Pakistan) in the second half of the 1960's. 
59 
Although it is difficult to relate such aggregate economic 
indices to economic and political discontent, it can be 
suggested that poor economic performances as reflected in 
such indices limits a regime's capability in establishing 
its legitimacy on the basis of economic performance. Having 
said this, it is nonetheless important to recognise that 
the PPP regime laid less emphasis (than the Ayub regime) 
on claims to be judged in terms of purely quantitative in- 
dicators (such as growth indices) than in terms of aspects 
of welfare indices (the equity dimension), to which atten- 
tion-is directed below. However, the large outlay on 
long-term projects did mean that less was available to 
finance welfare sectors (such as education and health) that 
needed urgent attention and that could perhaps have yield- 
ed quicker benefits, politically. 
In the industrial sphere, the nationalisation mea- 
sures were accompanied by the introduction of labour re- 
forms. These formed part of the regime's efforts (other 
attempts such as the subsidy programme and land reform 
legislation are discussed below) to establish its legiti- 
macy on the basis of attempting to bring about greater 
equity. Labour reforms represented an attempt by the PPP 
government to fulfil the promise, made in the party mani- 
festo and repeatedly in campaign speeches, of improving the 
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pay and conditions of industrial workers. Much of the 
PPP's urban support came from industrial labour, and as 
we noted above, growing labour militancy impelled govern- 
ment action to mollify their grievances. The "new deal 
for labour" involved pay increases through raising the 
minimum wage and a series of benefits such as a broadened 
profit sharing programme, pension plans and educational 
allowances for workers' children. 
60 
The new labour legis- 
lation also enlarged the scope of its applicability (see 
above, chapter V); this meant that over a half of industrial 
workers in the manufacturing sector were eligible for the 
benefits under the new labour laws compared to the previous 
figures of 25% (under the Ayub and Yahya regimes). The 
government used its leadership in the public sector to 
increase the real wages of workers; four pay increases were 
given during the first three years of the PPP government. 
61 
At the same time legal steps were taken, guaranteeing the 
right to strike and aimed at strengthening trade unions. 
The number of registered trade unions went up from 1,997 in 
1971 to 9,110 in 1977 while registered membership went up 
from 581,219 (in 1971)'to 760,300 (1977). 
62 
The new measures, however, fell short of labourIs 
expectations, which was reflected in continuing labour 
strikes and unrest. 
63 
Further concessions involving im- 
provements in procedural matters (such as no dismissals 
without prior approval of a labour court) also failed to 
reduce the general state of industrial unrest. Much of 
labour's heightened expectations was a product of extrava- 
gant promises made by PPP leaders in opposition, which in 
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power they neither had the resources nor the will to 
implement. Having used slogans such as awami raj and 
'factories for the workers' as rallying points for his 
populist appeal, Bhutto could hardly be surprised at 
labour's new intransigent and aggressive stance. Militant 
trade union leaders argued that the PPP had not carried 
out its promises of the 1970-71 period and that the reforms 
represented only a partial fulfilment of some of the pro- 
mises made. 
64 
Initially the government sided with the increas- 
ingly restless labour movement in their disputes with .. 
management, at times pressurising the latter into paying 
wages for periods of illegal strikes. 
65 While this may 
have been a politically rewarding move, it did not boost 
confidence in the economy not increase industrial produc- 
tivity - matters which became of pressing concern for the PPP 
government. Thus the earlier unqualified support for 
labour gave was to a tougher government line which included 
the threat to ban strikes and a "no work, no wages" policy. 
66 
The new, tougher line was demonstrated in the use of force 
against striking workers in Karachi in June and November 
1972 which resulted in several deaths, 
67 
and arrests of 
militant union leaders. 
68 The use of strong arm tactics 
to bring about industrial peace invited the following cynical 
comment from a critical new journal: 
"The first avowedly socialist party in 
Pakistan has killed the largest number of 
protesting labourers in the shortest span 
of time. " 69 
Such tactics together with the harassments and arrests of 
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union leaders on criminal charges alienated the leftist 
leaders in the PPP such as Mukhtar Rana and Mairaj Mohammed 
who announced their departure from the party. 
70 The exo- 
dus Of these men from the party, along with their respec- 
tive followings deprived the government of important trade 
union (and in the case of Mairaj, student support as well) 
support, both in urban Sind (Karachi) and Punjab (Lyallpur, 
Multan and Sargodha). 
The police firings on workers together with the 
arrest of militant union leaders in Karachi and the Punjab 
also led to the exodus of other PPP labour organisers such 
as Mahmud Babar (who was later jailed by the PPP regime), 
Abdur Rahman-: (who was mysteriously assassinated in 1974), 
Tariq Latif and Ziauddin Butt. This ended the PPP's links 
with militant trade unions in the Punjab such as the 
Muttihida Mazdur Mahaz (United Workers Front of Lahore), 
the Taracjgi Pasand Mazdur Mahaz (Progressive Workers Front 
of Lyalipur) and Mazdur Majlis-i-Amal (Workers Action 
Committee of Multan) and Sind, such as the Pakistan Workers 
Federation of Karachi. Many former PPP trade union radicals 
attempted to organise a country wide network of militant 
unions in opposition to the regime. Mahmud Babar and 
Abdur Rahman (until his assassination) for instance organised 
workers committees in Multan and Lahore respectively. 
71 
These committees were coordinated by a central (Punjab- 
based) Mazdur Majlis-i-Amal which was largely led by another 
former PPP figure, Ziauddin Butt. The erosion of the PPP's 
support amongst these militant union leaders was an impor- 
tant reason behind the regime's inability to rally organised 
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labour behind it during the 1977 crisis (see below). 
However, despite the PPP's loss of support amongst 
militant union leaders, the regime nevertheless continued 
to make efforts toward cultivating the constituency of 
urban labour. Such efforts had both symbolic/psychological 
and real elements. The former consisted of repeated 
government pronouncements demonstrating its esteem for the 
workers and its solidarity with their cause. 
72 These 
verbal assurances aimed at enhancing the psychological 
status of workers, while perhaps raising expectations on 
the one hand, did nevertheless give them 'a feeling of im- 
portance and a sense of dignity. This is best characterised 
by the widespread sentiment amongst labour that the Bhutto 
government had given them izzat (respect) and had appealed 
directly to them, reiterating that they were the 'fountain 
of power. ' 
73 The government also made real efforts to im- 
prove the lot of urban labour through wage increases on the 
one hand and direct subsidies on essential household items. 
like wheat, vegetable oil, sugar and rice. 
74 Money wages 
of industrial workers in the manufacturing sector increased 
by 15.1% at an annual compound rate during the period 
1971/72 - 1975/76.75 However, as we shall see below these 
wage increases were more than offset by the rise in the 
cost of living. The subsidised food products on the other 
hand, were made available through government ration-depots, 
thus also providing the PPP with an immense source of 
patronage as licences for depots were used to reward 
supporters. 
7.6 But, in assuming the responsibility for making 
essential food available through ration depots, it was the 
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government which was now blamed directly for periodic 
shortages of individual items, price increases, or for 
abuses amongst depot holders, such as under-weighing or 
adulteration of atta (wheat). 
77 Thus even this programme 
of helping the urban poor carried liabilities for the PPP. 
The food subsidy programme represented another 
effort by the PPP regime to make good its declared aim of 
pursuing the goal of equity. The programme was designed 
to insulate low-income urban groups (labour and lower- 
grade government employees) from rising inflation which 
was a product of both domestic (e. g. the devaluation of 
1972 and deficit financing) and international'(the oil 
price hike of 1973) factors. 
78 These efforts however 
seemed minimal in the face of the phenomenal price increases 
since the PPP came to power. Prices rose rapidly between 
1972 and 1975 and the cost of living increased by 100%. 
(See Table XII. 2 below). 
TABLE XII. 2 
TREND IN PRICES (YEARLY AVERAGES) 1971-72 to 1976-77 
1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 1974=75 1975-76 1976-77 
Consumer Prices* 110.6 121.4 157.8 200 223.2 228.2 
(1969-70 = 100) 
Wholesale Prices 150.3 179.7 229.1 288.8 321.8 342.6 
(1959-60 = 100) 
Sensitive Price - - 160.0 197.3 218.9 214.8 Indicator (28 
Essential Items) 
*Combined for three groups - industrial, government and 
commercial employees. 
Source: PAKISTAN ECONOMIC SURVEY 1976-77 
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The inflationary situation was seriously aggra- 
vated by'setbacks beyond the government's control - natural 
disasters such as the Indus floods (1973) and drought 
(1974), 79 and price convulsions in the international com- 
munity. 
80 But rising prices nevertheless posed a major 
challenge to the popularity and stability of the PPP regime, 
leading one adviser to remark to the finance minister that 
"your only opposition party is prices. "81 The apparently 
uncontrollable burden of rising prices emerged as a 
principal source of public discontent leading ultimately 
to widespread urban disillusionment. Corruption and poli- 
tical repression certainly had their influence on the urban 
mind, but the effect of rising prices hurt most. It wiped 
out much of the benefits received by way of wage increases 
by low-income groups like industrial labour and low-grade 
government employees, and seriously hindered the regime's 
efforts to establish legitimacy on the basis of its eco- 
nomic performance in terms of its welfare/equity dimension. 
As indicated earlier, money wages of industrial workers 
rose, by 15.1% at an annual compound rate under the Bhutto 
government; the cost of living index, however, rose by 
16.1% at an annual compound rate in the same period. 
82 
This meant that real wages, in fact, declined. Similarly 
for government employees who form an important part of 
the urban population, real wages and salaries declined. 
83 
Bhutto himself conceded that prices had "eaten up many of 
our achievements. 1,84 while his advisers warned him that it 
was this issue, more than any other, that the opposition 
would capitalise upon in the forthcoming election. 
85 
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The PPP administration attempted to deal with the 
effect that rising prices were having on the income of 
urban groups by decreeing wage increases to those who were 
organised and thus a potential source of trouble, e. g. 
government servants and industrial workers of large-scale 
enterprises. 
86 
Thus an undetermined but large portion of 
the urban labour force was not covered at all by the 
increases. At the same time having defused the threat 
from major protestors, the government, no doubt pressed by 
its resource limitations, in each instance raised the 
price of major subsidised commodities. At the third round, 
some of these raises were so drastic (for instance the 
price of atta went up from Rs. 21.00 to Rs. 32.00 per 
maund) that the action sparked off violent demonstrations 
in the urban areas. 
87 
The protesters were led by railway 
workers who were later joined by other industrial workers 
and students. In contrast to the resentment caused by the 
price increases in the urban areas the farmer was pleased 
with the principle of the government decision. 
88 This 
underlined the dilemma faced by the PPP in reconciling the 
demands of the urban consumer and rural producer - both 
formed part of the'PPP's support base. The 1975 decision 
to lower consumer subsidies also indicated that the regime 
realised that in view of financial limitations it was diffi- 
cult to do much for the urban poor in the short run. As 
one PPP minister explained: 
"The curse of subsidy must come to an 
end..... the question was where all the 
money would come from. " 89 
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It was evident from the discussion above - and 
as the 1975 food riots demonstrated so dramatically - that 
the issue of prices considerably weakened the legitimacy 
of the regime in the eyes of the urban population. It was 
not only the low-income urban groups that suffered as a 
consequence of inflation, but middle class salaried groups 
as well. These groups formed an important part of the PPP's 
initial support base. For the urban intellectuals and 
professional groups, rising prices was only one of the 
several issues which led to their estrangement from the 
PPP government. 
In an earlier chapter, it was suggested that these 
groups became increasingly-di: senchanted with the regime's 
record of infringement of democratic norms. 
90 The use of 
repressive measures and periodic terror against political 
opponents of the regime was one source of resentment. The 
content and pace of the government's reforms was another 
.0 
factor in the growing disillusionment of the educated 
middle class. To these'factors were added economic griev- 
ances such as shrinking job opportunities caused by a 
decline in private investment and of course the effects 
of inflation. Although the rate of inflation dropped by 
late 1975 (See Table XII. 2 above) since there is obviously 
a time-lag phenomena involved in the effect of such a de- 
crease on incomes, most middle class salaried groups did 
not perceive an improvement in their economic situation. 
Additionally, the middle-class professional groups saw 
their influence dwindle as their representatives (such as 
J. A. Rahim and Mubashar Hasan) were steadily edged out from 
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both the party and the cabinet. Thus the view expressed 
by one political commentator that the "regime has become 
the vehicle for the emergence of these middle sector 
groups in Pakistani politics"91 does not seem to be borne 
out in practice. In fact, the PPP's governing strategy 
seemed to indicate that while these groups may have been 
considered important in helping to bring the party to 
power, their support was not actively sought while in power. 
Indeed, the regime's increasing reliance and alignment with 
traditional feudal groups in the rural countryside suggest- 
ed that the regime probably felt that the middle class 
groups were dispensable. 
92 
In formulating its economic programme for the 
rural sector the PPP was guided by the pragmatic belief 
that support from this sector was indispensable for regime 
stability. 
93 
Its land reform and agricultural policies 
were aimed at satisfying the party's rural constituency - 
which included both landowning groups and tenants/share 
croppers. Through the land reform measure the PPP sought 
to consolidate and extend its control over both these 
groups. The land reform was officially proclaimed as a 
major effort on the part of the regime to promote equity. 
In its election manifesto and in campaign speeches, the 
party had promised to break the "shackles of feudalism" and 
to "destroy the power of the feudal landowner., 
94 But, the 
actual reform, announced in March 1972, which reduced the 
permitted landholdings from a ceiling of 500 acres to 150 
(irrigated) acres and introduced legal provisions purport- 
ing to strengthen the position of tenants (for details see 
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above, chapter V), showed that no basic transformation 
of the rural social stratification system was envisaged, 
and that the declared goal of equity remained a rhetorical 
statement. Clearly, the PPP's constituency support amongst 
landlord groups limited its capacity to effect a signifi- 
cant societal transformation. 
What then was the purpose of the land reform and 
what impact did it have? The reform served two major . 
purposes for the regime. Firstly, as indicated in chapter 
VII, it became an instrument by which Bhutto sought to 
curtail the independent power of the large feudal land- 
lords and to make them dependent on his regime. Given 
Bhutto's desire to establish his personal ascendancy over 
the landlord groups and then to make them an important 
element in his regime's support base, land reform appeared 
as an essential part of implementing this strategy. 
95 The 
alacrity with which landlords joined' the party after 1972 
was ample testimony to the success of this strategy. 
Secondly, the reform was aimed at putting an end to rural 
unrest amongst tenants, share croppers and peasants by the 
promise of redistribution of land and measures to improve 
the conditions of these groups. Indeed even a partially 
implemented land reform would help the regime in enlisting 
support amongst these groups. As long as expectant tenants. 
did not become secure in the new status of owners they 
would continue to feel dependent on the ruling party for 
the fulfilment of their dreams. Thus it was assumed that 
by mobilising support from both the privileged and non- 
privileged sections of rural society, the regime would be 
assured of power for a long time to come. 
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Given these aims, it is not surprising that-the 
economic impact of the reform was limited. There was con- 
siderable justification in the charges levelled by radical 
PPP members and other left-wing parties that the reforms 
were a mere "eyewash" and "a betrayal of the toiling pea- 
sants. "96 As one PPP dissident leader alleged, land re- 
form under the auspices of the PPP could not but be a 
'fraud' given the fact that "PPP feudalists" owned the major 
portion of the resumable land. 
97 The PPP's claim to have 
ushered in a new era by ending feudalism and breaking up in- 
egüititious concentrations of landed wealth was not borne 
out in reality. 
98 Even though the PPP's reform reduced the 
ceiling on permitted landholding considerably; from 500 
acres to 150 acres of irrigated land, and from 1,000 to 
300 acres of unirrigated land - its impact was limited for 
several reasons. 
99 Firstly, landholding was tied to the 
individual rather than the family, enabling landlords to 
divide their land among family members; the law made such 
transfers to heirs legitimate. Secondly, exemptions were 
given to landowners employing modern techniques of culti- 
vation, which indicated that the regime wished to encourage 
commercialised farming. Such exemptions also demonstrated 
that the PPP regime was willing to allow concentration of 
wealth in land, provided the owners were enterprising and 
contributed to agricultural progress. 
100 Thirdly, per- 
mitting the landlord to choose the land he surrendered in- 
creased the likelihood that the resumed land would be 
'waste' (or uncultivable) thus reducing the amount of cul- 
tivable land available for redistribution. 101 This was a 
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significant loophole in view of the well-known fact 
that very large holdings often consist of much 'waste' 
land. Fourthly, since the unit used in determining the 
ceiling of land was not the acreage, but the produce index 
unit (P. I. U. ), the de facto ceilings were much higher. 
Produce index is a measurement for determining the gross 
product of various classes of land. The existing PIU cal- 
culations were made at the time of the last land settlement 
during the mid-Thirties -a period of great depression. 
The existing PIUs thus reflected the cultivation pattern, 
yield and prices of the 1930's. Moreover, during that per- 
iod most of southern Punjab and Bahawalpur and almost all 
of Sind had not come under canal irrigation. Thus, accord- 
ing to one estimate, the calculation of ceilings from PIUs 
resulted in an average operative ceiling (including the 
PIU bonus allowed for possessing a tubewell or tractor) of 
318 acres in the Punjab, 519 acres in Sind, 500 acres in 
Baluchistan and 350 acres in the NWFP. 
102 
It is evident from the above discussion of the land 
reform that the measure would, at best, have a marginal 
effect on the pattern of landownership. Additionally since 
implementation was entrusted to the land revenue adminis- 
tration which was known to be corrupt (especially at lower 
levels), 
103 this further lessened the impact of the reform. 
Concealment of land by owners emerged as a widescale prac- 
tice104 such concealment obviously involved the complicity 
of local revenue officials since they are responsible. for 
maintaining land records. Referring to the practice of 
concealment of lands, one writer suggested: 
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"The success of landlords in so con- 
cealing lands ..... can be construed... 
... as the impotence of administrative 
authority in the face of feudal power.. 
.. However, 
it is more likely that the 
landlords are enjoying official patro- 
nage in their efforts at concealment. " 105 
The PPP government claimed that as a result of the 
land reforms, 3.3 million acres of land were resumed, of 
which 1.43 million acres were distributed to 131,000 tenants. 
106 
But a committee of inquiry set up by the military regime 
after the fall of the PPP government to look into the 
effects of the land reform, held that only 1.25 million 
acres had been resumed, constituting 3.06% of the total 
cultivated area. 
107 Additionally, the committee claimed 
that the land distributed to tenants formed 1.69% of the 
total cultivated area and that the 71,249 tenants who re- 
ceived land formed 0.83% of the total small farmers in the 
country. 
108 An independent study put the amount of land 
resumed at 1.8 million acres. 
109 But even if the PPP 
government's figures are accepted as accurate, the amount 
of land resumed and redistributed did not amount to a fund- 
amental alteration of the rural structure, 
110 
nor did it 
measure up to the PPP's pre-election promise of twelve 
acres for each peasant. Indeed, the consensus of informed 
agrarian opinion is that a fraction of the rural under- 
privileged benefited in any way from the reform. 
ill Clear- 
ly then, on the basis of the land reform measure, the PPP 
regime's claim of promoting equity, was, in large part, 
not justified by the facts. 
If the redistributive impact of the reform was 
minimal, it nevertheless served a number of non-redistributive 
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objectives related to the regime's need to maintain and 
consolidate its power. 
112 In this sense, the land re- 
form performed both real and symbolic functions. By sym- 
bolic is meant that the reform stands for something which 
it does not really do. A great deal of the relation bet- 
ween governing elites and governed masses involves the 
manipulation of symbols. 
113 In the case of the PPP, the 
land reform was utilised to authenticate its claims of 
being "socialist" and dedicated to the comman man. The 
reform itself stood as a symbol of commitment and sin- 
cerity. Newspaper headlines such as 'A Jagirdar abolishes 
jagirdari in the country' were designed to demonstrate 
Bhutto's (and the elite's) commitment to the dispossessed. 
114 
Such symbolic functions were aimed at establishing legitimacy 
for the regime amongst the rural poor as well as among 
urban groups (such as the intelligentsia). In order to 
impress the latter it was emphasised that the reform stood 
for modernity and progress, for the abolition of grotesque 
feudal exploitation and backwardness. As a real political 
resource, the reform was used to set up a patronage system 
of rewards and punishments. 
115 It became the instrument 
through which Bhutto could bring into political submission 
those feudal landlords who were opposed to his regime, 
while at the same time increasing the dependency of the 
landlords as a class on his regime to protect their 
interests. For a number of landlords the'only way to save 
their land was through Bhutto's own intercession. 
116 
In 
this sense, the land reform was an essential part of 
Bhutto's patrimonial strategy in establishing a stable 
clientelist base of support in the rural countryside. With 
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the reforms hanging over the heads of landowners, the 
latter rushed to join the ranks of the PPP. 
The reform also fulfilled what one writer has 
termed a "preemptive" function. 
117 As mentioned earlier, 
on assuming power Bhutto was interested 
in stabilising the 
agrarian scene by putting an end to the seizure of 
land 
by peasants. In this sense, the land reform was utilised 
to put an end to rural dissatisfaction which was viewed as 
constituting a threat to the existence of the regime. 
In 
this context the legal provisions in the land reform aimed 
at improving the status of tenants was viewed as crucial 
to re-establishing rural peace, and as the only alternative 
to chaos and bloodshed. The 1972 regulation attempted to 
bring about changes in the traditional landlord-tenant re- 
lationship. Begar (forced labour) was abolished, while 
the eviction. of tenants was prohibited except under the 
decision of a judicial court. However, the regulations did 
not place any limit on the percentage of the total crop 
that could be charged as rent. Without rent control, the 
prohibition against evictions was meaningless, as rents 
could be raised to ruinous levels should the owner wish to 
evict the tenant. 
118 
At the same time the burden of 
bearing the costs of inputs was shifted from the tenant to 
the landlord. While this measure aimed at transferring 
income from'landlords to tenants, it is evident that this 
needed constant policing of landlord-tenant affairs -a 
taxing and virtually impossible task. Indeed, there is some 
evidence that one consequence of making input costs the 
responsibility of the landlord was an increase in tenant 
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evictions. 
119 However, despite the weaknesses mentioned 
above, the new regulations did give a sense of psychologi- 
cal security to tenants and contributed to the development 
of a new consciousness and spirit amongst them in demand- 
ing their rights. 
120 
Even if there were loopholes in the 
law which landlords could exploit to their advantage, the 
law had for the first time recognised certain rights for 
tenants. 
The PPP's economic policies in the agricultural 
sector were aimed at satisfying important elements of its 
rural constituency - the large landowners and the middle 
farmers (landholders owning between 50 and 100 acres) of the 
Punjab. Within its overall declared policy objective of 
promoting agricultural production, the regime handed out a 
series of benefits and incentives to the agrarian elite. 
121 
To begin with, the regime sought to reverse the pro-industry, 
anti-agriculture bias of the growth strategy of the Ayubian 
era. 
122 The May 1972 devaluation of the Rupee was a major 
step in the direction of altering the terms-of trade bet- 
ween the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. The 
devaluation removed at one stroke the subsidy and protection 
received by the industrialists because of the overvalued 
exchange rate. 
123 
As a result, 1973/74 marked a high point 
in the 'parity ratio', the ratio between agricultural and 
non-agricultural prices. 
124 This meant that terms of 
trade were more favourable for agriculture in 1973/74 than 
they were in any previous year in the history of the country. 125 
The improvement in agricultural terms of trade benefited 
the landed aristrocracy and rich farmers. At the same time, 
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one of the first acts of the Bhutto government was to 
raise support for agricultural commodities. 
126 Procure- 
ment prices more than doubled in the period 1972-76 for 
major crops like wheat, cotton, rice and sugar cane. 
127 
High procurement prices obviously benefit those farmers 
who produce a marketable surplus (i. e. large and middle 
landowners). In some cases, procurement prices for ag- 
ricultural commodities were increased in the face of 
falling world prices. For instance, sugar prices on the 
world market were well below the procurement price. This 
policy was in sharp contrast to the policies pursued by 
the Ayub regime, when agricultural support prices were 
often lower than equivalent world prices. The implied 
subsidy was in effect borne by (urban) consumers. That high 
farm support prices would add to the general inflationary 
situation in the country was a calculated risk that the 
government sought to undertake for three objectives: (a) en- 
courage greater production, (b) redress earlier imbalances 
created by the Ayubian policies and importantly, (c) to keep 
the growers happy. 
High support prices for agricultural commodities 
translates into an incentive for the grower only when farm 
input costs do not rise proportionately. Therefore, the 
PPP government also directed efforts towards heavily sub- 
sidising agricultural inputs such as fertiliser, seeds and 
insecticides and provided subsidised credits for tubewells 
and tractors. The findings of various field studies in 
Pakistan as in Asia in general, indicate that access to the 
required inputs have tended to favour large and rich farm 
717 
owners. 
128 Once again, the major beneficiaries of sub- 
sidies on inputs were the large and middle landowners. 
However, there is some evidence to indicate that even in 
the face of resource constraints, small farmers benefited 
from the subsidies. 
129 The extension of credit facilities 
to small farmers probably played an important part in 
this. 
130 
The expansion of rural credit was another aspect 
of the PPP's efforts to respond to demands from its rural 
constituency. In addition to the tremendous increase in 
loan grants from the Agricultural Development Bank, (from 
Rs. 80 million in 1971/72 to Rs. 533 million in 1975/76), 
the nationalised commercial banks also advanced loans to 
farmers. 
131 
The beneficiaries of the rapid rate of expan- 
sion in rural credit were the large and middle landowners. 
132 
From the overall perspective of the national economy the 
increase in rural credit constituted a transfer of resources 
to the agricultural sector. In addition to this, the govern- 
ment also increased budgetary allocations to the agricul- 
tural sector - from Rs. 390 million in 1972-73 to Rs. 1225 
million in 1975-76.133 
The. PPP regime's efforts to satisfy its rural con- 
stituency of landed interests was also reflected in the 
nationalisation in 1976, of some 4000 agro-processing units. 
As noted above, the nationalisation of these agro-process- 
ing industries was largely aimed at protecting the farmer 
from alleged exploitation by the agrarian commercial bour- 
geoisie (who owned such units) and the arhtis. As Burki 
pointed out: 
718 
"The real political and economic sig- 
nificance of this measure was that it 
resulted in the vertical integration of 
the agricultural sector in the sense that 
the landed aristocracy now had a share 
not only in producing a sizeable part of 
the output traded in the market, but also 
in the marketing, processing and distri- 
bution of this output. " 134 
By this measure, the government dislodged the medium-sized 
industrial entrepreneurs, merchants and arhtis and brought 
in the landed interests and their representatives to manage 
the nationalised agro-processing industrial units. Of the 
4000 new managers nearly three-quarters are reported to 
have had close links with the large landlords who belonged 
to the PPP. 
135 Thus this measure clearly demonstrated the 
regime's efforts to consolidate its support among the 
landed interests at the cost of alienating the agrarian 
commercial bourgeoisie. 
The PPP regime's efforts to promote the economic 
interests of the landed g: 
low rates of taxation for 
principal direct taxes on 
land tax and water rates. 
in the 1970's despite rises 
1 qa 
roups was also reflected in the 
the agricultural sector. The 
agriculture until 1977, were the 
Both taxes were-kept extremely low 
in agricultural income and infla- 
tion. `-- The regime's unwillingness to raise these taxes 
in line with agricultural income growth and inflation was 
a reflection of the extent to which the PPP was dominated 
by landed interests. When the Punjab government announced 
an upward revision of water rates in June 1975 in order to 
improve revenues, this was immediately withdrawn because 
of protests by landlords and the unwillingness of other 
137 provinces to make similar increases. In 1977, when an 
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agricultural income tax was belatedly announced by Bhutto 
on the eve of the elections in an obvious effort to re- 
furbish his regime's populist credentials, critics were 
quick to point out that the-effective implementation of 
this measure, unlikely in any event because of administra- 
tive problems, carried generous exemptions (e. g. for capi- 
tal inputs) and benefits not allowed under the old land 
revenue system. 
138 In November 1975, however, Bhutto did 
make a gesture in the direction of increased taxation of 
large farmers. Land revenue (and related taxes) was 
abolished on small farmers holding up to 12 acres of irri- 
gated land or 25 acres of unirrigated land. 
139 The relief 
provided to small farmers was barely tangible in economic 
terms since land revenue rates have remained static in 
most areas for almost fifty years. The change was largely 
symbolic as Bhutto himself later pointed out: 
"The monetary index of this reform does 
not reflect its value in social and psy- 
chological terms.... By undertaking it, 
the state has identified itself with the 
interest of the small landowner who is the 
under-privileged. " 140 
The importance to the small farmer of liberating him from 
the exactions of petty revenue officials, was perhaps more 
significant than the monetary value, as Bhutto explained. 
141 
What emerges from the above discussion of the PPP's 
agricultural policies is that while directing efforts, 
largely symbolic, at improving the conditions of the rural 
poor, i. e. promoting equity, the government tried stren- 
uously to promote the economic welfare of the rural rich 
in order to consolidate its rural constituency. High pro- 
curement prices, state subsidies on farm inputs, the 
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unspectacular progress of land reform and even in 
elimination of 'feudal' practices (begar), the failure 
to tax agricultural incomes, all represented regime sol- 
icitude for the economic interests of the rural elite, 
which included both large and middle landlords. In 
his 
study of the Bhutto period, S. J. Burki has also contended 
that the PPP regime's policies towards the agricultural 
sector were aimed at benefitting the rural elite. 
142 
However, Burki argues that within the rural elite, the 
incentive structure adopted by the Bhutto government was 
aimed at favouring -only the large landlords. Thus accord- 
ing to Burki the middle sized farmers were deliberately 
neglected by the regime's agricultural policies. This 
position is at variance with the argument we put forward 
above that both large and middle-size landowners benefitted 
from the PPP's agricultural policies. Central to Burki's 
analysis is the assumption that the two groups of land- 
owners have conflicting interests and by implication con- 
stitute separate classes. As Hamza Alavi has convincingly 
demonstrated, the interests of the large landowners and 
middle farmers are fundamentally the same. 
143 Their goals 
on all essential issues of public policy are identical, 
whether it be a question of prices of agricultural com- 
modities, taxation of agricultural incomes or of provision 
of subsidised inputs. Similarly they share an identical 
position on issues of class relationship in the rural 
society vis 
ä 
vis sharecroppers and landless labourers. 
144 
It may be true that large landowners benefitted more from 
the PPP's agricultural policies than middle-sized landowners, 
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but this is not, as Burki suggests, the result of a 
deliberate discriminatory bias in the regime's agricultural 
policies but because any incentive scheme designed to 
promote the agricultural sector is likely to reflect the 
existing pattern of social and economic stratification in 
the rural countryside. In other words, since large land- 
owners have better access to subsidised inputs and pro- 
duce a larger surplus they are likely to gain the most 
from policies designed to favour the agricultural sector. 
But this does not mean that middle landowners do not gain 
any benefits at all from say, high support prices of sub- 
sidised inputs. The extent to which large landowners de- 
rived greater benefits than the medium landowners would 
have to await the availability of more information and 
data. Burki's conclusion that middle-class farmers suf- 
fered as a consequence of the PPP's agricultural policies 
rests on assumptions that have been questioned by other 
writers notably Hamza Alavi. Moreover, Burki's contention 
is supported by insufficient evidence; he does not, for 
instance indicate the data on which he rests the central 
argument that large landlords: specialise in the production 
of certain commodities while middle-sized farmers specialise 
in the production of other commodities. 
There is little dispute over the fact that the 
PPP's land reform measure and its agricultural policies 
did not bring about any real or substantial improvnnent in 
living conditions for the large majority of the rural under- 
privileged i. e. landless peasants and tenants. But des- 
pite this, these groups in the rural countryside remained 
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relatively placid as compared to the urban underprivileged, 
(e. g. the unionised industrial labour). The contrast in 
the response of the rural and urban workers to the regime's 
actions can be explained by two factors. Firstly, urban 
industrial workers are much better organised and have, 
through strikes or hartals, the effective means of ex- 
pressing their demands. The rural underprivileged in 
Pakistan on the other hand do not have any comparable or- 
ganisational power. Secondly, the 'peasant mentality' in 
the rural countryside predisposes the rural poor, to some 
extent, to resign themselves to a fatalistic acceptance of 
their inferior social and economic position. Urban labour 
on the other hand is relatively more sophisticated poli- 
tically and has learnt - particularly in the post-1960's - 
the efficacy of political action in seeking to improve 
their socio-economic condition.. 
The PPP regime showed greater concern for the social 
sector than the Ayub regime did. In the realm of social 
policy, the government announced a series of reforms de- 
signed to establish its progressive credentials and aimed 
at rewarding important elements of its constituency. An 
ambitious education programme was launched which promised 
to bring about a wholesale restructuring of values, equal 
access to education and eradication of illiteracy. 
Nationalisation of private educational institutions in 
Punjab and Sind, undertaken in 1972, formed the most im- 
portant practical part of the reform. While this was 
utilised to convey the resolve of the government to de- 
molish the system of social privileges145 there seem to have 
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been more pragmatic, political reasons behind the move. 
146 
The demand for nationalisation was voiced by teachers in 
the private sector in the sixties147 and gained momentum 
with the activation of teachers' associations in the 1968- 
69 movement to overthrow Ayub. 
148 It was at this stage 
that Bhutto, realising the potential in the organised 
power of the teachers, adopted their slogan in an effort 
to woo this urban constituency. In the 1970 campaign, the 
PPP won the support of leading teachers' associations, 
149 
with the result that teachers were second only to urban 
labour in contributing to the PPP's urban electoral vic- 
tories. 
150 Once in power, Bhutto viewed nationalisation as 
a-convenient way to pacify and cultivate the aroused urban 
constituency of teachers. The nationalisation was indeed 
greeted with euphoria by private teachers on the assumption 
that higher pay, job security and the coveted status of 
government servants were now within their grasp. These 
benefits did accrue to them but not after a prolonged per- 
iod of concerted action by them, including strikes over for 
instance their displeasure with the initial pay scales 
assigned to them and the slow pace of nationalisation. This 
made the overall outcome less gratifying than expected. 
By nationalising education, the PPP rewarded an 
important constituency. Needless to say, private management 
(middle class entrepreneurs for the most part) dispossessed 
by nationalisation without compensation, harboured bitter 
grievances against the PPP regime. The immediate losers 
and gainers are easy enough to identify - but what of 
other costs and benefits, particularly in the light of the 
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PPP's claim that nationalisation would benefit the under- 
privileged? Since nationalised institutions were nearly 
all urban, the beneficiaries of low or abolished fees were 
the urban consumers of education - most of whom come from 
the upper and middle classes and are least in need of sub- 
sidy. Nationalisation did nothing for the rural majority 
and little for the urban poor while from the middle class, 
the general complaint voiced most frequently was concerned 
with a lowering of the quality of education after national- 
isation. 
151 It was perhaps a recognition of such critic- 
ism that government enthusiasm for nationalisation diminish- 
ed during implementation'. Two hundred and twenty-one elite 
English-medium schools were exempted in 1974 as an obvious 
concession to middle and upper middle class families. 
The regime was not able to go very far in accomp- 
lishing the laudable objectives set out in its reform 
package. For instance the government had promised to 
achieve universal enrolment of boys (aged 5-9) in primary 
school by 1979 (later changed to 1983) and of girls by 
1984 (later changed to 1987). By-1975/76,63.7% boys and 
24.6% girls were enrolled in schoolp, which was only a 
marginal improvement over the figures for 1971/72 which 
were 62.8% and 22.4% for boys and girls respectively. 
152 
Similarly, the other targets far exceeded the government's 
resources. 
153 
Although the public outlay on education in- 
creased under the Bhutto government, the amount, 1.69% of 
GNP seemed insignificant in view of the targets set154 and 
compared poorly with other Asian countries. 
155 
In the light 
of our discussion above of the type of public sector 
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investment undertaken by the Bhutto regime, as well as 
large outlays for defence (see chapter XI, Table XI. 2), it 
was hardly surprising that there was little left for the 
social sector. It appears that both a lack of political 
will and financial resources were responsible for the 
wide gap between promise and performance. 
It would be appropriate here to mention briefly the 
PPP's relationship with students, who formed the original 
support-base of the party when it was first launched. 
After assuming power, the PPP directed few efforts at con- 
solidating its support amongst students. Other than with- 
drawing the hated Ayubian university ordinance of 1968 which 
placed severe restrictions on student activity, PPP leaders 
made little direct effort to cultivate this constituency. 
In power, the PPP was concerned with curtailing... the 
political activism of students. Student groups, however, 
felt that since they had played a major role in bringing 
Bhutto to power, they would now be given the opportunity 
of exercising some influence over national decision-making 
in general and the formulation of educational policy in 
particular. 
156 
Such expectations were not met as the PPP 
regime sought to discourage student involvement in politics. 
157 
The appointment of a former student leader of Rawalpindi, 
Raja Anwar (a founder member of the PPP-), as Adviser to 
Bhutto on student affairs was considered-sufficient to give 
students a 'sense of participation'. 
158 A Pakistan Peoples 
Youth Organisation was set up in 1972. This was primarily 
a Sindhi-based organisation, and even this remained a "paper" 
organisation,. 
159 
It was not only because the PPP regime 
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failed to fulfil its election promise of giving students 
a voice in national affairs that led to student disillusion- 
ment with the regime. Student disenchantment mirrored a 
number of complex issues that seemed to centre around the 
government's inability to provide for distributive 
justice. Their disappointment lay in the actual direction 
of the PPP's 'new Pakistan', with its emergency regulations, 
restrictions-on political activities, corruption, and the 
regime's apparent divergence from its socialist goals. 
Talk of Bhutto's "betraying" students who supported him 
became a common topic of conversation as early as 1972.160 
Moreover, the government's use of repression against the 
students during the 'Bangladesh na manzoor' movement in 
December 1972 further estranged the student community. 
161 
Other sources of discontent also emerged in the regime's 
failure to expand job opportunities to absorb the growing 
number of educated unemployed. 
162 
A combination of these factors led to a signifi- 
cant erosion of support for the regime amongst the student 
community. Disappointed with the PPP, a large section of 
the students turned towards the Jamiat-e-Tuleba-e-Islam, 
the well-organised student wing of the Jamaat-e-Islaami, 
whose millenial goals held an emotionally powerful appeal, 
and which appeared to provide the only avenue available 
for meaningful political activism. This explained the 
fact that by 1974, virtually all the student unions in the 
country's universities were controlled by the Jamaat. 163 
The PPP reacted by attempting to foist 'nominated' leaders 
on the student community through electoral manipulation, 
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throwing out genuine student leaders, 
164 
Recalcitrant 
student leaders were arrested and some even found themselves 
transported to the infamous Dulai camp in Azad Kashmir where 
political prisoners were kept (since Azad Kashmir was out- 
side the jurisdiction of Pakistan's courts of law). 
165 
PPP sponsored "dummies" were set up in various colleges, which 
further divided the already divided left-leaning student 
group and failed to provide the ruling party with any real 
support. 
166 
The PPP's programme of social reform was not only 
confined to the educational sector. The regime announced 
an equally ambitious national health policy aimed at pro- 
viding adequate health facilities to all citizens by 
1980.167 As with the educational proposals, the new health 
scheme was infused with ambitious egalitarian rhetoric 
designed to win popular support. But, as with education, 
the plans fell short of targets due to a lack of firm com- 
mitment on the part of the government to implement proposed 
plans and to the lack of financial resources. 
168 However 
laudable, the government's objectives remained largely 
rhetorical statements of intent. 
But there was one practical measure - that of the 
Generic names scheme - that the regime felt could be enacted 
promptly to convey its egalitarian resolve. 
169 
The object 
of the Generic scheme that banned the import, distribution, 
sale and prescription of drugs under brand or patent names 
was primarily to make drugs available to the public at 
cheap prices. 
170 
As the scheme involved the breaking up of 
the monopoly of large pharmaceutical companies it was 
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utilised to demonstrate the regime's concern to protect 
171 
the consumer from profiteering monopolists. Predictably, 
the scheme encountered stiff resistance from the pharma- 
ceutical companies, the overwhelming majority of which were 
foreign owned. 
172 What complicated the issue was that the 
government had given constitutional guarantees to protect 
foreign investment. 
173 Government enthusiasm for the scheme 
waned in the face of active lobbying by foreign interests 
and was reflected initially in the dilution of the scheme 
through increasing the list of exempted drugs. 
174 The 
government also found that the abolition of the patent sys- 
tem led to a mushrooming of local drug manufacturing com- 
panies producing sub-standard drugs. 
175 In the absence of 
a quality control system, which the government had neither 
the financial nor the technical resources to set up, such 
a development was wrought with serious danger. The 
generic scheme was also strongly opposed by (retail) chem- 
ists and doctors since it affected these groups financially. 
176 
For chemists, (allowed to dispense drugs without prescrip- 
tion), the sale of drugs that were marketed under brand 
names yielded a larger profit than those sold under the 
generic names, since the large multi-national pharmaceutical 
companies allowed the retailer larger profit margins for 
promoting their products. The doctors, too benefitted 
from economic incentives offered by the pharmaceutical, 
companies for prescribing drugs produced by them, The new 
scheme took away the financial benefits doctors and chem- 
ists derived by dispensing or prescribing drugs under 
patent names. Resentful of this outcome, these groups 
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protested strongly to the government. 
177 As a result of 
these various factors the generic scheme was finally aban- 
doned, earning for itself the title of the "biggest exer- 
cise in reformist futility. "t178 
The regime's other social 'reforms' followed a 
now familiar pattern of loudly-trumpeted progressive poli- 
cies leading to little substantive change. A declaration 
on womens' rights was adopted by parliament in 1976 with a 
view to improving the social, legal and economic status of 
women. 
179 An Act of Parliament limited 'dowry' and placed 
restrictions on wedding expenses. 
180 Only to the extent 
that symbolic endorsement of new principles contributes to 
their implementation can a case be made for social change 
having occurred in this area. Since such progressive 
policies remained confined to the level of rhetoric and 
manipulation of symbols, they can scarcely be said to have 
brought about any social change. 
While the PPP regime sought to establish its le- 
gitimacy primarily on, the basis of its economic and social 
programme, it also utilised issues of nation-building for 
regime consolidation and legitimacy. The Sindhi regional 
issue and the use of Islamic symbols represented different 
aspects of these nation-building efforts. With respect to 
the first aspect, a social policy that backfired badly on 
the government was the decision in 1972 to make Sindhi the 
official language of Sind. 
181 
This was in contrast to the 
other three provinces of the country which had adopted 
Urdu as their provincial (official) language. The move was 
directed at rallying the Sindhi regionalists behind the 
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regime, who formed an important element in the party's 
support base in Sind. 
182 What the regime seemed to have 
under-estimated was the reaction of the Urdu-speaking 
Muhajirs (refugees from India), who constitute 45% of the 
population of Sind, concentrated largely in the urban cen- 
tres. 
183 The refugee settlers reacted violently to the 
government's decision, viewing it as part of a broader 
strategy to deprive them of their dominating position in 
the economic and commercial life of urban areas like Karachi 
and Hyderabad. 
184 Bloody riots followed between 'old' and 
'new' Sindhis. Opposition parties, like the Jamaat-e- 
Islaami and the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan which tradition- 
ally enjoyed muha it support (see chapter IX, above) 
capitalised on such grievances, to lead pro-Urdu, anti- 
government demonstrations. Bhutto intervened personally to 
resolve the crisis by offering linguistic concessions to 
non-Sindhis. 
185 Peace was restored, but at substantial 
cost for the ruling party - the PPP regime had aroused the 
intense animosity of the muhajirs, who henceforth resolved 
to support the right-wing religious parties with renewed 
vigour. 
With respect to the second aspect of nation-building, 
the PPP regime attempted to utilise religious symbols and 
issues for establishing regime-legitimacy. The PPP had 
succeeded in defeating the religious parties in the 1970 
polls largely on the basis of a secular programme, but one 
sufficiently infused with Islamic content and ideology to 
make it acceptable to a people viewed as having firm emotion- 
al attachment to Islam. Bhutto clearly understood that the 
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voter's verdict amounted to a rejection of the clergy 
but not religion. Indeed, it must have been apparent 
to Bhutto that even this rejection of the ulema was by no 
means decisive in terms of the votes cast. Although the 
PPP won the majority of seats in the Sind and Punjab, yet 
if the religious (and other conservative) parties had com- 
bined against it, their total - vote would have been 
higher than that of the PPP in the Punjab and only slightly 
lower in Sind. 
186 
As K. B. Sayeed has also suggested, the 
religious parties "had been defeated but by no means eli- 
minated. "187 Thus the PPP regime felt constrained to direct 
much of its attention to placating religious sentiment 
in the country in order to defuse the threat from the 
religious and conservative opposition. 
188 
Within a few months of coming into power, Bhutto 
allowed a record number of persons to go for 'Haj' - 
the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. 189 Subsequently in the 
1973 constitution, the PPP government provided that Islam 
would be the state religion, and the head of state a 
Muslim. Friday was declared anational holiday, various 
government organisations were established to propagate 
Islamic teaching, and Koranic studies were included into 
school curricula. In addition, the teaching of Arabic was 
encouraged and a separate ministry of religious affairs 
was established. In February 1974 Bhutto organised the 
historic Islamic Summit Conference at Lahore holding out 
this achievement as "the most significant service rendered 
by the PPP government to the cause of Islam and solidarity 
of Islamic brotherhood. 11190 This was followed by the 
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convening of an International Seerat Congress in March 
1976. Earlier in 1974, in deference to conservative Muslim 
opinion, the PPP government declared the Ahmeddiya sect 
a non-Muslim minority. 
191 This action was taken despite 
the fact that the Ahmeddiya community had supported the 
PPP in the 1970 election192 and that Bhutto himself was 
averse to religious orthodoxy of the kind that regarded 
Ahmeddiya beliefs as contrary to Islam. 
193 On the basis 
of such policies, the PPP claimed that the services it had 
rendered for Islam had no parallel in the history of 
Pakistan. 
194 The government-controlled media repeatedly 
outlined the regime's services to Islam. 
195 Even the govern- 
ment's economic reforms were justified by reference to 
religious symbols. For instance, the first sentence of 
the 1972 land reform reads thus: 
"Whereas Islam enjoins equitable distri- 
bution of wealth and economic powers and 
abhors their concentration in a few 
hands..... " 196 
Indeed, the regime went so far as to claim that 
"the goal of an Islamic renaissance (had) 
burst forth..... under a great leader.... 
....., Zulfikar.... the namesake of the 
victor of Kaibar's sword. " 197 
This catering to Islamic sentiment to establish the 
regime's legitimacy, however failed to generate support or 
goodwill amongst the Islamist opposition on the-one hand 
and only alienated the regime's secular and socialist 
supporters on the other hand. The latter interpreted such 
endeavours as indicative of a move towards the Right, mark- 
ing the victory of the conservative Islamist (as represented 
by men like Kauser Niazi) element over the socialists within 
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the party. 
198 A disillusioned, former PPP minister des- 
cribed the same phenomenon in the following manner: 
the regime "helped by its lackeys in the official 
information media took it upon them- 
selves to out-mullah the mullah....... 
they administered massive doses of con- 
servatism, obscurantism, (and) tradition- 
alism. " 199 
What the PPP's secular-minded supporters described as 
Bhutto's "Right-wing opportunism" was viewed as a "retreat 
before the mullahs" which would eventually spell the demise 
of the regime since once it began "fighting the mullahs 
on their (i. e. the religious elements) grounds, the PPP 
was bound to lose. "200 The religious opposition, on the 
other hand, as represented by parties like the Jamaat-e- 
Islaami, viewed the PPP's religious policies as political 
gimmicks which did not alter in any way the regime's major 
thrust towards ushering in what they regarded as socialism 
and secularism. 
201 The religious elite condemned Bhutto's 
policies as secular and viewed with alarm his party's 
efforts to introduce an alien ideology to replace what was 
regarded as the fundamental pillar of Pakistan - Islam. 
202 
Although this chapter has been concerned with the 
PPP regime's domestic performances and its impact on 
legitimacy, it is necessary to mention briefly the regime's 
foreign policy endeavours in terms of their domestic 
impact on the regime's legitimacy. Bhutto's foreign 
policy successes were utilised by his regime to enlist do- 
mestic public support. The Simla Agreement, the Islamic 
Summit and the Nuclear Reprocessing deal with France 
(which Bhutto referred to as the 'Islamic bomb'), undoubtedly 
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major foreign policy achievements, were publicised as 
Bhutto's greatest success in order to project his image 
as a great statesman. The government controlled media was 
utilised to build up his image first as an "undisputed, 
peerless and supreme leader" of his own country, and then 
as leader of Asia and of the Third World. 
203 
Bhutto him- 
self instructed the official information media to project 
"an image of a man associated with the people, a man of the 
people, a man devoted to the people, product of the revolu- 
tionary Third World. "" 
204 Accordingly, in the official 
press, radio and television, Bhutto's domestic and foreign 
policy achievements were extensively and regularly pro- 
jected. Although Bhutto was aware of the danger of over- 
projection, 
205 
the official media nevertheless unleashed 
a barrage of propaganda which to some extent produced an 
air of public cynicism, particularly amongst the urban 
intelligentsia similar to one that followed Ayub Khan's 
publicity efforts celebrating his achievements. 
206 
REGIME PERFORMANCE AND THE 1977 URBAN PROTEST MOVEMENT 
Clearly, the performance of the PPP government was 
closely related to the urban protest movement which followed 
the rigging of the March 1977 election and paved the way 
for military intervention. 
207 As it was pointed out in 
an earlier chapter (see chapter IX) a determined political 
opposition - united for the first time by their hatred 
for the Bhutto regime - stood resolved to oust the PPP 
government. While the issue of election rigging provided 
the opposition with an explosive instrument with which to 
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challenge the legitimacy of the Bhutto government the 
ensuing protest was too big to be explained by the 
rigging of a single election. The volume of protest 
seemed more than the heterogenous collection of opposition 
parties could command merely because of their disappoint- 
ment over the outcome of the election. 
208 
While the issue 
of the election rigging undoubtedly became the catalyst 
of the crisis, there was sufficient indication of wide- 
spread disaffection with the regime before the election 
to suggest that the seeds of the crisis were sown much 
earlier. Indeed, the roots of the rebellion lay in a wide 
array of grievances arising from the performance of the 
PPP regime in the preceding five and half years. The PPP's 
economic and social policies gave rise to considerable 
social and economic discontent in urban areas which mani- 
fested itself both in the campaign period before the 
election and in the protest movement that followed subse- 
quently. Such discontent suggested that many aspects of 
the PPP regime's policies hindered its efforts to establish 
its legitimacy. 
Much of the discontent can be traced to the nature 
of the PPP's economic and social policies. As mentioned 
earlier, the PPP faced severe policy dilemmas in seeking 
to reconcile the demands of its divergent constituent 
elements. It had to respond to demands for both change 
and preservation of the status quo. On the other hand, it 
had somehow to reconcile the conflicting demands of its 
rural and urban constituencies. In the event, the uneasy 
balance that the regime achieved failed to produce economic 
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and social equilibrium and hampered the regime's efforts 
to establish legitimacy. The explanation for this lies 
in a number of factors. Of these the major factor was 
the content of its economic reforms. Its nationalisation 
measures termed socialistic, however limited, frightened 
and alienated the industrialist)merchant and trading 
community. However hard the PPP regime tried subsequently 
to reassure those affected that it favoured a mixed econ- 
omy and not complete socialisation, its use of socialist 
rhetoric suggested otherwise to them. At the same time 
the nationalisation measures clearly fell short of the 
expectations of the PPP's leftist leaders and supporters. 
Thus the nationalisation measures not only alienated the 
industrialists and those dispossessed and affected by the 
measure5(which as we saw earlier included large sections 
of the urban middle class, medium and small industrial 
entrepreneurs, merchants, traders and the arhtis of the 
mandi towns) but its socialist supporters as well. The 
same applied to other 'reforms'. The labour reforms for 
instance provoked hostile reactions both from those who 
argued that the reforms went too far (the industrialists 
and trading community) and from those who felt they did 
not go far enough (e. g. militant union leaders, the party's 
left-wing). Thus the nature of the regime's reforms, para- 
doxically, alienated both right-wing, conservative, 
propertied elements and. disillusioned those whom the re- 
forms were ostensibly designed to benefit, and served to 
erode the regime's legitimacy amongst such groups. 
Another factor behind economic discontent was the 
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kind of selectivity the regime showed in approaching the 
demands of social groups. As noted earlier, while the 
regime sought strenuously to reward its rural constituency 
of landed interests, the demands of its urban constituency 
(groups like the low-income urban consumer, labour, 
students) were only partially fulfilled or not fulfilled 
at all. In the context of disastrous inflation fed by the 
oil crisis of 1973 and a succession of natural disasters, 
a growing sense of discomfort was evident among urban groups 
- the lower middle class of minor clerks and officials, 
salaried professionals, students, and urban labour that had 
supported Bhutto and the PPP in 1970. Rising prices, unemp- 
loyment and corruption served to replace the euphoria of 
the PPP's accession to power with disillusionment amongst 
such urban groups and seriously eroded the PPP's legitimacy 
amongst them. In this dynamic, by keeping rural groups 
relatively satisfied, the regime of course commanded the 
numerical majority. But both the regime's strength and 
vulnerability are suggested by that maxim of Pakistani 
politics: 
"The cities may break governments but it 
is the countryside that makes them. " 
By trading the cities for the countryside in its economic 
policies, the regime handed its opponents a chance to 
mobilise urban unrest against it, 
209 
To the economic factor were added other factors 
which were also important in turning some of the urban 
classes against the Bhutto regime. The educated middle 
class resented the dictatorial tendencies of the regime and 
its brutal suppression of political opponents. Different 
I 
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groups harboured specific grievances against the PPP 
regime. Lawyers were concerned with the suppression of 
civil liberties; journalists with the curbs imposed on the 
press, students with the lack of job opportunities and the 
failure of the government to live up to its other promises. 
To such grievances was added the religious factor, with 
the Islamic fundamentalists opposed to the regime on 
account of its secular and socialist activities. In some 
instances, religious fervour combined with ethnic dis- 
content - as in the case of the muhajirs to produce a 
strong anti-PPP sentiment. In other instances, religious 
sentiment combined with ethnic identity and economic dis- 
content - as in the case of the predominantly East Punjabi 
muhajir trading community in Punjabi cities like Multan, 
Lahore and Faisalabad - to produce antagonism towards the 
PPP government. 
In the urban protest movement of March-June 1977, 
different urban groups for different reasons, banded 
together to express their opposition to the Bhutto regime. 
Journalists, orthodox mullahs, lawyers, petty shopkeepers, 
merchants, traders, arhtis, students, women, a section of 
industrial labour (the pro-Jamaat trade unionists) and 
the urban unemployed, participated in a two-and-a-half 
month campaign challenging the legitimacy of the Bhutto 
regime. Leadership of the movement was assumed by the 
Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), a coalition of religious/ 
conservative and regional parties. This had led some 
observers to characterise the challenge posed to the 
Bhutto government as a conservative backlash against a 
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moderately reformist, progressive government. 
210 This 
view has some validity for the campaign of street agi- 
tation against the Bhutto regime drew much of its sus- 
tenance from the merchant and trading community and reli- 
gious and conservative political groups. (See chapter 
IX, above). The PNA's promises of denationalisation un- 
doubtedly pleased disaffected industrialists and the 
business community. 
211 But it is equally important to re- 
cognise that the 1977 crisis of legitimacy for the Bhutto 
regime also reflected the disillusionment amongst those 
who had looked towards the PPP to bring about substantive 
social change, to redeem its promise of 'Roti, Kapara our 
Makaan' (food, clothing and shelter). Any interpretation 
of the fall of the Bhutto regime must also take into account 
the widespread disillusionment amongst groups such as 
industrial labour and urban professionals with the pace of 
change under the Bhutto government. In his account of the 
1977 urban protest movement, K. B. Sayeed mentions the 
fact that labour did not play a significant role in the 
anti-Bhutto campaign. 
212 
But he fails to mention that if as 
a group labour did not participate against Bhutto, neither 
did it rally its support in favour of the regime. In other 
words, if organised labour (like the katchi-abadi (slum) 
dwellers) remained for the most part quiescent spectators 
during the urban protests, this equally well demonstrated 
their sense of disappointment with the regime. 
213 
Secondly, 
the fact that the movement encompassed (secular) regional 
groups (from the Frontier and Baluchistan) also suggests 
that the protest cannot be viewed as merely a conservative 
740 
backlash. The protest seemed to have had a broader 
nature than. that suggested by those who have viewed it as 
merely a revival of Islamic fundamentalism, 
214 
or as an 
act of self-preservation on the part of the propertied 
classes under the garb of Islam, 
215 
or as a challenge posed 
by a powerful middle class using Islamic symbols. 
216 
Our 
analysis suggests that a variety of grievances lay behind 
the urban protest, many of which stemmed from the PPP: 
government's own contradictory policies, its failures and 
its ommissions. 
To conclude, it is evident that several aspects of 
the PPP regime's economic and social policies hindered its 
efforts to establish legitimacy amongst a wide variety of 
urban social groups. This happened because in some in- 
stances the regime failed to meet the expectations of 
certain groups (e. g. middle-class professionals, unionised 
labour), while in other instances because its policies 
threatened or damaged the economic (e. g. industrialist, 
trading and merchant community), social (e. g. muhajir) or 
religious interests (e. g. sections of the ulema) of-other 
groups. This in fact meant that the PPP regime's legitimacy 
was seriously eroded amongst wide sections of the urban 
public during its five and half years of rule. Thus, the 
urban protest movement of 1977 can be viewed and explained 
against this background of the regime's inability to es- 
tablish its legitimacy. 
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CONCLUSION 
This final chapter of the study sets out some 
conclusions and perspectives about Bhutto and the PPP and 
their place in the political development of Pakistan. The 
purpose here is not to summarise all the assessments made 
in the preceding chapters, but to emphasise the major themes 
of the study with a view to providing some comparative 
perspectives on political development as illustrated from 
Pakistan's experience in the Bhutto period. As Ralph 
Braibanti has pointed out there is in the literature on 
political development, a failure to relate the experience 
of Pakistan not only to concept-building but even to text- 
book or casebook exegesis (in the sense of using Pakistan's 
experience to either corroborate or disprove generalis- 
ations in text books concerned with political development 
theory), whereas the recent history of the country affords 
rich opportunities for understanding the processes of 
political development. 
1 The assessments made below can 
therefore be regarded as an attempt to fill this vacuum in 
scholarship on Pakistan in the field of political develop- 
ment. 
Structuring authority in the now states elicited 
a variety of responses throughout the Third World. The 
general tendency in the early literature studying such 
phenomena was to emphasise ideology, charisma and political 
parties (usually the nationalist-movement parties of inde- 
pendence) as the means for achieving political consolidation. 
2 
Such emphasis followed not only from the fact that the 
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leaders of these states were themselves emphasising ideo- 
logy, political parties, and their own personal qualities, 
but also because such phenomena were in a sense, the most 
visible to the western eye. 
Recent events, however, demonstrated the limited 
utility of these conceptualisations in communicating the 
problems involved in achieving political consolidation. 
Charisma, where it existed, in several instances proved 
short-lived, and its effectiveness in securing any degree 
of solidarity, as David Apter has noted in his revised 
study of Ghana, was highly questionable, 
3 Moreover there 
was a growing recognition in the literature on new states 
that the emphasis often placed on charismatic leadership in 
earlier studies, may, in fact be singling out patrimonial 
leaders instead. 
4 Ideology was similarly limited in its 
conceptual ability to encompass the problem of political 
consolidation in its full scope. As Henry Bienen, for 
instance, has stated: 
"It is false to assume that explicit idoo- 
logies... have any general relevance; they 
may be espoused by only a select few who 
themselves may be removed from the contra 
of power within the party. The aspiration 
of certain elites to transform their sociot. " ies... may or may not be significant. " 5 
Nor has the study of political parties in now states been 
too successful in clarifying the process of political con- 
solidation. Early studies of political parties in the new 
states tended to over-emphasise the role of the party in the 
consolidation and modernisation process, by frequently mis- 
taking the organisational aspirations of the political el- 
ites for reality and positing a cohesion that simply was 
not there. 
6 
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Such conceptual inadequacies led to a growing 
tendency in the recent literature on developing societies 
to describe the political regimes of a large part of these 
societies in terms which were usually used to describe 
various traditional political systems. G. Roth and 
A. Zolberg were amongst the first scholars to use the term 
'patrimonial' in the context - Zolberg applying it to 
many of the African states while G. Roth advocated a wider 
connotation to the term.? They were followed in this. by 
others, most notably, S. N. Eisenstadt and G. iieeger. 
8 
The use of the term 'patrimonial' was not merely descrip- 
tive, but constituted a critical attitude to some of the 
basic assumptions of the early studies of modernisation 
and political development. It emphasised the inadequacy 
of these assumptions by indicating (1) that many of these 
societies and states did not develop in the direction of 
some modern nation-states (either of the western liberal 
variety or communist type regimes); (2) that these regimes 
did not necessarily constitute a 'transitory' passing phase 
towards an inevitable path to one type of modernity; 
(3) by indicating that there was nonetheless some internal 
'logic' in their development and (4) by emphasising that 
part at least of this logic or pattern could be derived 
from some aspects of the traditions of these societies 
and understood in terms of these aspects (i. e. in terms 
of their unique configurations). 
This study has attempted to apply the patrimonial 
model to Bhutto's political system. As a heuristic tool, 
the concept has enabled us to explain and relato a wide 
r 
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range of phenomena, such as personalism, factionalism and 
patronage practices, which have thus far received relative- 
ly little attention from writers on Pakistani politics. 
Bhutto's patrimonialism has to be viewed against the 
background of the country's historical tradition and 
related to its culture and social structure. 
One dominant leader and the personal approach to 
governance has been the country's political tradition ever 
since its inception. This phenomenon of a dominating figure, 
however, is not necessarily synonymous with charismatic 
authority. Many of Pakistan's leaders (such as Liaqat and 
Ayub) did not have the magic of personal charisma for many 
groups in society, nor did any of the leaders have the 
kind of impersonal, institutional charisma that Edward Shils 
has stressed as a basic requirement for organisational 
stability. 
9 Indeed, the political situation in Pakistan 
has been fluid because leadership has largely been merely 
personal and lacking in both charismatic qualities, i. e. 
personal as well as office charisma. While the other 
outstanding and recurring feature of Pakistani politics - 
its praetorian tradition - is considered later, it is impor- 
tant here to note the relationship between this tradition 
and the tradition of a dominating personality. Both de- 
rive, in part from the colonial Viceregal legacy as we 
shall see presently, and appear to have strengthened and 
reinforced the other. For example, as the personal approach 
to governance has fostered neither national community nor 
institutionalisation of political forms or procedure, it 
has served to make the country vulnerable to practorianism, 
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both in the narrow sense of military intervention in 
politics, and in the broader sense of the lack of effect- 
ive political institutions capable of mediating group 
conflict. 
The "Great Leader" syndrome can be related to 
aspects of Pakistan's historical and cultural legacy and 
its social structure. With respect to the historical 
legacy, it can be traced to the Viceregal pattern of 
authority that has been the most persistent aspect of the 
country's colonial heritage. Many essential elements of 
the Viceregal heritage can be discerned in the Pakistani 
polity; in the concentration of power in a strong leader 
(from Jinnah through to Bhutto and Zia), in the primacy of 
personality over institutionalised governance - indeed in 
the ultimate dependence of the political system on a 
glorified leader. Clearly, then, the Viceregal legacy is 
an important factor in giving rise to the 'Great Leader' 
phenomena. Aspects of the Viceregal tradition, specifically 
the prominence accorded to "steel frame" institutions, the 
military and the civil service, has also given rise to the 
country's tendency towards practorianism. 
Aspects of the country's culture can also be 
related to the 'Great Leader' phenomenon. The Islamic 
ethos in the country's culture to some extent reinforcestho 
tendency towards the concentration of power in one dominant 
leader. Although Quranic doctrine explicitly prohibits- 
glorification of leaders, from the beginning, Islam, as a 
political system has placed one man at the head of the state 
organisation. In the early history of Islam, he was 
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elevated by a form of election, but since the Caliph was 
virtually irremovable, it constituted elective monarchy 
rather than democracy. Soon, the element of election was 
superseded by hereditary succession. Thus the weight of 
Islamic tradition is on the side of the concentration of 
authority in the hands of one man. 
The Pakistani traditional social structure also 
reinforces the tendency towards strong, personalised leader- 
ship. While the social structure obviously differs from 
province to province, in general, the Pakistani social 
order is for the large part a paternalistic one resting on 
various forms of customary leadership such as tribal chiefs, 
powerful landlords, biradari notables, heads of gentry 
lineages, and pirs (spiritual guides). Political leader- 
ship, then partakes of such feudal and tribal paternalism. 
It is important to note the differing impact of British 
colonial rule on the social structure in areas that com- 
prised Pakistan as compared to those that formed part of 
independent India. In the areas that comprised Pakistan, 
the British interfered less with traditional -tribal or 
feudal - privileges than elsewhere in India. Indeed, in 
the case of Punjab, the conservative British administrators 
of the "Punjab school" with an eye to maintaining the pres- 
tige of British authority in what was regarded as a strate- 
gic zone, operated by co-opting the "natural loaders" of 
the people. 
10 
This not only meant the strengthening of 
traditional, feudal and tribal entities, but also retarded 
the development of those nascent social classes (e. g. urban 
middle class) which in parts of India (e. g. Bombay, Madras, 
ý.,, ý, _ 
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United Provinces) were to demand representative institu- 
tions. This in fact helps, to some extent, to explain'the 
striking differences in the political experiences between 
post-independence India and Pakistan. 
These aspects of Pakistan's historical and cultural 
legacy and social structure have combined to make the 
phenomenon of a dominating personality a recurring one in 
the country's political history. Viewed from this pers- 
pective, Bhutto's patrimonial strategy for consolidating 
political power was in keeping with several aspects of the 
country's historical tradition. Indeed, in many important 
respects, Bhutto's patrimonial system can be viewed as an ad- 
aptation of the Viceregal model. Patrimonial features such 
as the personalisation and concentration of power, the 
manipulation of clientele support from rural landed groups, 
the personalised supervision over the bureaucracy and 
military are essentially thope that we identified with the 
Viceregal pattern of rule. The Viceregal disdain for the 
notion of popular sovereignity was reflected in Bhutto's 
reluctance to develop representative institutions - oven 
his own PPP as an instrument of popular participation (see 
below). 
Our depiction of Bhutto's patrimonial system as an ad- 
aptation of the Viceregal approach to governing highlights 
one important element in the country's historical tradition 
in shaping the contours of political development. This- 
suggests that modernising societies (as illustrated from. 
Pakistan's experience in the Bhutto period) do not necess- 
arily travel towards an inevitable path to one type of 
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modernity, but tend to develop patterns which can 
better be explained by reference to aspects of the society's 
historical tradition. 
If the patrimonial model is viewed as a particular 
method of coping with political change, this raises the 
question of the effectiveness of such a method, and in 
particular whether this method aids or retards the politi- 
cal development process, the key elements of which are 
defined as involving a greater participation of the citi- 
zenry in the political system, greater institutionalisation 
of political procedures and organisations and an increase 
in the capacity of the political system to cope with popu- 
lar demands and a changing environment. While taking 
cognizance of the various problems inherent in such a con- 
ceptualisation (particularly the implication of unilinear 
political growth ethnocentrically premised on western models) 
we nonetheless regard this to have a heuristic value to 
aid our understanding of Pakistan's experience under Bhutto. 
We will deal first with the problem of stability, a prob- 
lem of what can be viewed as "predevelopment", the pro- 
condition, as it were, of political development. 
The evidence from other studies of modern patri- 
monial systems shows that the limited durability of parti- 
mony-building and the continued dearth of material incen- 
tive aggravates the problem of political instability in 
such systems. 
11 A common theme in this literature is the 
precariousness of the patrimonial method for the purpose 
of ensuring regime stability. 
12 Our assessments of 
Pakistan's experience under Bhutto's patrimonially dominated 
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system appear to confirm this hypothesis, by 
depicting 
the serious difficulties as well as the limited durability 
of patrimony building for regime stability. The pre- 
cariousness and the transient sense of 
loyalty that is 
called forth in such a system, was clearly evident 
in the 
relative ease with which the military toppled 
Bhutto in 
1977. 
Other than the problem of stability, it is important 
to emphasise that the patrimonial strategy followed by 
Bhutto militated against the establishment of a durable 
set of political procedures and behaviour -a process re- 
ferred to as institutionalisation that is widely regarded 
as an essential attribute of political development. 
13 If 
we accept that institutionalisation, understood in the sense 
that Samuel Huntiniton has characterised the process 
14 
as stable, valued recurring patterns of behaviour, is a 
key indicator of political development, then Bhutto's 
strategy can be viewed as deleterious for the process of 
political development. The requisites for effective patri- 
monial rule work against the requisites for institutional- 
isation. Patrimonial authority is the antithesis of 
institutional: *authority,, and patrimonial leaders defeat 
themselves if they attempt to create stable institutions. 
Maintenance of control by a patrimonial leader requires the 
systematic inculcation of unpredictability in the political 
system, the constant shuffling of leiutonants and the support 
of the supremacy of different role occupants over time - 
tactics which hinder the development of stabilised pro- 
cedures and, organisation. In this sense, the personalism 
, _ý 
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that permeated Bhutto's political system yielded a pol- 
itical process that was not simply uninstitutionalised 
but in fact hostile to institutionalisation. 
These perspectives help to explain why Bhutto 
failed (or was unwilling) to develop the PPP into an in- 
stitutionalised party of the type associated with 'modern' 
political systems. Although Bhutto founded the PPP as an 
instrument to help him gain power, he never attempted to 
organise it into a discrete structure. Indeed, he placed 
greater reliance on personalised leadership and his genius 
for political manoeuvre than on party organisation. 
Bhutto's personalised and centralised control over 
the party became more visible after the assumption of 
power, but from the very beginning the PPP was always a 
party of personal loyalty to Bhutto. Bhutto's broad coal- 
ition strategy for challenging the Ayub regime and then 
contesting the 1970 elections led him to maintain the PPP 
as a loose structure, dominated by him. This meant that 
in its early years, the PPP was more a movement than a 
'party' with a well-structured organisation. In terms of 
its support base, the party from the beginning encompassed 
both 'traditional' and 'modern' groups. Thus the features 
that later dominated the PPP in power, were evident in the 
formative phase - Bhutto's dominance, the consequent weak 
organisational nature, the tension between disparate ole- 
ments and the attempt to combine tratiUional 'patron' party 
type features with those of the modern 'mass' party type. 
The party's 'patron' features were reflected in Bhutto's 
links with landed notables (initially in Sind) operating 
-1 -41 
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through customary sources of authority. But the PPP 
also came to represent the thrust of the newly politicised 
mass sectors in urban Pakistan and rural Punjab. This 
was evident in the composition of the social groups that 
formed an important element of the party's support base 
(e. g. urban labour, middle class professionals, and the 
non-privileged rural groups in the Punjabi countryside), 
and in the party's demand for a radical restructuring of 
Pakistani society. It was evident too in the "mass" 
character of the PPP vote in urban Pakistan and rural Punjab 
(where the PPP made a major dent in the traditional feudal 
structure of the province). Indeed, by virtue of Bhutto 
and the PPP's role as representatives of these newer social 
groups in the events of 1968/69-70, he and his party can 
be credited with ushering in the mass public (at least 
in the Punjab) into the political arena, a development re- 
ferred to by P. E. Jones as leading to the emergence of a 
"participant society., 
15 This can be viewed as representing 
a structural change in Pakistani politics in so far as the 
Punjab was concerned, holding out the prospect of building 
a mass-based political party and implanting the beginnings 
of a tradition of party government. 
The "mass", "populist" aspect of Bhutto and PPP's 
rule in the period 1968/69-70 opened up the possibility of 
a major system-idc. change in Pakistan. At the same time, 
the events of 1971 - resulting in the ultimate break up 
of the country - placed Bhutto and his party at a relative- 
ly advantageous position vis a vis the two power groups 
that wielded effective political authority in the pro-1971 
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period, the military and the civilian bureaucracy. This 
gave Bhutto a leverage to refashion a political system, 
denied in general to his predecessors, an opportunity to 
break away from one aspect of the Viceregal tradition, 
i. e. the dominance of the military-civilian bureaucratic 
complex in the process of governance. Here, then, was the 
possibility of surmounting at least one important element 
of the colonial heritage. 
Bhutto's choice of a patrimonial strategy for 
political consolidation had a number of repercussions for 
the development of the PPP. The dominance of a strong 
leader clearly inhibited the development of the PPP into 
an institutionalised group possessing organisational via- 
bility and autonomy. The requirements of a patrimonial 
strategy - as reflected in Bhutto's policy of manipulation 
of factional conflict - produced deleterious consequences 
for the PPP in terms of party cohesiveness and unity. At 
the same time, Bhutto chose not to build on what emerged 
as a potential mass base in the Punjab, preferring instead 
to adopt a policy of patrimonial cooption of traditional 
power holders in all four provinces. This was in part, 
because the sources of his party's strength were different 
in different provinces, with the PPP having a 'mass' base 
largely only in the Punjab. But more importantly, this 
was a function of Bhutto's personality, since he was not 
inclined towards organising the kind of mass base that. 
could impose constraints on his personal authority, or even 
threaten his dominant position. In the Punjab specifically, 
this meant a decisive shift away from the party's "mass" 
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constituency towards a greater reliance on traditional 
rural notables. As the PPP increasingly became a party 
of notables, its 'patron' features came to predominate 
over its 'mass' party characteristics. The PPP in power 
emerged as a patrimonial-clientele party, with Bhutto dis- 
pensing patronage to cement the party organisation. In 
such a party, the loyalty that was called forth was loyal- 
ty to the leader rather than organisational loyalty. This 
factor together with the high incidence of non-machine -- 
patronage (i. e. the use of patronage for self-enrichment) 
in the PPP, meant that such patronage did not aid the 
organisational development of the party. 
The PPP's weak organisational nature seriously 
affected its role as a governing party in the sense of 
acting as a two-way channel of communication between the 
rulers and the ruled. The PPP's organisational debility 
as a consequence of Bhutto's patrimonial strategy, meant 
that the party, as a middle level organisation linking 
government and citizenry, was unable to perform the crucial 
functions of communicating political demands in the politi- 
cal system and meaningfully participating in the process 
of governmental policy formulation. This urged Bhutto into 
greater reliance on the bureaucracy, constituting a rever- 
sion to the Viceregal practices of his predecessors. Thus 
Bhutto's policies were an important factor in the PPP's 
failure to emerge as an integral and essential part of . 
the 
political system. 
It is evident from the discussion above that 
Bhutto made little attempt to develop the PPP into a 
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participatory instrument. Indeed, the Bhutto regime 
was increasingly characterised by the severe restrict- 
ions it placed on political participation. This was re- 
flected in the use of coercion against opposition parties, 
as indeed against dissidents within the PPP itself. It 
was reflected also in the attempts to curtail the high 
degree of mobilisation achieved in the period 1968/69-71 
by various (mass sector) groups, such as urban labour and 
students. These policies aimed at discouraging partici- 
pation were related to Bhutto's patrimonial strategy. And 
they meant that Bhutto continued the Viceregal tradition of 
giving supremacy to the executive over representative insti- 
tutions. The political system built by Bhutto continued 
many aspects of the Viceregal tradition: characterised by 
a powerful and autocratic central figure, a disregard for 
the practices and institutions of representative politics 
and the use of executive power to curtail political part- 
icipation. It appeared paradoxical that Bhutto, as the only 
leader in Pakistani history who can in largo part be 
credited with involving (sections of) the mass populace 
in national politics whilst in opposition, should have 
reverted. to the Viceregal practices of his predecessors 
once he assumed power. This paradox, however, can easily 
be explained if we view Bhutto as preeminently a power 
craftsman, moving according to his own conception of what 
was most advantageous for winning and maintaining power; 
Thus just as it was in his interest when he was in quest 
for power to mobilise the mass sectors, when he attained 
power, he perceived that it was in his interest to seek to 
control and limit participation. 
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Participation, understood as the involvement of 
the mass populace (as contributory citizens rather than 
subjects) in political life, is widely regarded as an 
important characteristic of political development. In the 
literature this attribute has been variously referred to 
as participant society, 
16 
politicisation, 
17 
power sharing, 
18 
participation explosion, 
19 
power diffusion, 
20 
and channelment 
of mass society. 
21 If we regard participation as an 
important attribute of political development, then clearly 
the Bhutto regime's repressive limitations on participation 
can be viewed as de-developmental. The consequences of 
such a policy were dramatically illustrated in the events 
that emerged in the aftermath of the 1977 election, when 
political demands emanating from different sections of the 
(urban) citizenry were expressed violently in the streets 
of Pakistan. The intensity and manner of the protest can 
in part be related to the Bhutto regime's unwillingness to 
provide participatory channels for political expression. 
Closely related to the regime's use of suppression 
to curb political activity was its inability to resolvo tho 
two contentious issues that have dogged successive regimes 
since the inception of Pakistan: the issue of regionalism 
and the role of Islam in the state and society. Both these 
issues can be viewed as different dimensions of a single 
problem: Pakistan's continued search for a positive 
national identity. The quest for forging a national iden- 
tity proved as elusive during the Bhutto period as it had 
under previous regimes. With respect to the provincial/ 
ethnic problem, the Bhutto regime, while displaying greater 
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sensitivity to the problem than previous regimes, in- 
creasingly sought to contain rather than resolve it. This 
was, at best, a temporary answer but fraught with serious 
consequences, as the regime itself discovered when it had 
ultimately to resort to force (the military) to control 
ethnic discontent in Baluchistan in the style of pre- 
decessor regimes. With respect to the issue of the role 
Islam should play in the state and society, the Bhutto 
regime similarly proferred temporary answers through 
manipulation of Islamic symbols aimed at allying religious 
sentiment rather than coming to terms with the problem 
itself. The Bhutto regime failed to avail itself of the 
possibility of harnessing Islam in a systematic way to a 
programme of social change -a potent iality'inherent in 
the PPP's slogan of Islamic socialism. But Islamic social- 
ism remained more a slogan, rather than a systematic philo- 
sophy that could have provided a positive, cQnstructivo 
and unifying concept for forging a national identity. 
Thus the Bhutto regime contributed little that can be deem- 
ed as significant towards the evolution of a national con- 
sensus on the nature and purpose of the Pakistani polity. 
In the face of these assessments, what are the pros- 
pects for Pakistan's political future? Pakistan's primary di- 
lemma lies in the lack of community and of effective poli- 
tical-institutions to support such a community -a con- 
dition that was earlier referred to as praetorian. 
Military rule is but one manifestation of this general 
phenomenon. The fact that the military assumed power so 
easily in 1977 and has maintained it since is not so much 
a reflection of its use of naked force; but rather of 
769 
Pakistan's praetorian tradition in the wider sense of 
the term. As indicated earlier, such praetorianism is 
closely related to the colonial Viceregal heritage. 
Before independence the bureaucracy and the military were 
the chief instruments of colonial power. Therefore Pakistan 
inherited powerfully organised bureaucratic and military 
structures, and relatively weak political institutions. 
Thus the sources of Pakistan's praetorianism lie,, in large 
part, in its colonial legacy. At the same time, this 
praetorian tradition was strengthened and reinforced by 
the country's tendency towards dependence on a single, 
strong leader which itself too was, in part, a product of 
the Viceregal tradition. 
As Pakistan's history shows the praetorian tra- 
dition has produced what appears to be a recurring cycle 
of oppression, divisiveness and turmoil. This conveys a 
somewhat pessimistic view of the future: the probable 
continuation- of this tragic tradition making instability 
a chronic rather than a transitory ailment. There are no 
simple answers to the question of how Pakistan can over- 
come its proneness to praetorianism. The tradition is cer- 
tainly formidable, but it is not insurmountable. As 
Morris-Jones has suggested, "no 'objective' variable has 
an importance comparable to one of a more subjective kind"22; 
the degree of serious commitment on the part of the leader- 
ship towards, we may add, creating the common interests 
and the integrating institutions necessary to transform 
a praetorian society into a civic polity. To make this 
transformation certainly requires the scarcest commodity 
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in the Third World (as indeed the rest of the world for 
that matter): a truly extraordinary act of political 
will on the part of leadership. 
But while scarce, this 
quality is never absent in any society. 
In the light of recent events in Pakistan as 
elsewhere in the Third World two very different outcomes 
can be suggested as far as Pakistan's political future is 
concerned. First, as the resurgence of Islam throughout 
the Muslim world, particularly in neighbouring Iran, indi- 
cates, Pakistan may seek its national identity as well as 
an institutional infrastructure through a reassertion of 
Islamic values. This is not merely to say that Islam will 
continue to play an important role in the search for nation- 
al community, but that it is possible that the country's 
Islamic roots will be viewed as the sole remedy for the 
disorder, insecurity and corruption that seem to have be- 
come endemic in the country, regardless of the typo of 
regime (whether military or civilian) in power. This may 
lead to an Islamic radicalism, of a substantially differ- 
ent variety than that espoused by the traditionalist ulema, 
(since this has largely been directed towards the support 
of conservative social issues or interests) with a 
pronounced emphasis on egalitarianism, producing an ex- 
plosive substance that opens up to its audience prospects 
of material prosperity and earthly happiness. Such 
Islamic radicalism may reject western constitutionalism 
and representative government, or may involve efforts to 
establish that this form of rule is not only consonant with 
Islam, but that Islam actually requires this kind of 
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political organisation. 
The other possible outcome could be a more 
genuine experimentation with western-adapted (perhaps 
Islamicised)forms of democracy and party politics for 
which there are many advocates amongst the growing middle 
class in Pakistan. Social conditions - greater urban- 
isation, industrialisation, spread of media sources, the 
diffusion of technology, higher literacy - are more con- 
ducive now than ever before, for the functioning of rep- 
resentative institutions. Such social mobilisation, it 
should be remembered, continues regardless of the political 
nature of any regime at one point in time (whether more or 
less domocratic or authoritarian). 
Another possibility - that of a revolutionary 
communist uprising - has not been predicated here, since in 
the light of presently available evidence on the contem- 
porary political situation in Pakistan, this does not 
appear as a`likely outcome in the immediate or near future. 
A communist seizure of power requires, at the least, a 
strong Marxist-Leninist party; but while there are revol- 
utionary groups in the country (for example the Miazdoor- 
Kissan Party and fragments of the former Communist Party 
of Pakistan), there is little evidence to indicate the 
presence of an organised revolutionary party that could 
undertake to mobilise either the industrial proletariat or 
the peasantry. In neighbouring Muslim Afghanistan, a Marxist 
regime did seize power in April 1978, but such a takeover 
was led by a revolutionary party, the Democratic Party 
of the Masses known as the Khalq, that had existed since 
1965 (supported and later replaced in 1980 by the Parcham 
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Party with Soviet armed help). Pakistan has no compar- 
able organisation. In addition the Marxist regime in 
Afghanistan assumed power through staging a military coup 
d'etat, a development made possible by the systematic 
infiltration of the armed forces over a period of time 
and of course, Soviet backing. Again the evidence from 
Pakistan indicates little to suggest a comparable develop- 
ment. In other words there is little indication of in- 
filtration of the Pakistan army by revolutionary Marxist 
cadres. Neither is there any evidence of an attempt to 
organise a Chinese-style Red Army capable of challenging 
the conventional army and seizing state power. Therefore, 
while we do not seek to take issue with writers who have 
attributed the Pakistani masses with revolutionary poten- 
tial, 
23 for reasons given above, such a potential is not 
likely to be realised in the near future. 
The threat to Pakistan's future lies in the con- 
tinuation of its praetorian tradition with all that this 
involves for political stability and the danger of region- 
al disintegration in a country where centrifugal pressures 
and regional animosities have in the past been endemic. 
This means that the experiment in an alternative model, 
whatever its precise form, and even if imperfect, is 
worthy of urgent effort by the leaders of Pakistan. 
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Party with Soviet armed help). Pakistan has no compar- 
able organisation. In addition the Marxist regime in 
Afghanistan assumed power through staging a military coup 
d'etat, a development made possible by the systematic 
infiltration of the armed forces over a period of time 
and of course, Soviet backing. Again the evidence from 
Pakistan indicates little to suggest a comparable develop- 
ment. In other words there is little indication of in- 
filtration of the Pakistan army by revolutionary Marxist 
cadres. Neither is there any evidence of an attempt to 
organise a Chinese-style Red Army capable of challenging 
the conventional army and seizing state power. Therefore, 
while we do not seek to take issue with writers who have 
attributed the Pakistani masses with revolutionary poten- 
tial, 
23 for reasons given above, such a potential is not 
likely to be realised in the near future. 
The threat to Pakistan's future lies in the con- 
tinuation of its praetorian tradition with all that this 
involves for political stability and the danger of region- 
al disintegration in a country where centrifugal pressures 
and regional animosities have in the past been endemic. 
This means that the experiment in an alternative model, 
whatever its precise form, and even if imperfect, is 
worthy of urgent effort by the leaders of Pakistan. 
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APPENDIX A' 
SELECT LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED 
Of those interviewed, thirty-five individuals did not wish 
their names to be mentioned. These included eight senior military 
personnel, three industrialists, three student leaders, ten civil 
servants, three politicians, and eight trade union leaders. 
Aziz Ahmed - Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, 1972-77. 
Ahmed Waheed Akhtar - PPP Senator. 
Major General Rafi Alam - Divisional Commander, Armoured Corps. 
Raja Anwar - Student Leader, Rawalpindi. Later, Bhutto's Adviser (OSD) 
for student affairs in the P. M. Secretariat. 
Mahmud Babur - Trade Unionist, PPP activist in the Multan party organ- 
isation. 
Gutzar Bano - Senior Civil Servant. 
Iqbal Butt - Office-holder, Peoples Guards (Lahore). 
Ziauddin Butt - Trade Unionist, PPP activist; later a leader of the 
Lahore Mutahidda Mazdur Majlis-e-Amal. 
Lt. General Faiz Ali Chisti - Corp Commander, Pakistan Army. One of 
the ring leaders of the 1977 coup. 
Mian Muhammed Din, - President, Pattoki PPP. 
Chaudhury Zahur Elahi - Council Muslim League MNA from Gujarat. 
Altaf Gauhar - Former CSP. Editor Dawn (1972); later jailed by Bhutto. 
(Retd) General Habibullah Khan - Industrialist, one of the '22 families'. 
M. Habibullah Khan - Pro-PPP student leader from Peshawar. 
Air. Cmdr. Sajjad Haider - One of the accused in the alleged abortive 
coup of 1973. Later acquitted. 
Mehdi Hasan - Secretary General, Gujranwala District PPP. 
Mubashar Hasan - Founder-member PPP. Finance Minister 1972-74, Secretary 
General PPP, 1975-77. 
Pervez Hasan. - Lahore barrister, member of Tehriq-e-Istaqlal. 
Imtizuddin - PPP activist, Rawalpindi. 
Lt. General Iqbal - Deputy Chief, Pakistan Army, (at the time of the 1977 coup). 
Begum Naseem Jahan - Member PPP central committee, PPP MNA (elected on 
the quota of seats reserved for women. 
Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi - PPP chief minister, Sind. 
Dr. Abdul Khaliq - PPP MNA. Minister in successive Punjab provincial 
cabinets and central cabinet. 
Afzal Khan - Chairman FILEC, Board of Industrial Management. 
Ahmed Khan - Pro-PPP student leader, Peshawar. 
Amanullah Khan - Early PPP student activist, member PPP Punjab provin- 
cial committee. 
Asghar Khan - Leader, Tehriq-e-Istaglal. 
Malik Muzaffer Khan - Pro-PPP zamindar, former MPA. 
Raja Mubariz Khan - PPP MNA (elected 1975). 
Ghulam Mustafa Khar - Zamindar. Elected to the NA in 1962 and 1965. Early follower of Bhutto. First Secretary General of Punjab PPP. Governor of Punjab 1972-73,1975, and Chief Minister of Punjab 1973-74. 
Nasrullah Khan Khattak - PPP Chief Minister, NWFP. Yusuf Khattak - QML leader. Member of Bhutto's central cabinet 1973-76. Nasira Khokhar - Activist in women's PPP organisation, Rawalpindi. Rao Khurshid All - PPP MNA from Sahiwal. 
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Taj Mohammed Langah - Vice President Multan PPP. 
T. A. Tausif Lodhi - Corporate Executive in the private sector, member 
Economic Advisory Council 1973-77. 
Ali Mahmud - PPP leader, Karachi. 
Fariduddin Masud - PPP campaign (1977) organiser, Bahawalpur. 
Maulana A. A. Maudoodi - Founder and Amir, Jamaat-e-Islaami. Died in 
1978. 
Khurshid Hasan Meer - Founder-member Rawalpindi PPP. Deputy Secretary 
General, Minister in Bhutto's central cabinet. 
Aniz Mirza - Journalist, columnist for Dawn. 
Malik Fateh Muhammed - Press secretary toanif Ramay, PPP chief 
minister (Punjab). 
Major General Mujeeb - Minister of Information in the Zia government. 
Maulana Kauser Niazi - Formerly of the Jamaat-e-Islaami. Joined PPP 
in 1970, appointed PPP central secretary for information. 
Elected to the NA from Sialkot, served as Minister for 
Information and Broadcasting and Religious Affairs in the 
central cabinet. 
M. Jahangir Pervez - Early PPP activist, lhter PPP 14NA (elected in 
1974). 
Dr. Altaf H. Qureishi - Journalist with Zindagi. 
Mukhtar Rana - Radical leftist PPP labour organiser. MNA from Lyallpur. 
Later jailed by Bhutto. 
Ghaus Baksh Raisani. - PPP chief minister, Baluchistan. 
Mir Rehmatullah - PPP activist, Lahore. 
Sheikh M. Riaz - PPP MNA from Sahiwal. 
Col. Siddiq Salik - Writer, Public Relations Officer to the CMLA (Zia). 
Ras Abdus Sattar - Secretary General of Sahiwal district PPP. 
Malik Suleiman - PPP MNA from Sialkot. Later expelled from the party. 
A. R. Tahir - PPP student activist. 
Salmaan Taseer - Writer of Bhutto's biography. Presently PPP activist 
in-Lahore. 
Mian Tufail Mohammed - Leader, Jamaat-e-Islaami. 
Khan Abdul Wali Khan - President, National Awami Party. Leader of the 
Opposition in the NA until his jailing by the Bhutto regime in 
1975. 
Begum Nasim Wali Khan - Leader of the National Democratic Party, one of 
the constituent elements of the Pakistan National Alliance. 
Brig. Zafar - Military Secretary to Zia ul Iraq. Died in 1980. 
S. M. Zafar - Law Minister in Ayub Khan's government. Later Joined 
the Muslim League. 
Mian Javed Zeeshan. - Student leader in Muslim Students Federation. 
Pro-Bhutto. 
(Retd) Air Marshall Zulfikar Ali - Former Chief of Staff, Pakistan Air Force. Later a member of the Military Command Council under Zia. 
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APPENDIX 6 
POLITICAL PARTIES IN PAKISTAN - 1968/69 
1. PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE (CONVENTION) - Ayub's Ruling Party 
2. PAKISTAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT (PDM): Opposition Coalition formed 
in Dacca on ay ,w 
ch consisted of: 
(a) Council Muslim League - President: Mian Mumtaz Daultana. A 
faction of the Muslim League that had gone 
into opposition 
after the revival of political parties in 1962. Punjabi, 
feudal support. 
(b) Jamaat-e-Islaami - Amir: Maulana Maudoodi. Religious, con- 
servative vehemently anti-socialist. Largely urban support. 
(c) Nizam-e-Islam - President: Chaudhri Mohammed All (Former 
Prime Minister) Small, primarily urban party. Liberal, 
Islamic. 
(d) National Democratic Front - President: Nurul Amin. The party grew 
out. - of-the wams League split and the old Krishak Saramik. 
East Pakistani party. 
(e) Awami League (Ndsrullah Group) - President: Nawabzada Nasrullah 
an. Support confined to Punjab in West Pakistan. Liberal, 
moderate party. 
The PDM Programme was based on Eight Points: 
(i) Federal, parliamentary form of government, based on direct adult 
franchise.. 
(ii) Federal subjects to include defence, foreign affairs, currency 
and trade. 
(iii) Full regional autonomy. 
(iv) Removal of economic disparity between the two wings within ten 
years. 
(v) Currency, foreign exchange, foreign trade and inter-wing commun- 
ication to be managed by a Board composed of equal members from 
both wings. 
(vi) Parity in all central services. 
(vii) Parity in the military services. 
(viii) Parliamentary N. A. after election should incorporate clauses 
2-7 of the 1956 constitution. 
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DEMOCRATIC ACTION COMMITTEE (DAC) 
Opposition coalition formed in Dacca on 8 January 1969. Its 
constituent elements included the five parties of the Pakistan 
Democratic Movement, and in addition, the following three parties: 
(a) Awami League - President: Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Secular, 
as Pakistanis nationalist party, subscribed to the famous 
'6 Points'. These were (i) a federal parliamentary government 
for the country; (ii) transfer of all subjects except defence 
and foreign affairs to the provinces; (iii) separate but con- 
vertible currencies for each wing; (iv) all taxing power in the 
provinces which would make grants to the central government to 
fund its operations; (v) separate accounting of foreign ex- 
change earnings for each wing and (vi) a separate militia for 
East Bengal. 
(b) National Awami Party - (Wali Group) President - Abdul Wali 
K an. Pro-Moscow faction of NAP that had split from the pro- 
Peking group in October 1967. Secular, socialist party, 
incorporating the 'old guard' Left in West Pakistan. Its 
support was mainly confined to the NWFP and Baluchistan, where 
it was also a champion of provincial autonomy. 
(c) Jamait-e-Ulema-e-Islam - President: Maulana Mufti Mahmud. 
Islamic party that traces its roots to the Deoband School and 
the Majlis-i-Ahrar. "Progressive", Ulema party, enjoying 
support primarily in the NWFP and Baluchistan. 
DAC adopted the PDrI's 8 Point programme. 
3. NATIONAL AWAMI PARTY (BHASHANI GROUP) 
President: Maulana Bhashani. Pro-Peking faction of NAP. Largely 
East Pakistani party, enjoying worker and peasant support. Some 
support among 'leftist' groups in the Western wing. Revolutionary, 
socialist party of the Far Left. 
4. PAKISTAN PEOPLES PARTY 
Chairman: Bhutto. 
5. MAZDOOR-KISAN PARTY 
Chairman: Afzal Bangash. Formerly called NAP 
Small, progressive, radical socialist party, 
links in Karachi, and peasant support in the 
in the Punjab. 
6. JAMIAT-E-ULEMA-E-PAKISTAN 
(Mazdoor-Kisan Group). 
enjoying trade union 
NWFP. Some student support 
President: Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani. Sunni, conservative Ulema 
party; support base mainly in southern part of West Pakistan - 
some following in the Punjab. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASGHAR KHAN'S LETTER TO THE CHIEFS OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES 
APRIL, 1977 
ý// ." ý'1. " t. ý""i; 'i, r. 
1{i 1. aýý"4.. ýaý"r ii".;: it"3r"ý. .; ý 
!` '' "`' I Km nrtdreeslna thIti i rrngt to the Ciýlctri nl Stnfl'nnsi th4; '(Nf lean' rºf Mo. " Defence Services of 1'okietan. ,. 
ýýs 
Yx . "ý ' 
It to your duty to d: ifend thö'torritörtal integrity öf. Pnkirtahtnncl to obey 
all lawful commands of superior officers plifced over you.. To clitfcicntiiºte Set v .1nn 
'lawful' and an 'unlawful' command Is the duty of -every officer. Every'bne'of you must 
ask yourself Whether what the army is doing today In ' lawful' activity and if your cor cienre 
tells you that'-it Is not and ycu still carry it out, you would appear to lacl; rnorltl fibre and 
would bo guilty of n grave crime ngninat your country and your people. 
... "'.... ' ",. "1"t" 
,. WV-'i"S. _ .ý 
` You should by nova have realised that militciry' action in Ertct 1'nklntnn was 
a conspiracy in which the present Prime Minister played a Afachiovillian role. You know 
the circumstancea in which military action in Da'. uchistan was engineered and how completely 
unnecessary this action has been. You are'also probably aware Of the utlorly unnecessary 
military action taken list year in DIR In the North West Frontier Province. If you have nnv 
Iiite et äü t izt nül xftairaý'you iliust uiso li is%yito tlºuL ý1utln tli ci cle: cili, ii i: umlrli1 n the 
nation expressed its powerful"disapprovat-of the present regime. Following the people's 
rejection of the Government, you should have been aurpirsed at the election results In which 
the 'Pakistan National Alliance' which could muster such overwhelming popular support, 
could only got 8 out of 110 seats, in the Punjab.; You must surely know that many people wore 
not even allowed to file their nomination papers. Was It not too much of a co-incidence that 
"' no papers could bo filed against the Prime MtriisWr and all the Chief Mtnintore of the four 
provinces ? 'That those who dared to try,. cndc4 tip in opond. ag it few nights in l'olico custorty ? 
One. of 
. 
born hh. s aä1.1 not been traced. ,'. º"" 1 ý. 
, Those of on who were on turn tä1 CO 
:., c. r 'du" ,. ';. .. e oy nnected %%ith duties In connection 
Frith 7th Iºtareh. election would also know öf"tto blatant manner in which rI tag took pine(-; 
Of thehundreds of thousand3 of ballot paporo-of P. N. A. candidates that had been taken out 
of ballot bakes and wore found In the strcutv'nnd fiolde of Pakistan following the election on 
7th hiaich. You would also lnvoacen the deserted polling stations on 10th March, the clay of 
the provincial polls, following the call for boycott, of Provincial elections by the P. N. A. 
Nevertheless Governmont media announced that an tmprcccdonted number of votes had also 
been polled at the provincial election and the Percentngo was paid to bo more than al my. Ilion 
surely you must have followed the movement Which called for-bhu". to'o resil,; nation and re- 
elcctiong in the country. 
The corning out of women in thousands on t ho streets in every city and town 
with babies it) their arms wan a rieche that n3 onowi11 forget. Thono woro the women who 
Dl'utto claimed had voted for him. Tho movonmcnt proved within a few days that ho and hin 
government had been cömplatoly ro)octod by thocoplo" The death of hundreds of our youth 
rind the beating of our mothers and steter7iýn,, e, 'n'n"ecno th sway woll. havo stirred you to. 
shame and sorrow. have you over thou it crhý the pedplc gut themselves to co much trouble? 
Why must mothers come out to fuce bull(-; a With babies in their arms ? Why do parents allow 
their children to face roltco lathiri and bullets? Curoly it is only because they feel that they have been wronged - that they have been cheated.. That their basic right toh. lltF and FUU ' their rulers has been (14niod them. They undorstood, when wo told them the truth that the Constitution which you its officers at tho Defence i ozvicoa are sworn to defend had been viola- ted. Article, 218(3) of the Conrltituttoa of tho 'Islamic Republic of Pal. "intnn' say' : "itsh; 111 be the duty of the 11ectton Co, tuniooion constituted in relation to an election to organize and 
-ý- 
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ecnduct the elaction and to make euch arrangements as are necessary to ensure thnt t'ie 
election Is conducted honestly, Justly, fairly and in accordance with law; and that corrupt' 
practices are guarded against. 
This,, my friend, was not n just and fair election. Bhutto has vlolnted the 
Constitution and is guilty of a gra'o crime vLgtL! net the people. It In not your duty to support 
his illegal regime nor can you be called upon to kill yourown people no that he can continue 
a little longer in office. Lot it not be said that the Pakistan armed forces are a degenerate 
Police Force fit only for killing unarmed civilians. ' flow cl se can you explainthe shooting 
of a spirited lad whoso only fault was to show the ' V' sign to the army in Lahore the other 
" day: The spirit of adventure; of 
dcflancerather than servility needs to be encouraged in. 
our youth and this unfortunafo incident to-'a blot on the name of the army which would be ' 
difficult to wipe out. ' Similarly, shooting by the army in Karachi on an unartnecl crowd in 
unpardonable. Didn't you. rcaliso that the poor. and hungry people of Pakistan, throughout 
the 30 troubled years of our history, had shown only love and affection for our armed forces. 
That they wept when you Wd down arms in rast Pakistan; that they have always prayed for 
". ` your glory and have literally starved themselves and their children no that you are well 
fed and our Generals and Senior Officers can live a life that even their Flritish and imeri- 
can counter-parts would not dream of. It pains me to say tint, that love is now gone. Pray 
"= a" do not let it tarn to hate. For should that happen., a tragedy would huvo occurred in the 
history of this natien crhI h wo in our life-ti ., le may not be able to undo. ' " 
An men o: honour it in your responsibility todo your duty and the call of duty 
in these trying circumntc ices 13 not'the blind obedience of unlawful cömmnn, ls. There comes 
.a time in the 
liven of nations when each ma4 has to aalt hiira elf whether he in'doing thv' righ t 
thing. For you that time has come., Avower this call honestly and save PPaktntnn, (od 1' o 
lr"ith you. 
": ,'M. AEGHAR KIIAN 
"".,, '''F. 
"' (Aar-l Iar dhal-ßtd. ) 
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